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One of the most comprehensive management tools ever 
devised in the public sector is the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System (PPBS). PPBS was first introduced in the 
Department of Defense (DOD) in 196I by Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
made the system mandatory for all agencies of the Federal 
Government.
The study of the managerial practices and systems of 
the Federal Government is particularly appropriate at this 
time. The rapid expansion of government activities is well 
recognized. In 1900 the Federal Government spent only $'521 
million. By 1940 the government’s expenditures had increased 
to $9 billion, and by I967 to almost $126 billion.^ As the 
Federal Government consumes more of the resources of this 
nation, its management tools should be subjected to increasing 
scrutiny. Since the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System 
represents one of the major management tools of governmental 
agencies, it should come under this scrutiny.
pp. 242-44.
Ipercival Flack Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget.
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Purpose of This Study
The objective of this study is to evaluate current 
managerial training efforts in the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System in the Federal Government. To accomplish 
this purpose, two distinct sub-tasks were involved; a 
conceptual model^ of managerial training had to be built; 
a survey of current training/educational programs had to be 
conducted; and these programs had to be compared to the 
model.
This type of study differs markedly from the current 
major works on PPBS. These studies can generally be divided 
in two categories. First, there are books which concentrate 
on the weaknesses of traditional budgetary practices and 
propose, in broad general terms, a PPBS-type system. Two 
major books of this type are Frederick C. Mosher’s Program 
Budgeting: Theory and Practice (1954) and Arthur Smithies’
The Budgetary Process in the United States (1955). These 
books are primarily concerned with the political budgetary 
process.
Other studies may be considered general descriptive 
literature about PPBS. Four major works exist in this 
classification. Program' Budgeting, edited by David Novick 
in 1965, advocates the use of the DOD’s PPBS by the non­
defense sectors of the Federal Government. Program Budgeting
^The term ’’model" in this study is used in a descrip­
tive rather than an analytic form.
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and Benefit-Cost Analysis. edited by Harley H. Hinrichs 
and Graeme M, Taylor in 1969» is a collection of progress 
reports of the first three years of operation of a total
1Federal Government PPBS. Planning, Programming, Budgeting!
A' Systems Approach to Management, edited in 1968 by Fremont 
J. Lyden and Ernest G, Miller, is a collection of descrip­
tive articles about PPBS, These three books are advocatory 
descriptions of the system. The Planning-Programming- 
Bud'geting Approach to Government Decision-Making by Harold 
A. Hovey (1968) is a descriptive evaluation of PPBS from an 
opposing view.
In addition to these major works there are a large 
number of books and articles which discuss specific aspects 
of PPBS. Most of these are limited to one part of PPBS or 
to one benefit (or limitation) of the system.
The institution of a major system change such as the 
.use of PPBS in the Federal Government has a major impact at 
the managerial level. The managerial group is expected to 
participate in the design of the system; they are required 
to implement it; and they use it as a managerial tool. The 
determination of what training is necessary before these 
managerial responsibilities can be met and the assessment of 
the success of this training is an essential undertaking if 
PPBS is to ever achieve its potential.
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• Methodology of Study 
Conceptual Model of Training 
The development of a conceptual model of managerial 
training on the Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System may be 
classified as basic research. The objective of this research 
Is to establish a hypothesis which can then be tested.
The objective of any form of training Is to effect a 
change In behavior. Before establishing an effective 
training program, two determinations must be made. These 
are the present behavior of the potential trainees and the 
desired behavior of the potential trainees, and both can be 
Inferred from the potential state and present state of PPBS, 
There have been many articles and books written about 
the theoretical state of an "Ideal" Plannlng-Programmlng- 
Budgetlng System, On the other hand, the current state of 
PPBS In the Federal Government has been well documented by 
other writers and by investigations and reports of the General 
Accounting Office and Congressional Committees, Because of 
this available data, field research In these areas would be 
duplicative and was not required.
After the Identification of necessary managerial be­
havior changes, the development of the conceptual training 
model required the synthesis of two defined bodies of know­
ledge —  the PPBS and the training concepts. It was necessary 
to define the specific changes In attitude, knowledge, and 
skills that would be required before managers could be
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expected to perform the three management functions con­
nected with PPBS —  the planning or design of the system, 
the implementation of the system, and the daily use of the 
system.
Prom the literature available on PPBS, the require­
ments for design and use of PPBS could be defined. Imple­
mentation of PPBS, however, is largely ignored in current 
literature. Since implementation requires an organiza­
tional behavior change, requirements in this area were de­
veloped by a synthesis of the bodies of knowledge of PPBS 
and planned change of organizations.
A complete program of training was not developed in 
this model. The choice of types of presentation —  lecture, 
structured discussion, case study, problem laboratory, etc. —  
depends on several factors, including the qualifications of 
the individual instructor. Therefore, a general model in­
cluding details commonly associated with a complete training 
plan is not feasible. The model concentrates on specific 
objectives of training that should be covered. It is not a 
trainer's handbook for a managerial PPBS course but a skele­
ton model for purposes of evaluation of current training 
programs.
Evaluation of Current Educational/
Training Programs
With the model completed, the current training programs 
had to be compared to the model. This sub-task involved two 
steps. These were data-gathering and analysis and evaluation.
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During the data-gathering phase, the institutions 
which teach PPBS in the Federal Government had to be identi­
fied. These institutions were divided into two broâd 
classifications —  those whose purpose is training and those 
whose purpose is education. Under the second classifica­
tion universities which have courses that concern PPBS as 
a part of their curriculum were identified by a review of 
their bulletins. Institutions which offer short training 
courses in PPBS were identified by two means. First, the 
catalogs of specific institutions such as the armed services 
professional schools were reviewed. Second, agencies di­
rectly involved in PPBS training, specifically the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Civil Service Commission, 
were contacted to identify specific courses appropriate to 
this survey.
Next, it was necessary to gather enough data to com­
pare the training offered to the conceptual model. A basic 
questionnaire was sent to each of the appropriate institu­
tions .
After the data was gathered, analysis and evaluation 
was possible. Some data was amenable to objective evalua­
tion —  e.g., the number of hours of education/training on 
PPBS. However, much of the analysis and evaluation was 
subjective in nature.
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study was bounded by four main factors; the 
target of the training, the number of organizations using a 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, the institutions 
surveyed, and the limitations of the questionnaire data- 
gathering technique.
Training Target 
This study was designed to identify the training 
needs of a specific classification of individuals involved 
in the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System —  the managers 
in the public sector. Obviously this is only one class of 
individuals concerned with this system. Other classifica­
tions would include those technicians who perform the 
technical operation of PPBS (such as the comptrollers who 
deal directly with the budget and the systems analysts who 
perform analytical tasks involved in PPBS). Since govern­
mental budgeting is a major part of the political process, 
political scientists are also concerned with the study of 
PPBS. This study is not directed toward the needs of these 
classifications since their training needs may be different 
from those of the managerial group.
One result of this limitation concerns the summary 
conclusion about PPBS training efforts. While these efforts 
may be considered inadequate from the point of view of the 
manager's needs, this does not necessarily imply that they 
are inadequate to meet the needs of one of the other groups
concerned with PPBS.
Organizations Using PPBS 
PPBS has been implemented by most of the agencies of 
the Federal Government. In addition, several states, 
counties, cities, and other nonfederal agencies have imple­
mented PPBS. This study is concerned totally with the 
training needs of managers in the Federal Government. The 
efforts of the states and local governments were considered 
only as they gave increased knowledge of the managerial 
tasks required by PPBS in the Federal Government.
Institutions Surveyed 
Short governmental training courses were easily iden­
tifiable. Educational courses were listed in various places 
in the bulletins of different schools. Applicable courses 
were primarily located in Political Science, Public Admin­
istration, Economics, Management, and Accounting depart­
ments.
It is possible that this method of screening over­
looked some appropriate courses because of the vagueness of 
descriptions in university bulletins; there may have been 
new courses that were not included in the bulletins; and the 
PPBS concept may have been a significant part of the course 
offerings of a department not listed above. However, the 
screening should have ensured that the majority of appropriate 
institutions were contacted.
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Limitations of Questionnaires 
The use of questionnaires as a data-gathering device 
has two basic limitations. First, a sufficient percentage 
of the population surveyed must return the completed ques­
tionnaires. In order to ensure as high a percentage of 
returns as possible, the following procedures were used:
1. The surveys were addressed to the individual department 
involved, e.g., the Political Science Department or the 
Management Department, and not just to the university in 
general. If more than one department was involved at a 
single university, separate requests were sent to each.
2. Courses that appeared appropriate to the survey were 
identified by number and name. In addition, the department 
was asked to identify any other courses applicable to the 
survey.
3. Each questionnaire was accompanied by a personal letter.
4. A stamped return envelope was provided.
5. The questionnaire was designed to require a minimum 
amount of time and effort to complete.
The second limitation inherent in the use of a ques­
tionnaire for data-gathering is the possible ambiguity of 
communications in the questions asked and the replies re­
ceived. An explanation sheet was sent with each survey 
questionnaire, giving a complete explanation of the type of 
information desired. It was also possible to adapt the 
covering letter to the specific circumstances of the institu­
tion involved.
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Organization of Study 
This study Is divided Into three major sections: 
Description of the Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System, 
the Conceptual Training Model, and Current Training and 
Recommendations.
Part I: Description of PPBS 
This part of the study sets the basis for develop­
ment of specific behavior changes requiring managerial 
training to be presented In Part III. There will be a 
description of the "Idealized" Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng 
System as presented by Its advocates, as well as a historical 
summary of PPBS, The conceptual description of PPBS and Its 
historical development are important not only as a basis for 
developing the training model, but certain aspects of these 
subjects will necessarily be a part of the training model. 
Much of the Information required In the model will be brought 
together from the diverse and fragmentary sources on PPBS. 
Finally, there will be a view of the state of PPBS as Imple­
mented In various governmental activities.
Part II; Conceptual Training Model 
The conceptual model to be used as a base line for 
evaluation of current managerial tralnlng/educatlonal efforts 
Is developed In this part. A general training model Is at 
first presented and then expanded In more detail.
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Part III : Current Training and Recommendations
The findings of the questionnaire survey and over-all 
conclusions and recommendations for future action or study 
will be presented in this part.
PART I
DESCRIPTION OP THE PLANNING-PROGRAMMING- 
BUDGETING SYSTEM
CHAPTER I
DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANNING-PROGRAMMING- 
BUDGETING SYSTEM
PPBS Philosophy 
Premises of PPBS 
The philosophy that underlies PPBS Is based on two 
premises :
1. Policy and budgets are inseparable. The budget Is a 
concrete plan of action that translates goals Into reality. 
The relationship between policy achievements and budgetary 
actions should be explicit.^
2. Decisions made during the budgetary process Implicitly 
determine the allocation of limited resources to achieve 
policy objectives. The government should weigh the desira­
bility of spending money for a specific program against the 
desirability of spending the money In some other program or
of lowering taxes. The same general criteria should be used
2to eliminate obsolete programs.
^B. D. Bradley, Some' Views on Program Budgeting, p. 1,
^Charles L. Schultze, "The Federal Budget: The Need
for Choice." Business Horizons. IX (Summer, 1966), 10.
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Characteristics and Components of a PPBS System 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System is charac­
terized by three attributes. These are:
1. It is output oriented. Explicit identification of the 
objectives and goals of governmental programs is desired.
The emphasis is placed on accomplishments of programs, as 
described by outputs, rather than on traditional input 
items. This output orientation is reflected in the struc­
turing of expenditures by mission/objectives and in relating 
these inputs to specific program outputs.^
2. It is future oriented. The PPBS concept calls for 
explicit identification of the future-year implications of 
budgetary and policy decisions.  ̂ This future orientation is 
reflected in the primary use of PPBS —  strategic planning.3
3. It is analytically oriented. Systematic analysis to 
identify objectives, to determine alternative ways of 
carrying out these objectives, and to estimate the cost and 
expected results of each is a major part of PPBS. This 
analysis must then be integrated into the budgetary/policy­
making process.^
^Harry J. Hartley, Educational Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting : A Systems Approach, p.
^Joseph H. Murphy, "The Quiet Revolution in Govern­




^Murphy, "Quiet Revolution," p. 7.
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Each of these major characteristics is reflected in 
the major components of PPBS, The output orientation is 
seen in the program structure; the future-year orientation 
in the multi-year program and financial plan; and the 
analytical orientation in the systems analysis and system of 
integration of other components.
Program Structure
The first component, program structure, relates the
output oriented programs of the government to the specific
resources required to implement these programs, in terms of
budget dollars required,^ The following terms are used in
describing the program structure:
The program structure is: A set of program cate­
gories, program subcategories, and program elements. 
Usually the term has reference to a single agency,
A program category is : A classification within a
program structure which groups programs which have the 
same or similar objectives,
A program subcategory is: A subdivision of a pro­
gram category. It combines agency programs or activities 
on the basis of narrow objectives within the broader 
objectives of the program category,
A program element is : A subdivision of a program
category (or subcategory) which comprises the specific 
products that contribute to an agency's objective(s),2
To illustrate these definitions a portion of the program
structure for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
^Hartley, Educational Planning-Programming-Budgeting.
p. 76,
^u. S., General Accounting Office, Glossary for 
Systems toalysis and Planning-Programming-Budgeting, (1969), 
pp. 52-53.
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Is shown in Table 1,^
The program categories reflect the major missions 
(or goals) of the agency. These are determined by looking 
outside the agency in question at the service that should 
be provided,2 This idea of program structuring implies that 
the organization should generate services that meet the 
current needs of its "clients" rather than having its 
"clients" accepo services that have historically been pro­
vided.^ The program subcategories are a refinement of the 
objectives stated in the program categories.
Program elements constitute the basic building block 
of the program structure. The program element is a single 
activity or a group of activities with the following charac­
teristics :
(1) They should produce clearly definable products, 
which are quantified wherever possible; (2) wherever 
feasible, the output of a program element should be an 
agency end product —  not an intermediate product that 
supports another element; and (3) the inputs of a 
program element should vary with changes in the level 
of output, but not necessarily proportionally.^
^The program structures including all program cate­
gories and subcategories for the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare and two other government agencies are 
shown in Appendix A-1.
^James E. Webb, Space Age Management, p. 75.
^California, State Personnel Board, Program Budgeting 
in California; A Critical Comment, by Len Silvey, (April, 
1970), p. 9.
iiU. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Planning, Prograimning. Budgeting (PPB) System. 
BOB Bulletin ko. 6B-§, (April 12, 19b«), p. 3.
TABLE 1





Development of basic skills 
Development of vocational and 
occupational skills
Program Elements
Improving the education of 
the general population 
Improving the education of 
the economically and 
socially disadvantaged 
Improving the education of 
the physically and 
mentally handicapped
Development of academic and 
professional skills 
Library and community 
development 




Social and rehabilitation 
services 
Income maintenance 
Executive direction and 
management (Office of 
the Secretary)
Source: Jack W. Carlson, "The Status and Next Steps for Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting," in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB
System, ed. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. II, 1969, 
pp. 746 and 655.
00
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Program elements do not necessarily correspond to 
the organizational structure of the agency. It is likely 
that more than one organizational unit contributes to a 
single program element and that a single organizational unit 
performs functions that apply to more than one program 
element.1
Program elements also do not directly correspond to 
the traditional appropriation categories. For example, in 
the program element, "Improving the education of the general 
population," which is shown in Table 1, the following appro­
priation categories supply funds :
Expansion and improvement of vocational education;
Grants to states
Innovative occupational programs
Vocational and technical education construction
Higher educational activities:
Undergraduate equipment 
Strengthening developing institutions 
NDEA student loans 
Guaranteed loans 
College work study 
Facilities construction
Research and development^
These appropriations can also supply funds for other program 
elements.
llbid.
2jack W. Carlson, "The Status and Next Steps for 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting," The Analysis and 
Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System. U. S.,
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. II, 19&9, p. 655.
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This lack of congruence of appropriation categories 
and program elements creates a need for a "crosswalk" which 
translates dollar requirements for program elements into the 
traditional appropriation categories. This crosswalk im­
poses a heavy data-processing work-load which can be handled 
only by the use of automatic data-processing equipment.^
Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan
The second major component of the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System is the multi-year program and 
financial document. This document is called the Program and 
Financial Plan (PPP) in the Federal Government, and it pro-
Pjects financial and program data for a period of five years. 
Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No. 68-9 states:
The PFP is a comprehensive multi-year summary of 
agency programs in terms of their outputs, costs. and 
financing needs over a planning period covering the 
budget year and 4 future years if this is appropriate 
to agency programs. . . . the PFP is the basic planning 
document of the agency PPB System.3
^The magnitude of this data-processing task becomes 
evident when one considers that the Department of Defense 
alone has nearly 1,000 separate program elements in its 9 
major program categories and over 500 separate appropriation 
accounts. A crosswalk matrix would then have a size of 
1000 by 500. (Committee for National Objectives. Budgeting 
for Economic Development. (January, 1966), p. 35.)
p The Department of Defense projects program data 
(number of aircraft wings, etc.) for a period of eight years 
and cost data for a period of five years. The majority of 
other agencies in the Federal Government project both finan­
cial and program data for five years.
3u. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Planning. Programming. Budgeting (PPB) System.
BOB Bulletin No. ba-9, (April 12, 1968), p. 2. (italics added)
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The PPP expresses the outputs^ and costs for each 
program element In the program structure and aggregates 
these projections into program subcategories and categories. 
Financing needs are projected by the traditional budget 
appropriation categories.
The level of programs projected originally was that 
which the agencies felt would be required in the future.
This was changed by Bureau of the Budget (BOB) Bulletin 68-9; 
future-year projections now include only those where the 
government is "committed by law or contract" or those that 
are "logically or morally compelled by past decisions.
The basic purpose of the PFP with these guidelines is to 
identify the future consequences of current budgetary deci­
sions.3
The fact that expenses are projected for a period of 
five years does not imply that more than single-year appro­
priations are involved. Also, the projection of cost does 
not involve a firm commitment since circumstances may change 
so that "logical or moral" commitments should be canceled;
^Outputs are only included when a quantitative measure 
(or measures) of benefit have been defined for the program 
element, subcategory or category,
p The phrase "logically or morally committed" is one 
that is especially ambiguous. A summary of the classifi­
cation scheme used to minimize this ambiguity is contained 
in Appendix A-2.
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
I T r W T p .  619.
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even contract or legal commitments can be changed. The 
purpose of the projection Is to Improve planning —  not to 
prematurely and Irrevocably commit the government to a 
course of action.^
Systems Analysis 
The third component of the Plannlng-Programmlng- 
Budgetlng System Is systems analysis. While the program 
structure and the multi-year financial and program plan are 
the two central documents In PPBS, the use of systems 
analysis Is the "heart" of the system.
Definition of Systems Analysis 
The words "systems analysis" are particularly pres- 
teglous and are used by many writers In a casual manner.
In a narrow context, systems analysis means a " . . . part 
of the family of analytical techniques known as simulation. 
The users of the term In this context generally view systems 
analysis as a collection of techniques that are solely 
quantitative In nature. As such, the applicability of 
systems analysis to problems In the government sector Is 
severely.limited.
Charles L. Schultze, "Why Benefit-Cost Analysis," 
Program' Bud'getin'g' ahd Bbriefl't-Co'sf AhaTysls. ed. by Harley 
k. Hinrlch-S and Graeme M. ïaylor, pp. 3-5.
^Helen 0. Nlchol, "Guaranteed Income Maintenance:
A Public Welfare Systems Model."' Planning.' Programming. 
B'ud'ge'flh'g':'• A S'srs'feWs' Apprb'a'ch''fo'lia'na'gieMent. ed. fay Fremont 
J. Lyden and'Ernest G. Miller, pp. 315-l6.
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In a broader context, systems analysis may be described 
as " . . . a way of looking at p r o b l e m s . A s  such, systems 
analysis does not depend on specific techniques. Many 
analytical techniques are useful, but not as alternatives to 
the use of good judgment. Systems analysis has also been 
called any systematic approach to the evaluation of cost, 
effectiveness, and risks of alternatives.^
One formal definition of systems analysis used In 
the Federal Government's PPBS effort Is;
Systems analysis may be viewed as the search for 
and evaluation of alternatives which are relevant to 
defined objectives, based on judgement and, wherever 
useful, on quantitative methods, with the objective of 
presenting such evaluations to decision-makers for their 
consideration. It emphasizes the system concept under 
which, any course of action designed to achieve an ob­
jective is viewed as a system requiring Inputs and pro­
ducing outputs. The Inputs and outputs Involved may 
take on any of a large variety of forms. In this sense, 
systems analysis encompasses both cost-beneflt and cost- 
effectlveness analyses as well as other types of analysis 
which may be more limited In scope.’
Another, and possibly more operational, definition 
of systems analysis because of Its stress on definition of 
alternatives was noted by E. S. Quade Cone of the early 
pioneers In the use of systems analysis for military prob­
lems) as:
^Charles J. Hitch, "The Case for Cost-Effectlveness 
Analysis," Defense, Science, and Public Policy, ed. by Edwin 
Mansfield, p. ü6.
^E. S. Quade, Pitfalls In Systems Analysis, pp. 1-2.
3u. S., General Accounting Office.' Glossary. p. 67.
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, . . inquiry to aid a decisionmaker choose a course 
of action by systematically investigating his proper 
objectives, comparing quantitatively where possible 
the costs, effectiveness, and risks associated with the 
alternative policies or strategies for achieving them, 
and formulating additional alternatives if those 
examined are found wanting.! "
Systems Analysis —  Provider of 
Solutions or Information?
Systems analysis required for most governmental PPBS 
applications is still largely a form of art. As E. S. Quade 
noted ;
in systems analysis we have to do some things we 
think are right but that are not verifiable, that we 
cannot really Justify, and that are never checked in 
the output of work. Also, we must accept as inputs 
many relatively intangible factors derived from human 
Judgement, and we must present answers to be used as a 
basis for other Judgements, Whenever possible this 
Judgement is supplemented by inductive and numerical 
reasoning but it is only Judgement nonetheless,2
Because of the high content of Judgment involved in 
the application of systems analysis, it cannot be expected 
to determine an "optimum" solution. The purpose of systems 
analysis is to structure and define the problem and present 
to the decision-maker an appropriate set of alternatives 
in a summary which is as accurate, complete, and meaningful 
as possible,3 In other words;
^E, S, Quade, "Introduction," Analysis for Military
Decisions. ed, by E, S. Quade, p. 4,
^E, S, Quade, The Limitations of a Cost-Effectiveness
Approach to Military Decision-Making, pp, 7-5.
^Alain C, Enthoven, "Systems Analysis and the Navy,"
A Modern Design for Defense Decisions, ed, by Samuel A, 
Tucker, p. 161,
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. . . the function of analysis is not to automate 
decisionmaking but rather to present a greater stock 
of information in usable form to assist a decision­
maker in the selection of wiser or more rational 
courses of action.^
Systems Analysis Compared to 
Operations Research^
Since systems analysis evolved from World War II 
experience with operations research (OR), it is not sur­
prising that the two disciplines are very similar. Since 
World War II, OR has become a discipline noted for its 
development of mathematical techniques (linear programming, 
dynamic programming, queuing theory, etc.) and for its 
ability to find new applications for these techniques.3
In most PPBS writings a distinction is drawn between 
OR and systems analysis by the types of problems upon which 
each operates. If problems could be viewed in a spectrum, 
operations research would operate on the end where : criterion
are obvious and well defined; relatively few variables enter 
the system; interaction with other systems is a minimum; 
a minimum of technological and environmental uncertainty
^William E. Hoehn, Economic Analysis in Governmental 
Deci'sTonmaking. p. 1.
^Other terms are used in the PPBS literature as 
synonyms of systems analysis. The most prominent of these 
are economic analysis and program analysis. Some authors do 
not distinguish between operations research and systems 
analysis. In order to achieve a consistent terminology, 
systems analysis will be used in the broad context in lieu 
of the other terms and operations research will be consi­
dered only in the more restricted sense.
^Quade, "Introduction," Analysis for Military Deci­
sions , ed. by Quade, pp. 6-7.
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exists; quantitative factors dominate the problem; emphasis 
is placed on the application of techniques; and an optimal 
solution is desired. By contrast, systems analysis operates 
on the other end of the spectrum, where; choice of objec­
tives is a major part of the analysis; the long-range nature 
of the problem makes most of the factors of the system 
variable; a high degree of interaction with other systems 
exists; environmental and technological uncertainty exists 
to a high degree; qualitative factors often dominate the 
problem; emphasis is placed on problem search and defini­
tion; and better and more usable .Information for the decision­
maker Is desired.Ï
As one might expect, the ends of the spectrum are 
better defined than Its center. However, since most of the 
problems that are Involved In budgetary allocation deci­
sions belong to the more Ill-defined class of problems, the 
term "systems analysis" In connection with most PPBS efforts 
is appropriate.
Characteristics of Systems Analysis 
One way to better grasp the concept of systems analy­
sis is to note the characteristics that distinguish this 
method of studying a problem. These seven characteristics —  
the components of systems analysis; the unique process of 
systems analysis; the attempt to achieve the scientific
^Tbld.. p. 7.
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method by being open, explicit, and verifiable, by adopting 
the attitude of tentativeness and experimentalism, by 
treating quantitative factors quantitatively, by testing 
hypotheses by appropriate means, and by striving toward 
objectivity; the orientation of analysis toward marginal 
costs and effectiveness; the future orientation of analysis, 
including explicit treatment of time; the systemic nature 
of analysis; and the explicit recognition and consideration 
of uncertainty and risk —  distinguish systems analysis 
from other decision processes.
Systems analyses normally have six^ distinct com­
ponents: an objective or objectives to be achieved; one or
more measures of effectiveness; alternatives; costs or 
resources to be used; one or more models or abstractions of 
reality; and a criterion, or some other means of choosing one 
alternative over another.^
Another characteristic of the use of systems analysis 
is the process followed during the analysis itself. Analysis 
advances through five stages: formulation, search, explana­
tion, interpretation, and verification.
^Most authors (for example, E. S. Quade, Systems 
Analysis' Techniques' for •Plannlng-Programming-Budgetlng) list 
five components. Objectives and effectiveness are not 
normally separated. Because of the need to use proximate 
measures of effectiveness in most analyses the separation 
of these two is beneficial to understanding.
^The component parts of systems analysis are dis­
cussed in more detail in Appendix A-3.
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During 'forniulafl'on. Issues of concern are defined, 
objectives are clarified, appropriate measures of effec­
tives are defined, the problem is limited by appropriate 
assumptions, and criterion are formulated. It is common 
that the formulation stage is repeated because of informa­
tion received during some of the other stages. During 
search, data relative to the problem is determined. Alter­
natives as well as facts are the subject of the search, and 
relevant costs are determined. During explanation, the 
model which will explore the consequences of the alternatives 
is built. The relationships between inputs and outputs are 
explored and formulated. During interpretation, all of the 
factors not treated explicitly in the model must be consi­
dered —  nonquantifiable variables, factors omitted, un­
certainties, and contingencies. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn. The final step, verification, includes testing the 
conclusion by experiment. Often this step is impossible —  
for example, in many military force structure problems 
complete verification cannot be performed since it would 
involve a test war,^
Another characteristic of systems analysis is the 
attempt to adopt characteristics of the scientific method by 
being open, explicit, and verifiable,^ Because of the
^The process followed in systems analysis is dis­
cussed in more detail in Appendix A-4,
^Alain C, Enthoven, "The Systems Analysis Approach," 
'Fr'o'gr'a'm' Budgeting and Benefit-Cost' Analysis, ed, by Hinrichs 
and Taylor,p, 16Ô,
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nature of the problems with which systems analysis deals, 
this goal of scientific precision is not totally attainable. 
However, the attempt to make all assumptions. Judgments, 
calculations, and data so explicit that the results can be 
subjected to disagreements, checking, and criticisms is 
one of the major strengths of systems analysis.^
Another of the characteristics of science that 
systems analysis strives to achieve is that of "scientific 
attitude." This attitude is noted by its "hypothetical 
spirit" or respect for tentativeness and probable error of 
solutions and findings and by its "experimentalism" or 
willingness to subject findings to empirical tests and
experimentation.2
The art of systems analysis adopts one other aspect 
of the scientific method: it treats quantitative aspects 
in a quantitative manner. This is not to say that all aspects 
of decision problems can be quantified. In fact, most uses 
of systems analysis must be highly supplemented with quali­
tative reasoning,3 Still, one advantage of the use of 
systems analysis is the attempt to quantify as far as possi­
ble. This includes efforts to quantify data that was not 
quantifiable previously. Because of the precision which
^E. S. Quade, "Methods and Procedures," Analysis for 
Military Decisions, ed. by Quade, p. 150.
^Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations, pp. 47-48.
^Gene H. Fisher, The' World of Program Budgeting, 
pp. 12-13.
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quantitative data achieves, the quantification of every ele­
ment that can be quantified with any degree of accuracy 
eliminates one aspect of uncertainty.1
Another aspect of the scientific method adopted by 
systems analysis is the attempt to test each hypothesis by 
the appropriate method —  logical, experimental, or his­
torical, The appropriate method of testing depends on the 
nature of the problem and the circumstances surrounding 
this problem.2 To achieve this position of testing hypo­
theses by the appropriate method it is necessary to dis­
tinguish between questions of "fact" and "value." "Fact" 
can be subjected to the more rigorous tests associated with 
the scientific method. Questions of "value" must be left 
to the judgment of the decision-maker.
Finally, . systems analysis attempts to emulate the 
scientific method by being objective —  where the analysis 
itself does not depend on personalities or vested interests.3 
Because of the large element of judgment involved in the 
application of systems analysis, the objectivity of pure
^Quade, Limitations of Cost-Effectiveness Approach, 
pp. 4-5.
pAlain C. Enthoven, "Decision Theory and Systems 
Analysis," Readings in Command Management —  Analytical 
Methods, U. S., Department of Defense, Department of the 
Army, pp. 4-5 and 4-6.
^Alain C. Enthoven, "Choosing Strategies and Selecting 
Weapon Systems," Modern Design, ed. by Tucker, p. 139.
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science (where the absolute truth of propositions is 
established by logical and empirical means common to the 
whole profession) is an unachieved goal. Institutions and 
personalities play too large a role in the outcome of systems 
analysis for it ever to achieve total objectivity. The 
best that systems analysis can hope for is that the major 
biases are identified in the analytical effort itself.1 
While systems analysis is not able to attain its goal of 
objectivity, neither are any alternative methods of reaching 
a decision. In the words of E. S. Quade;
We have not and never may be able to make the systems 
approach a pure, [wholly] rational, coldly objective, 
scientific aid to decisionmaking —  only one far more 
so than its alternatives.2
Another of the major characteristics of systems 
analysis is that it works at the " m a r g i n . "3 The costs and 
effectiveness subjected to analysis are the total addi­
tional costs required and the additional level of effec­
tiveness achieved —  not the absolute total costs or abso­
lute total effectiveness of the problem.^
^E. S, Quade, Cost Effectiveness Analysis: An
Appr'e'cTatTon, p. 5.
^E. S. Quade," The Systems Approach and Public Policy.
p. 28.
2Alain C, Enthoven, "Economic Analysis in the Depart­
ment of Defense," Speech presented to the American Economic 
Association, Pittsburg, Pa., December 29, 1962.
^Por example, a proper question for system analysis 
is not whether the United States requires a missile capability 
to destroy 97 per cent of 100 strategic targets instead of
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Another characteristic of systems analysis is its 
orientation toward the future. This is one of the major 
complicating factors of problems requiring systems analy­
sis,^ The future orientation of the analysis also makes 
uncertainty in the problem more significant. Finally, the 
future orientation of analysis complicates the criterion 
selection since the time phasing of both effectiveness and 
costs must be considered.^
The "systemic" nature of systems analysis is another 
major characteristic,3 The term "systemic" means that 
systems analysis takes a broad, systems view to the problem 
at hand. The problem is broadened until most of the major 
interactions are included. This characteristic also means
94 per cent, A proper question is whether the cost of in­
creasing the destruction capability from 94 to 97 per cent 
is worth the cost of the additional missiles required,
^Charles J, Hitch, "Analysis for Air Force Decisions," 
Ah'a'lÿ'si's for Mil.ifary Decisions, ed, by Quade, p, 14, It is 
obvious that the numoer ot variables active in a problem 
increase as the time span under consideration increases. If 
the proper operations procedure for a specific bombing 
mission that is to occur in the near future is being consi­
dered, a number of technological and strategic elements are 
fixed, e,g,, the basic capability of the weapon systems and 
the enemy’s basic system of air defense. If the bombing 
mission is to occur five years from the time of analysis, all 
of these fixed aspects become variables,
^Gene H, Fisher, "The Role of Cost-Utility Analysis 
in Program Budgeting," Program Budgeting, ed, by David 
Novick, pp, 74-75,
^Richard F, Norford, "Systems Analysis; A Missing 
Element in Foreign Policy Planning," Naval War College 
•Review, XXIII (January, 1971), 90,
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that the number of variables is increased.^
The final major characteristic of systems analysis 
is its explicit recognition and consideration of the un­
certainty which dominates many problems. The analyst must 
determine the consequences of this uncertainty and its 
impact on the various alternatives under consideration.
Most importantly, the analyst can assist in developing new 
alternatives that negate the influence of uncertainty to
psome degree.^
Misconceptions About Systems Analysis 
Before discussing approaches that are common to the 
application of systems analysis, it is appropriate that some 
misconceptions concerning the use of systems analysis be 
dismissed. These misconceptions were extensively held in 
the early history of use of systems analysis in the Federal 
Government.
Biased Toward '"'Cheapest ”
One of the common misconceptions about the use of 
systems analysis is that it automatically leads to the
An example of this can be seen in military appli­
cations. Prior to the widespread use of analytical efforts 
in the Department of Defense, it was a common practice to 
consider a weapon system, e.g., the B-36, in isolation.
With the systemic view the B-36 weapon system includes the 
basic system, the necessary ground support equipment, the 
necessary air base modifications, crews and crew training, 
specialized maintenance facilities, etc.
^The treatment of uncertainty in analysis is described 
in more detail in Appendix A-5.
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weapon, program, or process with the lowest unit cost. This 
is not true. Systems analysis is neutral on the question 
of unit cost.l Systems analysis compares the incremental 
effectiveness of a unit to the incremental cost of that 
unit. This comparison is vastly different from the minimi­
zation of unit cost.
Closely related to the misconception that systems 
analysis is biased toward the "cheapest" program is an 
attitude that the goal of systems analysis is dollar savings, 
Again this is not true. The goal of systems analysis is to 
provide information that helps decision-makers make better 
decisions which result in increased effectiveness —  not 
necessarily in cost reductions,2
Computerization of Decisions
Another misconception is that systems analysis is 
an attempt to computerize all decisions, "Systems analysis 
is not synonymous with the application of computers. There 
is no essential connection between the t w o . T o  understand 
this, it is necessary to understand something of the capa­
bility of computers.
^Charles J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense, 
pp. 46-47. --------------  ------------
^Robert S. McNamara, "Decision-Making in the Depart­
ment of Defense," Modern Design, ed. by Tucker, p. 22.
^Enthoven, "The Systems Analysis Approach," Program 
Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed, by Hinrichs and 
Taylor," p. Ï6Ô. ' ------------ ----
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The most obvious and dramatic capability of the 
computer is its speed. Much has been written about this; 
one example will illustrate this attribute. The following 
table shows the evolution of computers and time required 
for solution of a RAND Corporation missile trajectory 
problem:
Method Elapsed Time
By Hand —  19^9 6 months (two clerks)
Computer —  19^9 3 hours
Computer —  1956 1 minute
Computer —  1961 1/2 second
Computer —  1965 1/200 second^
The second noticeable aspect of a computer is the 
absolute accuracy of its computation. Finally computers, 
when they have been programmed, perform the calculations 
cheaper than hand labor. For example, on the missile tra­
jectory problem the cost of hand calculation in 1949 was 
$6,000 and the cost of computer operation in 1965 was about 
one cent, (Programming cost for the computer was $100 and 
zero for hand calculation,)
In spite of these capabilities, it can be stated that 
a computer is totally unable to solve a problem. Problems 
are solved by men. The computer can only perform the mathe­
matical calculations (addition, subtraction, and comparison) 
that it is directed to perform, Man must first solve the 
problem intellectually.^
Ipaul Armer, "The Use of Computers," Analysis for 
Military Decisions. ed, by Quade, pp, 250-51.
•̂ It)ld,. pp. 253-55.
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Some conclusions can be drawn on the relationship of 
computers and systems analysis;
1. Computers can assist with the manipulation of quantifiable 
variables in a problem. They generally cannot consider 
variables which are unquantifiable
2. Computers are an aid to systems analysis because of 
their ability to sort data. Probably the major use of the 
computer in connection with systems analysis has been as a 
storage facility and sorting capability for the large data 
base required for an effective analytic effort.2
3. Computers have made some techniques of operations re­
search practical for use in analysis. If a technique such 
as the trajectory problem required one year to work (two 
clerks requiring six months each), its use was not practical 
until the computer was available.3
4. Computers will allow an analyst to make more studies and 
review more alternatives by utilizing its speed. More detail 
can be investigated and sensitivity studies can be more 
easily performed.^
^E. S. Quade, "Mathematics and Systems Analysis,"
Ibid.. p. 246.
^B. G. Schumacher, Computer Dynamics in Public 
Administrat'i'on. p. 107.
^Alain C, Enthoven, "Decision Theory and Systems 
Analysis," Speech presented at George Washington University, 
December 5, 1963.
^Armer, "The Use of Computers," Analysis for Military 
Decisions, ed. by Quade, p. 252.
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Systems analysis is then not confined to the appli­
cation of computers. Because of the development of computer 
capability, systems analysis has been stimulated and its 
effectiveness has been enhanced.^ This additional capa­
bility is not without its disadvantages. Limitations of 
the use of computers in performing systems analysis in­
clude :
1, The variables that cannot be quantified may be ignored
in interpretation of the problem,
2, Computer programs often take many years to formulate
and are therefore both expensive and rigid,
3, Only selected stages of computation are visible. Some
knowledge of the interaction of parameters is lost,^
4, Translation of the analyst's model into computer termi­
nology through programming may involve the loss of some 
generality, including some additional assumptions. As more 
advanced computer program languages become available, 
allowing the analyst to interact more closely with the com­
puter itself, this limitation may be partially alleviated,^
5, Because computer models are often complex, users tend to
^Frederick C, Withington, The Real Computer: Its
influences', ITses', and Effects, p, 1B2,
^Quade, "Mathematics and Systems Analysis," Analysis 
for" Military 'Décisions, ed, by Quade, p, 246,
3e , s . Quade, Co's't'-Effectiveness : Some Trends in 
Ana'ly's'is, pp. 2-4,
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forget that assumptions are still embodied In the model.^
The misconception that the use of computers Is syn­
onymous with systems analysis can be dismissed by noting 
that computer "experts" have not made great Inroads Into 
the systems analysis staffs of the Federal Government. In 
the Systems Analysis Office of the Department of Defense, 
there Is only one computer expert on a professional staff 
of 130 persons.2
Computers are a tool of systems analysis and should 
be used when they will Improve the analysis. The use of 
the computer, like the use of any other tool. Involves 
advantages and disadvantages —  both of which must be con­
sidered In the decision to use It.
Total Quantifieat1on
One of the most pervasive misconceptions about systems 
analysis Is that It requires total quantification. Systems 
analysis was criticized by James E. Webb, the former Admin­
istrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra­
tion, In these terms;
In recent years a myth has grown up that with modern 
management tools —  and particularly those associated 
with the computer, the techniques of systems analysis, 
and a "cost effectiveness" approach —  areas of
^Armer, "The Use of Computers," Analysis for Military 
De'cTsl'ons. ed. by Quade, p. 254.
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 
Cperatlons ,' "Planning, Programming.’ B u d g e t ' Inquiry of 
the Subcommittee on National Security and International 
Cperatlons, 19^9, p. 303.
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uncertainty can be largely eliminated within even the 
most complex of undertakings. The assumption behind the 
myth is that goals and subgoals, and present and future 
requirements to meet these, lend themselves to reason­
ably precise calculation through the use of such modern 
tools. Any endeavor, the concept has it, can be cast 
in the mold of a system of measurable units and dimen­
sions, and into this system all component programs, 
projects, and activities can be fitted with high pre­
cision.1
Admiral H. G. Rickover expressed the same opinions 
in testimony before Congress;
The basis for using cost-effectiveness studies as 
the rationale on which to make a decision is the assump­
tion that the important factors can be expressed in a 
numerical form and that a correct judgment of the 
situation can then be calculated mathematically.2
and:
All factors of military effectiveness for which the 
analyst cannot calculate a numerical value have auto­
matically been discarded from consideration.3
It is not difficult to see why this misconception 
is so widespread. Many writers in the area of systems 
analysis define it so narrowly that the conclusion that only 
quantified data is used is inevitable. For example, one 
author lists the steps of systems analysis as:
1. Translate objectives into quantitative terms.
2. State in an analytical way the general interrelation­
ships among variables.
3. Quantify the relationships between variables and outputs,
IWebb, Space Age Management, p. 149.
2y. S., Congress, Senate, Planning, Programming. 
Budgeting, Inquiry. 19o9, p. 600.
^Ibid.. p. 602.
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4, Quantify the relationships between variables and inputs.
5, Combine these two into a quantitative input/output 
model.
6, Determine the optimal solution.^
Another reason for the persistence of this misconception 
is that much of the literature on systems analysis empha­
sizes application and manipulation of specific quantitative 
techniques to the exclusion of problem definition, alter­
native exploration, etc.
The feeling that systems analysis deals only with 
quantifiable data is based partially on the results of many 
analytic efforts. The emphasis of some practitioners of 
systems analysis has been with the quantitative aspects of 
problems.
There is no intrinsic reason why problems of sub­
jective evaluation cannot be dealt with under the heading 
of systems analysis. . . . The barrier lies in the 
scientific-quantitative origins of operational research, 
which make it psychologically difficult for practi­
tioners to accept such a theory.2
If systems analysis demanded complete quantification, 
it would be of little practical use in most PPBS-type deci­
sions, Most decision-type problems in the real world cannot 
be expressed totally or even mostly in mathematical terms. 
"They involve too many complexities, uncertainties, value
^Guy Black, "Systems Analysis in Government Opera­
tions," (October, 1967), B43.
Zjames R. Schlesinger, "Quantitative Analysis and 
National Security." World Politics. XV (January, 1963), 309.
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judgments, and intangibles.”  ̂ For example, in a military 
problem it is impossible to quantitatively express " . . .  the 
reliability of an ally, or the psychological and political 
consequences of a military o p e r a t i o n . T h e r e  is nothing 
inherent in systems analysis that negates the importance of 
qualitative factors.3 In fact, analysis that either excludes 
qualitative considerations or attempts to quantify the un- 
quantifiable is inadequate analysis.^
While it is one thing to assert that most decisions 
involve a substantial element of qualitative considerations, 
it is quite another to assert that these decisions are to­
tally qualitative.5 Therefore, Just as it is inadequate 
analysis to quantify the unquantifiable, it is equally un­
acceptable decision-making to abandon or neglect the aspects 
of a decision that are quantifiable simply because there are 
some qualitative considerations.^
^Enthoven, "Decision Theory and Systems Analysis."
^Enthoven, "Decision Theory and Systems Analysis," 
Readings in Command Management, U. S., Department of Defense, 
Department of the Army, p. 4-8.
^Bradley, Some Views on Program Budgeting, p. 7.
^Henry S. Rowen and Albert P. Williams, Jr., "Policy 
Analysis in International Affairs," Analysis and Evaluation, 
U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. ÏÏI, 1$6$,
p. 1002.
^Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, p. 51.
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Guide­
line's for Estimating the Benefits of Public Expenditures. 
Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 
1469, p. 235.
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Charles L. Schultze^ stated;
What we do want our analysis to do is try to quan­
tify the benefits and costs as much as they can be 
quantified. But then the analysis should also point 
out in terms as explicit as possible, the nonquantifi- 
able benefits and costs,^
There are two reasons for wanting to quantify data 
as much as possible (including much that may not have been 
quantified earlier). First, quantitative data can be manipu­
lated through mathematical computations. Through these 
manipulations it is possible to observe the effect of 
changes in the parameters of the problem.3 The second reason 
for the use of quantitative data in systems analysis is to 
facilitate expression. "Numbers are a part of.our language. 
Where a quantitative matter is being discussed the greatest 
clarity of thought is achieved by using numbers instead of 
avoiding t h e m . I n  the area of expression, numbers often 
must be used when finite calculations of absolute accuracy 
are impossible.
The real issue is one of clarity of understanding 
and expression. Take, for example, the statement 
"Nuclear power for surface ships offers a major increase
^Charles L. Schultze was the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget when PPBS was introduced in the nondefense 
agencies of the Federal Government. He was responsible for 
its over-all implementation.
^"Inside View of the New Budget," Nations Business. 
LV (January, 1967), 42-43. (italics added")
3Snthoven, "Decision Theory and Systems Analysis."
^Enthoven, "The Systems Analysis Approach," Program 
Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Hinrichs and 
Taylor7 p""l'^^". -------------- ----
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In effectiveness.” Precisely what does that mean? Does 
It mean 10 oer cent better or 100 per cent better? When 
that sort of question is asked, a frequent answer is,
"It can’t be expressed in numbers." But it has to be 
expressed with the help of numbers.!
One distinction that helps clarify the relationship 
between systems analysis and qualitative factors is the one 
between analysis and calculation. The process of calculation 
is only one part (and in many cases a relatively minor part) 
of analysis. Obviously, qualitative factors must be excluded 
from the calculations but they should be isolated, described,
pand related to the alternatives in question.
Closely allied to the misconception that systems 
analysis is simply a method of handling quantifiable data is 
the feeling that the use of systems analysis automatically 
involves the use of extremely complicated mathematics.
While there are some complicated and sophisticated mathema­
tical techniques available to the analyst, most of the mathe­
matics used is of the simpler variety (e.g., elementary 
probability theory, statistics, calculus, and geometry).3 
Many of the more sophisticated analytic techniques are much 
more elaborate than the data available or the state of
^Testimony of Alain C. Enthoven as cited by William 
W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy, pp. 244-45.
^Statement of Alain 0. Enthoven, U. S., Congress, 
Senate, Planning. Programming. Budgeting» Inquiry. 1969, 
p. 229.
^Quade, "Mathematics and Systems Analysis," Analysis 




The most sweeping misconception of systems analysis 
is that it is a replacement for Judgment. This is incorrect. 
The exercise of Judgment pervades the entire analytic effort. 
Judgment must be used to analyze and determine the proper 
objective, select alternatives to be considered, determine 
the factors which are relevant for analysis and the inter­
relationship between them, and even select the types of data 
to be gathered and used.^
It is obvious that systems analysis does not totally 
replace Judgment since the application of considerable 
Judgment is necessary during the analytical process itself. 
The criticism that the use of systems analysis replaces the 
Judgment of the decision-maker with the Judgment of the 
analyst has more credence. This criticism is not entirely 
correct for three reasons ;
^Hartley, Educational Planning-Programming-Budgeting. 
p. 6. An example of this is the analysis of the comparability 
of Soviet and U. S. infantry divisions. After a number of 
attempts with sophisticated gaming devices, a rough esti­
mate of military comparability was determined by simply 
asking how much a Soviet division would cost in the United 
States with our labor rates, materiel prices, etc. Of course, 
the assumption was made that costs in both Soviet and U. S. 
divisions were optimally allocated. (Alain C. Enthoven, 
"Systems Analysis in the Pentagon," Speech presented to the 
Association for Public Program Analysis, Washington, D. C., 
September 26, 1968.)
^Heymont, et al.. Guide for Reviewers of Studies 
Containing Cost-EffectTveness Analysis, p. 9.
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1. The analyst does not work in a vacuum. The analytical 
effort must be a joint effort of the analyst, the decision­
maker, and the technical personnel with knowledge and/or 
experience to apply to the problem.
2. In its effort to make Judgment explicit in the analysis, 
the decision-maker has the opportunity to impose his own 
Judgment over that of the analyst,
3. Systems analysis is not usually able to recommend an
optimum solution. It is only able to structure information
in such a manner as to allow the decision-maker to apply
Judgment effectively. As Alain C, Enthoven^ stated;
Ultimately all policies are made , , , on the basis 
of judgement. There is no other way, and there never 
will be. The question is whether those Judgements have 
to be made in a fog of inadequate and inaccurate data, 
unclear and undefined issues and a welter of conflicting 
opinions, or whether they can be made on the basis of 
adequate, reliable information, relevant experience, 
and clearly drawn issues. In the end, analysis is but 
an aid to Judgement, , , , Judgement is supreme,2
•
Common Approaches to Systems Analysis 
There are two standard approaches that are used in 
systems analysis in the Federal Government, These are 
normally called cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Both are required before a decision is made, 
Cost-Effectiveness analysis provides information about the
^Dr, Enthoven was the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Systems Analysis) when the use of analytical techniques 
became widespread in the Department of Defense,
2"U, S, Agencies Get Order: Join McNamara’s Band,"
Business Week, November 13, 1965, p. 189,
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benefits and cost of alternatives under consideration. Cost- 
benefit analysis provides information on whether the pro­
ject should be undertaken at all.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
There are three basic types of problems involved in 
cost-benefit analysis. These correspond to the different 
classification of benefits: where costs and benefits can
be expressed in equivalent terms (usually dollars); where 
the level of benefits can be quantified but cannot be ex­
pressed in the same units as cost; or where there is no way 
to quantify benefits.
Benefits in Dollars
The most rigorous use of quantitative methods has 
taken place where benefits and costs are in the same unit.
A direct comparison is possible to determine if the program 
is beneficial. Where the government is engaged in producing 
services which are essentially "market goods," the measure­
ment of benefits using a dollar measurement is possible.
The earliest use of extensive quantitative methods 
has been in water development projects for flood control, 
hydro-power, navigation, and irrigation. The calculation of 
net benefits for water resource activities on a systematic 
basis has been standard procedure since 1936. The guidelines 
for this form of benefit-cost analysis include: "the ulti­
mate purpose of an economic analysis of a project is to
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ascertain the extent to which, the use of economic resources 
such, as land, labor and materials necessary for a project 
were not undertaken.” The difference that the project makes 
to the national Income over the life of the project Is cal­
culated, and this benefit Is compared to the expected 
costs.1
When cost-benefit analysis Is used In this category 
there are four basic considerations which become relevant: 
Which costs are used? Which benefits will be used? How 
are these benefits valued? How Is time handled?^ No 
totally satisfactory answer has been found to any of these 
questions.
The answer to the first question In cost-benefit 
analysis Is the easiest. Budgetary costs are normally 
straightforward. The ability to predict accurately financial 
costs for any government program Is largely a function of 
the technological certainty of the program, and of the length 
of the future projections required.3 In the water resource 
area the financial cost estimates have become quite accurate.
^Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process In the United 
States, pp. 332 and 336.
^A. R. Brest and R. Turvey, "Cost-Beneflt Analysis: A
Survey,” The Economic Journal. LXXV (December, 1965), 686.
3por example, cost estimates are notoriously Inaccurate 
In the high-technology military programs because the system 
Is not well defined at the time the estimate Is made.
Changes In equipment, price level changes, etc. also effect 
cost over an extended period of time.
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and often actual costs are below the projections made,^ How­
ever, even this relatively straightforward area of analysis 
is complicated when one considers nonfinancial costs such 
as the cost of displacement of people, etc.^
If problems in determining which costs are to be 
included in cost-benefit analysis and how they are to be 
valued appear large, the problems in the estimation of 
benefits are staggering. Even in the relatively well- 
structured area of water resources, no totally satisfactory 
definition exists on what benefits should be included. The 
benefits that accrue from the primary purpose of each pro­
ject are obviously counted. However, secondary benefits 
also exist. For example, the Flood Control Act of 1936 
listed the primary benefit as preventing damage by floods 
and required calculation of the dollar damage averted. The 
Act further stated that "all benefits to whomsoever they 
accrue" should be considered. This led to attempts to mea­
sure indirect effects such as loss of business and employment 
by floods, temporary dislocations of business, temporary un­
employment, and disruption of transportation and communica­
tions. Flood-control projects can also have irrigational.
^Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget, pp. 170-71. This 
enviable record was not achieved immediately. Prior to 
World War II the cost estimates were normally understated by 
a considerable percentage. A 1951 study of 182 Corps of 
Engineers projects found overruns in excess of 100 per cent.
^A more complete discussion of the problems of esti­
mating costs in systems analysis is found in Appendix A-3.
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navigational, and hydro-power benefits,^
The problem of benefits is further complicated by the 
presence of intangible benefits. The primary and secondary 
benefits discussed above are tangible benefits —  meaning 
that they can be measured in terms of market dollars.^ in­
tangible benefits such as recreation, municipal and indus­
trial water supplies, waste disposal, pollution control, and 
preservation of "complex ecosystems" are also important.3 
Currently, tangible values are placed on some factors pre­
viously considered intangibles.^ If the inclusion of secon­
dary and intangible benefits is carried to an extreme, the 
measure of benefits becomes dubious and often totally use­
less.
The determination of which benefits to include in a 
cost-benefit analysis becomes even more troublesome in areas 
outside of natural resources. For example, in the health 
area it has often been customary to use as a measure of 
benefits the number of days of illness averted (where the 
illness prevents an individual from working) and the number
^Smithies,' Budgetary Process, p. 332.
2Ibid.. p. 340.
3jack L. Knetsch, "Economic Analysis in Natural 
Resource Programs, " Analysis' and Evaluât ion. U. S., Congress, 
Joint Economic Committee, Vol. Ill, p. lOBb.
^For example, the Auburn-Folsom-South water project 
in California included an estimated $90 million of recrea­
tional benefits. ("Putting a Dollar Sign on Everything," 
Business’ Week. July l6, 1966, p. 124.)
50
of extra productive days added because of death averted,^ 
However, health should be considered a consumer good as 
well as an Investment good since the public would be willing 
to pay for the avoidance of the pain and Inconvenience of 
Illness even If earnings were not lost.^
An even more difficult aspect of cost-benefit analysis 
Is the conversion of benefits to dollars. Usually "market 
prices" of goods are used to make this conversion. The use 
of market prices conceals two basic assumptions; consumer 
sovereignty and Indifference to Income redistribution. Both 
of these assumptions can be the cause of major distortion 
In many government program evaluations.3
The first assumption of consumer sovereignty Ignores 
the fact that many government programs are Instituted largely 
because the private market has given Inadequate direction 
to the use of resources.^ Public values are not necessarily 
reflected In the "market" price system which Is a reflection
^The value of these benefits Is measured by calcu­
lating a present value of Increased earnings.
^A. W. Marshall, Cost/Benefit Analysis In Health, 
pp. 2—3.
^Arthur Maas, "Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance
to Public Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. LXXX (May, 1966), 208-1Ü.
^Lawrence G. Hines, "The Need to Develop ’Public 
Interest’ Criteria for the Appraisal and Selection of 
Federal Economic Activity," Problems of United States Eco­
nomic Development. II (May, 195Ü), &31. A prime example of 
this Is In the area of environmental pollution.
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of private values.^
The second assumption Ignores the fact that some 
government programs have a primary goal of Income redistri­
bution. It would be unreasonable to assume that the flow 
of benefits from a government project to a single Individual 
or firm would be considered equally desirable as the same 
amount of benefits dispersed throughout the general popula­
tion.
While these criticisms are valid ones, they do not 
necessarily negate the usefulness of many applications of 
cost-benefit analysis where benefits are calculated In 
dollars. They do caution against the use of a single bene­
fit dollar amount as a total decision guide. As a minimum, 
the following supplemental Information Is necessary:
1. The declslon-maker should not rely on a single estimate 
of benefits. Since benefit estimation Is subject to a high 
degree of judgment, this judgment should be specifically 
Identified and a range of different benefit amounts pre­
sented corresponding to different circumstances.
2, An estimate of noneconomic benefits should be presented 
(probably In nonmonetary terms), or the use of the cost- 
benefit analysis could bias governmental activity toward
llbld., p. 232, and Martin Shublk, On Different 
Methods' for ATlocating Resources, pp. 4-9.
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economic goals which do not properly reflect public values.^
3. An estimate of the redistributional effects of the pro­
gram should be given.
The final task involved in the performance of cost- 
benefit analysis is the treatment of time. While there is 
general agreement that future benefits and costs should be 
discounted, there is less agreement on what discount rate^ 
should be applied. An excessively low discount rate for 
government projects would divert resources from private 
use to government projects, and these latter projects could 
become "capital intensive."3
The range of discount rates proposed for cost- 
benefit analysis is from 3.2 per cent to 15 per cent. The 
best approach to the practical use of a discount rate is to 
use a rate of approximately 5 to 6 per cent (which most 
economists advocate as the minimum rate that is justifiable) 
and test the outcome for sensitivity to higher rates.^
^Guy Black, The Application of Systems Analysis to 
Government Operations. p. 3b and Maas. "Benefit-Cost Analysis ; 
its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, LXXX (May, 1966), 208.
^The term "discount rate" is used to indicate the 
percentage (i) in the formula that indicates the present 
worth (PV) of one dollar spent (or received) in n years.PV a»' ' 1TTFTF
3jacob A. Stockfisch, "The Interest Rate Applicable 
to Government Investment Projects," Program Budgeting and 
Benefl'f-Cosf Analysis. ed. by Hinrichs and Taylor, pT 189.
^A more complete discussion of the discount-rate 
problem is presented in Appendix A-6,
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In cost-benefit analysis where the benefits are cal­
culated In dollars, the normal method of presenting the final 
product Is a ratio of benefits to costs. If this ratio Is 
greater than one, the program Is assumed to be economically 
effective. Since benefits cannot be measured to a finite 
degree and cannot usually be translated Into dollars, and 
since the estimation of costs Is not an exact science, a 
declslon-maker must beware of attaching undue reliance to 
any single ratio. He should demand supplementary Informa­
tion as well as Indications of how the ratio varies with 
changed circumstances, assumptions, and judgmental consi­
derations .
Quantified Benefits Not In Dollars
When the benefits of a program are quantifiable 
through either direct measurement or proximate measures of 
effectiveness,1 the type of cost-benefit analysis possible 
may be somewhat rigorous. A cost per unit of benefit may 
be calculated. For example, the Department of Transporta­
tion uses "cost per reduced fatality" for highway safety 
measures, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
uses "cost per reduction In mortality" for health research 
fund allocation.2
iThe term "proximate measures of effectiveness" Is 
borrowed from Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. MeKean, The 
Economies' of Defense" in' the Wuclear Age. These are practical 
substitutes tor direct measurements or effectiveness. They 
are discussed In more detail In Appendix A-3.
^Robert N, Anthony, Manag'e'nfent' Accounting. p. 601.
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The use of these quantitative measures of benefits 
has one distinct advantage. The amount of resources can be 
varied, and incremental benefits versus differential costs 
can be evaluate!. The question of whether the incremental 
benefits are worth the incremental cost is, however, one 
that must be made on the basis of subjective judgment.
(For example, "Is an additional reduced fatality worth the 
additional cost required?" is a question that cannot be 
totally answered with quantitative measures.) The most that 
analysis can contribute to the decision is a careful speci­
fication of all of the benefits (including those where 
quantification is not possible) and a complete specification 
of costs.
Unquantifiable Benefits
Under the category of benefits where no quantifica­
tion is possible, the rigorous analysis is restricted to 
the cost inputs. "A careful estimate of the cost is made, 
and the decision-maker arrives at a subjective judgment by 
asking: ’Are benefits worth at least the cost?’ Or, . . .
'Are the incremental benefits likely to be worth the 
differential costs?’"^ Examples of this form of problem are
pnumerous. In many cases, however, it is possible to devise 
proximate measures of effectiveness for evaluation of
•̂Ibld.
^It is practically impossible to assess the benefits 
accruing from Voice of America broadcasts to Eastern Europe.
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benefits.1 To the degree that proximate measurements can be 
devised, and are meaningful, a problem with benefits that 
are not capable of quantification may take on many of the 
characteristics of the problem where the benefits are 
directly quantifiable. With the use of proximate measures 
of effectiveness the decision-maker must be very careful that 
benefits (positive or negative) that are not covered by the 
measurement used are not ignored.
Practical Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Formal cost-benefit analysis has been applied in 
several areas of government activity, including health pro­
grams (cancer control and eradication of syphilis), voca­
tional rehabilitation,2 outdoor recreation, high-school 
dropout prevention, civil aviation, urban highways, and 
urban renewal,3 as well as the traditional natural-resource 
areas. Analysis in each of these areas has a different 
degree of validity.
There has been an unfortunate trend to use dollars 
as a single measure of benefits by weighting factors and 
converting these to dollars.^ An analyst who is bold enough
1In the case noted above, a proximate measurement of 
effectiveness could be the increase in signal density, area 
covered, and length of broadcast by Voice of America.
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Modern Public Sector, p. l62,
'̂Measuring Benefits of Government Investments, ed. 
by Robert Dorfman.
^State-Local Finance Project, Implementing PPB in 
State', City', and County, p. 84.
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can reduce anything to dollars by imposing some rather arbi­
trary assumptions on the data at hand.^ The net result of 
this action by analysts Is that cost-benefit analysis Is 
often viewed as something which Is "conceptually playful" 
but Is of little use In practical declslon-maklng.^ For 
decision purposes It Is probably preferable to use benefit 
calculations In dollars In areas where a dollar measurement 
does not Imply exceptionally arbitrary assumptions (a 
distinction that Itself requires an application of judgment); 
to use other quantitative measures of benefit when direct 
measurement and use of proximate measures of effectiveness 
Is possible; and to use qualitative descriptions of
^James R. Schleslnger, Systems Analysis and the 
Political Process. p. 4. One example of this Is a study 
that establishes dollar values for proposed military weapon 
systems by making the value equal to the cost of the system 
It replaces (less depreciation), multiplied by a weighted 
factor for performance Improvement, The number of, and 
Importance of. Implicit assumptions In this type of analysis 
Is obvious. (U, S., Department of Defense, Department of 
the Army, Decision Analysis Using Present Value Techniques  ̂
by George B, Williams, James S, Butterfield, and Mary A. 
Blagloll, pp. 1-22.)
^Virginia Held, "PPBS Comes to Washington," Planning. 
Programming. Budgeting. ed. by Lyden and Miller, pp. 22-23. 
This same tendency Isoften noted In attempts to use a 
single quantitative measure of benefits. For example. In a 
cost-benefit analysis for outdoor recreation, a benefit 
measure of weighted user-days was constructed. Value 
Judgments In this measure Included the determination of 
Increased value cf a redistributed dollar and different 
values of benefits for various types of outdoor recreation 
(e.g., a day In the country was weighted higher than a day 
In the park). (Ruth P. Mack and Sumner Myers, "Outdoor 
Recreation," Measuring Benefits of Government Investments. 
ed. by Dorfman, pp. 7l-llb.)
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unquantlfiable benefits instead of a simple benefit/cost 
ratio.1
The use of a simple benefit/cost ratio to determine 
the amount of funds to allocate to a given project is also 
questionable. j?or example, the objective of flood-control 
project allocation should not be to maximize the benefit/ 
cost ratio but to maximize the benefits minus the cost. 
These two objectives may not be the same. Table 2 illus-
ptrates this property. Note that the maximum benefit/cost 
ratio is for levees but the maximum net benefit is for a 
medium reservoir.
Cost-benefit analysis is not a substitute for cost- 
effectiveness analysis. Normally, only one alternative 
method of achieving an objective is considered in cost- 
benefit analysis, and other, and possibly better, alterna­
tives are overlooked.3
One case where this was done was in an urban renewal 
analysis. Monetary benefits were calculated for the increased 
productivity of the renewal site land, and the total costs not 
offset by this direct monetary benefit were shown. Other 
benefits such as the higher value of neighboring land, reduced 
crime and poverty, etc. were described in a subjective manner. 
(Jerome Rothenberg, "Urban Renewal Programs," Measuring Bene­
fits of Government Investments. ed. by Dorfman, pp. È9Z-366.)
^This example was adapted from Otto Eckstein, Public 
Finance (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964) 
as cited in Held, "PPBS Comes to Washington,," Planning. 
Frogrananing. Budgeting. ed. by Lyden and Miller, pp. 18-19.
A further discussion of the problem of using benefit/cost 
ratios as a criterion for alternative selection is contained 
in Appendix A-7.
^Knetsch, "Natural Resource Programs," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
TTTTTm: pp. 1092-93.
TABLE 2






























(1) Annual Cost includes operating cost and amortized investment costs. •
(2) Annual Damage Reduction is the estimated flood damage in a typical year 
without protection compared to the damage with protection.
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Co s f-Ef f e cf i vene s s' Analy sl s
The second major approach to systems analysis is 
cost-effectiveness analysis. In its broadest context cost- 
effectiveness analysis is concerned with the evaluation of 
alternative methods to achieve an objective to determine 
the preferred alternative (or mix of alternatives). All of 
the elements and methodology of systems analysis are present 
in cost-effectiveness analysis.
Normally cost-effectiveness analysis is conducted 
along two general lines —  the level of costs may be fixed 
and effectiveness maximized, or the level of effectiveness 
may be fixed and cost minimized.^ If all costs and effec­
tiveness could be measured on finite scales, this would be 
relatively simple.
However, this simplicity is seldom, if ever, the 
case. The problems of measuring costs are similar to the 
problems of cost measurement in cost-benefit analysis.^ The 
cost-estimating task is somewhat simplified in cost- 
effectiveness analysis, since the emphasis is placed on 
relative, rather than absolute, accuracy.3
^Karl Seiler III, Introduction to Systems Cost- 
Effectlveness. p. 98. Trying to maximize effectiveness while 
simultaneously minimizing cost is a nonsensical objective of 
analysis. The minimum cost is zero and the maximum effec­
tiveness implies a heavy cost commitment —  possibly infinite,
pAll of these problems are discussed in greater 
detail as a part of Appendix A-3. 
qGene H. Fisher, "Costing Methods," Analysis for 
MiTifary Décisions. ed. by Quade, p. 268.
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Again the measurement of effectiveness Is more 
difficult than the measurement of costs. Even where quanti­
tative measurements of effectiveness exist, or meaningful 
proximate measures of effectiveness can be dlvlsed, the 
problem of fixing a level of effectiveness In order to 
minimize costs or maximize effectiveness for a specific 
cost Is often complicated by multiple measures of effec­
tiveness and time.
The existence of multiple effectiveness Is a source 
of major problems In cost-effectlveness analysis. The de­
cision of which alternative Is preferable Is simple when one 
alternative dominates all others. For example. If the prob­
lem Is maximization of effectiveness In three separate 
dimensions for a given level of cost, the alternative which 
has the highest level of effectiveness on all three dimen­
sions Is obviously superior. This clear-cut case does not 
usually happen. Alternative A may dominate effectiveness 
measurement number 1, B dominate measurement number 2, and 
C dominate measurement number 3. To determine which alter­
native Is better the analyst can:
1. Set a minimum level of all but one measure of effective­
ness and maximize the one that Is not fixed. This requires 
a subjective choice of which measure of effectiveness Is the 
most Important (not set at a minimum).
2. Determine weights to give to each measure of effective­
ness. The determination of weights Is In Itself a matter of
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subjective choice.^
Another problem In cost-effectlveness analysis In­
volves the treatment of time. Time may be an explicit part 
of the analysis by being one measure of effectiveness and 
treated as above, or It may be considered In the Interpre­
tation of the analysis. The parameter of time cannot be 
Ignored when effectiveness Is gauged.^
Because of the above difficulties It Is not always 
possible to perform cost-effectlveness analysis by fixing 
the level of effectiveness and minimizing cost. Instead, 
the analyst uses a fixed level of cost and determines for 
a group of alternatives the various levels of effectiveness. 
This data Is then presented to the declslon-maker, who 
Implicitly weights the different measures of effectiveness 
by his decision.
The fact that cost-effectlveness analysis usually 
approaches a problem by fixing the level of effectiveness or 
cost does not mean that the analysis Is complete when the 
answer Is achieved for that one level. A complete analysis 
varies the parameter which was fixed so that marginal analysis 
(Increased or decreased effectiveness compared to Increased 
of decreased cost) Is possible.
A. Myrlck Freeman III, "Project Design and Evalua­
tion with Multiple Objectives," Analysis and Evaluation.
U. S.,Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. I, 1969* 
pp. 570—72.
^Roland N. MeKean, "Criteria," AhaTysls for Military 
Decisions. ed. by Quade, p. 88.
62
There are circumstances when cost-effectlveness 
analysis cannot proceed by fixing cost or effectiveness.
This happens In a least two circumstances: when the alter­
natives under consideration are mutually exclusive and are 
relatively fixed In cost, and when the measures of effec­
tiveness are Incommensurate. This does not Imply that cost- 
effectlveness analysis cannot be performed In these cases —  
rather the specific form of analysis Is changed.
In the case where alternatives are mutually exclusive 
and are relatively fixed In size, the selection of a fixed 
level of effectiveness or cost Is tantamount to selection of 
the preferred alternative. Before a decision Is made systems 
analysis can Identify the costs and effectiveness of alter­
natives. Table 3 shows the possible outcomes of an analysis 
such as this when there Is a single measure of effectiveness 
and two alternatives. Notice that two of the recommenda­
tions are Indeterminate. The probability of an Indeter­
minate outcome Increases when multiple objectives are pre­
sent. These can only be presented to the appropriate 
declslon-maker so that he can apply his judgment.
Where Incommensurate measurements of effectiveness 
are necessary,^ there Is no way to directly compare
^Incommensurate measures of effectiveness are often 
found when widely different alternatives are used to achieve 
the same general objective. For example, the damage reduc­
tion potential of fallout shelters and assured damage capa­
bility of strategic weapons may be Incommensurate measures 
of effectiveness for the objective of deterring nuclear 
conflict.
TABLE 3
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OP COMPARISON OP TWO ALTERNATIVES
State* Recommendation
Cl) Cb ; E& E% Indeterminate
(2) Ca ^  Cj, ; Ea ^  Ê , Alternative B
(3) j/ Cb ; E& &b Alternative A
(4) Ca ; E& j/ E% Indeterminate
• Ca and Ĉ j are costs of the alternatives
Eĝ  and E^ are effectiveness of the alternatives
0\U)
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alternatives. The use of "trade-off" analysis has the poten­
tial of at least illuminating the basic choices. Figure 1 
demonstrates the essentials of trade-off analysis. A de­
crease of Ac in the costs (C&) allocated to alternative A 
causes a decrease of A e^ effectiveness. This same cost 
allocated to alternative B increases its effectiveness by 
AE^). Of course, the determination of whether it is better 
to have A E q ̂or A e ĵ is still a matter of subjective judg­
ment. The major point is that some comparison can be made 
and the results of that comparison can assist decision­
makers in their decision.^
Similar to cost-benefit analysis, the performing of 
cost-effectiveness analysis requires a high degree of judg­
ment. As a result, single estimates of costs and of effec­
tiveness are usually not sufficient. A range of estimates 
for different assumptions and environmental circumstances 
is generally required.
Techniques of Systems Analysis 
As noted earlier, systems analysis is not simply a . 
collection of techniques that can be applied to problems to 
achieve optimum solutions. Systems analysis is more an 
approach to, and a way of viewing, different problems. How­
ever, there are certain techniques that are often used in 
the practice of systems analysis.










Alternative A Alternative B
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One of the basic groups of tools often used by 
systems analysts includes those of microeconomics. Among 
the microeconomic concepts and tools which often are found 
in systems analysis efforts are dimishing returns, indiffer­
ence curves, iso-quantity curves, marginal-cost curves, and 
demand curves.
Another group of tools is derived from mathematics, 
including calculus and statistics. Prominent techniques 
include correlation and regression analysis, probability 
theory, and deductive statistics.
Another group of tools is commonly found in the 
operations-research discipline. These are especially useful 
in suboptimization portions of systems analysis. Among the 
techniques used are linear programming, gaming, game theory, 
queuing theory, simulation, dynamic programming, and inven­
tory theory.
There are some more qualitatively oriented techniques 
that are used in systems analysis on a frequent basis. Two 
major techniques in this area are the Delphi technique and 
scenario writing.^
Benefits of the Use of Systems Analysis
Because the use of systems analysis implies a heavy 
investment in time and resources, it is appropriate to con­
sider the benefits that it promises for governmental decision-
^These two techniques are described in Appendix A-8.
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making.
Specific Advantages of Systems Analysis
First, cost-benefit analysis, even with all of its 
uncertainty and judgment, is capable of becoming a quasi- 
rational screening device to eliminate projects that are 
obviously uneconomical,^ After discussing the many uncer­
tainties and shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis, one 
author concluded;
Yet cost-benefit analysis may still be important 
in getting rid of the worst projects. Avoiding the 
worst where you can’t get the best is no small accom­plishment,^
Systems analysis contributions to decisions are not, 
however, limited to eliminating the worst projects. The 
type of information that a well-performed systems analysis 
provides is not routine to the decision-making process. 
Decision-makers do not have time to explore numbers of 
alternatives, many interactions of the system, and the 
multitude of sensitivities of a proposed program,3 By 
clarifying these and pointing out the crucial considerations 
to the decision-maker, systems analysis definitely sharpens 
the use of judgment and experience.^
^Weidenbaum, The Modern Public Sector, p. 158.
2Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary 
Process. p. 159.
^Gene H. Fisher, Analytical Support for Defense 
Planning. p. 6.
^Donald M, Fort, Systems Analysis as an Aid in Air 
Transportation Planning, p. 41.
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The explicit nature of systems analysis gives two 
major advantages. If all objectives, alternatives, assump­
tions, calculations, judgments, and data are made openly 
and explicitly, the analysis can be self-correcting. These 
aspects of the analysis are open to "checking, testing, 
criticism, debate, discussion, and possible refutation,"^
As errors are noted they can be corrected within the frame­
work of the analysis itself, and when new information is 
received it can be easily incorporated into the framework
pof the existing analysis.
The second major advantage of explicitness in systems 
analysis is its effect on the debate on resource allocation. 
Because it is open, good analysis can turn debate from 
statements of "noble purpose" and rhetoric to disagreements 
on realities.3 The very fact that a critic can point out 
what is wrong with a particular systems analysis is one of 
the main indications that it is a good technique,^
^John Haldi, "The Role of Analysis," Program Budgeting 
and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed, by Hinrichs and Taylor, p. 15$.
^Quade,' Limitations of Cost-Effectiveness Approach.
p, 11,
3James R, Schleslnger, "Uses and Abuses of Analysis," 
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis. ed, by Hinrichs 
and Taylor, p. 55!l,
^E, S. Quade, "Pitfalls and Limitations," Systems 
Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense.ed,
by E, à, Quade and w. I, Boucher, p, 3^8, Admiral Rlckover’s 
criticism of the systems analysis used to support the limita­
tion of nuclear-powered ships illustrates the possible high 
level of debate. He was able to point specifically at two 
areas in the analysis which he felt caused the improper
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The use of systems analysis also helps decision­
making because of its consistency. At the very minimum,
systems analysis can ensure that quantitative data and 
assumptions are internally consistent,^ "To the extent of 
our forgetfulness (and) inconsistency, our decisions are 
deficient."2
The use of systems analysis also stimulates the
development of more alternative ways to achieve an objective.
One of the major limitations in solving problems in an in­
tuitive manner is that alternatives beyond the experience of 
the decision-maker are often ignored.^ The use of systems 
analysis provides the vehicle to consider these alternatives. 
Also, more alternatives are integrated into the analysis 
because the objective of the program is investigated and 
the analyst and the decision-maker learn more about the
conclusions —  oil was assumed to be available regardless 
of the military situation, and the original cost of the 
system was overemphasized compared to total lifetime cost. 
This raised the level of debate by focusing it on these two 
major areas of disagreement. The same higher level of debate 
is noticed in Dr. Wohlstetter's disagreement with the Depart­
ment of Defense over the value of the Safeguard missile 
system. Again the key assumptions and judgments that formed 
the basis of the opinions, rather than emotional rhetoric, 
became the main areas of discussion. (U. S., Congress, 
Senate,- Planwirtpf.- Pro-gramiing. Budgeting. Inquiry. 1969. 
pp. 599-608, 659-6W3.*-----^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^E. S. Quade. BoMe" 'Comments' on Cost-Effectiveness, 
p. 14. :
^Edward P. R. Hearle, "How Useful are ’Scientific 
Tools' of Management," Public Administration Review. XXI 
(Autumn, 1961) 208,
^David I. Cleland and William R. King, Systems 
'An'a'iys-iS' and Project Management. p. 21.
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problem. Its components and interactions, its measures of 
effectiveness, and its elements of cost.
Systems analysis also assists in handling problems 
of great complexity. Many problems involve several differ­
ent types of knowledge and technology and require different 
forms of expertise.
On occasion it might be possible to assemble a 
group of "experts", each of whom has a good intuitive 
grasp of factors relevant for answering , . , a sub­
question, and after discussion emerge with a fairly 
unequivocal answer. But in general, and especially 
where, as is usually the case when the choice is not 
between two but many [alternatives], systematic analy­
sis will help —  or prove essential.!
Systems analysis allows the collection of judgment and
intuition from a number of experts within the structured
context of the model developed for the analysis. The model
also provides the structure necessary to integrate this
2diverse knowledge.
Another advantage of the use of systems analysis is 
that it provides a means whereby complex problems can be 
separated into meaningful components. In each of these 
components, the application of judgment is required, but 
each judgmental aspect becomes less critical and more easily 
handled.3
^Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense, p. 108,
^Quade, Systems Analysis Techniques, pp. 5-6.
%eld, "PPBS Comes to Washington," Planning. 
Programming.' Budgeting. ed. by Lyden and Miller, p. 23.
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One of the criticisms of the use of systems analysis 
is that it tends to oversimplify complex problems. This 
criticism is not too valid since it is difficult to see how 
a technique like systems analysis, which is open-ended and 
can handle all of the interrelationships and factors that are 
considered major to the problem, tends to oversimplify more 
than the application of simple intuition on a total complex 
problem.1
A final advantage of the use of systems analysis in 
the government is that it has the potential to force changes 
in governmental process in a manner similar to the profit 
motive in private enterprise.^ in private enterprise firms 
are compelled by the promise of profits and the threat of 
bankruptcy to seek efficient innovations and allocations of 
funds. Even if a firm does not systematically work to im­
prove its methods, it is able to copy the innovations of 
others or it is eliminated through the process of natural 
selection.
. In the government there is no profit motive to ensure 
efficiency. The costs of inefficient methods do not impinge 
directly on those who make the choices and the process of 
natural selection operates weakly, if at all. There is 
"neither an adequate price mechanism to reveal the cheapest
^Enthoven, "Systems Analysis and the Navy," Modern 
"Design, ed. by Tucker, p. l82.
^Harold A. Hovey, The Plannihg-Programming-Budgeting 
"Appyoa’ch: to" •Qovernmehf Dec is ion-Making. pp. 3-4.
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methods of performing government functions nor any force 
which Induces or compels the government to adopt such methods." 
One approach to assuring a high degree of efficiency (and 
thereby substituting In part for the lack of a profit motive)
Is to Insist on systematic analysis "to determine the most 
efficient alternative allocations and methods at all levels 
of government."!
Alternative Approaches to Decisions
Another way to examine the usefulness of systems 
analysis Is to compare It to the alternative ways of making 
a decision. The major alternative Is the use of Intuition 
alone (either the decision-maker's Intuition or the expert's 
Intuition), Of course Intuition Is very powerful and Is 
remarkably proficient at solving some kinds of problems.
The human mind has a memory that can learn from experience 
and has the ability to Isolate Important variables and 
suppress the unimportant In solving problems. But It Is In­
correct to consider Intuition and analysis as complete 
rivals. In fact. Intuition and analysis complement each 
other, and analysis should be considered an aid to Intuition. 
Every systems analysis contains significant amounts of In­
tuition and Judgment. Unaided Intuition, while It Is often 
successful, can be just as spectacularly unsuccessful.
Finally, there Is no way to verify the results of Intuition
^Hitch and McKean, Ec'oh'Omlc's of Defense, pp. 106-8,
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without some analytical check.1
With the use of unaided Intuition It Is possible to 
turn to experts. In complex problems It Is difficult to 
find one expert who has a total grasp of the entire prob­
lem.^ It Is then necessary to turn to a number of experts, 
taken either Individually or in a committee. Systems 
analysis has the capability to Integrate and effectively use 
this expert advice.
It Is Important to note that the use of unaided In­
tuition, either by the declslon-maker alone or with expert 
assistance, does not mean that a model of the problem Is 
not constructed. Unless some form of systems analysis Is 
used, this model Is likely to remain hidden and will also 
be highly aggregated and simplified,3
It Is obvious that the use of analysis with Intui­
tion can hardly be worse than the use of unaided Intuition, 
The use of Intuition Integrated with analysis has the poten- 
tlal of greatly Improving the decision process.
^Hltch, ’“Analysis for Air Force Decisions," Analysis 
for Military Decisions, ed, by Quade, pp, 21-22,
^Hltch, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis," Defense. 
Science, and Public Policy, ed, by Mansfield, p, B^,
3Quade, Limitations of Cost Effectiveness Approach, 
pp. 9-10,
^H, Sternberg, J, Renz and G, Pasollna, "Flannlng- 
Programmlng-Budgetlng System (PPBS) In Nassau County, N, Y,," 
Innovations in Planning. Programming, and BudgetTng In 
state and Local Governments. Ü, È , . Congress.Joint Économie 
Committee, 1909, p. l2g.
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Allocation of Budget' by 
RequTrements and PrloritTe s
The major decision that systems analysis is concerned 
with in the PPB system is how resources are allocated.
Systems analysis makes budget allocations based on an 
explicit consideration of the effectiveness and costs of 
different programs. An alternative approach to budget 
allocation mi.ght be termed the "requirements approach,"
Under this approach the system, procedure, process, or 
action that is "required" is determined. It is checked to 
see if it is technically feasible, and if so, the necessary 
funds are allocated. This approach is unreasonable if the 
basic constraint is considered that "requirements" are 
greater than resources available to achieve them. It is, 
therefore, unrealistic for the government ever to consider 
embarking on a program without some consideration of cost. 
Eventually every government program must meet the test of 
cost.l The basic difference between the requirements 
approach and systems analysis is that costs are explicitly
considered in the evaluation of alternatives rather than in
2a secondary and informal manner.
Another alternative to the use of systems analysis 
for the allocation of resources can be termed the "priorities 
approach," where desirable items are listed in their order
^Hitch, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis," Defense. 
Science. and Public Policy, ed. by Mansfield, p. bO.
^Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense. pp. 121-22,
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of priority. This appears to be a systematic way of per­
forming allocation, but the basic question is still unan­
swered; How much should be allocated to the item on the top 
of the list? Suppose the item on the top of the list can 
absorb funds almost without limitation. For example, the 
capability of a nuclear retaliatory force might be the 
highest-priority need in the United States. Does this mean 
that all federal funds should be allocated to this need and 
none for a limited-war capability, nuclear defense, educa­
tion, natural resources, etc.? Obviously this is not de­
sirable, What is necessary is a system that considers the 
marginal dollar, i.e., at what point the last dollar spent 
for a nuclear retaliatory force would be better used in some 
other area. This latter question is one of allocation, not 
a listing of priorities, and involves the matching of costs 
and objectives, or, in other words, systems analysis.^
Applicability and Effectiveness 
of Systems Analysis
Systems analysis is applicable to most decisions in 
the governmental sector. It is only at the lowest levels 
that analytical efforts are able to "make" the decision.^ 
More often systems analysis has a limited (but important) 
input into the decision process. This is particularly true
•̂ Ibid.. pp. 122-23.
^At the level where analytical efforts can make the 
decision, they should be termed "operations research" as 
defined earlier.
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at the highest levels of decisions. Even when benefits can 
be converted into dollars it is not generally possible to 
compare programs across broad functional lines (e.g., high­
way programs to health programs to natural-resource pro­
grams).^ This is because the judgments, assumptions, and 
environmental conditions operating on the programs are not 
consistent across these broad lines.^ William Gorham, 
Assistant Secretary (Program Evaluation) of the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, noted this in testimony 
before a Congressional committee;
Let me hasten to point out that we have not attempted 
any grandiose cost-benefit analyses designed to reveal 
whether the total benefits from an additional million 
dollars spent on health programs would be higher or lower 
than that from an additional million spent on education 
or welfare. If I was ever naive enough to think this 
sort of analysis possible, I no longer am. The benefits 
of health, education, and welfare programs are diverse 
and often intangible. They affect different age groups 
and different regions of the population over different 
periods of time. No amount of analysis is going to tell 
us whether the Nation benefits more from sending a slum 
child to pre-school, providing medical care to an old 
man or enabling a disabled housewife to resume her normal 
activities. The "grand decisions" —  how much health, 
how much education, how much welfare, and which groups
Ijohn Haldi, "Issues of Analysis in Cost-Effectiveness 
Studies for Civilian Agencies of the Federal Government," 
Systems. Organization . Analysis. Management : A Book of
'Readings, ed. by David I. Cleland and William R. King, p. 272,
^This means that cancer-control programs which have 
benefit/cost ratios of 4:1 to 9:1 cannot be considered con­
clusively better than vocational rehabilitation programs 
with 3:1 to 6:1 ratios or even water resource projects with 
benefit/cost ratios only slightly in excess of 1:1.
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in the population shall benefit —  are questions of 
value Judgements and politics.^
This does not mean that systems analysis has no input 
into these decisions of broad allocation. However, the best 
that it can do is provide a summary type of trade-off 
analysis by showing what can be done in two (or more) areas 
with the same amount of money.^
Systems analysis seems to have its greatest strength 
in areas where the alternatives are relatively similar and 
a common objective is being pursued.3 Even in these areas, 
hoping to determine an optimum alternative is too optimis­
tic. A more attainable goal is that systems analysis can 
help to avoid the more inefficient alternatives and to point 
out better alternatives than the one which might have been 
intuitively chosen.^
The user of systems analysis in the government PPBS 
should recognize that there is no truly "scientific" way to 
make large complex decisions. There are better and worse 
ways that are more or less systematic, more or less compre-
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System; Progress and Poten­
tials . Hearings. before the Subcommittee on Economy in 
Government, 19b7, p. 5.
pU. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Guide­
lines. 1969, p. 37,
^E. S. Quade, Military Systems Analysis, pp. 4-5.
^Alfred H. Weimann, "Decision-Making and Resource 
Allocation," (unpublished thesis. Air Command and Staff 
College, 1966), p. 62,
78
henslve, and more or less explicit. The proper use of 
systems analysis is one of the better ways.l
Integrative System 
The fact that a governmental unit has a program 
structure, a multi-year financial and program plan, and an 
analytic capability does not mean that they have an operating 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, A system of proce­
dures that integrates these components and ensures that the 
analytic effort is brought into the mainstream of decision­
making is required.
Relationship of Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting
One of the major reasons for the development of PPBS 
was that a separation existed between planning and budgeting. 
The programming function was devised to bridge the gap 
existing between these two.^ When planning and budgeting 
were separated, the budgetary process dominated planning 
because the budget was where final decisions on the alloca­
tion of resources were concentrated.^
The tasks involved in each of these phases include ;
Ipeter Szanton, "The Present and Future of PPBS: 
Status and Plans," Information Support. Program Budgeting 
and tne Congress, ed. by Robert L. Chartrand, Kenneth Janda 
and Michael Hugo, p, 213.
2Gene H. Fisher," Some Comments on Program Budgeting 
in the Department of Defense, p. 6.
^Held, "PPBS Comes to Washington," Planning.
Progratflning"Budgeting, ed. by Lyden and Miller, p. 13.
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planning —  choosing major objectives; identifying problems; 
posing alternatives and evaluating them in terms of re­
sources, effectiveness, and major inter-relationships; and 
making major choices of desirable alternatives; programming —  
performing more detailed planning and feasibility testing; 
scheduling programs and making resource allocation deci­
sions between programs and time; and budgeting —  making 
firm decisions for resource use for the first year of the 
program plan.l
The nature of information used in each of these steps 
also varies. In planning, program details are general and 
the costs are only "rough" estimates. In programming, 
more details of the program are available but the costs are
still tentative. By its very nature, budgeting requires
2firm program details and precise costs.
These three steps could also be considered checks on 
the feasibility of the program. During planning, fiscal 
feasibility is a criteria of decision, but it is not over­
riding because of the rough nature of cost estimates. Fiscal 
feasibility is a greater consideration during programming, 
and budgeting makes the final determination of fiscal
David Novick and Daniel J. Alesch, Program 
Budgeting; Its Underlying Systems. Concepts and International 
Dissemination, pp. 9-10.
^State-Local Finances Project, The Role and Nature of 
Cost Analysis in a PPB System, pp. 2-4.
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feasibility.^
An ideal planning-programming-budgeting cycle would 
proceed as follows:
1, Planning would be performed continuously,
2, Programming (by program analysis) would occur in the 
first nine months of the year prior to the budget year.
At the end of this time all program decisions would be made. 
These decisions would be firm for the first year (the budget 
year) and tentative for subsequent years,
3, Budgeting would be performed in the last three months, 
based on the program decisions which had been made earlier. 
The concentration in this phase would be the translation of 
program requirements to budgetary terms and questions of 
efficiency rather than program decisions.2 As Frederick C, 
Mosher noted: Budgeting is the ingredient of planning which
disciplines the entire process.3 It Is at this point that 
all of the competing program claims are reduced to one common 
denominator —  the need for budgeted dollars.
The entire process may then be thought of as circular, 
with each step affecting previous ones:
^Smithies, Budgetary Process, pp, 23-25.
^This was adapted from State-Local Finances Project, 
development of initiaT Instructions to Inaugurate a Planning- 
Prograitiming-Budggting System: Some Preliminary bonsidera-
tions and wodel Insiruction to be Adapted for Local Use.p, Ao,
3Frederick C, Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory







Each step In the process defines to a more finite degree 
the matching of objectives and resources.
Program Change Procedures 
Within this generalized framework of plannlng- 
programmlng-budgetlng, the system used to Integrate the other 
three components of PPBS (program structure, multi-year 
program, and analytical capability) can be discussed. In 
the Department of Defense the system Is primarily built 
around the multi-year program. This plan projects outputs 
for eight years and finances for five years. It Is a record 
of the program decisions made and Is used as a base line 
for change. Planning Is performed continuously, and the 
results of these plans are translated Into the multi-year 
program by Program Change Proposals CPCP’s ). The PGP’s are 
approved at various levels In the Department of Defense In 
accordance with pre-established "threshold" values. All
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p o p 's are to be supported by analytic studies.^
Outside of the BCD no formal mechanism exists to
routinely translate planning decisions into the multi-year
program. The major documents used to integrate the
government-wide system are Program Memoranda, Special
Analytic Studies, and Issue Letters. Program Memoranda
(PM's) are defined as;
. . , presenting a statement of the program issues, a 
comparison of the cost and effectiveness of alternatives 
for resolving those issues in relation to objectives, 
the agency head's recommendations on programs to be 
carried out, and the reasons for those decisions.
PM’s . . . provide the documentation for the strategic 
decisions recommended for the budget year.2
The Program Memoranda incorporate the results of any
analyses that bear on the issue in question.
The Special Analytic Studies provide the analytic
background for PM's, This is a broad category of document
meaning " . . .  any piece of work analyzing a particular
problem with the objective of coming to conclusions that can
be used in the policy-making process."3 The areas where
Special Analytic Studies are performed are determined by the
David Novick, Program Budgeting: Long-Range Planning
in the Department of Defense, pp. 8-11 and State-Local 
Finances Project, Initial Instructions, pp. 6-7.
^U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget. Planning,' Programming. Budgeting (PPB) System, 
BOB Bulletin No."68-§',"p‘. 5.----  ---- -------- -----
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol.
irri5^'57“p. 618.
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head of the agency Involved and in response to Issue Letters 
from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 
"Issue Letters are letters from the Budget Director to the 
agency heads defining the major policy issues that should 
receive attention during the current planning and budgeting 
cycle."!
The system used to integrate parts of PPBS in the 
Federal Government has its basis in this Issue Letters- 
Special Analytic Studies-Program Memoranda cycle. The 
Issue Letters ensure that certain areas of policy are sub­
jected to formal analysis. Analyses performed under this 
direction and from other guidance are called Special Analytic 
Studies. These form the background data for the Program 
Memoranda, which summarize decisions recommended to the 
President in the multi-year program. Requests for appro­
priations in the current budget year are based on approved 
PM's.2
PPBS and Traditional and 
Performance Budgets'
Before drawing a distinction between PPBS and the 
traditional and performance budgets, it is necessary to estab­
lish a theoretical basis of this distinction. Robert N.
!lbid.
2lt should be noted that the Department of Defense 
also uses Program Memoranda (called the Draft Presidential 
Memoranda) in addition to the Program Change Proposal cycle 
to integrate analysis into the multi-year program and into 
the budget cycle.
8H
Anthony notes three separate but interrelated activities 
that are required in an ongoing organization. These are 
defined as :
Strategic planning is the process of deciding on 
objectives of the organization, on changes in these 
objectives, on the resources used to attain these objec­
tives, and on the policies that are to govern the ac­
quisition, use, and disposition of these resources.
Management control is the process by which managers 
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively 
and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organiza­
tion’s objectives.
Operational control is the process of assuring that 
specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficient-ly.i
It is unrealistic to expect a single budgetary pre­
sentation to provide the data necessary to perform all three 
of these tasks. The three different budgets noted earlier 
conform to the needs of these different tasks. This is 
shown in Table
Traditional Budget
The difference between PPBS and the traditional budget 
is considerable. PPBS is future oriented (five years or 
more) and organized by programs, while the traditional budget 
is historically oriented with a horizon of only one year and 
organized by object inputs. This difference can be easily 
noted in the case of the Department of Defense which is shown
^Robert N. Anthony, Planning and Control Systems:
A Framework for Analysis, pp. 16-I0I
^The use of multi-purpose budgets is more developed 
in industry. Appendix A-9 contains a discussion of tradi­
tional, performance, and PPBS concepts in private Industry 
to better Illustrate the differences between them.
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(1) Budget type PPBS Performance Traditional
C2) Budget information Program Activity Input Object




cal, conforms to 
organizational lines
Internal, histori­
cal, conforms to 
organizational lines
GO






(5) Time horizon Long Short (1 year) Short (1 year)
(6) Personnel primarily Top management 
served and staff




It is a misconception to believe that PPBS can 
totally replace the traditional budget. The input orienta­
tion of the traditional budget is required for budget 
execution and operational control. Generally managers do 
not buy outputs; they buy input objects —  people, travel, 
etc. Effective control requires that attention be paid to 
these items.^ It is equally untrue that the use of a 
traditional budget implies that a PPBS-type budget is not 
required.
Performance Budget 
There exists a great deal of confusion regarding the 
distinction between PPBS and performance budgets. Many 
writers in the area of performance budgeting see program 
budgeting (which they equate to PPBS) as only an interim step 
to performance budgeting.3 This is not correct since PPBS 
is designed to serve strategic planning, and performance 
budgeting is designed to serve management control.
Appendix A-10 compares the traditional budget to 
the PPBS budget for the education part of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare.
^William Capron, "Development of Cost-Effectiveness 
Systems in the Federal Government," Information Support, 
ed. by Chartrand, Janda and Hugo, p. 14$.
^Examples of this are found in George A. Terhune, 
•pe'rTormance and Program Budgeting Practices in the TJhited 
States' and Canada, p. 1. ana Gladys M. kammerer. Program 
Budgeting; An TTd to Understanding, pp. 4-5.
TABLE 5




Operation and maintenance 
Procurement





Revolving and management funds 
Other
Strategic forces 
General purpose forces 
Intelligence and communication 
Airlift and sealift 
Guard and reserve forces 
Research and development 
Central supply and maintenance
Training, medical, and other general 
personnel activities
Administration and associated 
activities




There are important similarities and equally impor­
tant distinctions between PPBS and performance budgets.
Both of these identify programs within government agencies.
It is not necessarily true that the programs are equivalent. 
Programs under performance budgeting are designed with an 
internal view and to assist management control. Programs 
for PPBS are designed by looking outside of the organization 
to the over-all purposes performed. One of the early in­
structions to Federal Government agencies on PPBS gave an 




Vessel Operations Search and Rescue
Aviation Operations Aids to Navigation
Shore Stations and Aids Law Enforcement
Operation Military ReadinessRepair and Supply Facilities Merchant Marine Safety
Training and Recruiting Oceanography and Other
Facilities Operations
Administration and Operational Supporting Service
Control 
Other Military Personnel 
Expanse 
Supporting Programs-*-
Even if the major programs established by performance 
budgeting are the same as those required under PPBS, the re­
mainder of the program structure would not necessarily be 
equivalent. Under performance budgeting, programs are broken 
into subfunctions, departments, activities, and sub-
U, S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Planning. Programming. Budgeting. BOB Bulletin 
No. 66-3, (Ocïb"6érri2," 1565)7 Exfiiblt 5.
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activities,^ This can be contrasted to the process of 
structuring programs under PPBS which was noted earlier.
The main distinction is that performance budgeting requires 
that lines of organizational activities be noted and used 
in the structure since management control is exercised 
through the organizational lines. PPBS, on the other hand, 
ignores organizational lines in the designation of program 
elements.
Another similarity between PPBS and performance bud­
gets is that both require output measures. There is, however, 
a basic distinction between the output measures. In per­
formance budgeting the output measures are used to measure 
the rate of activity that is being achieved for a specific 
level of inputs versus the rate of activity that should be 
achieved. PPBS output indicators are trying to measure the 
h'enefit that is being received for the level of inputs pro­
vided. As a result, many of the output indicators used in 
performance budgeting Include "intermediate" outputs as well 
as "final" outputs (those furnished directly to the client 
of the service). PPBS output indicators should focus on 
final outputs.2
There are many examples of output indicators that are
^Municipal Finance Officers Association, Performance 
Budgeting' and Unit Cost Accounting for Governmental Units.
2Charles Christenson, "Program Budgeting" (Unpublished 
paper. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, August, 1968), pp. 8-9.
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commonly used in performance budgeting. Some of these in­
clude requisitions processed in a purchasing department of 
a government organization, checks processed in a financial 
department, case-load in a welfare department, etc. It 
should be noted that it is often necessary to use output 
measures in PPBS that are essentially activity rates —  
e.g., number of patients served in medical programs and 
number of students in educational programs. However, the 
purpose of thess output indicators is not to measure the 
efficiency by which an organization is performing the acti­
vity but to act as a proximate measure of the benefits 
being achieved by the program. These should be used only in 
absence of a more direct form of benefit measurement.
There are other major differences between performance 
budgeting and program budgeting. Performance budgeting is 
largely oriented toward the review of past performance, with 
a high degree of emphasis on performance reports. PPBS 
relies on evaluation of past performance but only as a method 
to increase its capability to view the future. Performance 
budgeting must serve line management at all levels of the 
organization, from the lowest supervisor to the head of the 
department. PPBS is primarily designed to serve top manage­
ment in the making of major decisions, and the line manage­
ment becomes largely an instrument for the input of data.^
It should also be noted that a well-developed
Ijesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting. p. 139.
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performance budget Is an aid to PPBS. The data on activi­
ties that is provided by performance budgets is helpful in 
analysis of alternatives —  particularly resource require­
ments.^
PPBS and the Federal Government's 
Budgetary Process
"Disjointed Incrementalism"^
The budgetary process in the Federal Government has 
been called "disjointed incrementalism," "the science of 
muddling through,"3 and "five percentmanship budgeting."^
The "base" of the budget is established on what has been 
conducted in the past, and the desirability of this "base" 
is seldom questioned. Most budget review is concentrated 
on the marginal adjustments made in the budget requests 
from the previous period. Normally for any given agency 
these marginal adjustments are requested increases in the 
budget. These Increases are subjected to intense scrutiny, 
both within the administration and in Congress, and usually 
result in some reduction of, but not a total elimination of.
^Stanley T. Gabis, Mental Health and Financial 
Mahagement;• Some Dilemmas of Program Budgeting. p.T.
complete discussion of "Disjointed Incrementalism" 
is found in Wildavsky, Budgetary Process.
3charles L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of 
Public Spending, p. 4?.
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Progress 
arid Pdfentiale Hearings. 1969, p. 207.
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the Increase requested.^
The advocates of this form of budgeting state that 
It Is preferable because the complex problem of managing the 
Federal Government Is broken Into segments small enough to 
be handled. The fact that the budget process Is then com­
posed of a number of small decisions means that a multi­
plicity of values Is accommodated and conflicts are more 
easily resolved.^
Zero-Based Budgeting
The opposite of "disjointed IncrementalIsm" Is
called "zero-based budgeting."
[Zero-based budgeting] means that Instead of accepting 
the established base of the program and challenging 
only the Increments, that you assume that the base 
should be zero. The agency must therefore every year 
or every couple of years. Justify the base of the program 
rather than Just the Incremental amounts,3
Some Individuals view PPBS as a form of zero-based 
budgeting. They would regard Figure 2 as an accurate repre­
sentation of the PPBS process.^ Object Inputs are converted 
to specific activities and these activities converted to
^Wlldavsky, Budgetary Process, pp. 3-60.
^IbId., pp. 166-67.
^Testimony of Dr. James R. Schleslnger, U. S.,
Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Planning. 
FrograMn'lng,' Budgeting. Inquiry, of the Subcommittee on 
National Security and International Operations, p. 493.
^Thls figure was adapted from a model In Robert 
Stephen Brent, "A Model of the Planning, Programming, and 































specific program outputs which are converted to a one­
dimensional "social value." At the same time, costs (both 
financial and nonfinancial) are noted. By the use of 
Lagrangian multipliers (or some other mathematical program) 
the social value is maximized for all possible budget 
levels.
This equation of PPBS and zero-based budgeting can 
be noted by the statements of several users of PPBS. 
Governor George Romney, in introducing PPBS in Michigan, 
stated:
This notion of "zero-base budgeting" is not new, 
but it is in sharp contrast to the incremental tech­
nique of budgetary analysis.!
Another advocate of PPBS stated:
Approval of a particular spending project cannot be 
based on the certainty that it will yield some social 
benefits, since the variety of projects which would 
produce such results is virtually unlimited. Rather, 
it must be based on the conclusion that a program has 
a higher return to society than would expenditures on 
all alternative programs not being undertaken.2
This view of PPBS as a gigantic optimizing model 
does not consider the following major problems:
1. There is not any group of individuals who are able to 
construct a model such as is shown in Figure 2. This model 
far exceeds the capacity of man to solve problems.
2. This model does not consider the lack of a complete.
!paul H. Wileden, "Development of a PPB System in 
the State of Michigan," Innovations. U. S., Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, 1969, p. 46.
^William J. Brown, The Federal Budgeting and Appro­
priations Process. pp. 33-34.
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authoritative source of values that could convert diverse 
program outputs into a social value unit or even convert 
different inputs, activities, and program outputs into non­
financial costs.
3. This model does not recognize the inadequacy of infor­
mation from which the production matrix, technological 
matrix, and financial cost matrix would be constructed.
4. This model does not recognize the cost of analysis that 
would be required to develop these matrices from the raw 
data.l
The only major attempt in the Federal Government to 
achieve "zero-base" budgeting was in the Department of 
Agriculture in 1962. This attempt demonstrated that the 
time required for "zero-base" budgeting was not available 
in a normal budget cyclej that there was a noticeable lack 
of theory about the effect on outputs if inputs were varied; 
and that there was a lack of ability to compare programs 
with diverse outputs.^ After this "zero-based" budget was 
completed it was found that more detail and documentation 
was generated (much more than the central staff could digest 
in the time available) and the character of the budget
1These criticisms were adapted from the list of 
problems of "synoptic" decision-making in David Braybrooke 
and Charles E. Lindbloom, A Strategy of Decision, pp. 48-57
^Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammann, "Comprehensive 
Versus Incremental Budgeting in the Department of Agricul­
ture," Flahning. Frograiming. Budgeting, ed. by Lyden and 
Miller, p. 142.
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changed slightly from previous incrementally prepared 
budgets.1
PPBS in the Budget Process
It is obvious that if PPBS attempts to become a 
"zero-based” budgeting device it is doomed to failure. The 
magnitude of that task is overwhelming. In fact, the PPBS 
concept has mucn more modest goals than "zero-based” bud­
geting.
A well-designed PPBS recognizes that a "grand 
optimum” of budget allocations is not possible. This does 
not imply that budget allocations should not be placed on as 
rational a basis as possible.
PPBS does not claim to be so comprehensive that all 
allocations in the budget are based on in-depth analysis. 
Most budget review continues on an incremental basis because 
of the lack of analytic capability to consider all alloca­
tion issues, PPBS is comprehensive only to the extent that 
over time all programs could be dealt with in an analytical 
manner.2 The PPBS concept holds, however, that there are
^Ihld.. pp. 144-47.
^Selma Mushkin and Brian Herman, The Search for 
Alternatives : • Program Options in a PPB System, p. B. Even 
this degree of comprehensiveness is theoretical. Many pro­
gram areas will never be subjected to in-depth analysis 
because they do not consume enough resources to make this 
analysis worthwhile and/or because the state of the problem 
is so intractable that the results of the analysis would not 
prove beneficial.
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some types of decisions where analysis Is essential. Some 
decisions are not Incremental In nature, and an Incremental 
approach to these would be Inadequate.^
It should also be noted that uncertainty Is so great 
in most analyses that the resulting decision causes change 
In small Increments that closely corresponds to "disjointed 
lncrementallsm."2 The difference between these changes Is 
that the PPBS advocate recommends these small changes be­
cause of an explicit consideration of uncertainty and not 
because It Is easier to "sell" In the budgeting process. 
Changes which should not be Incremental are possible under 
the PPBS concept and not under the "disjointed incrementalism" 
process.
The major differences between "disjointed Incrementa- 
llsm" and PPBS are more of philosophy than of technique.3 
These differences can be summarized as follows;
1. In "disjointed Incrementalism" the budgetary process Is 
important. What Is achieved with the budget Is assumed to 
be "good" because the process Is "good." In PPBS the output 
Is explicitly examined.
Schultze, Public Spending, pp. 77-82. Examples of 
this type of decision are new, major programs and large, 
expensive military weapon systems.
^William M. Capron, "The Impact of Analysis on 
Bargaining In Government," (Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association,
New York City, 1966).
^Edward A. McCreary, "That New Federal Budgeting Sys­
tem, " personnel Admin istrat ion. XXIX (September/October, 1966) , ---------
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2» In "disjointed incrementalism" the bargaining process 
is most important. In PPBS alternatives and analysis are 
most important.
3» "Disjointed incrementalism" focuses on the past, with 
current positions protected and expanded. PPBS focuses on 
the future and does not consider the "base" as secure.^
Summary
This chapter has laid a framewohk for considering 
the training needs in the Federal Government’s Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System. The basic philosophy of PPBS 
was described by Charles L. Schultze as;
Planning, programming, and budgeting constitutes an 
attempt to integrate policy formulation with budgetary 
resource allocation, and to provide a means for regu­
larly bringing systematic analysis to bear on both 
policy formulation and budget allocation.^
^Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems 
Budgeting," Public Administration Review, XXIX (March/ 
April, 1969),T3B-39.
^Schultze, Public Spending, p. 15.
CHAPTER II
HISTORY OP PPBS
There is a tendency for some writers in the PPBS 
area to assume that the system was developed and implemented 
in the Federal Government totally without historical 
precedent. This is untrue. Like most governmental sys­
tems, PPBS is a product of evolution. The general history 
of budgeting and some specific antecedents of PPBS will be 
discussed in this chapter. The conditions which precipitated 
the need for a change from traditional budgeting will then 
be explored. Finally, the process of implementation of PPBS 
in the Department of Defense and its expansion into the 
nondefense sector of the government will be discussed.
History of Budgeting 
Since 1789, with the passage of the Treasury Act, 
the budgetary process has been a part of the political his­
tory of the United States. The history of budgeting can be 
divided into four general phases; early history, 1789— 1920; 
expenditure control, 1921— 19^9; performance budgeting,




The budget became one of the first points of poli­
tical conflict in the United States, One of the earliest 
disagreements between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas 
Jefferson revolved around the budget. While Hamilton was 
the Secretary of Treasury he received only a few lump-sum 
appropriations.
For instance, from 1791 to 1794, there was one 
appropriation for the Civil List, one for the Depart­
ment of War, one to cover Treasury warrants outstanding 
and one to cover other listed expenditures. The 
Treasury was given wide latitude in the use of funds.^
Thomas Jefferson opposed this offhanded way of treating
government monies. When he became President, his first
message to the Congress stated:
In our care, too, of the public contributions en­
trusted to our direction it would be prudent to multiply 
barriers against their dissipation by appropriating 
specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible of 
definition; by disallowing all applications of money 
varying from the appropriated application or trans­
cending it in amount; by reducing the undefined field 
of contingencies and thereby circumscribing discre­
tionary powers over money.2
Hamilton violently opposed this proposition. He pointed out 
that then the Congress could conceivably have separate 
appropriations for oats and hay for horses and that cer­
tainly one would be oversupplied and the other undersupplied, 
The Army officer in charge of transportation would not have
^Smithies, Budgetary Process. p. 50.
2pred Wilbur Powell, Control of Federal Expenditures 
(Washington, 1939), p. 175 as cited fay gmithles. Budgetary"'
•process. p. 51.
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the authority to divert funds from the purchase of hay to 
the purchase of oats. By the time Congress got around to 
changing its appropriation, all of the horses could starve.1
The Jeffersonian view prevailed and the Congress 
attempted to provide funds limited to precise uses. The 
period from I8OI to 1921 was one of Congress appropriating 
monies and the executive branch working to circumvent the 
laws which rigidly bound them to specific purposes. Only 
during periods of crisis —  e.g., the Civil War and World 
War I —  did Congress formally relax the controls.
Through this same period one .other aspect character­
ized the budgeting process. Except under the first two 
Presidents, Washington and Adams, there was not an executive 
budget. Each department submitted its own budget request 
directly to the Congress and received direct authorizations 
to spend.2 This meant that the President had little control 
over budgetary decisions of the separate departments. This 
situation left Congress with the feeling that the executive 
branch was a "rudderless ship," with no one individual able 
to provide the necessary cohesion and direction.3 The 
amount of control that Congress actually exercised during
^Smithies, Budgetary Process, p. 52.
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluation. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
ÏÏ, 19'B'9. p. 614.
3capron, "Cost-Effectiveness Systems," Information 
support, ed. by Chartrand, Janda and Hugo, pp. 145-46,
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this period can be seen from the casual treatment of original 
appropriations by executive agencies. The agencies were 
certain that the Congress would not want their functions to 
be discontinued during the latter part of the fiscal year, 
so they treated the original appropriations as only partial 
funding and routinely approached the Congress for supple­
mental monies.1
Until 1920 there was little attempt to provide a 
systematic form of planning to the budgeting process. Of 
course, the functions performed by the Federal Government in 
this period were normally simple and straightforward, and 
there was little need for extensive plans.
Expenditure Control 
The second major period of budgetary history is 
noted by its emphasis on expenditure control. Because of 
the widespread use of supplemental appropriations, the degree 
of Congressional control of spending was questionable.
There was also no control over agency spending exercised by 
the President, since he was not an active participant in the 
budgetary cycle. The lack of active control was the force 
that generated the first major budgetary reform.
The Commission on Economy and Efficiency
The Commission on Economy and Efficiency was formed
Ijohn S. Saloma III, The Responsible Use of Power:
A' Critical Analysis' of the Congressional Budget Process.
p. 6.
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by President Taft in 1911. This group reported in 1912:
The best that a budget can do for the legislator is 
to enable him to have expert advice in thinking about 
policies to be determined. His review of the economy 
and efficiency with which work has been done should be 
based on facts set forth in the annual reports of ex­
penditures which would supplement the budget.
To the administrator the advantage to be gained 
through a budget is the ability to present to the legis­
lature and to the people, through the Chief Executive 
or someone representing the administration, a well- 
defined, carefully considered, lucidly expressed wel­
fare program to be financed, and in presenting this, 
to support requests for appropriation with such concrete 
data as are necessary to the intelligent consideration 
of such a program.
To the Executive the advantage to be gained lies in 
his ability to bring together the facts and opinions 
necessary to the clear formulation of proposals for 
which he is willing actively to work as the responsible 
officer. To the people the advantage is the fact that 
they are taken into the confidence of their official 
agents. Therein lie the practical use and purpose of 
the budget,1
The Commission made five major proposals for reform:
1. The budget should show not only the expenditures and 
receipts that were provided by existing laws but include the 
"budgetary consequences of new legislation . . . proposed by 
the President." This meant that the President was to be 
recognized as a definite author of policy as well as an 
agent to carry out the will of the Congress,
2, The budget should be formulated in terms of "programs
or functions" broken into capital and current outlays. This 
breakout was not to replace the traditional organizational 
units and object classifications (travel, personal services.
'̂Ta'ff Contmiss'ioh on Economy and Efficiency. 62d 
Cong., 2d sess,. House Doc. Ü54, p. 139, as cited by Smithies, 
Bu'dgefary Process. p. 68.
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etc.) but was to be a supplementary breakout.
3. Congress should recognize a distinct difference between 
the programs recommended and the question of economy and ; 
efficiency.
4. Vertical arrangements should be established so that the 
authority existed to shift funds from one appropriation to 
another with decreasing discretion to lower levels of the 
executive branch. For example, the President would have 
more discretion to move appropriations than the department 
head who would have more than the next lower level, etc., 
until the appropriation categories were absolutely rigid,
5. A systematic procedure of review of the budget should 
be established by the Congress. This review would include 
annual reports to the Congress on what was actually spent 
plus increases and decreases in inventories, etc.l
The Commission study provided a basis for much of the 
ensuing reform of budgeting. The political climate of 1912 
did not permit serious consideration of this far-reaching 
document. Only after the end of World War I and the drive 
for economy that accompanied the cessation of hostilities 
were the proposals of the Commission reviewed. These pro­
posals laid the foundation for the Budgeting and Accounting 
Act of 1921.2
^Smithies, Budgetary Process, pp. 68-71.
2Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for the Program 
Budget," Program Budgeting. ed. by Novick, p. 30.
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Budgeting and Aocounting Act of 1921
The Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 Is the basic 
budgeting law in effect today. It made three changes to the 
budgeting system. First, the act provided for a comprehen­
sive executive budget by the President. The flexibility 
that was recommended In the use of appropriations was not 
Included. The second change was the organization of the 
Bureau of the Budget. This office was placed under the 
Secretary of the Treasury and was responsible for assisting 
the President In developing the total executive budget.
"The Bureau Is directed to prepare the budget and Is em­
powered to assemble, correlate, revise, reduce or increase 
the estimates of the several departments or establishments." 
Also, the Bureau was authorized to make studies required by 
the President to determine which changes were necessary to 
achieve "greater economy and efficiency." The third change 
was to transfer the Comptroller of the Treasury to a new 
organization, the General Accounting Office (GAO), under a 
Comptroller General of the United States. This office was 
removed from direct control by the President and Is generally 
regarded by the Congress as their agent. (The Comptroller 
General's appointment is by the President but for a term of 
fifteen years).^
The changes made by the act did not meet the entire 
scope recommended by the Taft Commission, There was no
^Smithies, Budgetary Process. pp. 72-76.
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provision for a budget classification based on functions or 
programs. The main area of contention of the act regarded 
the placement and authority of the GAO. President Wilson 
originally vetoed the act but it was later accepted, un­
changed, by President Harding.^
Expenditure' 'Control Budget Operation
The role of the budget during this period can easily 
be seen from the operation and emphasis of the Bureau of the 
Budget. Almost all of the broader aspects of the management 
of government programs were neglected, and "paper clip" 
efficiency was enforced. In a speech by General H. M, Lord, 
who was Director of the Bureau of the Budget from 1922 to 
1929, the primary use of the budget was noted:
Investigation by a representative of the department 
of which the bureau was a part disclosed loss or theft 
of towels by the hundreds, while more than 500 soiled 
towels were discovered tucked away in desks, file cases, 
and closets. The simple and obvious requirement that 
an employee turn in a soiled towel in order to secure a 
clean one was immediately put into effect.^
It is not surprising that the most narrow function of 
management was given the greatest attention during this 
period. The activities of the government were limited, and 
the budget of the Federal Government amounted to a small
'̂'Ib'id.. p. 76.
^Addresses of the' President of the United States' and 
the Director' 'of the BureaûTôf the feudget. Regular Meeting of 
the Business Organization of the Government, Ninth Regular 
Meeting, June 22, 1925, pp. 15-16, as cited in Schultze, 
Public Spending, p. 11.
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percentage of the Gross National Product.^
'Period of Transition
After the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921, no 
major change In budgeting occurred for eighteen years. At 
that time economic changes made the existing organizational 
relationships Inadequate. The depression of 1929 caused a 
major change In the activities of the Federal Government.
With the proliferation of new agencies and programs, control 
and co-ordination by the President became more difficult. 
President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management 
proposed that the President be given greater staff assistance, 
and the Reorganization Act of 1939 provided for an Executive 
Office to advise the President directly. The Bureau of the 
Budget was moved from the Treasury Department to this office 
In that year. In this new organization, the Bureau of the 
Budget began to "exercise a more Important and a more effec­
tive role in coordinating Federal activities and In assisting 
the President to formulate and enforce public policy through 
budgeting.
Even with this organizational change, the budgeting 
process continued to focus on organizational entitles and 
objects purchased. Further emphasis on budget change was 
provided by the Hoover Commissions.
^Schultze, Public Spending, p. 12.
^Alaln C. Enthoven, "Introduction," Modern Design, 
ed. by Tucker, p. 2.
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Performance Budgeting 
After World War II it became evident that the scope 
of activities of the Federal Government had undergone a 
massive change since the 1920's. Many writers recommended 
that the sole emphasis on input-oriented budgets be elimi­
nated. This was expressed by the Hoover Commission of 19^9 
in its final report:
Some of the fiscal concepts of the Federal Govern­
ment come down from Alexander Hamilton, They were 
archaic when the total expenditures of the Government 
were $4,000,000,000 per annum. Now with a Government 
which expends over $40,000,000,000 per annum, they are 
totally inadequate. They have been patched up over the 
years, but, even so, they contribute to wasted efforts 
and even defeat the capable management and initiative 
of the best of officials.
The time has come when the budgeting and accounting 
system of the Federal Government must be modernized. 
Unless this is done, the Congress, the executive branch, 
and the public will be unable intelligently to Judge 
the wisdom of the proposed expenditures and the effec­
tiveness of past expenditures,!
To correct this problem the Hoover Commission of 1949 recom­
mended that "the whole budgetary concept of the Federal 
Government should be refashioned by the adoption of a budget 
based upon functions, activities and projects: this we
designate a ’performance budget.
The Congress adopted the Hoover Commission Report in
^Commission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Budgeting and Accounting. February, 
1949, p. 1, as cited by Smithies, Budgetary Process. p. 7.
pCommission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Budgeting and Accounting. February, 
1949, p, 8, as cited by SmithiesBudgetary Process. p, 83.
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the Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. This 
act made the use of traditional object classifications for 
budgets subject to the wishes of the individual appropria­
tions subcommittee. The subcommittees have continued to 
insist on the detailed breakdown, and the "performance 
budget" was never achieved,^
The second Hoover Commission in 1955 recognized that 
the changes made by the law of 1950 did not reach their 
envisioned goal. In their report they recommended:
That the executive budget continue to be based on 
functions, activities, and projects adequately supported 
by information on program costs and accomplishments, and 
by a review of performance by organizational units where 
these do not coincide with performance budget classifi­
cations.
That the agencies take further steps to synchronize 
their organization structures, budget classifications, 
and accounting systems.
That executive agency budgets be formulated and ad­
ministered on a cost b a s i s . 2
With its emphasis on the performance of organizational 
units in connection with budgeting, it is obvious that the 
major budgetary practice advocated by the Hoover Commissions 
was performance budgeting as defined in Chapter I and not 
PPBS. The implementation of the Hoover Commission’s
^Smithies, "Conceptual Framework," Program Budgeting, 
ed. by Novick, p. 30.
2Budget and Accounting (Washington, D. C,: U. S.
Government Printing Office, June, 1955), pp. 13-14, as cited 
by George A. Steiner, "Problems in Implementing Program 
Budgeting," Program’ Budgeting, ed. by Novick, pp. 313-14.
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performance budget has been "slow and only p a r t i a l . T h i s  
is not to say that these changes have not been significant. 
For example, the Army earlier submitted separate budgets for 
the Quartermaster Service, the Transportation Service, the 
Ordnance Service, etc. The National Security Act of 19^9 
with the Budgeting Act of 1950 changed this presentation to 
a "performance budget" using major classifications of 
Military Personnel; Operation and Maintenance; Procurement; 
Military Construction; and Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation. While this budget is still concentrated on 
inputs, the inputs conform to normal staff responsibilities 
and are more revealing than previous budget breakouts.^
Antecedents of PPBS 
In contrast to a totally unique, revolutionary system, 
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System adopted components 
that had been used earlier. PPBS’s major contribution was 
that it spread these components to parts of the government 
which had not practiced them before and institutionalized 
all of the components together into one operable system.
Each of the components of PPBS —  program structure, multi­
year projections, and analytical studies —  have definite 
historical precedents.
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Program Budgeting —  Applying 
Economic Analysis to Government Decisions," Planning. 
Programming/ Budgeting. ed. by Lyden and Miller, p. l68.
^Smithies, "Conceptual Framework," Program Budgeting. 
ed. by Novick, pp. 30-33.
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Program Structure
As noted In Appendix A-9, the philosophy of the 
program structure has long existed in private industry. The 
bases of most industrial budgets are program or product 
decisions.
The concept of grouping the Federal Government's 
budget into program lines was well developed shortly after 
World War II. As early as 1946 the total federal budget was 
aggregated into very broad functional programs such as major 
national security, labor and welfare, commerce and housing, 
and inter-national affairs and finance.^ These classifica­
tions are too broad to serve as an effective basis for 
analysis, but they do establish the precedence of program 
structuring.
Another precedent to program structure in budgets was 
the work of the War Materials Board during World War II. 
During the early years this board attempted to control the 
demand on critical materials by controlling these materials 
in the contractor's plant with the Production Requirements 
Plan. This plan was unsuccessful because the broad program 
decisions were not made first —  i.e., how many tanks, 
planes, etc. should be made from the materials. In 1943 a 
Controlled Materials Plan, that allocated critical materials 
on the basis of end items, was instituted. For the remainder
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Planning. Programming. 
Budgeting. Inquiry. 1969, p. 325.
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of World War II this method continued to be used.^
Another application of a program budget in the Federal 
Government was by the Tennessee Valley Authority, Prom the 
time of its first budget in 1933, TVA’s budget has been in 
program terms, TVA's operations were divided into four 
major programs: navigation, flood control, and power;
fertilizer and munitions; resource development; and general 
service. Each of these were subdivided into sub-programs 
and Individual elements which cut across the organizational 
lines,2
One of the major antecedents of PPBS in the Federal 
Government was the financial control system practiced by 
General Motors,3 In 1920 the General Motors Corporation 
faced financial crisis. In the words of Alfred P, Sloan,
Jr,, the president of this company:
The significance of the weakness in General Motors’ 
organization was not clearly visible during World War I 
and for a time during the postwar inflation. It first 
took critical form in late 1919 and 1920, At this time 
large sums were being allotted upon request to all
^David Novick, Melvin Anshen and W, G, Truppner, 
Wartime Production Controls, pp. 30-32,
^Burkhead, Government Budgeting, pp, 158-62,
^The connection between the system at General Motors 
and the Federal Government’s PPBS is relatively straight­
forward, After World War II, Ford Motor Company hired a 
group of General Motors’ executives to rejuvenate the company. 
The financial control system of General Motors is one of the 
techniques transplanted by these men. At the same time Ford 
also hired some young, former Air Force statistical control 
officers. One member of this latter group was Robert S. 
McNamara, who later, as Secretary of Defense, was the moving 
force behind the Defense Department’s adoption of PPBS,
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divisions for plant-expansion programs, and, at the 
same time, rising material and labor costs ate up these 
funds before the projected expansions could be com­
pleted, There were overruns on appropriations —  that 
is, expenditures beyond the established limits —  by 
almost every division.1
Inventories followed the same runaway course as the 
overruns on capital expenditure. In November 1919 pro­
duction schedules for the next fiscal year were set 36 
per cent higher than for the closing year. These pro­
duction schedules were made by rule of thumb, or the 
division manager's ambition. To meet the schedules, 
the divisions began immediately to make heavy purchases of inventory.2
Each division, in the absense of a corporation 
policy, operated independently, making its own price 
and production policies which landed some cars in iden­
tical price positions without relationship to the in­
terest of the enterprise as a whole.3
It was natural for the divisions to compete for 
investment funds, but it was irrational for the general 
officers of the corporation not to know where to place 
the money at best advantage.^
The financial control system introduced into General 
Motors by Donaldson Brown was one of the major tactics used 
to overcome these weaknesses. The basic concepts of that 
system are very similar to PPBS. These concepts were:
1. Major objectives for the firm were stated. The principal 
objective was that cars would be produced for all price 
lines from the lowest to the highest. The steps in this 
price line were specifically defined.
2. Individual cars were identified within these price lines.
3. Every investment was approved only after it had been
^Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., My Years With General Motors, 
ed. by John McDonald with Catherine Stevens, p. 27.
^Tbid.. p. 30. ^Ibid.. p. 60. ^Ibid., p. 48.
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thoroughly analyzed In light of these objectives —  including 
technical feasibility —  and after it had been proven that 
it provided the capability to earn a higher return on in­
vestment than possible alternative investments.^
In addition to these practical usages of program 
budgeting there were a number of recommendations that the 
concept of program budgeting be adopted by governmental 
agencies. One of the earliest of these was a study in 1907 
by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. This study 
recommended that budgets be presented in three classifica­
tions —  by function, by work programs, and by object of
expenditure.2
In the special area of defense there were a number of 
writers who began advocating PPBS shortly after World War II. 
One of the first papers was by Charles J. Hitch in 1949; 
he advocated the use of systems analysis for the allocation 
of the defense budget.^ David Novick of Rand Corporation^ 
was one of the earliest advocates of a complete PPBS. Novick 
recommended a program structure which was remarkably like
^Ibid., pp. 65-67 and 120.
^Schultze, Public Spending, p. 9.
^Planning Defense Production. Hitch later became 
the Comptroller in the Department of Defense and was one of 
the prime architects of PPBS.
Êfficiency and Economy in Government through Hew 
Budgeting and Accounting Procedures. C#ebruârÿ 1, 1954), and 
Which' ̂ ''Program" Do We Mean in Program Budgeting, '(May 12, 
1954). The first of these is the classic work in the area 
of PPBS as adopted by the Department of Defense.
116
the one which later evolved, with the exception that he 
recommended a separate program structure for each service.
At the same time Frederick C, Mosher was also advocating a 
program structure for each service,^ One of the first ad­
vocates of a program structure that crossed service lines 
was Roland McKean in 1959.^ The theory of structuring the 
budget in a program format in the Department of Defense was, 
therefore, relatively well developed by 196I.
By contrast, specific advocates of program struc­
turing of budgets in the nondefense sector were not as 
vocal. As early as 1949 a program structure was recommended 
for the entire government.  ̂ This recommendation was seconded 
by various writers through the next decade —  including 
Arthur Smithies (1955), Jesse Burkhead (1956), and Gerhard 
Colm (1955).^ These recommendations were general in nature.
It was 1965 before specific details on how a program struc­
ture could be developed in the nondefense sector of the 
government were published in a collected work by David Novick.5
Program Budgeting; Theory and Practice. (1954). 
Mosher•s suggested program budget appears to be oriented more 
toward performance budgeting than is the PPBS program struc­
ture.
’̂'Erva'lU'a'tTrtg Alternative Expenditure Programs.
^Don S. Burrows, "A Program Approach to Federal Bud­
geting," XXVII (May, 1949), 272-73.
^Smithies,' Budgetary Process ; Burkhead, Government 
Budgeting; and Gerhard Ùolm, The Federal Budget and the 
Hat lo'n'a'l Economy.
^Program Budgeting, ed. by Novick.
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In spite of all of these efforts and general recom­
mendations, the majority of agency budgets in the Federal 
Government bore little resemblance to a program-oriented 
structure in 19ol« The Department of Defense budget was 
more oriented toward inputs than others, but all of the 
agencies' budgets (except TVA) had a high degree of input 
orientation.
Multi-Year Projections
The problems of using a single-year horizon for 
budgeting were recognized early. President Truman stated 
in 1954:
. . . the financial program of the Government cannot be 
planned in terms of a single fiscal year. It must be 
planned in light of security, economic and budgetary 
goals —  not just for the ensuing year but for three 
and even four years ahead.1
Executive Order 9384 in 1943 required all agencies 
to prepare five-year forecasts for all public work programs. 
This requirement was enacted into law in 1956 by Public Law 
84-801.2 In addition, the Bureau of the Budget began to 
prepare rough five-year projections of budgets as early as 
1946.3 In spite of these sporadic attempts to program over
•̂ Th'e' Budget of the United States Government for the 
Fiscal' Year Ending June 3 0 1 9 5 4 . p. M54. as cited by Mosher. 
FrograM Budgeting:' ' Theory' and 'Practice. p. 43.
2U. s . .  General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the United S t a t e s Report to' the Congress : Survey of
Pr'o'g'r'e's's' ih' XmpTemehfin'g the' Flahning-Frogramming-Bu'dgeting 
system' in. Executive Agencies. cJuly 29, 19b$). p7 9.
3u. S., Congress, Senate, Pranh’ing, Programming, 
B'ud'geti:ng,lTriqui-ry, 1969, p. 325.
118
a multi-year basis, in 1961 the majority of the governmental 
budget was reviewed on a single-year basis.
Analytical Efforts 
As noted earlier, the first use of systems analysis 
was in the area of water resources. As early as 1902 in the 
Rivers and Harbors Act, Congress demanded cost-benefit 
analysis to support proposed projects.^ Since 1935 these 
analyses have been commonplace In water resources.
The immediate precedent for the use of systems 
analysis in the Federal Government was the experience with 
Operations Research in World War II. Because of the success 
of OR on tactical problems, the military services felt that 
this same approach could improve planning in the postwar 
environment. As a result the Air Force started Project RAND 
in 1946. By 1958 RAND had over 480 professionals employed 
to study Air Force problems.  ̂ Immediately after World War II 
the Navy, in connection with Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, established the Operations Evaluation Group to 
study operational naval problems. Later the Naval Warfare 
Analysis Group, to study larger scope problems, was estab­
lished as a part of the Navy.3 In 1947 the Secretary of
•̂ihid.. p. 10.
^R, D. Spech, "Rand —  A Personal View of Its His­
tory,"' Operations Research, VIII CNovember-December, I960), 
825-39.
3joseph H. Engel, "Operations Research for the U. S. 
Navy Since World War II," Ibid., 798-809.
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Defense established the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group to 
provide top-level technical and scientific advice in the 
weapon systems area. In 1954 the Institute for Defense 
Analysis, with about 200 technical and scientific personnel, 
was organized to perform studies of weapon systems to be 
used by more than one service. These studies were performed 
for the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.^ In 1948 the Army 
formed the Operations Research Office in connection with 
John Hopkins University. The Army used this capability and 
also contracted for consultant OR studies.^
By 1948 all three military services and the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense had established offices to per­
form operations analysis. The major problems that were 
faced in the postwar environment were vastly different from 
those faced during the war. The major reason for this is 
that the problems in the postwar era did not focus on the 
present time horizon but on systems that would be operational 
in ten or even fifteen years. It is not surprising that the 
operations research agencies for all of the services and the 
Department of Defense began to devote more attention to the 
broader questions of development and procurement of advanced
^George E. Pugh, "Operations Research for the Secre­
tary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Ibid.. 
839-46.
2w. L. Whitson, "The Growth of the Operations Re­
search Office in the U. S. Army," Ibid., 809-25.
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weapons than to operational tactics of existing weapons.
While the Department of Defense was gradually de­
veloping an analytical capability to study defense problems 
over a period of fifteen years, no comparable effort was 
taking place in the nondefense agencies —  with the excep­
tion of the traditional water resources area. The sub­
jection of allocation decisions to analytical study had not, 
therefore, penetrated deeply into the Federal Government 
before PPBS.
Inadequacies of Traditional Budget 
The immediate problem that precipitated the imple­
mentation of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in the 
Federal Government was the inadequacy of the traditional 
budget as an aid to planning. For planning purposes budge­
tary data should answer the following three questions : What
are we trying to do? How much of a Job is it? How well is 
it being done?^ The traditional budget of the Federal 
Government, expressed in its terms of input items, did not 
provide a satisfactory answer to any of these questions.
The major inadequacies of the traditional budget can 
be summarized thus; objectives and accomplishments are ob­
scured; the functions of planning and budgeting are separated; 
fund allocations are made without any rational basis; required 
planning data is not provided; future-year costs are neglected;
^Felix A. Nigro, Public Administration Readings and 
"Documents. pp. 319-20.
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a bias toward the continuation of obsolete programs is 
created; alternatives are obscured; and the budget is not 
used as a management tool.
Objectives
The traditional budgetary documents describe in 
massive detail how the Federal Government spends its money, 
but this detail obscures, rather than illuminates, the pur­
poses for which the money is being spent.1 It is impossible 
to extract from the budget document itself any aggregate 
information on the objectives pursued by the Federal Govern­
ment in total or by any single department.2 The only ob­
jectives that are contained in the budgetary process are 
found in the budget message by the President. This narra­
tive, usually about one hundred pages long, presents the 
President's program in very general terms. These general 
terms are totally inadequate for the transmission of ob­
jectives down through the hierarchy of the government.3
^The detail contained in the Government's budget 
submission staggers one's imagination. The hearings before 
Congressional committees on the budget in 1953 required over 
25,000 pages to record. (Smithies, Budgetary Process, 
p. 133.) In i960 over 500,000 pages of budget justification 
and associated data were generated in the Department of 
Defense alone. (David Novick, New Tools for Planners and 
•Programmers. p. 4),
p George A. Steiner, "How to Forecast Defense Expen­
ditures." California Management Journal, II (Summer, I960), 
87.
^Smithies, Budgetary Process, pp. 101-8. This message 
often contains little more than a statement of the statutory 
authority for the various programs.
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The clear understanding of objectives is a critical 
factor in the vitality of any organization, including the 
government. Operating " . . .  without clearly defined 
objectives is like steering without a compass; one may 
avoid the rocks and stay afloat, but one may also go around 
in c i r c l e s . T h e  degree of effort (input) applied in any 
activity is not meaningful unless it is "directed effort." 
"Directed effort" requires that objectives be defined and
pall effort expended in pursuit of those objectives.
While the lack of clear objectives is damaging be­
cause it hinders the effective review of the budget and 
limits the knowledge of private individuals of the purposes 
of governmental programs, its effect on the internal opera­
tion of governmental activities is even more damaging.
Lacking clear specification of what a governmental program 
is supposed to achieve, and having detailed knowledge of 
inputs of a program, it is not surprising that personnel tend 
to become more concerned with specific items of inputs than 
with the objectives of the program. The exclusive use of 
the traditional budget then is a major contributor to the 
substitution of means for ends in governmental activity. 
Internal criteria of effectiveness cease to be the accom-
^Duncan Davies and Callum McCarthy, Introduction to 
Technological Economics. p. 6.
2Philip Marvin,' Management' Goals : Guideline's' and
Accountability. p. 1.
^Mosher, Program' Budgeting : Theory and Practice.
p. 81.
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pllshment of the objectives of the program and turn instead 
toward the goals of self-preservation and institutional 
growth.1
Separation of Planning and Budgeting
A second major criticism of the traditional budgetary 
process is that it allowed the separation of planning and 
budgeting. To understand how extensive this separation is, 
one needs to understand that planning and budgeting were 
performed by different people at different times and in 
different units. Plans were formulated by planning staffs 
on a continuous basis and in units of major programs. Bud­
gets were formulated by financial staffs in a relatively 
constricted period of time and in units of inputs. The only 
point at which the two met was during review by the head of 
the agency, who was unable to make a valid comparison between 
the two because of the unit differences.
One author commented on this separation by stating:
Traditionally, government bureaus have been split . , . 
between the "planners" and the "budget people," the 
former living in a fictitious world where programs were 
developed on the hypothesis that resources were free, 
while the latter were engaged in trimming the fondest 
aspirations of the planners in light of the fundsavailable,2
Ideally the budget should be one part of the planning
^Alain C. Enthoven and Henry Rowen, Defense Planning 
and Organization, pp. 19-21.
^Schlesinger, "Quantitative Analysis and National 
Security," p. 299.
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process. This was not the case in traditional budgeting.
Plans were based on requirements and were often "fiscally 
unrealistic.Budgeting, by its very nature, is fiscally 
realistic but there is every evidence to believe that budgets 
were not based on carefully defined plans but were formu­
lated in one of two methods: in the first, the costs in­
curred in the past were automatically transferred forward 
into the future;2 in the other method, a ceiling amount was 
allocated to each department, service, or activity, and 
these activities determined the program to follow. This 
latter method has been described as "starting with a budget 
and sending it off in search of a program."3
Inadequate Basis for Fund Allocation 
The budgetary process is the point at which the deci­
sions concerning the allocation of funds to different govern­
mental projects must be made. Under the traditional budgetary 
process there was no meaningful information given to the 
decision-makers on how these funds should be allocated. The 
actual allocation was an "accidental result" of a myriad of
^Hitch,' Decision Making for Defense, p. 26.
 ̂ ^Mosher, Program Budgetingt Theory and Practice,
^David Novick, "The Department of Defense," Program 
Budgeting. ed. by Novick, p. 97.
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1 2 independent decisions based on "dominant enthusiasm,"
The decision-maker had to decide which of the programs
described as "vital national necessities" and "absolute
essentials'* would receive the funds required for operation.
Inadequate Data Base 
The traditional budget did not provide the type of 
data necessary to evaluate programs —  either before the 
program or during the operation of the program. In fact, 
from a managerial point of view it is difficult to conceive 
of a less informative way to classify expenditures than by 
an object classification,^
The budget classification provided ample detail to 
determine that the Army had 104 years' supply of Jeep parts 
and that the Navy had 11,000 dozen oyster forks, but it 
yielded no meaningful information to be used in program de- 
sign or program evaluation. As a result, most government 
agencies did not have any statistical or financial records 
that could be brought together to evaluate the need, the 
results, or even the cost of their ongoing or proposed
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, Prospects for Reallocating 
Public Resources, p, 47,
^Schlesinger, "Quantitative Analysis and National 
Security," p, 296,
^Kammerer, Program Budgeting, p. 24,




Neglect of Puture-Year Costs 
As noted earlier, the single fiscal year is a con­
venient administrative device, but each year cannot be con­
sidered a completely autonomous unit which is independent of 
the years proceeding and following. Yet the single-year 
horizon of the traditional budget accents the tendency to 
consider the fiscal year as autonomous, in spite of the fact
that most programs have implications that extend more than
2one year into the future. The failure to consider more 
than one year's cost of a program leads to four possible 
dysfunctional results:
1. Ill-advised legislation may be passed because of the 
consideration of only one year's impact, PL 89-329, The 
Higher Education Act of 1965, is an example of this. Under 
this act, aid to certain college students was granted without 
the thought that the cost of this aid would double the second 
year, triple the third, and quadruple the fourth as addi­
tional classes entered the eligible categories. The Congress 
was unwilling to sustain the higher cost of the aid in these
John Haldi, "Program Monitoring, Evaluation and 
Control," Program budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed, 
by Hinrichs and' taylor, p , 344,
2por example, in the 1964 budget, one author noted 
thirty-five separate new legislative acts that had implica­
tions for future years' spending, (Murray L, Weidenbaum, 
ye'de'raT Budgeting:' The Choice of Government Prograhis. 
CTohgress and the Federal Budget, pp. 54-56).
127
latter years, and the eligibility criteria had to be changed.^
2. Agencies are tempted to use "foot-in-door" tactics to 
gain the initial approval of desired projects. Using this 
tactic the agencies can begin projects and programs, im­
plying that future years' costs will be as low as the first 
year’s. When the request for larger amounts of money is 
received in the subsequent years the justification for 
these funds is enhanced by the fact that if the larger funds 
are not approved, all of the money spent previously would be
wasted.2
3. The use of a single-year horizon creates a greater ten­
dency to fund some programs on a "start and stop" basis.
In the long run a program conducted in this manner is more 
costly than it would be if the funding was sufficient for a 
sustained effort.3
4. The use of a single-year budgeting horizon implies an 
extremely high discount rate. Agencies are reluctant to 
recommend an increased expenditure in the current year based 
on the fact that it would be economical over a long-run
Senator William Proxmire, "Efficiency in Government 
and PPB; Some Prosals for Reform of the Budgetary Process," 
Congressional Record. CXV (May 23, 1969), 85500.
^Wildavsky, Budgetary Process, pp. 111-12.
3üavid Novick, Lead-Time in Modern Weapons, pp. l6- 
17. This problem is not totally solved by using budgets 
with multi-year horizons since the appropriation process is 
still conducted on an annual basis. However, the tendency 
to fund a program on an ad hoc basis is less when the long- 




Bias Against Change 
Another of the weaknesses of the traditional budget 
was its tendency to continue programs long after they became 
obsolete. Generally the traditional activities of agencies 
were not questioned during the budget cycle.^
Even more of a problem is the tendency under tradi­
tional budgeting to expand traditional programs rather than 
establish new innovative programs to meet new requirements. 
This is because the new programs were more difficult to 
Justify than expansion of the traditional programs.
Obscured Alternatives 
The traditional budgetary process also obscured 
alternative ways to attain objectives. The only way to de­
termine the purpose for which most of the appropriations were 
being used was to note the title of the organizational en­
tity receiving the funds. Quite often the agency organiza­
tion title does not adequately describe the functions per­
formed, and the relationships between substitute and
Enthoven and Rowen, Defense Planning and Organiza­
tion, p. 24. An example of this was found in the case of 
military pay. It was shown that a substantial increase in 
pay for military personnel would be more than repaid through 
reduced recruitment and training costs over a long period 
of time. The military services were reluctant to request 
this pay increase because of the effect on the current 
year's budget.
^Committee for National Objectives, Budgeting for 
Economic Development. p. 25.
129
complementary programs were llldeflned.^ The major effects 
of the obscuring of programs which competed with or comple­
mented each other included duplication of programs,' programs 
which worked at cross-purposes to each other, and the lack 
of co-ordination on many complementary programs.
Budget Not a Management Tool 
Largely for the reasons noted above, the traditional 
budgetary process was not adaptable to many of the most im­
portant managerial functions. As a result, operating mana­
gers in the government tended to develop managerial tools 
independent of the budgetary process. Even more damaging 
was the fact that the budget was widely regarded as a "game" 
which had to be played by managers, manipulating it to their 
own ends.2 The primary effort in budgeting was to attempt 
to expand the resources available to the organization.
Implementation of PPBS in the 
department of Defense
There are two reasons for isolating the Department of 
Defense's implementation of PPBS. The first reason is ob­
vious. The PPBS was developed and first implemented in the 
DOD, The use of this system by nondefense activities repre­
sents a movement, almost intact, of the techniques and pro­
cedures of the DOD-oriented PPBS.
^Robert E, Millward, "PPBS: Problems of Implementation,"
Journal of the- Amerioah Institute of Planners. XXXIV (March, 
------------------------------------------
^Burrows, "Program Approach," p. 280.
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The second reason for separate consideration of the 
PPBS in the Department of Defense is because of the DOD's 
impact on society as a whole. In 1966 the DOD employed 
some 3,700,000 people (including 2,700,000 in uniform and 
1,000,000 civilians); spent over $50 billion a year which 
was over 50 per cent of the total federal budget and 10 to 
15 per cent of the Gross National Product; had an inventory 
of real property and equipment worth over $150 billion; 
had some 6OO major installations in the United States which 
included housing, utilities, transportation systems, schools, 
hospitals, and policing needs —  in short, actually munici­
palities; operated airlines, shipping lines, communication 
systems and maintenance establishments, world-wide, to support 
its forces; and procured over 4,000,000 different items of 
equipment and supplies annually.^
The size of the DOD makes its management tools of 
particular interest. If this one department achieves a high 
degree of efficiency, a large part of governmental activity 
is then efficient.
Historical Development of the DOD 
The understanding of the use of PPBS must be preceded 
by an understanding of how the Department of Defense evolved. 
The end of World War II marked an end to a military era of 
the United States, Prior to that time the military policy
^Robert S. McNamara, "Managing the Department of 
Defense," Modern' Design, ed, by Tucker, p, 12,
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of this nation had been to maintain a small cadre of pro­
fessional military personnel with a limited amount of weapons, 
At the outbreak of a war, the industrial complex was acti­
vated into an all-out effort to supply the weapons that an 
expanded armed forces required for combat.
Two things intervened to change this long-standing 
policy —  one international and the other technological. At 
the end of World War II there began a "cold war conflict" 
that has continued from that time until the present. This 
period has been characterized by small conflicts (Korea, 
Vietnam, Middle East, Cuba, etc.), with the constant threat 
of a major war.
The military technological revolution began during 
the latter part of World War II. One of the things which 
has characterized this revolution is that the complexity of 
weapons has increased tremendously, with an accompanying 
increase in destructive power. Military weapons generally 
became more powerful, more effective, and infinitely more 
complex.
This fact is complicated by another technological 
factor —  the rate of technological change is constantly 
increasing. Weapons are consistently improving and making 
existing weapons obsolete. A nation must continually bring 
new and modern weapons into its inventory.
The end result of this technological revolution and 
political environment is:
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1. The destructive power of weapons and the tense inter­
national system means that a continuing military state-of- 
readiness must be maintained. The time for mobilization of 
industry, technology, and military forces is a luxury that 
is no longer permitted. The preparation for war, including 
the application of industrial technology to weapons, must 
be complete before any hostilities begin.^
2. The complexities of weapons mean that the cost and lead 
time of a new weapon are staggering. Several major weapon 
systems programs cost over $1 billion, with a lead time of 
several years.^
3. The complexity of weapons and their high cost places a 
premium on adequate planning at all levels —  strategic and 
operational.
In this new environment of military readiness it was 
necessary to make organizational and managerial changes to 
control the military programs. The basic organizational 
authority was the National Security Act of 1947. President 
Truman proposed that a single Department of Defense be created 
and the Departments of War and Navy be reduced to branches 
under the DOD. The major purpose of this change was to have
^Hitch and McKean, Economics of Defense, pp. 8-17.
^Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Pro­
cess; Economic Incentives, p. 21 An example of the complex- 
ity of modern weapons is found in the intercontinental 
ballistic missile. The guidance package for the Titan 
Missile contains about 100,000 separate electronic parts. 
(David Novick. The' Cost of Advanced Weapons, p. 6).
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"unified direction of the land, sea, and air forces at home 
as well as in all other parts of the world where our armed 
forces are serving. . . . [and] we should have integrated 
strategic plans and a unified military program and budget.
The legislation which emerged from this proposal by 
President Truman did not provide for a unified department. 
Instead it was a "confederation of three military depart­
ments [with Executive Department status] presided over by a 
Secretary of Defense with carefully enumerated powers,"
The separate services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) retained
"all powers and duties related to such Departments not speci-
2fically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense."
This organizational arrangement was doomed to failure 
from the very beginning. The first Secretary of Defense, 
James V, Porrestal (who ironically was one of the main oppo­
nents to a unified military establishment), recommended in 
his first annual report to the Congress that
the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense 
should be materially strengthened . . .  by making it 
clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibil­
ity for exercising "direction, authority, and control" 
over the departments and agencies of the National Mili­
tary Establishment.3
^"Special Message to the Congress Recommending the 
Establishment of a Department of National Defense, December 
19, 19^5," Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 
1945. (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 54o, 
as cited in Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 14,
^Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p, 15.
Bpirst Report of the Secretary of Defense. 1948. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1^4b), as cited in 
Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 15.
13^
The next ten years included many legislative steps 
that strengthened the power of the Secretary of Defense,
In 1949 the National Security Act was amended and the ser­
vices lost their status as Executive Departments. Uniform 
budget and accounting procedures were prescribed for use 
throughout the DOD, In 1953» in another amendment to the 
National Security Act, the Secretary's position was again 
strengthened as his office was expanded. President 
Eisenhower, in proposing the amendment, made it clear that 
the Secretary of Defense was to participate in all functions 
of defense. In 1958 the act was again amended. The Secre­
tary of Defense was given operational control of "unified 
commands" through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each service 
was no longer to be "separately administered" but only 
"separately organized," President Eisenhower noted at that 
time ;
, . . complete unity in our strategic planning and basic 
operational direction (is a vital necessity). It is 
therefore mandatory that the initiative for this planning 
and direction rest not with the separate services but 
directly with the Secretary of Defense and his opera­
tional advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by 
such staff organization as they deem necessary.
No military task is of greater importance than the 
development of strategic plans which relate our revolu­
tionary new weapons and force deployments to national 
security objectives. Genuine unity is indispensable at 
this starting point. No amount of subsequent coordina­
tion can eliminate duplication or doctrinal conflicts
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which are Intruded into the first shaping of military 
programs.1
These unification efforts gave the Secretary of ■ 
Defense control of the over-all level of the defense budget. 
This control, however, was primarily exercised by the allo­
cation of budget ceilings to the separate services, who
pallocated their portion to specific weapons and programs.^
Secretary McNamara
Robert S. McNamara became the Secretary of Defense 
in 1961. He defined his managerial philosophy as follows:
I think that the role of public manager is very 
similar to the role of a private manager; in each case 
he has the option of following one of two major alter­
native courses of action. He can either act as a Judge 
or a leader. In the former case, he sits and waits 
until subordinates bring to him problems for solution, 
or alternatives for choice. In the latter case, he 
immerses himself in the operations of the business or 
the governmental activity, examines the problems, the 
objectives, the alternative courses of action, chooses 
among them, and leads the organization to their accom­
plishment, In the one case, it’s a passive role; in the 
other case, an active role, , , . I have always believed 
in and endeavored to follow the active leadership role 
as opposed to the passive Judicial role,3
In embarking on the "active role" of management.
^"Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization 
of the Defense Establishment, April 3, 1958," Public Papers 
of the' Presidents. Dwighf D. Eisenhower. 1958. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, I960), p, 278, as cited in 
Hitch, DecisTon-'Making for Defense. p, 17.
^Hitch., De'c'tsion-Making for Defense, p, I8,
^Extract from the transcript of an interview with 
Secretary of Defense Robert S, McNamara on the National 
Broadcasting Company's program Today, February 17, 1961, as 
cited in Hitch, De'Cision-^aking for Defense. p, 27.
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Secretary McNamara found that there were some basic problems. 
First he found that there was an inadequate amount of infor­
mation available for decisions. Within three weeks after 
assuming office Secretary McNamara directed a long list of 
questions beginning with "why" to the services —  Why are you 
doing this? Why can it not be done in a more effective way? 
He asked for answers to these questions (commonly called 
McNamara’s "76 Trombones") within three weeks. He concluded 
from these answers that the data base was inadequate. For 
example, the services did not even know the total cost for 
supporting a B-70.^ Because of this lack of data to support 
his "active role" of management. Secretary McNamara chose to 
modify the DOD's budget process.
DOD’s Traditional Budget 
All of the problems noted earlier with the use of 
traditional budgeting were found in the DOD, These short­
comings were particularly acute because of the size and com­
plexity of the Defense Department and because of the fact 
that its budget was more input-oriented than was the budget 
of most nondefense agencies.
The problem of the separation of planning and bud­
geting was particularly critical. Generally budgets were 
assigned on a "ceiling" basis to the Department of Defense,
^Donald J. Smalter and Rudy L. Ruggles, "Six Business 
Lessons from the Pentagon," Harvard Business Review. XLIV 
(March-April, 1966), 70.
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and these ceilings were broken down Into separate service 
allocations. Under Presidents Truman and Elsenhower the 
military services received approximately one-third of all 
government revenues after the fixed charges of the budgets 
were met. These were apportioned to the services on a 
relatively rigid percentage basis, with the Air Force re­
ceiving 47 per cent, the Navy 29 per cent, and the Army 
22 per cent. These budget ceilings did give the Secretary 
of Defense some degree of control, but they did not guaran­
tee a sensible allocation by the services themselves.^
Planning, on the other hand, was performed by the 
military services and was not fiscally realistic. One esti­
mate of the price of the basic military operating plan 
(Joint Strategic Operating Plan —  JSOP) In the mld-1950’s 
came to about $150 billion.2
Another major problem In the DOD with the tradi­
tional budget was that the services were not forced to co­
ordinate their programs. Technology had succeeded In erasing 
many of the traditional lines between the separate military 
services which were largely based on means of transporta­
tion —  land, sea, and air. In the allocation of funds, each 
separate service naturally "tended to exercise Its own
^Kaufmann, The" McTTamara Strategy, pp. 22-31.
^Ralph. E. Hanes, Jr., "Operations Research and Systems 
Analysis —  Tools That Can Help Us." Army' Managememt" Views, 
XIII (May, 1968), 4. By comparison, the Federal Govern- 
ment*s total spending In the same time period was about $65 
billion. (Brundage, The' Bureau of the' Budget, p. 244.)
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priorities, favoring its own unique missions to the detriment 
of joint missions."! The type of war that the services en­
visioned was not even the same. The Air Force was planning 
to conduct a short war of nuclear proportions and the Army 
planned to conduct an extended war of attrition.^ The result 
was a military establishment which was highly unco-ordinated 
and imbalanced. The Air Force gave priority to bombers and 
missiles for a strategic mission and neglected tactical air­
craft to support Army operations and the airlift capability 
to move conventional forces. The Navy supported their nu­
clear attack forces (primarily aircraft carriers) to the 
exclusion of antisubmarine and escort capabilities. The 
Army used its minority share of the defense budget to retain 
the existing number of divisions even though they lacked 
equipment and supplies for a sustained conflict.3
The lack of consideration of the future was also 
critical in the Department of Defense. Planning used a 
horizon of four to five years but budgeting continued to pro­
ject only one year into the future even though it was obvious 
that the lead time for weapon development ranged from five to 
ten years.^ This limited horizon for budgeting gave the 
services an incentive to propose a large number of new weapons
^Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 24.
^Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, p. 28.
^Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 25.
^Hitch, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis," Defense, 
Science, and Public Policy, ed. by Mansfield, p.' 49.
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whose full cost would become evident only in subsequent 
budgets.
All of these problems led Secretary McNamara to de­
velop a new system of planning, programming, and budgeting. 
This system was primarily designed to bridge the gap between 
the planning function and the budgeting function and to give 
the Secretary of Defense the information which he required 
to make program decisions effectively,
DOD's Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
To implement the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System in the Department of Defense, Secretary McNamara 
turned to his Comptroller, Charles J, Hitch, who had pre­
viously been in RAND Corporation. All of the elements of 
PPBS discussed in Chapter I were initially formulated in the 
DOD,
The first step of the DOD's implementation of PPBS 
was the design of a program structure. The major missions 
of the Department of Defense were investigated and nine pro­
grams were chosen:
1, ■ Strategic' 'KetaTiafory Forces : This program was broken
into three subcategories —  Aircraft Forces, Missile Forces, 
and Command and Control, The building blocks for this and 
the other programs are separately identifiable weapons sys­
tems or combat units. The 1965 program for Strategic Re­











Sea Based: Fleet Ballistic Missile System
(Polaris)
Regulus Missile System
Command, Control, Communication, and Support:
SAC Control System
Post Attack Command and Communications System 
Base Operating Support 
Advance Flying and Missile Training 
Headquarters and Command Support
Notice that both Air Force and Navy systems were included
in this program. The other programs in the DOD PPBS have a
comparable amount of detail in their information.
2. continental Defense Forces; This program included the 
surveillance, warning, and control network —  including the 
radars and control systems; manned interceptors; air-defense 
and anti-missile missiles; and the Civil Defense programs.
3. General Purpose Forces : This was the largest program in 
the defense budget. As opposed to the other two programs 
which have forces primarily involved in operations of a 
world-wide nuclear scope, this program contains the forces 
which are designed to fight local and limited wars or engage 
in theatre operations in a general war. These forces were 
broadly broken into service lines. Further subcategories of
I4l
broad missions or types of forces were contained in each 
service breakdown. The basic identifiable combat units were 
the program elements. For example. Infantry Divisions was 
one program element in the subcategory of Divisions of the 
Army ; Cruisers, Frigates, and Destroyers were program ele­
ments in the Multi-Purpose Combat Forces subcategory of the 
Navy; and different aircraft types such as F-4C and F-105 
were program elements in the Tactical Aircraft Forces sub­
category of the Air Force.
4. Airlift and Sealift: This program was composed of 
three major subcategories —  Theatre Airlift, Military Air 
Transport Service, and Military Sea Transport Service.
5. Reserve and National Guard Forces; The program elements 
here were arranged by service and further broken into the 
appropriate missions that each component supports. Reserve 
and National Guard elements were also reviewed as a part of 
the mission element that they supported —  e.g.. Airlift and 
Sealift, and General Purpose Forces.
6. Research and Development; This program contained all of 
the R & D projects which were not directly associated with 
one of the other programs. When a system reached the stage 
of operational systems development which is "the effort di­
rected toward continuing development, test, evaluation, and 
design improvement of projects which have already entered the 
production-deployment stage," it was included in the program 
to which it was applicable. The Research and Development
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program was broken into four categories —  research, 
exploratory development, advanced development, and engineer­
ing development.
7, ■ general Support ; This was the overhead category of the 
DOD, It included all activities which were not directly 
allocated to mission forces or weapon systems. Some of the 
subcategories include individual training and education, 
technical training, flight training, service academies, 
intelligence, and medical services. In terms of dollars this 
program accounted for 30 per cent of the defense budget.
It should be recognized that many of the costs in this pro­
gram are variable and will change as levels of the major 
"combat" programs are changed,
8, Retired Pay; This category has costs that are largely 
outside of the control of the Defense Department, Rates of 
pay are established by law,
9, ■ MiTitary Assistance : This program includes the military
training and equipment assistance provided to foreign 
nations,1
These program classifications have not been static. 
Changes are made almost annually in an attempt to have a 
program budget which is more illuminating. To demonstrate * 
the evolution of programs, the 1965 budget programs are com­
pared to those used for the 1969 budget;
iRitch, Decision-Making for Defense, pp. 34-38,
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Strategic Retaliatory Forces Strategic Forces
Continental Defense Forces
General Purpose Forces General Purpose Forces
Airlift and Sealift Airlift and Sealift
Reserve and Guard Guard and Reserve
Research and Development Research and Development
General Support Intelligence and Communi­
cations 
Central Supply and Main­
tenance
Training, Medical, and Other 
General Personnel 
Activities 
Administration and Associated 
Activities
Retired Pay Retired Pay
Military Assistance Assistance to Other Nations
The general trend of programs has been toward a more
finite breakout in the "overhead" (or General Support) area.
The consolidation of Strategic Retaliatory Forces and
Continental Defense Forces into one program —  Strategic
Forces —  simply represents a recognition that these both
were part of the same general mission —  strategic warfare.
The basic element in the DOD's program structure is
the individual weapon system or military unit. For each of
these systems the following data is accumulated:
1. An eight-year projection of the number of units of the 
weapon system —  e.g., the number of wings, squadrons, and 
aircraft for an Air Force fighter aircraft.
2. A five-year projection of the total costs required to 
support the system broken into:
ICarlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluâtion. U. S.. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Vol.Trrrmri- 745.
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(a) Research and Development, Investment and 
Operating; and
(b) Traditional Appropriation Categories,
3. A five-year projection of the human resources required, 
broken into numbers of civilian and military personnel. The 
"critical" resource in some systems is not the number of 
dollars required but the availability of qualified per­
sonnel.^
All of this information is contained in the Five- 
Year Force Structure and Financial Plan. Most of the data 
is contained in a machine-processable format and can be 
summarized in various degrees of detail for use at different 
levels of the Department of Defense.^
The use of systems analysis is algo a major part of 
the DOD’s PPBS, To ensure the inclusion of analysis in DOD 
decisions, a Systems Analysis Office was established. At 
first, this office was organizationally located in the 
Office of the Comptroller, but its head subsequently became 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) who 
reported directly to the Secretary. Alain C. Enthoven, the 
first Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), 
described the purpose and functions of this office;
The Systems Analysis Office integrates the costs, 
effectiveness, and requirements data and the recommenda-
^Alain C. Enthoven, "Programming and Budgeting in the 




tlons of the four services into groupings arranged so 
that the Secretary can understand what capabilities he 
is buying, at what cost, and how they relate to overall 
defense needs. The Office routinely provides the 
Secretary with the staff assistance necessary to identify 
and analyze alternative levels and mixes of forces.
This insures that his choices are not limited to the 
alternatives proposed by the military services and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In short, the Systems Analysis 
Office helps to broaden the range of alternatives 
available to the Secretary, to develop explicit criteria 
for defining the national interest in defense programs, 
and to structure the debate over issues in such a 
fashion that it focuses on the key Judgements that must 
be made in choosing among the alternatives.!
Probably the greatest emphasis to the use of systems analy­
sis was that Secretary McNamara demanded an analytically- 
based study before he would make a decision.^
PPBS, as implemented in the DOD, also contained the 
integrative system. The key to this was the Program Change 
Proposals (PCP’s). These PCP’s were to be prepared by the 
appropriate military department and submitted to the Comp­
troller’s office in the Department of Defense. This office 
co-ordinated a total review by all of the activities con­
cerned, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Systems 
Analysis Office. After review and recommendations, the PCP’s 
were to go to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration. 
If approved, the change would become a part of the five-year
^Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, ’’The Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System in the Department of 
Defense; Current Status and Next Steps,” Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Vol.
TTr,"TP69, p. 960!
2Adam Yaxmolisky, "How the Pentagon Works.” Atlantic, 
CCXIX (March, 1967), 59. ~
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approved program. All of these changes were to be made 
continuously throughout the year. The Five-Year Force 
Structure and Financial Program was then to be a complete 
record of Secretarial guidance for use by the services In 
preparing their traditional budget estimates for the next 
fiscal year.^
It should not be assumed that the Secretary of De­
fense reviewed all of the Program Change Proposals and 
approved or rejected each one. "Threshold" values were es­
tablished. Program changes below these threshold values 
could be made by the secretary of the military department or 
lower In the organization. Secretary of Defense approval 
was required for changes (1) of Investment costs of more than 
$10 million In the first year and/or $25 million In total; 
or (2) of operating costs of more than $20 million In the 
first year and/or $50 million In total.^
Each PCP was to be based on an analytical study.
Some of the analytical studies which resulted In a Program 
Change Proposal were Initiated as the result of direction 
from the Secretary of Defense. Each year the Systems Analy­
sis Office developed a program of studies that they felt 
should be performed. This list was approved by the Secretary 
and forwarded to the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
^Enthoven, "Programming and Budgeting," Modern Design, 
ed. by Tucker, p. 93.
^Hltch, De'clsTon-Maklng for Defense, p. 71.
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who performed the studies in co-ordination with the Systems 
Analysis Office.
The other major integrative device in the DOD’s PPBS 
was the Draft Presidental Memorandum (DPM), This document 
was designed to give major analysis to the Secretary of 
Defense and the President and to serve as the primary 
guidance to the individual services of their force struc­
turing actions. The DPM was prepared in the Systems Analy­
sis Office and sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
services for their comments before being forwarded to the 
Secretary of Defense.
PPBS in the Nondefense Sector 
of the Government
Paced with the reality of success of PPBS in the 
Department of Defense, President Johnson directed the non­
defense sector of the government to adopt the same system. 
The President stated that the goals of PPBS were to allow 
the Federal Government to;
(1) Identify our national goals with precision and 
on a continuing basis.
(2) Choose among those goals the ones that are most 
urgent.
(3) Search for alternative means of reaching those goals 
most effectively at the least cost.
C4) Inform ourselves not merely on next year's costs—  
but on the second, and third, and subsequent year’s 
cost— of our programs.
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(5) Measure the performance of our programs to insure 
a dollar’s worth of service for each dollar spent.
The Bureau of the Budget was made the director of
the implementation effort, BOB Bulletin 66-3 directed the
mechanics of implementation. A total of twenty-three
agencies were directed to adopt PPBS, and seventeen others
(mostly smaller, regulatory agencies) were encouraged to
padopt the system.
^"Statement by the President to Members of Cabinet 
and Heads of Agencies, August 25, 1965," Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential' Documents. I, August 30, 19&5. A copy of 
the entire memorandum iscontained in Appendix B-1.
2u. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau 
of the Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting, BOB Bulletin 
No. 66-3, (October l 2 , 1965), Exhibit iT A list of the 
agencies required to adopt PPBS is contained in Appendix B-2,
Filmed as received 




How close does the practical use of the Plannlng-
Programming-Budgeting System come to achieving Its potential
In the Federal Government? It has been noted;
. . .  as Interesting as observing what happens to 
government when confronted with PPB will be watching 
what happens to PPB when confronted with government.!
Once a firm statement of the success (or lack of success)
of PPBS has been formulated, the training needs designed
to raise the current level of performance of PPBS to the
desired standard can be derived.
The practical application of PPBS will be discussed 
In two sections. First achievements In the Department of 
Defense will be noted, and then achievements In the remainder 
of the government will be discussed.
PPBS' In the' Department of Defense
One way to evaluate the use of PPBS In the Department 
of Defense Is to view the changes made after Secretary 
McNamara left the office. Then some specific problems still
^U, S,, Congress, Senate, Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, Inquiry, 1969» p, l6,
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encountered In the DOD’s PPBS and some of the positive con­
tributions of PPBS will be noted.
PPBS After McNamara 
One of the major criticisms of the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System developed during Robert S. 
McNamara’s tenure as Secretary of Defense was that the mili­
tary was downgraded.1 Under the traditional budgeting pro­
cedure the separate services played an independent role by 
selecting specific weapons to be purchased. In this manner 
the uniformed personnel had a significant voice in force 
and equipment decisions.
The early advocates of PPBS in the DOD made no secret 
of their desire to have the Secretary of Defense and his 
Office of Systems Analysis play a dominant role in the deci­
sion process. Alain C. Enthoven noted that one proven way 
of having better systems analysis was to have the analysis
performed in the Office of Systems Analysis and allow the
2services to comment on the completed study.
Under this system it is no wonder that the primary
^A strong case could be made that the use of PPBS 
actually enhanced the role of the military. Previously the 
military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was isolated 
from the over-all budgetary process. Under PPBS this was no 
longer true. All Program Change Proposals were co-ordinated 
with the JCS, and military advice was solicited on all 
budgets. (Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, pp. 66-67.).
^Enthoven and Smith, "Current Status," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Vol. ÏII, 1969, p. 964.
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source of power and Influence over decisions shifted to 
the Secretary's office. Admiral George W. Andersen noted 
this shift of power in an address before the National Press 
Club on September 4, 1963;
Both the experienced military man and the operations 
analysts are important contributors to the decision­
making process. However, I am disturbed because now, 
in the Department of Defense, the operations analyst —  
properly concerned with "cost effectiveness" —  seems 
to be working at the wrong echelon, above the profes­
sional military level rather than in an advisory capa­
city to the military who should thoroughly appreciate 
his assistance.!
The dissatisfaction with the actions of the Systems
Analysis Office and the authority-centralizing tendencies
of PPBS continued after Secretary McNamara left office.
This dissatisfaction extended even to the Congress. In
December, 1969, Ivan Selin, who had been Acting Head of the
Systems Analysis Office, stated in his resignation:
. . .  it has become clear that I cannot be confirmed in 
this position. . . .  As you know, the House Armed Services 
Committee has been trying diligently to abolish the 
Systems Analysis Office.2
Gardiner L. Tucker was, however, appointed Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) on December 17, 1969, 
and was quickly confirmed by the Senate for that post.3
!as cited in Claude Witze, "Cost/Effectiveness —
Tool or Crib." Air Force/Space Digest. XLVI (October, 1963),
^Donald May, "Laird Gives Systems Analysis Office 
A New Boss and a Changed Mission," Ifational Journal, January 
3, 1970, pp. 5-6. ~
•3lbld.
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Under Mr. Tucker the nature of the operations of the Office 
of Systems Analysis changed considerably. Currently the 
individual services perform the majority of the analyses and 
the Office of Systems Analysis plays the role of "devil's 
advocate" in the review of these studies. This places the 
Individual services back in the role of initiator of pro­
posals and greatly increases the role and power of military 
judgments in decisions.^
Another point of contention that developed under the 
Defense Department's use of PPBS was the method in which 
Draft Presidential Memorandums were prepared. The individual 
services submitted their Program Change Proposals without 
knowledge of the financial limitations of the budgetary 
process. The over-all reconciliation of PCP's (which in­
evitably exceeded the funds available) was made by the Office 
of Systems Analysis when it prepared the DPM's, The indivi­
dual services could appeal the decisions, but the burden of 
proof was on them.^
Under the revised system, the individual services 
are given tentative fiscal guidance before they submit Pro­
gram Change Proposals. Many of the decisions previously 
made by the Systems Analysis Office in the DPM's are now being
^Grover Heiman, "Defense Revises PPB Process," Armed 
Forces Management. XVI (February, 1970), 43-^5.
2Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr., "The Draft Presidential 
Memorandum: Tool of Defense, Decisionmaking," Terspecfives
for" Defense' Management. December, 1969, p. 49.
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made by the individual services before PCP's are submitted.^ 
Another change in the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System involved the depth in the organization at which sys­
tems analysis was performed. Under the McNamara-PPBS, 
systems analysis was performed primarily at the top of the 
organization. Recently it has been attempted to push the 
use of systems analysis "down" the organizational chain-of-
command to the lowest levels so that all DOD investment
2decisions are supported by an analytical effort.
The important thing to note about these changes in 
the DOD's PPBS is that they are not a refutation of the sys­
tem but a refinement of it.^ The very fact that the system 
survived after the departure of a strong, active Secretary 
of Defense such as Robert S. McNamara speaks well of its 
contribution to the operations of the Department of Defense.
Problems in the Defense Department's PPBS 
The fact that the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System has apparently been successful in the Department of 
Defense does not mean that the system has achieved perfection. 
There still exist problems that limit the effectiveness of
^Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense 
oW the Department' of Defense "by the Blue Ribbon Panel,
CTuly 14701, pp. 112-13. -----------------------
2"Economic Analysis Goes Down Chain of Command,"
Arm'e'd Tofces Maha'gemeht. XV (May, 1969), 60-63.
^D. V. Schnurr, "Military Programming and Budgeting 




Number of Program Changes
One of the major problems In the use of PPBS has been 
the number of Program Change Proposals that are generated.
In the early days of PPBS, the office of the Secretary of 
Defense was literally flooded with Program Change Proposals.^ 
After a period of time the number of major decisions re­
quired leveled off to 400 to 500 a year.^ It should be 
noted that the system itself did not create the need for 
these changes. The size and complexity of the Department of 
Defense, as well as constantly changing environment and 
technology, create the need for change. The use of tentative 
fiscal guidance may reduce the number of changes submitted 
in the future.
Caiendar
One of the problems that PPBS was to overcome was 
that of the calendar. Charles J. Hitch stated that PPBS 
would :
. . . provide for more orderly, continuous program 
review in contrast to the hectic program-budget review 
crammed into just a few months of the year which had 
been the practice in the past.3
^Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, p. 291.
^Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget. p. 139.
^Charles J. Hitch, "The New Approach to Management 
in the U. S. Department of Defense," Management Science. IX 
(October, 1962), 4.
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The system has not performed to expectations in this 
regard. Most of the program decisions are made during the 
budget review which extends from October through April. In 
fact, it has been estimated that some 90 per cent of all 
major program decisions are made after January.^ There are 
three reasons for this ;
1. The individual services tend to delay the submission of 
Program Change Proposals until late in the budget cycle.
They realize that program decisions are not as "final" as
2budgetary decisions.
2. The Secretary realizes that decisions on some changes 
cannot be made in isolation. Changes then tend to be held 
until all of those relevant to a particular program category 
are received.3
3. The Secretary wishes to retain his flexibility. He can 
do this by delaying the decision until the last possible 
moment.^
Cost' Estimates
Another major problem with PPBS has been the lack of 
validity of cost estimates.5 The record of the DOD in
^John P. Crecine, 'Defense Budgeting; Organizational 
'Adaptation' to Ex'femaT Constraints, pp. 30. 41.
'̂'Ibid.. pp. 41-42.
3John P. Bloom, "The Department of Defense Programming 
System." 'Comp'frolTer. June, 1964, pp. 2-3.
^Crecine, Defense 'Budgeting, p. 4l.
^Novick, "The Department of Defense," Program Budgeting. 
ed. by Novick, pp. 104-5.
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estimating development costs for new weapons has been 
"spectacularly bad." The DOD has traditionally understated 
development costs by 100 to 900 per cent. There is hope 
that this record will improve with the continued development 
of a parametric cost-estimating capability in the military 
services,^
Even when development costs are adequately estimated, 
the record of accurate cost estimates is not good. The 
tendency of underestimation because of the omission of in­
direct and support items, or "tip-of-the-iceberg" estimates, 
still continues. While systems analysis attempts to ex­
plicitly consider the relationship between primary system 
costs and indirect costs, these relationships are not always 
well understood.2 One of the major reasons for this is that 
the operating costs have not been tied closely to the programs, 
An arbitrary allocation of many of these costs is still 
required.3
A final problem in the area of cost-estimating in the 
Department of Defense is the tendency to use less than full 
value as a price for some resources. This is the case in
^Parametric cost estimating is discussed in more 
detail in Appendix A-3.
^Enthoven and Smith, "Current Status," Analysis and 
EVaTuation, U, S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,Vol. Ill, 1969, p. 957.
^Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, p. 65.
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manpower, land, and nuclear materials.^ There are also some 
activities where the prices used in analysis reflect more 
than the market value. This is the case in shipping, where 
the requirement to use U. S, vessels increases the cost.2
Use' of Analysis' for Limited War
Another of the problems of PPBS in the Department of 
Defense has been its uneven capability to deal with major 
Issues. Systems analysis has not been as useful in dealing 
with the problems of limited war as it has been with stra-
Otegic warfare problems. This is particularly unfortunate 
since General Purpose Forces represent some two-thirds of 
the Department of Defense budget, including most of the 
Army, all of the Marines, all of the Navy (except for Polar­
is), and some 60 per cent of Research and Development.
The problems of dealing with limited conflicts that 
can occur over a broad geographical and political spectrum 
can be easily imagined.^ However, the use of systems analysis
Manpower is underpriced because of the draft; land, 
because its "opportunity cost" is seldom considered; and 
nuclear materials, because the cost is charged to the Atomic 
Energy Commission instead of the DOD.
2William A. Niskanan, Jr., "The Defense Resource 
Allocation Process," A Commentary on Defense Management, 
ed. by Gordon P. Smale, pp. 2l-2z.
^Spisher," AhàlvtïcaT Buppor'f for D'e'fehse P'l'a'n'n'in'g.
^Charles L. Schultze, Edward K. Hamilton and Allen 
Schick.' S'et'tihg national Priorities : The' 1971 Budget.
pp. 23-2T:------------   — -----------^
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has made some definite contributions to the study of limited 
war. It has brought a form of rigorous structure to these 
problems and has assisted in identifying inferiorities in 
the force that can be corrected and superiorities that can 
be exploited.1 On a more limited scale, systems analysis 
has been helpful in the design of specific weapon systems 
and in trade-offs between specific weapons with similar
plimited-war missions.
Budget" Domihahce
One of the most pressing problems in the DOD's 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System is the dominance of 
the budgetary process. Most of the budgetary decisions in 
the Department of Defense are still made in terms of objects 
instead of programs.3 There are several reasons for this. 
First, it is not feasible to subject all areas to systems 
analysis. Second, the personnel involved in the budgeting 
process are more familar with object classifications than 
with program terms. Third, many budget decisions that must 
be based on object data are still necessary —  particularly 
in the area of efficiency. Finally, the services are aware 
that the Congressional budget must be presented in terms of
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Plannihg. Programming. 
BUdg'e'fihg\ • inquiry. 1969, p. 209.





While the vast majority of individual budget deci­
sions are made in the traditional object classifications, 
the major reductions of service budget requests are now made 
in program terms. In the Fiscal Year 1970 budget submission, 
some 75 per cent of the total dollar reduction was made 
during the program-review phase.^
An even more dangerous tendency of the DOD's PPBS is 
that it appears to be moving toward a performance-oriented, 
rather than planning-oriented, system. The Department of 
Defense has instituted Project PRIME to attempt to develop 
performance/cost reporting down to the lowest autonomous 
organizational elements.  ̂ This system is based on the need 
for management control. The danger to PPBS could be that 
the performance data requirements could dominate the planning 
data. The breakout of the General Support program into the 
four major programs of Intelligence and Communications; 
Central Supply and Maintenance; Training, Medical, and Other 
General Personnel Activities; and Administration and Asso­
ciated Activities appears to be motivated more by the desire 
for performance data than for planning data.3
^Robinson, "Draft Presidential Memorandum," pp. 48-49.
^Project PRIME and PPBS have been combined under one 
system called the Resource Management System.
3Allen Schick, "Multipurpose Budget Systems,"
Program Budgeting ^ d  Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Hinrichs 
and Taylor, pp. 368-69.
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In a d e q u a t e An a ly s l s
Another problem in the DOD's use of PPBS is the cover­
age of systems analysis. Analysis is used in only a small 
percentage of the appropriate decision-making situations in 
the DOD.l There are two basic reasons for this: first, the
porganizational capability for analysis is limited; and
second, a high number of decision areas are excluded from
analysis because of the "political override," including the
effect of decisions on the careers of immediate superiors,3
It is hoped that the recent directive to make all
relevant decisions at all levels subject to systems analysis
will eliminate some of these problems. As one author noted:
Compliance [with the need for systems analysis] will 
depend on understanding and understanding may take a long 
time. But the wise manager will make the effort to 
learn what it is all about and "get with the program,"
He will find that he will make better resource alloca­
tion decisions when he does. And his decisions will 
"sell,"4
One other problem in regard to the use of systems 
analysis in the PPB system is the inadequacy of some of the 
analyses themselves. There is evidence that some studies
^U, 8,, Congress, Senate, Planning, Programming. 
Budgeting.- • Tnquiry. 1969, PP. 127-2Ü,
^Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense 
on the' Department' of T/e'fen'se' by the' Blue Ribbon Panel, 
ljuly 1, igYo), p, 6Ü,
% ,  S,, Congress, Senate, Planning, Programming. 
Budgeting,- Tn'quiry. 1969, pp. 127=Z?1
^"Economic Analysis Goes Down Chain of Command," 
A'rMe'd Forces' Managemient. XV (May, 1969), 63.
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are not performed to provide inputs for decisions but to 
support existing decisions.^ This problem can only be cor­
rected as decision-makers become more knowledgeable on how 
to use the capability of systems analysis.
Contributions of PPBS in the DOD
The problems mentioned above do not mean that the
implementation of PPBS in the Department of Defense has been 
unsuccessful. There have been direct benefits: It has
provided the Secretary of Defense with better and more com­
plete information needed for decisions by allowing him to 
relate resources to programs. It has given the Secretary of 
Defense a greater degree of control over the military es­
tablishment and allowed him to exercise that control in a 
meaningful manner rather than arbitrarily or capriciously.
It has closed the gap between planning and budgeting and 
allowed budgeting to proceed on an orderly basis, with em­
phasis on long-term (five-year) effects of budgetary deci­
sions. It has provided a data base that allowed the applica­
tion of systems analysis to military decisions and a system
2to integrate this analysis into the actual decision process.
The use of systems analysis and the PPBS has provided 
another benefit. The Secretary of Defense and subordinate
^Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense 
on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Panel, 
I’juiy'i; T9T ü),‘'w : ------  -----------------------
^Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, pp. 290-91.
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officials are now required to make explicit decisions on 
forces, capabilities, and weapons. These decisions were 
previously obscured in budget ceilings. Now both the deci­
sion and the process by which It was made are open and sub­
ject to review and criticism.^
The major contribution of PPBS and systems analysis 
may have been Its effect on the use of emotion. Secretary 
McNamara stated:
I expect Defense executives to develop their recom­
mendations on the national military strategy, operating 
plans, force structures, budgets, etc., based on reason 
rather than emotion.2
The use of systems analysis has encouraged this. Analysis
requires the search for facts and their relationships, and
then the application of these facts to the problem at hand.
The use of PPBS has also made It possible for the 
Secretary of Defense to manage the programs by broad mission 
outlines without a major reorganization.^ Unified analyses 
can be performed across service lines. This has resulted In 
a more balanced force structure.
The real question Is whether or not decisions are 
better as a result of the Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng
^Enthoven and Smith, "Current Status," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress. Joint Economic Committee, 
V ô r m T 7 ”l969, p. 959.
^Robert S. McNamara, "Defense Decision Making as 
McNamara Sees It," Armed Forces Management, X (November, 
1963), 38. -----------------
^Niskanan, "The Defense Resource Allocation Process," 
A Commentary on Defense Management, ed. by Smale, pp. 3-5.
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System. Any answer to that question would be largely specu­
lative since it is impossible to determine if decisions 
would have been different if PPBS had not been implemented.
It can be stated that the decisions which have been made 
have been based on more meaningful data, on the knowledge of 
and explicit consideration of more alternatives, on debate 
which focuses on fact instead of rhetoric and emotion, and 
on a greater consideration of interservice effects of deci­
sions.^ If it can be assumed that more informed decisions 
are "better" decisions, it appears that PPBS, with all of 
its existing problems, has apparently fulfilled the promise 
of improvement of decision-making in the Department of 
Defense.
FPBS in the Nondefense Sector 
of the üovernmenF
As noted before, the dissatisfaction with the tradi­
tional budgeting process as a management tool was not limited 
to the Department of Defense. All federal agencies were 
experiencing the same problems. Because of this dissatis­
faction PPBS was implemented in the nondefense sector of the 
government.^ The problems associated with this implementa­
tion of PPBS in the civilian agencies and a general evaluation
^Enthoven and Smith, "Current Status," Analysis and 
EVaTu'a'tTon, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
VoT.’Tir,”1969, p. 961.
^The statement of President Johnson which implemented 
PPBS on a government-wide basis is contained in Appendix B-1,
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of how it has fared will follow.
Problems of PPBS in the Civilian Agencies 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System was moved, 
almost intact, from the DOD to the civilian agencies of the 
government. Many authors have written that the Department 
of Defense’s PPBS was an inappropriate prototype for use in 
the civilian sectors.^ Some of the reasons for this posi­
tion are based on actual difficulties, while others repre­
sent misconceptions about PPBS that must be corrected before 
PPBS can become effective.
Lack of Planning
One major difference in the situations faced in the 
Defense Department and in nondefense agencies was the connec­
tion between budgeting and planning. In the DOD the concern 
was that there was a separation of planning and budget. In 
many of the nondefense agencies this separation did not exist 
because there was a noticeable lack of long-range planning. 
Planning was often accomplished in terms of the budget, with 
its limited horizon of one year, and no planning staff existed.' 
Robert N. Grosse, Professor of Health Planning in the School
Ipor example, see Keith E, Marvin and Andrew M.
Rouse, "The Status of PPB in Federal Agencies: A Comparative
Perspective." Analysis and Evaluation, U. S., Congress,
Joint Economic Committee,' Vol. ÏÏÏ, 1969, p. 803.
2oscar Disler, "Progress from Budgeting to Planning 
in Government." Managerial Planning. XVIII (March-Aprll, 
1970), 25.
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of Public Health, of the University of Michigan, noted one 
example of lack of evaluation of programs and needs;
There has been little systematic planning of the 
department's [Health, Education and Welfare's] programs. 
There was "thought" as to how to get across certain new 
concepts or how to get more funds for existing programs, 
but no tradition of carefully studying our interrelated 
program needs and evaluation of these programs.^
Professor Grosse later made it clear that the problem was 
basically one of no departmental co-ordination and no con­
sideration of long-range problems as well as lack of eval­
uation of alternatives.
Prior to the introduction of the planning-programming- 
budgeting system, long-range planning in HEW was sporadic 
and generally not department-wide. No mechanism existed 
for focusing attention on longer range objectives, de­
ciding which types of programs should be given highest 
priority over the next several years, and then drawing 
up a budget consistent with those objectives and priori­ties.=
What was true in Health, Education and Welfare was also true 
in many of the other agencies.3
^Robert N. Grosse, "Cost-Effectiveness as a Tool for 
Decision Makers in the Executive Branch," Information Support. 
ed, by Chartrand, Janda and Hugo, p. 15%.
^Robert N. Grosse, "Problems of Resource Allocation 
in Health." Analysis and Evaluation. U. S., Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, Vol. IÏÏ, 1969, pp. 1220-21,
3This lack of long-range planning was typical of many, 
but not all, nondefense agencies. For example, the Post 
Office Department's planning effort was described as ad hoc 
before PPBS. (R. Joseph Novogrod, Marshall Edward Dimock 
and Gladys Ogden Dimock, Casebook in Public Administration. 
pp. 253-54.) One noticeable exception to the lack of civi- 
lian agency planning was the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. Their planning effort was largely responsi­
ble for their successful achievements. (Webb, Space Age 
Management. pp. 61-62.)
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The use of PPBS in the DOD was to eliminate the gap 
between planning and budgeting. In civilian agencies, PPBS 
was largely required to stimulate long-range planning.
Levels of Government Involved
A major problem encountered in the use of PPBS in the 
civilian agencies of the Federal Government is that these 
agencies often are not able to exert total control over 
either expenditures (inputs) or services and products 
(outputs). Control by the Federal Government is lost when 
the particular program involves several levels of govern­
mental organizations.
In contrast to most other governmental agencies, the 
Department of Defense is concerned with only one level of 
government —  federal. States and local governments do not 
maintain armed forces for the purpose of national security,1 
Programs of nondefense agencies are greatly complicated by 
the interaction of state levels in administration. The 
problems faced by the Department of Labor, for example, 
range from the program under the Manpower Development and 
Training Act to the program under the Unemployment Insurance 
system. Under the former program, the entire burden of finan­
cing is carried by the Federal Government, Federal standards 
are applied for eligibility, operation, and reporting, and
^States do exercise some degree of control over 
National Guard forces. However, for purposes of training and 
in times of national mobilization, these forces are under 
federal control.
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data collection, analysis, and system modifications are 
possible on a national scale. In the latter program the 
system is totally administered by, and primarily financed 
by, the individual states. While there are federally im­
posed minimum standards for this program, these standards 
will not even allow for a nationwide uniform collection of 
data.^
The multiplicity of levels of governments involved 
in a program can also be seen in the Urban Renewal Program.
In 1961 the Federal Government contributed $1.3 billion to 
urban renewal projects. This was matched by $700 million 
by local governments and $900 million by state governments, 
as well as $9 to $12 billion from private sources.^
The problem of levels of activity is compounded when 
the financial aid is given through grants-in-aid. In this 
case the federal organization becomes a conduit of funds to 
states and other government bodies who run the programs and 
spend the money. The agency head cannot direct men and 
material through a command channel like the Secretary of De­
fense, but can only reorient programs by recommending legis­
lation or recommending that next year's budget be reallocated.
The use of grants has become more significant. In
^Asher Achinstein, "Constraints on Policy Analysis 
and Policy Implementation in the Federal Agencies," Analysis 
and Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
Vol. I, 1969, p. 372.
^Rothenberg, "Urban Renewal Programs," Measurlhg Bene­
fits of G'overhment Investments. ed. by Dorfman, p. 2927
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1929 there was only $100 million in grants to states. This 
rose to $900 million in 1941 and to $20 billion by 1968.1 
Currently there are over 400 different grant-in-aid programs 
administered by the Federal Government.^ The use of grants 
is not evenly spread throughout all of the functions of the 
government. Table 6 shows the percentage of total expendi­
tures involved in direct purchases versus transfer payments 
(grants to governmental activities and payments direct to 
individuals) for various areas of Federal Government acti­
vity. The effect on the operations of an agency such as 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, where a 
high percentage of their funds are used for grants-in-aid, 
is obvious.
When there are a number of levels of government in­
volved in a program, PPBS is not inapplicable nor analysis 
impossible. In fact, the need for analysis to determine the 
effect of grants is evident. In many cases it is not known 
if the grants have an addition or substitution effect (i.e., 
does the money in the grant add to the resources available 
for the purpose, or are other resources which would be avail­
able simply diverted from the purpose because the grant 
exists?). 3
Iweidenbaum, The Modern Public Sector, p. 14.
^Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Optimal Allocation of Juris­
dictional Responsibility: The Principle of 'Fiscal Equiva­
lence.'" ;^ï&igble_an;d^^ U. S., Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Vol. Ï, 19b9, p. 323.
3schultze, Public Spending, pp. 119-21.
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TABLE 6




National Security 93.5% 6.5%
Military Defense 97.2 2.8
Defense-Related Activities 85.2 14.8
Space Research 99.5 0.5
International Affairs 18.7 81.3
Welfare, Health and Education 10.8% 89.2%
Social Insurance 1.8 98.2
Veteran’s Programs 22.6 77.4
Poverty Programs 14.5 85.5
Education 33.6 66.4
Health 45.2 54.8




Agriculture and Natural Resources 37.6% 76.7%
Source: National Industrial Conference Board, The Federal
Budget; Its Impact on the Economy, Fiscal Year 
1968, pp. 35-41.
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A multiplicity of government levels involved in a 
program does make the required analytical effort more diffi­
cult. Most systems analysis efforts in the Department of 
Defense assume that there is a single decision-maker with 
the authority to implement the recommendation. Social 
programs lack this structure for implementation of recom­
mendations. The proper method of implementing recommenda­
tions (i.e., a manipulation of the system of rewards to meet 
the desired end) must become an explicit part of these 
analyses
This multiplicity of governmental levels involved in 
programs also has a definite effect on the data-gathering 
problem of PPBS. State and local Integration into the data 
system is required to make PPBS most effective. Some pro­
jects have been implemented to achieve this goal. Five city, 
five county, and five state governments were given grants 
to implement PPBS on an experimental basis. The Department 
of Housing and Urban Development and Bureau of the Budget 
have begun an experimental project to determine the areas 
of state government planning, programming, and budgeting 
which require the most improvement. Two states were surveyed 
during Fiscal Year 1969 and were provided funds to effect 
improvements noted. Six other states were to be reviewed
pp. 19—20.
^Quade, Cos't-Effectiveness; Some Trends in Analysis,
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during Fiscal Year 1970.^
Interdepart'iiiental Effort s
Civilian agencies also differ from the military be­
cause of the interdepartmental fragmentation of programs.
In the area of national security, the Department of Defense 
is responsible for almost all of the programs. The same 
thing cannot be said for the other departments. For exam­
ple, the Department of Commerce notes that almost every 
program in their Department ties in with some other federal
pprogram in some other department.
The classic examples of multi-agency concern and 
participation in broad programs are in health and education. 
In the area of health there are twelve agencies, six de­
partments, and one separate commission (administering a 
health trust fund), as well as the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, directly involved. This does not in­
clude the agencies which simply have employee health benefit 
plans. These twenty agencies spend a total of $5.4 billion 
annually on health. The Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare spends only $2.5 billion, or less than 50 per cent 
of this,3
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps,” Analysis and 
Evaluatïon, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol.TrrrwTp. 634.
^Achinstein, "Constraints," Ibid., pp. 371-72.
^Marvin Frankel, "Federal Health Expenditures in a 
Program Budget," Program Budgeting, ed, by Novick, p, 213.
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Education programs are even more fragmented. Forty- 
two agencies have funds In their budgets for education. The 
larger of these Include HEW (which Is primarily responsible), 
National Science Foundation, Veterans Administration, De­
partment of Agriculture, Department of Defense, Atomic 
Energy Commission, and National Aeronautics and Space Admin­
istration.^
The foreign affairs area Is another example of the 
problem of Interdepartmental fragmentation. The Department 
of State controls only about 20 per cent of the foreign 
affairs budget. As one author noted. In the area of foreign 
affairs, Mr. Hitch would have to " . . . Invent a budget, 
not rationalize one.
Interdepartmental fragmentation should not be con­
sidered a block to the effective use of the Plannlng- 
Programmlng-Budgetlng System. On the contrary, this should 
be considered an urgent reason for Its use. One of the pur­
poses of PPBS In the DOD was to offset the problems of 
Interservice fragmentation of programs. Similarly, the use 
of PPBS In the civilian sector of the government should fa­
cilitate the management of programs where Interdepartmental 
efforts are Involved. A well-designed program structure 
would allow some consolidation of Information and co-ordination
IWerner Z. Hlrsch, "Education In a Program Budget," 
Ibid.. p. 179.
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Planning. Progranünlhg. 
Budgeting: inquTry. I969, p. 115.
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of decisions across department lines.^ PPBS is definitely 
more useful in this regard than the traditional object 
classification budget.
Fixed Costs
Another aspect of civilian agencies that is different 
from that of the Department of Defense is the higher percen­
tage of funds that are relatively uncontrollable in any 
given budget year. The government can modify all federal 
spending programs and can eliminate most of them. This 
power is more theoretical than practical, however. In 
practice there are four categories of institutional barriers 
to changing the allocation of government funds. These are;
1. ■ Trust' Funds : These funds (such as social-security pro­
grams of old-age survivors and disability insurance) are fi­
nanced by permanent appropriations and do not require annual 
appropriation action. Other trust-fund-type expenditures 
make annual appropriations a mere formality. For example, 
the Pederal-Aid Highway Act of 1954 authorizes the states to 
enter into obligations which commit the Federal Government 
to liquidate these obligations through grants.
2. Permanent or Indefinite Appropriations : The largest of
these is payment of interest on the public debt. Other per­
manent appropriations include removal of surplus farm
1 Appendix A-10 shows how some educational efforts 
from other departments and agencies are consolidated into the 
program structure of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare.
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commodities (30 per cent of gross customs receipts are ear­
marked for this purpose) and range improvements (one-third 
of grazing revenues from federal lands go for this purpose).
3. ■ Other Fixed Charges; These expenditures are fixed by 
basic statute rather than through the annual appropriation 
process. Primarily these involve public assistance (the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare makes grants to 
states to reimburse them for a fixed share of certain public- 
assistance payments) and veterans' compensation and pensions 
(paid to all qualified veterans, widows, and dependents with 
the amounts specified by law).
4, Fa'rt'iaTly Completed Projects: This includes funds for
the completion of projects that were started with money 
approved in earlier budgets. The size of this can be indi­
cated by the fact that $2.4 billion of the Fiscal Year 1969 
budget was to continue construction projects for which a 
total of $28.8 billion had been spent prior to the budget 
year. There is a natural reluctance to cancel these ongoing 
projects after a substantial investment of public funds.
(The political damage of "a half of a bridge" could be very 
high.) Because the Department of Defense does cancel some 
of their programs after substantial investment in research 
and development, none of the military programs are classified 
in this category.!
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Budget 'Uncontrollability' as 
an Obstacle to Improving the Allocation of Government Re­
sources,"' U. S., Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Vol. Ï, 1969, pp. 359-63*
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If the above categories are used to indicate portions 
of the budget that are "relatively uncontrollable," a total 
of $96.6 billion (or about 48 per cent of the total budget 
authority requested) would be classified in this manner.
If these "relatively uncontrollable" portions of the budget 
are broken into the separate agencies. Congress would con­
trol, through its normal appropriation process, the following 





General Service Administration 99Defense (Military) 97State 97
Commerce 66







Health, Education and Welfare 12
Labor 12
Civil Service Commission 12
Treasury 0
If ongoing projects are eliminated from the uncontrollable 
category (assuming they are the most "controllable"), there 
would be three significant changes ;
NASA 100 per cent
Defense - Civil 99 per cent
Interior 57 per cent
^Ibid.. p. 364.
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This "fixed payment" condition only emphasizes the 
need for PPBS. This feature demonstrates that a multi-year 
horizon is mandatory in considering governmental programs. 
Since changes can be, made only over an extended period of 
time, long-range planning conducted on a systematic basis 
becomes absolutely essential.
undefined Ob.1 ectlves
One of the primary problems of implementing PPBS in 
the nondefense sectors of the government resulted from the 
widespread feeling that the objectives of these agencies 
were of such a nature that they were simply not adaptable to 
that system. One author comments that the DOD’s PPBS was 
not a good prototype for civil agencies because " . . .  most 
civil agencies have more undefined (and) varied . . . objec­
tives than the Defense Department."^ It is difficult to 
distinguish between the ambiguity of objectives in the De­
partment of Defense and in other agencies. One booklet, 
published in i960, concluded that program budgeting would 
not work in mental health any more than it would work in the
PDepartment of Defense. Only one year later PPBS was suc­
cessfully implemented in the Department of Defense.
There is considerable truth in the statement that the 
objectives of nondefense agencies are not well defined. In
^Marvin and Rouse, "Status of PPB," Ibid., Vol. Ill,
p. 803.
^Gabis, Mental Health, p. 50.
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the field of education there exist a number of possible 
objectives that could be followed. The role of the Federal 
Government could be to ensure or promote equality of educa­
tional opportunity or to develop new or innovative approaches 
to education or to promote general excellence throughout 
the nation's education system or some combination of these 
three.1 This ambiguity of objectives should be an incentive 
to the use of PPBS by these agencies. One of the purposes 
of PPBS expressed by President Johnson was to identify our 
national goals with precision and on a continuing basis.
MulfipTicify of Objectives
Critics also point out that the multiplicity of ob­
jectives in civilian agencies prevents the effective use of 
PPBS. Generally these individuals note that the government 
performs several basic functions; providing for a public 
good (something that is consumed in common); dealing with 
"spillover effects" (the consequences of an individual de­
cision not only effect the decision-maker but also effect 
some other individual); making the distribution of income and 
opportunity more equal; managing publicly owned resources; 
performing tasks which are large scale and/or high risk; and
pincreasing the efficiency of private markets. As these
Ijohn E. Brandi, "Education Program Analysis at HEW," 
Analysis' and EvaTuation. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, Vol. Ill, 1969, p. 1225.
2pred S. Hoffman, "Public Expenditure Analysis and the 
Institutions of the Executive Branch." Ibid.. pp. 929-30.
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critics point out, national security is an area which is 
almost a pure example of a "public good," but most civilian 
programs participate in more than one of these six roles.
This multiplicity of roles gives rise to a multiplicity of 
objectives.
The multiplicity-of-bbjectives argument against PPBS 
makes the incorrect assumption that the "public good" of 
national security can be measured as one item and that mul­
tiple objectives do not exist. The following four objec­
tives are all valid in the area of national security; to 
prevent, or deter, war; to limit war, if it occurs, to the 
smallest geographical area and the lowest level of intensity; 
to terminate the war, if it occurs, as rapidly and deci­
sively as possible; and to conduct the war, if it occurs, 
so that a minimum loss of life is involved.^ Notice that 
these are not only multiple objectives but that they also 
conflict. For example, actions or weapons that will terminate 
conflicts as rapidly and decisively as possible may not ensure 
a minimum loss of life.
It is true that civilian programs have greater inter­
actions with other programs than do military programs and 
that some of these interactions are difficult to define and 
measure. The existence of multiple objectives and high inter­
actions with other programs complicates analysis and limits
^Special Studies Report II of the Rockefeller Brothers 
Inferriafion'aT Se'(
York; boubleday, 195b)
Fund, Tnt matlon'a 'cUrity -- The Military Aspect. (New
, p. 01.
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the strength of comparison of various alternatives. With 
multiple objectives it is doubtful that any one alternative 
will dominate all others. However, the existence of multiple 
objectives creates a stronger need for a systematic analysis. 
The effects of all of the alternatives on all of the objec­
tives (some of which reinforce each other and others that 
conflict) can be considered explicitly by systems analysis.
The record seems to indicate that many of the pro­
grams that have been instituted without any form of systematic 
analysis have tended to disregard all effects except the 
primary ones or have tended to misstate the direction of 
these effects. The distributional role of the government is 
a prime example of this observation. One place where distri­
butional effects have been disregarded is in transportation 
programs. The general income distribution effect of highway 
programs seems to be regressive. Highways are constructed 
from general tax revenues (as well as from gasoline tax), 
yet the benefits appear to accrue largely to those people 
who own automobiles, or the relatively affluent. To the ex­
tent that highway construction lowers freight costs and 
lowers the price of necessities, it could be a progressive 
redistribution. However, the net effect appears to be re­
gressive. The major point in the case for systems analysis 
is that this aspect has never been totally evaluated.^
Ijohn R. Meyer, "Transportation in the Program 
Budget," Frogram Budgeting, ed. by Novick, p. l6?.
I8l
In some other cases the distributional effects of 
domestic programs have been misstated. A prime example is 
in higher education. A study by Hansen and Weisbrod con­
sidered the distributional effect of the college-educational 
program of California, This program is one of the most 
open and accessible in the nation. The reason for this 
heavily state-financed program of education is so that youth 
from any economic class could have ready access to the 
possibility of upward social mobility. This study showed 
that contrary to intentions, the system was highly regressive.
The point of this discussion is not to condemn the 
highway program or California's higher-education program 
because the objectives that they are designed to meet are 
not solely those of income or wealth redistribution. How­
ever, effective systems analysis is the only way that spill­
over benefits can be explicitly considered. The record to 
date indicates that they have been largely ignored in pro­
gram design and decisions.
The impact of the explicit consideration of spill­
over benefits on the complexity of analysis should be noted.
A simple analysis includes :
  input ------ ► output
% .  Lee Hanson and Burton A. Weisbrod, Benefits, Costs 
àhd'Financé'of'Public Higher Education, (Chicago; Markham 
Publishing Co,, 1969) as cited in James T. Bonnen, "The 
Absense of Knowledge of Distributional Impacts: An Obstacle
to Effective Public Program Analysis and Decisions,"
Analysis' and Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, Vol. I, 1969, p. 433.
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but the existence of spill-over benefits means that the 
analysis includes;
Output A 
y Output B 
Output C 1
The analysis is necessarily more complicated in this latter 
case.
One other complication to analysis caused by multiple 
objectives is that the scope of the problem is increased. 
Consider the case of explicit consideration of the distribu­
tional effects of programs. This requires the making of 
three distinct decisions: the decision to support the
general program, the decision of how the support will be
2given, and the decision of how the support will be financed. 
If distributional effects were not considered, the third 
decision would not require analysis.
The use of a PPB type system is then made even more 
essential by the fact that multiple objectives exist in 
domestic programs. The systematic analysis of decisions 
will not guarantee easier decisions but only better-informed 
decisions. The distributional effects again provide an 
example :
^Arthur Smithies, "Programs, Objectives and Decision 
Making," Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed, by 
Hinrichs and Taylor, p, loi.
^Prankel, "Health Expenditures," Program Budgeting, 
ed, by Novick, p, 240,
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A good PPB system can illuminate these distribu­
tional decisions, but cannot make them any easier. 
Indeed, assembling and publicizing information on who 
is helped by particular government programs may inten­
sify political conflict,1
This political conflict over proper objectives would be
directed toward defined issues and supported with adequate
data instead of being based on pure emotion and rhetoric.
Impossibility of Quantification
Another limitation to the use of PPBS in the non­
defense sector of the government has been that agencies 
believe that the programs that they are engaged in do not 
lend themselves to quantification,  ̂ This tendency was well 
described by Aaron Wildavsky, Professor of Political 
Science in the University of California at Berkley. He 
stated;
If there is a demand for information the cry goes out 
that what the organization does cannot be measured. 
Should anyone attempt to tie the organization down to 
any measure of productivity, the claim is made that 
there is no truth in numbers. Oftentimes this is 
another way of saying, "Mind your own business," 
Sometimes the line taken is that the work is so subtle 
that it resists any tests. On other occasions the point 
Is made that only those learned in esoteric arts can 
properly understand what the organization does, and 
they can barely communicate to the uninitiated. There 
are men so convinced of the ultimate righteousness of 
their cause that they cannot imagine why anyone would
^Alice M, Rivlin, "The Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System In the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare: Some Lessons from Experience," Analysis and
Evaluation. U. S,. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
ÏÏÏ’;'Ï969, p. 922,
^Achinstein, "Constraints," Ibid,. Vol. I, p. 377.
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wish to know how well they are doing in handling our 
common difficulties; Their activities are literally 
priceless; vulgar notions of cost and benefit do not 
apply to them.i
This argument often comes down to the fact that no 
value can be placed on intangibles such as scenery, time, 
security, or even human life.2 No one will argue for the 
placing of a firm dollar value on these intangibles. How­
ever, it should be recognized that the mere act of making a 
decision, with or without analysis, implicitly places a 
value on these. For example, the allocation of funds for 
educational purposes instead of for health implicitly places 
a value on human life relative to education. The purpose 
of PPBS is to make this implicit valuation process better 
through the information that PPBS will provide.
While it is conceded that most activities of the 
government cannot be measured to a finite degree of accuracy 
by the use of numbers, it should be noted that the full 
potential of quantitative data has not been exploited in 
most areas. Just as proximate measures of effectiveness are 
used in place of absolute measures in military problems, the 
use of imagination will allow the development of proximate 
criteria in ma.ny domestic programs.
In general, our ability to measure benefits and costs 
of public activities is limited only by our imagination
^Aaron Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis from 
PPBS,"- PubTlc- Administrafioh He view. XXIX (March-April. 
1969), iW,
2"Putting a Dollar Sign on Everything," p, 124,
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and willingness to see them measured. We have the 
capability to measure many more impacts of public 
action than we are willing to measure.1
In addition to the possibility of the use of im­
perfect but somewhat effective "proximate measures of 
effectiveness, the use of some quantitative data is abso­
lutely essential for most decisions. For example, the 
statement that "improving literacy in primary schools is 
more important than improving literacy in college" does 
not have much meaning. If it is said that an extra billion 
dollars spent on improving literacy in primary schools will 
contribute more to achieving universal literacy than the 
same billion dollars spent on improving literacy in college, 
the statement begins to have some meaning. Only when quan­
titative data that expresses cost is Introduced does the 
choice begin to be meaningful.^
The use of quantitative data and cost-effectiveness 
analysis in some areas which were previously considered as 
too intangible for analysis is the best proof of the poten­
tial effectiveness of PPBS. One of these studies concerned 
the detection and treatment procedure of glaucoma. The study 
centered around the level of detection possible with com­
binations of permanent clinics and mobile examination units. 
The variables were the number of people who could reach a
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Guidelines.
1969, p. 239.
^Smithies, "Programs, Objectives and Decision Making," 
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cosf Analysis. ed. by Hinrichs 
and Taylor, pp. îüZ-b]!
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clinic versus the depth of examination possible. A com­
bination of permanent and mobile facilities as well as an 
examination procedure which maximized the number of cases 
of glaucoma detected per dollar was formulated.^
Another study concerned the allocation of funds for 
the examinations for cancer. With this study the allocation 
was made so that for a given sum of money, the maximum 
number of deaths could be averted. The study was then ex­
panded to include other health hazards —  motor vehicle 
accidents, arthritis, syphilis, and tuberculosis —  with the 
savings in prospective productive earnings as the criteria.^
In these cases the use of analysis which included 
quantitative data on problems which were earlier classed 
as totally unquantifiable facilitated the decision process.
It can be seen that quantitative approaches to many domestic 
problems are possible and fruitful. It is true that output/ 
benefit definition in quantitative terms is more difficult 
for some programs than it is for others, but basically this 
difficulty "has been used as justification for the slow rate 
of progress (in implementing PPBS) made by many agencies" 
which have only "avoided wrestling with benefit definitions."3
^Augustin P. Nunez, "Disease Detection Under Uncer- 
tainity; An Applied Model," T^nagemeht Action; Models of 
AdWini'stra'tiye' "Decisions« ed, by Edward Weber and Üerald 
Peters, pp. 22b-42.
^Grosse, "Cost-Effectiveness," Information Support. 
ed. by Chartrand, Janda and Hugo, pp. Ib3-t$.
^Marvin and Rouse, "Status of PPB,"' Analysis' and Eval- 
uation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. Ill,mrrv- 813.
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Laclc of Data
Perhaps the major problem with the implementation of 
PPBS in the civilian agencies of the Federal Government is 
the lack of data. Information in many governmental areas is 
grossly inadequate.
The major data deficiency in civilian agencies of 
the government is the lack of knowledge of social "produc­
tion functions," Very little is known in areas such as 
welfare, health, and education about what effect changes in 
the levels of input or in alternatives have on the attain­
ment of the objective desired.
Despite the fact that much research has gone on in 
the psychology of learning and in the sociology of 
social problems, and that educational and social re­
search data have accumulated in the literature over 
centuries, very little is really known and understood . 
about the instructional process as it takes place in 
educational institutions or about behavior as it occurs 
in society. The theories , , . and data that exist, 
fall far short of the robustness and breath needed for 
effective systems analysis and design.1
Not only is the social production function often 
unknown, but evaluation data to measure the benefits of 
Federal Government programs is "almost n o n e x i s t e n t , P a r ­
ticularly in the social area, programs that are in progress 
are "quasi-experiments," They were based on the assumption 
that they would improve health, education, housing, or raise
^Eugene A. Cogan, Remarks on Systems Analysis for 
Social' TrobTems. p. 3.
^Allen Schick, "From Analysis to Evaluation," The 
•Anhal's' of the" Amer'ican' Academy of PoTifical and Social 
Science. CCCXCIV Ckarch. 19^1;. 64.
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employment, etc. There has usually been no concrete 
attempt to test these assumptions or to measure the degree 
to which these programs have achieved their goal.l
Some examples of this lack of evaluation data are 
appropriate. Manpower and antipoverty programs are designed 
to increase the social productivity of the participants.
Yet no program has been totally evaluated with data on what 
happens to the participants after they have left the program. 
"Some . . .  have pieced together the fragments of evidence 
available and have published their own opinions, but most of 
these have reflected unabashed personal judgements supported 
by no ’scientific' me th odo log y.O the r equally large gaps 
in benefit data include the distributional effects of pro­
grams 3 and the effectiveness of different methods of financial 
support (e.g., grants, revenue sharing, and direct pay­
ments),^
There are several reasons for the lack of this data.
The major reason is time. In the manpower and antipoverty 
programs, one measure of effectiveness is the increased
Ijoseph S. Wholey, "The Absense of Program Evaluation 
as an Obstacle to Effective Public Expenditure Policy; A 
Case Study of Child Health Care Programs," Analysis' and 
EVaTu'a'tTon, Ü. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. I,TgwTpnrsi.
^Garth L. Mangum, "Determining the Results of Man­
power and Antipoverty Programs," Ibid.. Vol. Ill, pp. 1171-76.
Ssonnen, "Distributional Impacts," Ibid., Vol. I,
p. 447.
^William B. Ross, "Policy Analysis and Housing and 
Urban Development Programs." Ibid.. Vol. Ill, p. 1241.
189
earnings and employment experiences of participants. This 
requires a detailed follow-up to the program over an ex­
tended period of time, at least on the basis of an adequate 
sampling plan.^
This requirement of time for the collection of data 
is partially the cause of the second handicap to an effec­
tive data-collection system —  cost. An extensive follow-up 
system such as is needed for manpower and antipoverty pro­
grams is expensive. Secretary of Labor W, Willard Wirtz 
gave an indication of the magnitude of cost required:
For example, if we were to improve our appraisal of 
this nation’s employment problems, collecting separate 
data for several hundred geographic areas, and using 
definitions of employment that would permit quantifica­
tion and analysis of the full range of employment prob­
lems, the cost would be about $10-15 million a year 
above our current expenditures ($8 million) for national 
employment statistics.
Or, if we were to fully implement a management 
information reporting system so that it could provide 
both, up-to-date data on individuals and the services 
performed for them, the cost would be about $10 million 
a year.
Finally, if we were to analyze fully what we are 
achieving through our manpower efforts, we would need a 
more complete program participant followup system. This 
would include tracing individuals over a period of time 
in order to determine the effects of varying mixes ofservices.2
Notice that this cost is just for one limited area. The 
cost of routine data needed for analysis in all governmental 
areas would be a high multiple of Secretary Wirtz*s estimates
^ Man gum, ’’Manpower and Antipoverty Programs,” Ibid..
pp. 1171-80,
^Achinstein, ’’Constraints.” Ibid.. Vol. I, p, 385.
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The earlier efforts toward evaluations of programs 
were created on an ad hoc basis. Most of the evaluation 
funds were spent on "crash efforts to serve as after-the- 
fact justification for program decisions." This cannot be 
a substitute for the routine collection of data on effec­
tiveness of programs through the use of "scientific" 
evaluation methods.^ This need has been recognized.
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Gardner stated in 
his Program Memorandum to the President, "Recommended Mater­
nal and Child Health Care Programs for Fiscal Year 1968":
Lack of data on the effects of current programs has been 
a handicap to evaluation and planning. I am, therefore, 
directing that the Welfare Administration and the Public 
Health Service develop and implement improved reporting 
systems and intensified health interview and health 
examination surveys to improve our knowledge of the need 
for and the effectiveness of maternal and child health 
care programs. I am directing a continuing evaluation 
of the effectiveness of all maternal and child health 
care programs in meeting specific objectives such as the 
reduction of infant mortality and chronic handicapping 
conditions.2
Recently Congress has passed legislation in several 
areas that earmarks one-half to one per cent of the program 
funds for program evaluation. These funds have been included 
in public health grant programs, juvenile delinquency pro­
grams, work incentive programs, educational programs, and 
vocational rehabilitation programs.3
p. 624.
^Wholey, "Child Health Care," Ibid.. pp. 469-70. 
•̂ Ibid.. p. 464.
3carlson, "Status and Next Steps." Ibid.. Vol. II,
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In addition to the use of routine reporting of the 
effectiveness of various programs, there has been a tendency 
to begin to upgrade knowledge and data with controlled ex­
periments. One of the largest of these is the experiment on 
the effect on employment patterns of various "income guar­
antee plans" which was conducted in 1969 and 1970 in New 
Jersey.1 Other experiments have been conducted on the 
effects of "negative income tax."^ Large-scale, controlled 
experiments are also advocated for other social areas such 
as education,3
There are some individuals who believe that the lack 
of theory on the production function of social programs 
"paralyzes" the use of systems analysis.^ This is not true. 
One of the major reasons for calling systems analysis into 
the public arena is that theoretic knowledge is lacking and 
a "model" must be developed.5 The use of analysis and PPBS 
provides a framework for identifying the data which is re­
quired. At the very minimum, the use of analysis will
l"Can Handouts Make Better Wage Earners," Business 
"Week. February 28, 1970, pp. 80-82.
^Hoffman, "Public Expenditure Analysis," ^alysis and 
EvaTuation. U, S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
Ill,' 1969, p. 940.
^Brandi, "Education Program Analysis at HEW," Ibid.,
p. 1232.
^Por example see Braybrooke and Lindbloom. A Strategy 
of Decision. p. 117.
^Quade, Systems' Approach, pp. 2-3.
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demonstrate where the data is inadequate.
Lack of data is evident for both costs and benefits.
Data on costs is unavailable for the same reasons that it 
was unavailable in the Department of Defense —  the tradi­
tional budgeting and accounting system does not accumulate 
cost data by programs.1 This is not a significant handicap 
to the use of PPBS. One of the basic purposes of PPBS is 
to collect cost data from diverse accounting object classi­
fications and to group it under meaningful program headings.
The lack of data definitely limits the amount of 
assistance which PPBS, in its early stages, can be to govern­
mental decision-making. Only after PPBS has been implemented 
will the data gaps be adequately filled.
Lack of •personnel
Another problem that the nondefense agencies have 
faced in the implementation of PPBS has been the shortage of 
qualified personnel. The success of the Defense Department’s 
implementation of PPBS was largely based on the quality of 
the people involved in that effort and their confidence in 
each other.2 This same situation does not exist in civilian 
agencies. Secretary of Commerce C. R. Smith noted the shortage 
of qualified personnel;
^Marvin and Rouse, ’’Status of PPB,” Analysis and 
Evaluation. U. S., Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Vol.
p. 813!
^Thomas C. Schelling, "PPBS and Foreign Affairs," 
The' TUhli’c’ Thfeyest. Spring, 1968, p. 27.
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First, economic analysts are in scarce supply and 
like all other agencies we face expenditure and per­
sonnel hiring limitations. While this is patent, it 
would be a mistake to underestimate the limits these 
factors place on mounting continuing and comprehensive 
program analysis,i
Currently, outside of the Department of Defense 
there are about 1,145 positions identified specifically for 
implementation of PPBS. About 825 are professional and the 
remainder are support personnel.  ̂ These figures indicate 
that the quantity of personnel is not a significant problem. 
The General Accounting Office survey of implementation of 
PPBS disclosed that seven agencies (Commerce, NASA, AEC, 
Transportation, HEW, Labor, and HUD) have a higher proportion 
of their personnel working on PPBS than does the Department 
of Defense. Two other agencies (GEO and Interior) have 
about the same proportion, and nine agencies have signifi­
cantly lower proportions of PPB employees than does the D0D.3
While the number of people involved in PPBS does not 
appear to be a problem, the quality of these personnel is 
questionable. Of the 125 professional employees, the educa­
tional level is high (averaging approximately 17 years of
^Achinstein, "Constraints," Analysis and Evaluation.
U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. I, 19&9, 
p. 382.
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Ibid., Vol. II, 
p. 636. The Central Intelligence Agency, Small Business 
Administration, Civil Service Commission, and Tennessee Valley 
Authority are not included in these figures.
^U. S., General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the United States. Heporf to the Congress. (July 29, 1969), 
48.
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formal education), but analytical experience is low (about 
47 per cent have quantitative educational experience, 25 
per cent have any quantitative staff experience, and less 
than 25 per cent have had any PPB training).^
The ideal staff member concerned with PPBS must have 
a firm background in analytical experience. He should also 
be experienced in the systems and programs of the specific 
agency involved. Only with this experience will the analyst 
have enough familiarity with the program to perform valid 
analyses. The development of this experience can only be 
achieved after PPBS is implemented.
La'c'k of Experience with Analytic Concepts
Closely related to the two problems noted above is 
the difference between the long historical experience with 
analysis in the Department of Defense and the lack of com­
parable experience in the civilian agencies. Early use of 
systems analysis in the Defense Department made the imple­
mentation of PPBS easier. As early as 1958, Charles J. 
Hitch noted that the use of operations research on military 
problems had succeeded in changing the attitude of many 
military men on the applicability of quantitative techniques 
to military problems and had demonstrated that significant 
alternatives existed in methods to accomplish military
^Marvin and Rouse, "Status of PPB," Analysis and 
'Evaluation, U. s . .  Congress, J oint Economic Committee,
Vol. ÏÏ, 1969, p. 810.
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objectives.^ The widespread historical use of systems 
analysis caused other favorable conditions in the DOD. Some 
decision-makers were educated in how to use systems analy­
sis. Staffs were developed and analysts became familiar 
with the military organizations, concepts, systems techniques, 
and constraints.2 a  specific methodology of military systems 
analysis was established. The key leverage point of mili­
tary decisions, the selection of weapon systems, was iden­
tified. A sophisticated methodology for collecting cost 
data was established.3 Finally, the years of research had 
yielded methods of measurement that were unattainable 
earlier.^
The civilian agencies did not have the benefit of this 
experience. As one author noted:
The lack of sound theory and data with which to 
analyze mosc domestic programs points to another differ­
ence between systems analysis in the national security 
and domestic programs areas. For over 20 years, the 
Department of Defense and the military services have 
spent large sums of money on systems analysis of national 
security choices. As a result, there exist substantial 
analytic organizations within the Department of Defense 
as well as large independent ones outside. Large numbers
^Charles J. Hitch, Economics and Military Operations 
Research. pp. 6-7.
^Ernest Q. Miller, "Implementing PPBS: Problems
and Prospects," Puhli'c' Administration Review, XXVIII 
(September/October, igbWj, 4bb.
3weide.ibaum, "Program Budgeting," Planning. Program­
ming,' Budgeting, ed, by Lyden and Miller, pp. 171-72.
^Robert S. McNamara, "The Analysis of Nuclear Defense: 
The Ultimate Case," Program' Budgeting and Benefit-Cost 
Ah'aTVs'ls. ed. by Hinrichs and Taylor, p. Ibff.
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of highly trained people from many disciplines have for 
years been working together on the analysis of national 
security programs. They have developed the data and 
analytic models needed to evaluate programs. Prior to 
1965 this situation was a very rare exception in most 
domestic agencies. As a result the newly developing 
analytic organizations in the domestic agencies must 
begin with very little in the way of accumulated know­
ledge or experience in the program areas concerned,!
This major difference between civilian agencies and 
the military does not mean that the evolution of an operative 
PPB system will require ten to twenty years in the civilian 
agencies. Much of the analytic work in the DOD before the 
implementation of PPBS was concerned with specific policies 
and technical matters which contributed to the immediate 
decisions to be made. However, the contribution of these 
efforts to a better understanding of the role of analysis in 
the decision process is often transferable to the nondefense 
area. While it would be helpful to have similar experience
in the nondefense areas because it would improve the quality
of the current analyses, the framework of an implemented 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System gives impetus and di­
rection to the development of an effective analytic capability 
in the civilian agencies of the government.
The fact that analytical methods have not been used
extensively in the nondefense sector of the government means 
that a learning process will be necessary before the analyses 
are refined. As Dr, Enthoven testified:
^Hoffman, "Public Expenditure Analysis," Anaiysis and 
EVai'uaJt'ion. U, S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol.
TÎT7T5ÏÏ57 p. 932,
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I don't expect any spectacular breakthroughs [in 
the analyses In civilian agencies]. The studies that 
we did in the early days of PPBS in the Pentagon were 
terribly primitive by today's standards. I expect 
other areas of the Government will have to go through 
a phase of very primitive, very unsophisticated studies 
that you will want to treat with considerable caution.1
High Political Content of 
Civilian Programs
Another aspect which has inhibited adoption of PPBS 
in civilian agencies is the high political content of many 
of their programs. While special-interest groups do some­
times effect national security decisions, the role that they 
play is not overriding. In domestic programs which are
primarily concerned with who gets what, the role of politics
2and special-interest groups is often dominant. As one
spokesman stated:
Killing Communists on paper is easier to calculate —  
and much less controversial —  than deciding which con­
stituents deserve how much,3
As was noted in the discussion on distributional benefits, 
analysis which makes the distribution of benefits more ex­
plicit might increase political controversy.
The political sensitivity of programs in civilian 
areas effects analysis in many ways:
^U. S. Congress, Senate, Planning. Programming, 
Budgeting. Inquiry. 1969, p. 307.
^Hoffman, "Public Expenditure Analysis," Analysis and 
Evaluation. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
IIÏ, 1^69, pp. 932-33.
^George B. Finnegan III, "Budgeting a la McNamara," 
Journal of Accountancy, CXXI (February, 1966), 17.
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1. Private interest groups who anticipate that systems 
analysis might endanger the size of the benefits that accrue 
to them may prevent analysis being performed.^
2. Most people will admit that they do not have an intui­
tive grasp of complex military and technological problems. 
However, everyone feels that he has an intuitive grasp of 
even the most complex sociological problem.^
3. With programs that have a high political sensitivity, 
not only the objective that the program is to meet but the 
mechanics of the program become political issues. These 
political issues arising from the mechanics of a program 
are difficult to assess in analysis.3
^Robert H. Haveman, "The Analysis and Evaluation of 
Public Expenditures: An Overview," Analysis and Evaluation,
U. S, Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. I, 1969, p. f. 
For example, the appropriation act for the Federal Highway 
program prohibits the expenditure of any funds for economic 
analysis,
^Daniel P. Moynihan, "Policy Vs. Program in the 
« 70 's . "The TuhTic Thferest. Summer, 1970, p. 96. Most 
people will be comfortable with leaving the design of per­
sonnel nuclear protection devices to the experts. But every­
one feels that he is an expert on what constitutes a "good" 
education.
^An example of this is found in the 1967 budget for 
education. The President's recommended budget eliminated 
some $400 million of Federal Impacted School District funds. 
Analysis had disclosed that this program did not meet the 
purposes for which it was intended. The same budget recom­
mendation contained an additional $1 billion in Title I aid 
to education which was to be partially financed by the $400 
million reduction. Because of the high political content of 
the Federal Impacted School District aid, the House of 
Representatives restored the $400 million to that program, 
in addition to voting the additional $1 billion in Title I 
aid. (Schultze, "The Need for Choice," pp. 14-15.)
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4. Because of the high political content of many civilian 
programs, the unitary direction that was common in the 
Defense Department does not exist. The DOD did not have 
Congress imposing its own will on the President and on the 
Secretary, as do many civilian agencies,^ The use of 
analysis in these circumstances is less straightforward 
because of the more complex decision process.
The existence of areas with high political content 
should not preclude the use of PPBS and systems analysis. 
There is nothing in PPBS that automatically excluded the 
consideration of political factors.2 Political feasibility 
can be explicitly considered in the analysis and should be 
considered in the recommendations resulting from that 
analysis,3 At the very minimum, PPBS and systems analysis 
can illuminate the consequences of action even in the most 
politically sensitive question and allow a better-informed
^Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Effi­
ciency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program 
Budgeting," FubTic' Administration Review. XXVI (December, 
1966), 307. An example of this is found in the water-resource 
area. Based on cost-benefit analysis, the administration 
had recommended, in the last ten years, 282 Corps of Engi­
neers projects worth $4.1 billion. The Congress has added 
another 270 projects worth $4.5 billion. (Schultze, Hamilton 
and Schick. Betting •National Priorities, p. 167.)
^While this is true in theory, in practice political 
realities tend to be ignored in systems analysis. The major 
criticism of a group of systems analyses performed bÿ aero­
space firms for the State of California was that the recom­
mandations were politically naive, (Weidenbaum, The Modern 
•pubTic' Sector. p. I67.)





There are a number of other differences between the 
situations which PPBS faced in civilian agencies and those 
in the Department of Defense. Some of the following make 
the use of PPBS and systems analysis easier in the civilian 
environment :
1. The variables are often easier to define.^
2. The conflict in social programs is largely against
nature and not against a malevolent enemy.
3. The ability to gather data is less limited.
4. The results of programs are testable and verifiable,
even though verification may require an extended period of 
time.3
5. The cost uncertainty faced in many nondefense programs 
is often less because of the reduced effect of technology. 
Nondefense programs can hope for a goal of plus or minus 10 
per cent accuracy in cost estimates —  a goal that is
^Hoffman, "Public Expenditure Analysis," Analysis and 
Evaluation. U. S.. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. 
Ill, 1969, p. 939.
2For example, it is easier to relate the number of 
individuals moving across an arbitrary annual income line to 
the eradication of poverty than to relate the performance of 
a given weapon system to the objectives of national defense.
^Robert A. Levine, "Systems Analysis in the War on 
Poverty," Readings. ed. by Cleland and King, pp. 235-36.
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unattainable in high-technology military programs.^
A final difference between the environments of mili­
tary and civilian PPBS efforts concerns the stability of 
the environment. In the military, much of the analysis is 
concerned with physical systems such as aircraft and other 
weapons. This environment is relatively stable. The social- 
political environment is normally a part of most military 
systems analysis, but it often totally dominates civilian 
analyses. The social-political environment constantly 
changes as man acquires, protects, and changes his values.
Executive Commitment
Probably the major handicap of PPBS in the nondefense
sector of the government is the lack of executive commitment
to the system. The contribution of Secretary McNamara to the
Defense Department's PPBS should not be underestimated. As
David Novick stated:
The interest of Secretary of Defense McNamara in 
planning and management sciences has led him to seek out 
those who could help him in this task. His interest 
provided the needed impetus to effect a major management 
change in the immense and complex Department of Defense. 
Equally important, the extraordinary capacity of the 
Secretary to master the complexities of vast programs
^State-Local Finances Project, Role and Nature of 
Cost Analysis » p. 4. Civilian agencies do have a problem in 
cost-estimating that is not normally faced by military acti­
vities. In civilian programs, the total cost of the program 
is often not that appropriated by the Congress since costs 
to other levels of government and to private citizens must 
be considered. The total program cost in military programs 
more closely corresponds to the funds appropriated by 
Congress. (Hovey. government Decision-Making» pp. 36-45.)
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has given vitality and stature to the new planning 
tools.1
When Secretary McNamara implemented PPBS he was en­
gaged in an "active" executive role and he found the tradi­
tional budget process incompatible with that role. He 
facilitated the implementation process by insisting on the 
data generated by PPBS and using it in his decisions.
Alain C. Enthoven expressed the effect that this type of 
top management attitude had on the PPBS process;
. . .  an absolutely necessary condition for the success­
ful development of a PPB system is that the head of the 
agency want it, understand it, be prepared to use it, 
and act upon it. The analysts must be able to know that 
their analyses are either acted upon or rejected for 
cause; the analytical and planning process must really 
interact with the decision process or else it will waste 
away. Good systems analysts were willing to work for 
Secretary McNamara because they knew that when they did 
good work —  work that stood up well in debate —  it 
would be acted upon and would influence decisions.
Analysis was not simply window dressing. If the head of 
the agency does not understand and want a PPB system, 
it cannot be forced upon him. Thus, I think that we 
have a difficult Job of public education ahead of us to 
get men chosen to head Government agencies to understand 
what the possibilities of a PPB system are so that they 
will want to have one and develop it into a practical 
and effective tool of policy decisionmaking.2
This type of attitude described by Enthoven was not 
prevalent in the nondefense sector. There were only a few 
agencies which were headed by men who either wanted systematic
^Novick, Long-Range Planning, p. 2.
2Alain C. Enthoven, "The Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System in the Department of Defense: Some Lessons
from Experience," Analysis and Evaluation, U. S., Congress, 
Joint Economic Committee, Vol. Ill, l&b$, pp. 907-8.
203
policy studies or were able to understand thera.^ The reac­
tions of the heads of agencies to the Presidential imposi­
tion of PPBS ran from enthusiastic acceptance through in­
difference to hostility.
The attitude of the agency head "has been the single 
most important factor in the development of a PPB system and 
its integration with the agency decisionmaking system."
Where the agency head was indifferent to the implementation 
of PPBS the use of systematic analysis has been sporadic, 
with most studies being produced outside of the PPBS frame­
work . 2
Part of the problem of the agency head’s reaction to 
PPBS is undoubtedly the method of implementation. In the 
Department of Defense, Secretary McNamara was instrumental 
in developing the system and perceived it to be a tool to 
improve his ability to manage the DOD. Some agency heads do 
not perceive the PPBS ordered by President Johnson as one of 
their tools, but instead feel that it is a tool of the Bureau 
of the Budget.3 This notion is probably enhanced by the 
technique of Issue Letters from the Budget Director identi­
fying issues that require study and analysis. Thus, an
^Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS,"
p. 294.
^Marvin and Rouse, "Status of PPB," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol.
I ll,1969, p. 808.
3lbid.. p. 809.
204
outside organization was identifying major problem areas 
rather than this being done internally, as was the-case in 
the DOD.
When the PPBS is viewed by agency personnel as a 
tool of the Bureau of the Budget, the emphasis on what is 
done is shifted. The personnel tend to consider PPB data 
and traditional budgeting data as duplication and "make- 
work. They see the PPB system as only a method to justify 
budget requests.
Even if the agency heads were committed to the devel­
opment of an effective Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System, it is questionable if they could achieve the same 
results as Secretary McNamara did in the Department of 
Defense. The implementation of PPBS in the DOD came after 
a decade of centralization of the authority of the Secretary. 
This same centralization of control has not occurred in many 
civilian agencies. Many of the nondefense departments repre­
sent a gathering of existing, established activities —  each 
with a significant degree of autonomy and political power.
The heads of these departments are not able to exercise the 
same degree of control over subordinate activities as was 
the Secretary of Defense.^ This means that the attitude of 
subordinate officials toward PPBS is often as critical for
^Ibld.. p. 807.
Zschlesinger. FoTitical Process, pp. I6-17,
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its effective implementation as is the attitude of the de­
partment head.
Achievements of PPBS in Civilian Agencies 
As a result of the directive to implement PPBS, a 
total of twenty-three nondefense agencies have adopted a 
formal PPB system. At one time it was planned to have 
twenty-nine agencies with mandatory Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting Systems, but this number was later reduced to 
twenty-one. All of these twenty-one agencies, with the 
exception of the Department of State, have formally adopted 
PPBS. In addition, three agencies which were not specifi­
cally directed to implement the system have done so. The 
Department of State has successfully resisted PPBS and its 
implementation in all parts of the department except for the 
cultural affairs area.^
One of the requirements in the implementation of PPBS 
was that a staff organization be established. Three of the 
agencies with PPS systems have not formed central staffs.
Of those that have formed staffs, most of these report either 
to the Deputy Secretary or to an Assistant Secretary. Two 
of the agencies (Agency for International Development and 
United States Information Agency) have staffs lower in the 
organizational hierarchy. Five of the agencies (Commerce;
^Appendix B-2 contains a list of all agencies that 
have been directed to implement PPBS and those that have an 
operating PPB System.
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Health, Education, and Welfare; Post Office; Atomic Energy 
Commission; and Peace Corps) have staffs that report to 
the Secretary or to the Director.^
One way to note the effectiveness of PPBS in the 
nondefense agencies of the government is to evaluate the 
usage of several of the key documents in the system. The 
use of the program structure. Program and Financial Plan, 
Program Memorandums, Issue Letters, and Special Analytical 
Studies will be discussed before an over-all evaluation is 
made.
Program Structure
Program structures have been established in all of 
the appropriate agencies except for the Department of State, 
The number of major program categories ranges from four to 
ten except for the Corps of Engineers which uses each of its 
twenty-one major hydrologie regions as a major category, and 
the Agency for International Development and United States 
Information Agency which use the individual countries as 
program categories,^ One of the major problems in connection 
with the program structures developed to date is the extent 
to which these structures mirror the organization structure,3
^U, S,, General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the United States,'■Report to the Congress. (July 29,1969). 
101-3,
2'Ibid,. PP. 18-19,
......  3Marvin and Rouse, "Status of PPB," Analysis and
Evaluation. U, S.. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Vol. 
Ilf,"1969, p, 813Î
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For example, each major organizational component of the 
General Services Administration corresponds to a major pro­
gram category. In the Post Office Department there is no 
program category which contains elements from more than one 
organizational unit. This can be contrasted to the Depart­
ment of Defense where each program category has elements 
of each of the military services.^
One of the reasons for the extent to which many pro­
gram structures conform to organizational lines is that 
nondefense agencies are usually organized more on a program 
basis than is the DOD. This is apparently not the only 
reason. The coincidence of organizational structure and 
program structure is also a symptom of the failure of offi­
cials to look beyond their own organization for objectives 
and goals. The net result of this is ;
. . . .  that the PPB analyses and displays become 
collections of supporting information for the particular 
means employed by the organization, without due consi­
deration of alternatives whose adoption might require 
changes in entrenched activities, or even more shattering, 
involve administration outside of the organization.2
To the extent that agencies have endeavored to de­
velop a meaningful program structure, PPBS has helped them 
to identify objectives and to achieve a more specific ex­
pression of these objectives. This has not been the case in
^U. S., General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the, United States. Report to the Congress. (July 29, 1969), 
pp. 56-57.
^Marvin and Rouse, "Status of PPB," Analysis and 
Evaluation, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol.
Iir, 1969: p. 813.
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most agencies.
Prograw and Financial Plans
The Program and Financial Plans have not been totally 
successful either. The original direction for the Program 
and Financial Plan Indicated that this document was to be 
a plan of the agencies to meet their objectives for the next 
five years. It was to "Include activities under contemplated 
or possible new legislation as well as those presently auth­
orized,"^ The five-year projections degenerated Into a 
"wlsh-llst" for the next five years that was anything but 
fiscally realistic.2 Some agencies showed an Increase of 
25 per cent for funds for each year of the projection. The 
five-year projection was modified In 1967 to Include only 
those funds that the government Is legally or morally com­
mitted to as a result of past Congressional action. This 
has greatly llm3.ted the utility of the five-year plan.3 
Another dysfunctional result of the Program and Financial 
Plan Is that agencies have begun to design programs that 
minimize cost In the first five years In order to obscure
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Pla'hnTng-Pr'ogrammlng-Budgetlng. BOB Bulletin 
No. 66-3, (October IS, 1965). "'
^Robert A. Levine, "Policy Analysis and Economic 
Opportunity Programs." AhaTysTs ahd Evaluation. U. S., 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. IÏI, 1969, p. 1169.
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Ibid.. Vol. II, 
p. 623. The criteria for legal and moral commitments Is 
contained In Appendix A-2.
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the total cost of the programs to be authorized.^
The use of output measures In the PPP has also been 
marginal. In a 1969 survey of government agencies using 
PPBS, the General Accounting Office noted the output data 
definition and collection efforts of seven major agencies. 
Only the Office of Economic Opportunity was characterized 
as "expending considerable effort" in this area. Health, 
Education and Welfare and Housing and Urban Development 
exercise only "loose and intermittent efforts" in this di­
rection. Labor, Agriculture, and Interior only receive 
partial output data.^
Program Memoranda
The use of Program Memoranda has not been good.
Only 25 per cent of these received have been adequate. The 
others did not identify major alternatives,3 did not address 
policy decisions, and/or did not present multi-year data. 
They have tended to be descriptive accounts of existing pro­
grams. The result is that they are virtually useless in 
making allocation decisions among programs of "urgent
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
â'lysi's' and the Efficiency of Government. Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, l&b$, p. 781.
2u. S., General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the United States. Report to the Congress. (July 29.
1969), 31-32.
^The typical alternatives discussed in Program 
Memoranda are those of eliminating the program entirely, 
funding 400 per cent increase in the existing program, or 
funding a 10 per cent increase in the existing program.
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necessity,” "dire national need,” ”a must expenditure,” 
and "vital responsibility,"^ Many of the managers in the 
government consider Program Memoranda a " n u i s a n c e , T h e  
quality of their documents have substantiated this opinion.
The Program Memoranda have also undergone signifi­
cant changes since PPBS was implemented. The original 
guidance stated that a PM had to be prepared for each of the 
program categories of the agencies. The objectives of the 
program were to be described as well as an analytical com­
parison of alternative ways to achieve these objectives.
There was no specified length of PM*s,3 in 1966 the direc­
tion on PM's was changed to specify that they would be twenty 
to fifty pages,^ In 1968 the maximum length was shortened 
again to twenty pages.5 In 1969 the requirement for a PM was
(Hoffman, "Public Expenditure Analysis," Analysis and Evalua- 
tion, U, S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. tlï, 
W !  p. 936.)
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Ibid,. Vol. II,
pp. 621-22,
^Donald Ray Escarraz, "PPBS and the National Govern­
ment: Alternative Approaches," National Tax Journal, XXI
(June, 1968), 137.
3u, S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting. BOB Bulletin 
No, 66-3 (October l2, 19&5).
S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting. Supplement to 
BOB Bulletin Wo, b6-3 (t'ebruary 2I, i$6b')7
5u, S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget. Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB). BOB Bulletin 
No. 68-2 (july"lT ," i m H  ^ -----------
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deleted unless there was a major program issue Involved.^
This means that a PM is not required unless some major change 
is being made in the program or unless the Bureau of,the 
Budget has identified the area for special review.
Issue Letters
In the area of Issue Letters there have been greater 
problems, A total of 380 Issue Letters was sent to 17 agen­
cies for the Fiscal Year 1970 budgeting cycle. About one- 
half of these were analyzed.^ Only 16 per cent of the replies 
in the human resource areas were "usable." The percentage 
of "usable" analyses went as high as 90 per cent in community 
and economic development programs.3
Special Analytic Studies
The record of the government activities in the area 
of Special Analytic Studies is mixed. There can be no doubt 
that the quantity of analysis has greatly increased. The 
Bureau of the Budget noted that 149 major program analyses 
were completed in the Fiscal Year 1970 budget cycle.^
^U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of 
the Budget,’ ’Fl’annin’g-’Programiming-Budgeting (PPB) System. BOB 
Bulletin No. 6Ü-9 CApril 12, 19oü).
^One reason for the small percentage of replies was 
that some Issue Letters were not mailed until late April.
3carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluâtion. U, S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol.
if, 1469, pp. 621-22.
•^Ibld.. p. 762.
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' Some specific studies that have contributed to 
decision-making In the civilian sector of the government 
were noted earlier. However, the general quality of analyses 
produced so far In the nondefense agencies Is suspect. To 
date there appear to be problems In both the analyses them­
selves and In tne areas selected for analysis.
The analyses themselves are often of marginal use.
As one Individual noted: " . . .  the production of useful
analyses has been disappointing."1 The major problem with 
most analyses Is that alternatives are not considered. The 
usual alternatives analyzed Include abandoning the program, 
maintaining It, or slightly expanding It.2 There Is strong 
evidence that much of the program analysis Is performed on 
a crash basis to Justify programs where decisions have al­
ready been made rather than to assist In the decision 
process.3
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Guidelines, 
Hearings, 1969, p. 20. The General Accounting Office survey 
of six studies found that none were totally adequate. (U. S., 
General Accounting Office, Comptroller General of the United 
States.• •Report' to the Congress. [July 29, 19691, 28-29.)
2A review of sixty program analyses In Mushkln and 
Herman," The" "Search: fo'r 'Alternatives. found that this criti­
cism was almost universally true.
3wholey, "Child Health Care," Analysis and Evaluation. 
U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. I, 19&&, 
p. 469. One author noted that In the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare there were "chaotic rushes" In Septem­
ber and October to produce numbers to support the budget to 
be recommended. (Brandi, '/'Education Program Analysis at 
HEW."" "Ibid.. Vol. Ill, p. 1227.)
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A part of the problem with Special Analytic Studies 
appears to be that the issues selected by the agencies for 
analysis are of marginal interest. This means that the 
impact of the analytic effort on substantive issues is 
almost negligible.!
General Evaluation
Within the area of general evaluation there are some 
specific improvements that have been noted because of PPBS. 
These include:
1. Many agencies have made a partial reappraisal of their 
objectives.2 This is true only to the extent that agencies 
have not allowed their existing organizational structure to 
straight Jacket the program structure.
2. Justifications of the budgets have been improved.3 
However, PPBS is of doubtful utility if its only contribution 
is the improvement of budgetary narratives. There must be 
improvement in the budget decision process, not just more 
sophisticated narratives accompanying the same decisions.
3. Agencies have become more aware of the alternative methods
!u. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
Analysis .' Hearings. 1969, p. 78.
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluat'ion. U. S., Congress. Joint Economic Committee,
ViT.’ir," 1969, p. 625.
3u. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Guidelines, 
Hearings, 1969, pp. 32-33.
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in achieving objectives,^ However, this awareness has not 
succeeded in allowing significant alternatives to be consi­
dered in most of the analytic efforts.
4, There has been a greater awareness of the legitimacy and 
necessity of "analytical a r g u m e n t s . Unfortunately, this 
awareness has too often succeeded in only causing analytically 
based arguments for preconceived decisions,
5. A wider number of officials have been involved in the 
budget process; there has been a greater emphasis on program 
evaluation; and a greater number of analyses have been 
achieved,3
The overwhelming evidence concerning the civilian 
agencies’ implementation of the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System is that most agencies have adopted the sys­
tem only superficially and consider it only another form of 
budgeting,4 Most agencies do not perform planning, programming.
^"PPBS —  A New Approach to Government Spending," 
Bahicing. XXXIX (February, 1969), 39.
^Carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluatïon. U. S.,Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Vol,
Tï ; 1 W , "  PP. 626-27.
^Ibid,. pp, 625-26,
^One example of the attitude of many agencies toward 
PPBS is found in the Post Office Department, This Department 
had an individual transferred from the Bureau of the Budget 
to establish their PPBS, The primary motivation in this re­
quest was not to establish the best PPBS possible, but to make 
it more difficult for BOB to criticize the system that would 
be established. This same Department showed that it consi­
dered PPBS as Just another budgetary format when the Deputy 
Director of the Planning and Systems Division said that his 
office was "backing out" of PPBS now that it was implemented
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or budgeting much differently than they did before the in­
troduction of PPBS, The only differences are additional 
formats for the budgeting process,^ At the very best it can 
be said that PPBS has made a start in the changes necessary 
for an effective governmental planning, programming, and 
budgeting process. The following general evaluations by 
various writers substantiate this conclusion:
The publicity [of PPBS] has outdistanced the performance 
by a wide margin.=
. . . some progress has been made in bringing a more 
rational means of decisionmaking into the public sector, 
but —  this is only a beginning. The Government has a 
long way to go in applying PPBS or any similar system 
of program management on any kind of comprehensive 
basis.3
This [inertia and resistance of the bureaucracy] has led 
to ritualization, overformalization, and overdocumenta­
tion —  clogging the channels of government communica­
tion . . . [and] in some cases threatened the very capa­
bility for rational action that it was supposed to 
enhance,%
since it was now a budgeting problem, (Novogrod, Dimock, 
and Dimock, Casebook in Public Administration, pp. 262-65.)
^Stanley B, Botner, "Pour Years of PPBS: An
Appraisal," Public Administration Review, XXX (July/August,
1970), 423.
^Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems Budgeting," 
PuhTi'C Admipistrafiop Review, XXIX (March/April, 1969), 149.
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The 
Frahhln'g-Pro'gr’a'nuriirig-Btf̂  Sy s tern : ' Progress and Potential, 
Report.of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government. 1967.
P . O .
^Bertram M. Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting,"
Public Administration Review. XXIX (March/April, 1969), 115.
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In many places the system exists only in name and 
will disappear with the first adverse wind. In others, 
it has been skillfully gutted by the entrenched bureau­
cracy.1
Perhaps the only safe prediction, therefore, is that 
because of the unfortunate start PPBS got in Washington, 
an heroic selling job will be needed if it is to play 
the role in future budget administration that its 
merits seem to justify.^
This evaluation of PPBS implies the need for an extensive
training program.
^Emerson Markham and William C, McConkey, "PPBS as 
an Aid to Decision Makers," Midwest Review of Public 
Administration. Ill (February , b5-6b, ~
^Marshall Edward Dimock and Gladys Ogden Dimock, 





The discussion to this point has served as a founda­
tion to the assessment of training needs in the area of the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. A generalized model 
of PPBS training will now be established. The next three 
chapters will contain an expansion of some parts of this 
model; then the complete model of training will be presented. 
Training is a program to be followed to change the 
behavior of employees. The term "training" will refer to more 
formal aspects of training rather than to the efforts of 
immediate supervisors to influence the behavior of individual 
employees. As defined by the Federal Government, "training" 
means :
. . , the process of providing for and making available 
to an employee, and placing or enrolling such employee 
in, a planned, prepared, and coordinated program, course, 
curriculum, subject, system, or routine of instruction 
or education, in scientific, professional, technical, 
mechanical, trade, clerical, fiscal, administrative, or 
other fields which are or will be directly related to 
the performance by such employee of official duties for 
the Government, in order to increase the knowledge, pro­
ficiency, ability, skill, and qualifications of such 
employee in the performance of official duties.!
!u. S., Congress, Government Employees Training Act. 




A well-designed training program cannot be constructed 
in isolation from the organization in which the behavior 
change is necessary. The assessment of training needs must 
begin with the determination of the difference between the 
desired conditions and the current conditions within that 
organization. The factors causing this difference must then 
be isolated and the training needs built around those fac­
tors which training can change.^
The preceeding two chapters provide the information 
that is required to determine the training needs in the area 
of PPBS. Chapter III contains an evaluation of the current 
state of PPBS in the Federal Government. Chapter I describes 
an ideal PPB System for the Federal Government. By examining 
the differences between this actual state and the ideal 
state in light of the historical evolution of the system 
presented in Chapter II, a training model can be derived.
In the Department of Defense, it was concluded that 
PPBS is operational and effective but some problems still 
exist that can, and should be, corrected. The same situation 
does not exist in the nondefense sector of the Federal 
Government. In this area it was seen that the adoption of 
PPBS has been largely superficial and the system is not 
achieving its potential. The training model that will be 
constructed will address itself primarily to this latter
^George S. Odiorne, Training by Objectives. pp. 130-31'
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sector of the government. Changes in the model to adapt 
itself to the situation of the Department of Defense will be 
noted in Chapter VIII.
The discussion in Chapter III establishes that a 
massive program of change is essential if PPBS is to achieve 
its potential on a government-wide basis. Training is not the 
only part of the required program of change. The training 
required should be addressed only to those areas where be­
havioral change of governmental personnel will improve the 
current system. To identify these areas where training is 
the appropriate means of correcting performance, the causes 
of inadequate performance will be separated into the 
following factors:
1. Situations where PPBS cannot be applied to the govern­
mental activity involved.
2. Situations where the environmental circumstances prevent 
PPBS from achieving its full potential.
3. Situations where the full potential of PPBS is not 
achieved because of the behavior of management personnel.
It is primarily this third barrier which is the proper sub­
ject for training efforts.
Causes of Inadequate PPBS 
System Inappropriate for Use
It is difficult to visualize a given organization 
where it would be impossible to implement a Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System. The basic concepts of
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structuring program data on the basis of objectives, con­
sidering multi-year implications of decisions, and using 
systems analysis to structure information for decision pur­
poses are almost universally applicable. It is obvious that 
some individuals believe that PPBS is inappropriate for many 
civilian agencies because of the lack of systematic planning, 
the fragmentation of programs among different governmental 
agencies and levels, the high level of fixed costs, the 
impossibility of quantification of program data, the exis­
tence of undefined and multiple objectives, and the high 
political content of programs. But these problems actually 
accent the need for —  rather than preclude the possibility 
of —  a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in these areas.
While the possibility of implementing PPBS in almost 
any governmental activity exists, governmental managers 
should question whether the implementation of the system 
would be wise in specific areas. This determination should 
be based on an assessment of the benefits that the total 
system would allow versus the cost required to implement and 
operate the system. In some cases it might be appropriate 
to adopt only selected portions of PPBS for the activities 
of the agency. It is doubtful if it is desirable to adopt 
only the superficial, mechanistic portions of the Planning- 
Programming-Budgetirig System that have been adopted in the 
majority of civilian agencies.
Under the general category of situations where PPBS
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is inappropriate for use in governmental agencies, it appears 
that this is not a significant factor In the discrepancy be­
tween the desired system and the current system. Instead, 
some general training needs can be identified. First, the 
misconceptions about PPBS that cause individuals to believe 
it cannot be adopted should be corrected. Second, the con­
cept of PPBS as a flexible management conceptual tool, that 
should be modified as necessary to meet the specific situa­
tion at hand, instead of the concept of PPBS as a simple 
list of mechanistic techniques to be applied arbitrarily to 
the activities of any given agency, must be developed.
Environmental Factors
There are a number of environmental factors that limit 
the effectiveness of PPBS in the Federal Government, The 
primary one is the shortage of personnel to perform the re­
quired analyses and the shortage of data to be used in these 
analyses. Only by following a program of implementation of 
PPBS that is concrete and definite can data needs be identi­
fied and the shortage of analytic data overcome. An aggres­
sive implementation program for PPBS will be effective in 
developing the personnel required to use the system. It is 
unrealistic to expect that the data and personnel limitations 
of PPBS can be removed simply with the passage of time and 
the adherence to a mechanistic, superficial form of PPBS,
An environmental factor which inhibits the implementa­
tion of PPBS is the political atmosphere which surrounds
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some of the agencies. It is difficult to achieve an opera­
tive Planning-Programming-Budgeting System if the Congres­
sional committees which deal primarily with the agency and 
the clientele of the agency are openly hostile to the con­
cepts of the system. To simply note that these groups are 
hostile to the concepts of PPBS and decide to limit the 
implementation of the system to the absolute minimum, ig­
nores the fact that one of the primary determinants of this 
political climate is the professional management corps of 
any given activity —  including the head of the agency. This 
limitation of the potential of PPBS highlights a need for 
training. The management personnel of the activities should 
be concerned with the determination of the method of imple­
menting PPBS which will overcome the problems of inadequate 
data and personnel as rapidly and effectively as possible.
Managerial Behavior
The key determinant of the level of effectiveness of 
PPBS in the Federal Government has been the behavior of 
managerial groups in the various agencies. For PPBS to be 
effective in the Federal Government agencies there must be, 
in each of these agencies, a responsible group of individuals 
who want it to be effective and who are willing to take the 
active steps to make it effective.
This level of active, interested participation in PPBS 
has not been achieved in the civilian agencies of the 
Federal Government. Generally PPBS has been viewed " . . .
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throughout the organizational bureaucracy as a threat to 
existing, familiar, and manipulable institutional arrange­
ments."1 The management elite of many agencies has resisted, 
to the maximum degree possible, the implementation and 
effective use of PPBS. The degree to which training is 
necessary to overcome this resistance to implementation of 
PPBS is obvious.
Behavior Change Required 
The necessary specific behavior changes must be noted. 
Generally implementation of PPBS in the Federal Government 
means that a change is required in the background, education, 
and skills of many managers.2 A simple briefing that ex­
plains to management personnel what PPBS is and why it is 
required is not adequate to achieve significant behavioral 
changes.3 Required behavioral changes can be discussed under 
three headings —  attitudes, knowledge, and skills.
Attitude Changes
Attitude changes are probably the most important
^Finnegan, "Budgeting a la McNamara," p. 17.
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
Systems: Selected Case Materials," (unpublished class notes,
Washington University, 1969), p. 39.
^This concept of using a short orientation briefing 
to expose top management to PPBS is recommended in State- 
Local Finances Project. Implementing PPB. p. 109. Only the 
technical personnel who perform the analyses and compile the 
budgets are subjected to intensive training. This practice 
ignores the fact that managerial behavior effectively sets 
the limits within which these technicians must operate.
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changes made necessary by PPBS and also the most difficult 
to achieve and to measure. The attitude of an Individual Is 
his predisposition to view some symbol, object, or aspect of 
the world about him (In this case PPBS) In a favorable or 
unfavorable manner. These attitudes can be expressed either 
verbally (by stating an opinion) or nonverbally (by some 
behavior response).^
The need for attitude changes by personnel In response 
to PPBS can be simply expressed as the need to "sell" the 
system to management personnel. Unless the attitude of 
management personnel Is changed substantially, PPBS Is likely 
to Increase the elegance by which decisions are Justified, 
but It Is doubtful that the quality of solutions and deci­
sions will be changed.
The change of attitudes should be central to any PPBS 
training efforts. However, this change Is extremely diffi­
cult to achieve. Attitudes about PPBS are formulated In the 
following manner:
1. PPBS Is a cognitive factor or a stimulant,
2. This stimulant Is viewed through the Individual's needs 
and value system (his beliefs, assumptions, and convictions).
3. The Individual's attitude Is aroused.^
In order to change the Individual's attitude, needs and value
^Quentin W. Guerin, "Attitudes —  An Operation 
Definition,"'Training and Development'Jourhal, XXII (December, 
1968), 21.
^ I b l d . , 2 1 - 2 2 .
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systems must be changed. This can be accomplished by pre­
senting information about PPBS in such a manner as to change 
principally his assumptions and beliefs about the effect of 
the system on his own personal frame of reference. For this 
reason the change of attitude is not normally a separate part 
of a training program but is a part of the program directed 
toward either changes in knowledge or changes in skill (or 
a combination of the two).
Knowledge Changes
There can be little doubt of the need for an increase
in the knowledge of PPBS by managerial personnel in the
government. As one author expressed it:
. . . all public administrators —  but especially pro­
gram managers —  must learn far more about the philoso­
phy and techniques of cost-benefit analysis and PPBS 
than they can so far be expected to know.l
Almost all aspects of PPBS should be treated in the
training to increase the knowledge of managerial personnel.
Only with this base of extensive knowledge can the system be
expected to achieve its full potential.
Skill Change
Not only must the attitudes of managerial personnel 
be changed and their knowledge of PPBS substantially in­
creased, but many new skills must be developed. Particularly
^Dimock and Dimock, Public Administration, p. 521.
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important is the need for decision-makers to develop a high 
level of skill in the use of analytic efforts. PPBS is only 
a tool. In the hands of an experienced, skillful decision­
maker it can be very helpful. In the hands of unqualified 
decision-makers its use can be dangerous.^
Who Should Be Trained 
The broad specification of training needs can be 
completed with the determination of which individuals should 
be trained in the PPBS managerial training effort. Since 
PPBS is designed primarily to serve top management levels of 
the government, these individuals must be completely know­
ledgeable of the implications of, and the requirements for, 
PPBS.2 The magnitude of effort required is significant when 
training is restricted to just this group since there are 
some 11,000 upper career executives in the Federal Govern­
ment . 3
However, training in PPBS cannot be restricted only 
to the top level of management. A decision to institute a 
significantly different management system could require the 
training of every manager in the organization.^ While de­
tailed training in PPBS will probably not have to extend
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Planning. Programming, 
Budgeting. Inquiry. 1969, p. 21.
^State-Local Finances Project, Staffing and Training 
•for a PPB Sysvem in State and LocaT Governments, p.
3pred Tickner.' Training in Modern Society. p. 132.
^Malcolm W. Warren, Training for Besuits. p. 50.
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down the organization to the lowest supervisory levels, it 
will be necessary to extend at least to the level where sig­
nificant data and technical inputs are required. The effec­
tive use of PPBS will place heavy demands for information 
required at that level.^ The willingness of these indivi­
duals to provide that input, and the quality of the input, 
will largely be a function of their understanding of the 
system itself.
It is unrealistic to expect that the same emphasis 
in various areas of training is required for all levels 
from top management to lower intermediate levels of manage­
ment. The most extensive treatment of PPBS must be at the 
top level of management where the system is primarily used.
The model to be presented will be specifically pointed at 
that training need. The necessity to change this model for 
the training efforts of lower levels of management will be 
discussed in Chapter VIII.
General Content of Training 
Based on the above discussion of training needs, it 
is possible to outline the content of the recommended training 
efforts. The content of the required training can be divided 
into five general areas: History; Concepts and Techniques;
Design; Implementation; and Utilization.
^Weidenbaum, "Program Budgeting," Planhing. T̂ ro- 
graWmirig.' Budgeting, ed. by Lyden and Miller, p. Itl.
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History of PPBS 
The training required for PPBS must Include a sub­
stantial part of the material discussed In Chapter II on the 
history of PPBS, The knowledge of PPBS that can be achieved 
Is limited unless It Is placed In a historical perspective. 
Knowledge of the historical evolution of PPBS also has a 
definite Impact on the attitude of managers toward the 
Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System,
A study of the historical sweep of budgeting has one 
other effect on the required behavior changes. By concen­
trating on the Inadequacies of the traditional budgetary 
process, the need for a Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng 
System Is demonstrated. An awareness of this need for change 
can be beneficial In establishing the attitude of the 
managerial personnel In government agencies toward PPBS,
Concepts and Techniques of PPBS 
Training In the area of concepts and techniques of 
PPBS Is directly applicable to the knowledge required. The 
necessary Ingredients of this area are contained In Chapter I 
and In Chapter III, It Is Important that the misconceptions 
about PPBS and systems analysis be addressed during this 
training effort. The persistence of these misconceptions and 
their negative effect on the attitude of governmental per­
sonnel Is obvious.
230
Design of PPBS 
Design of a specific PPBS that takes into account the 
special circumstances and needs of the individual agency is 
an important part of the required training effort. If PPBS 
is viewed as a specifically defined set of procedures and 
forms that are arbitrarily applied to the activities of an 
agency without regard to their usefulness or possible modi­
fication, it is doubtful if the system will ever be completely 
effective.
The training on the design of Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting Systems to meet the specific needs of the particu­
lar agency should be pointed toward changes in the skills 
of the managers. More detail on the specific content of 
training in this area will be provided in Chapter V.
Implementation of PPBS 
Another important aspect of the required PPBS training 
concerns implementation of the system. Managers should be 
as skillful at how to make a change in the methods of the 
organization as they are in diagnosing what should be done. 
This is one aspect of PPBS that has generally been neglected 
in most of the writings about the system in the Federal 
Government. It appears that there has been a tendency to 
believe that a simple directive to implement PPBS is all 
that is required to achieve an operative system. On the 
contrary, the implementation of a management system such as 
PPBS requires an organizational change of large magnitude.
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This change effort deserves a high degree of managerial 
attention.
As with the design phase of instruction, the training 
on implementation of PPBS is primarily aimed at achieving 
the necessary skill change of managers. Here the manager 
should be concerned with the methods possible to overcome 
opposition to the system and complete its implementation as 
effectively and rapidly as possible. The specific content 
of this area of training will be discussed in Chapter VI,
Utilization of PPBS
The final major area of PPBS training is in the 
utilization of the system. Particularly important in this 
area is instruction on how to utilize properly the analytical 
studies that are central to PPBS. Because of the lack of 
historical precedence of analytic studies in most areas of 
governmental activity, many managers have not developed the 
proper skills to use these studies. This lack of skill can 
lead to the abuse of studies by either overreliance or under­
reliance. Obviously the major purpose of this area of 
training is to upgrade the skill level of decision-makers. 
More detail on this area of training will be provided in 
Chapter VII.
Summary
An investigation of the difference between the actual 
and ideal PPB System has permitted an identification of the
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class of individuals who should be trained in the use of 
techniques associated with PPBS. Top management levels re­
quire extensive training in PPBS. Requirements for training 
coverage can be relaxed as the needs for training at sub­
ordinate levels are considered.
The necessary content of training has been introduced. 
This content was divided into five general areas. Material 
necessary for training in the areas of History and Concepts 
and Techniques was presented in the earlier chapters. The 
material necessary for presentation in the areas of Design* 
Implementation, and Utilization of PPBS must still be de­
veloped before a complete model can be presented.
CHAPTER V 
DESIGN OF PPBS
The first decision that management in a specific 
agency must make regarding the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System concerns the general design of the system. 
Before beginning this design phase, the executive should be 
very knowledgeable in the concepts of PPBS.^ The design 
phase translates these concepts into practical applications 
for the specific circumstances at hand.
It has been well recognized that the design of in­
dividual PPB systems should vary depending on the organiza­
tional climate of individual cases. This was noted in the 
case of attempts to transfer PPBS to other countries;
. . . the precise form of the system will vary from 
place to place as it is implemented, reflecting the 
values, institutions, and relationships in those govern­
ments and nations.2
The same conclusion was drawn about the movement of PPBS
from the Federal Government to local governments:
The techniques of program planning and budgeting and 
systems analysis are promising and available tools for
Ij. B. Benton and A. L. Tenzer, Program Budgeting and 
Executive Commitment. p. 6.
^Novick and Alesch, Program Budgeting, p. 10,
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improving governmental decisionmaking. These terms 
should be used with caution, however. To say that these 
techniques should be used by State and local governments 
and that the Federal Government should encourage their 
use does not mean that the system of PPBS as developed 
by the Federal Government for its own use should be 
engrafted onto other governments.1
Even the movement of PPBS from the Department of Defense to 
the civilian agencies was supposed to be flexible and adap­
tive. "It (the DOD's PPBS) is not a model to be slavishly 
imitated."2 The design of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System should accept the fact that a diversity of institu­
tional arrangements, documents, and procedures will be 
required to be adapted to individual situations.
As an example of major differences that can occur in 
governmental organizations, the regulatory agencies can be 
contrasted to the Department of Defense. In regulatory 
agencies, all of the cost and benefits of their decisions 
are external to the agency rather than internal.3 This 
does not mean that many of the concepts of PPBS are inappli­
cable to regulatory agencies but that the form in which these 
concepts should be applied must be significantly changed.
Ijack W. Carlson, "Federal Support for State and Local 
Government Planning, Programming, and Budgeting," Innovations. 
U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1969» p. 17.
^Committee for National Objectives, Budgeting for 
Economic' Development. p. 36. It should be noted that most 
oi* the procedures subsequently adopted in the nondefense 
agencies appear to be "slavish imitations" of the DOD's 
system. (U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
•Analysis-.• Hearings. 1969, p. 779.)
3ouy Black, The Application of Systems Analysis to 
Government Operations, p. 154.
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Just as it is desirable to vary specific aspects of 
PPBS in certain circumstances, it is not always necessary 
to adopt all of the components of the system. Program 
budgeting can be adopted without systems analysis or multi­
year plans, and vice versa. Each of the components can be 
adopted singly or in combination.
Some of the key decisions which must be made in the 
design of PPBS for a given activity will follow. Then the 
assessment of which components of the system should be 
adopted will be discussed.
Key Design Decisions 
There are a number of key decisions in the design of 
a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, The major ones of 
these include the determination of proper leverage points, 
the general design of the program structure, the general 
design of the multi-year program, the general design of 
output indicators, the relationship PPBS will have to manage­
ment control, and whether budgetary formats will be changed.
Leverage Points 
The first decision that must be made in the design of 
a PPB System is what aspects of an agency operation are most 
critical in determining over-all costs and benefits. The 
aspect so identified becomes the key subject for systems 
analysis and the basic element around which program struc­
tures are constructed. In the Department of Defense the
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selection of weapon systems for acquisition was this leverage 
point. In many civilian programs the weapon system has a 
direct analogy —  e.g., specific water-resource projects.
In other areas the main point of leverage concerns operating 
characteristics (including eligibility criteria of benefit 
recipients) of programs.
Once the type of decision that affords the greatest 
leverage is selected, the time when this decision should be 
made is determined. In the Department of Defense the budge­
tary process was the time when these weapon-system selection 
decisions had to be made. There are organizations where the 
budgetary process is not the proper time for these program 
decisions. As noted in Chapter III, much of the Federal 
Government’s budget is fixed by earlier action. In this case 
the budget is not the dominant decision vehicle and the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System should not try to force 
decisions into this budgetary process. While all govern­
mental activities have budgets and the level of these budgets 
is critical to their activities, the major program decisions 
are often made entirely outside of the annual budgetary 
cycle by a continuing legislative process. Legislation formu­
lated and considered by the authorization committees of 
Congress can recommend upper limits to authorizations for 
programs and establish specific details of program operation.^ 
To be effective in the decision process, PPBS must provide
Isaloma, Congress'iohaT Budget Process. pp. 14-15.
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an Input Into this authorization process and not Just into 
"classic" budget decisions.
Program Structure 
The next major group of decisions in the design of 
a Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System concerns the program 
structure construction. The structuring of programs has a 
profound effect on the types of questions that PPBS will 
address and even on the specific decisions to be reached.^
In designing the program structure the overriding 
consideration must be a structure to facilitate analysis.^ 
This means that the structure must be built on the basis of 
the management planning decisions that should be made. A 
first step of the process of structuring a program budget is 
the investigation of the "ideal" decision process in the 
activity.3 A part of this investigation is complete when 
the leverage points described earlier have been determined. 
This should be extended to determine what information is
^Melvin Anshen, "The Federal Budget as an Instrument 
for Management and Analysis," Program Budgeting, ed. by 
Novick, p. 11,
^Graeme M. Taylor, "Designing the Program Structure," 
Program' Budgeting' and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Hinrichs 
and Taylor, p. 4$. There has been an unfortunate tendency 
to design program structures with little concern for the re­
quirements of good systems analysis. In these cases the 
program structures are apparently designed as "window 
dressing" for the description of activities of the govern­
mental agency. (California, State Personnel Board, Program 
Budgeting in California, by Len Silvey, p. 3.)
^Anshen, "Management and Analysis," Program Budgeting, 
ed. by Novick, pp. 19-20.
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necessary to make' declsTons' IW a 'irie'ajiltfgfuT manner" on these 
leverage points. The program structure is then designed to 
provide that information. All specific decisions on the 
structuring of programs must affirmatively answer the ques­
tion of whether it facilitates analysis.
There are two general approaches to the development 
of a program structure. One works from objectives down and 
the other begins with specific activities and works up,^
The first method is the one normally used.
In working from the top down, it is necessary to
begin with a broad objective and break it into increasingly
2concrete and operational terms. It is possible to begin 
with objectives that are too broad and never be able to 
achieve sufficiently finite breakouts for analytic purposes. 
For example, to begin civilian program structuring efforts 
with the objective of "promoting for the general welfare" 
would lead to an exercise in futility. Instead, it is 
necessary to begin with a more intermediate level objective 
and compare it for consistency to the higher level objectives. 
Table 7 shows how an intermediate objective of elimination 
of poverty can be narrowed and defined in more concrete terms. 
Each lower level of the objective structure more concretely
Paul L. Brown, "An Operational Model for a Planning- 
Pro gramming-B udge t in g System" (paper presented to the Post- 
Audit Seminar, Lexington, Kentucky, June 17, 1970), p. 3»
^Davies and McCarthy, Introduction to Technological 
Economics. p. 7.
TABLE 7
SUBOBJECTIVES OF ELIMINATION OF POVERTY
First Level
Enhancement of Earning Power
Second Level




Community and Environmental 
Improvements
Financial Aid
Health Programs for Poor
Low-Income Housing Improve­
ment








Achievement of School 
District Equity
Adult Literacy 










Source; Adapted from National Industrial Conference Board, Inc,, Service Extension 
Division, The Federal Budget: Its Impact on the Economy, Fiscal Year 1968,
p. 27.
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defines the programs involved.
The major problem with the deductive, or top-down, 
process of structuring programs is the time required to 
develop a meaningful structure of programs. The structure 
so developed can also bear little resemblence to the 
reality of operations in the agency. A reasonable alterna­
tive to this approach to designing a program structure is 
the inductive, or bottom-up, approach.
With an inductive approach the activities that the 
organization is currently performing are investigated by 
asking why the activities are being performed. From this 
investigation, interactions between activities are noted. 
Activities that serve the same purpose are grouped together. 
This grouping process is continued, with each level becoming 
broader. Ideally the major aggregations of activities 
(programs) would have a higher degree of interaction with 
activities in the same program than with any activity out­
side of the program. Of course it is unreasonable to expect 
no interactions with activities outside of the program. The 
best that can possibly be accomplished is to minimize these 
external interactions.
The major problem with the inductive approach to 
program structuring is the tendency is reinforced for an or­
ganization to describe as objectives the services which they 
have historically provided, without any consideration of
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broader objectives,^ Traditional activities are not chal­
lenged to the degree that they are in the deductive approach. 
In the practical design of a program structure, both 
approaches should be followed, and the two results compared. 
The discrepancies between the two establish the framework 
for another iteration of program-structure design. This use 
of both processes gives structure to the deductive approach 
and overcomes the parochial viewpoint weakness of the in­
ductive approach.
The task of designing the program structure is a 
significant analytical task itself.^ The end result should 
be a structure that relates to the end products of the or­
ganization and is useful for agency decision-making, "Ideal" 
programs should be clearly defined, amenable to at least 
partial quantification, and interact with other programs to 
a minimum degree,3 This ideal is seldom achieved and the 
final result is almost always a compromise,
Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan 
There are three key decisions required in the design 
of. the Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan, The number of
^This tendency to describe objectives in terms of what 
the agency has always done exists even in the top-down 
approach. The use of the bottom-up approach only accents it,
2Appendix C-1 contains some guidelines for the hand­
ling of questions that invariably arise in the process of 
structuring a program budget,
Swerner Z, Hirsch, Integrating View of Federal Program 
Budgeting. p, 7.
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years in the plan, which costs are to be used, and finally, 
the level of programs to be projected all require decisions.
The length of time for the multi-year plan cannot be 
specified to a finite degree for all agencies. The five 
years currently used in the Federal Government’s PPBS appears 
to be an arbitrarily determined figure. The number of years 
that the programs should be projected should be enough to 
provide a "reasonable perspective" of the impacts of the 
proposed program,^ Obviously this number will vary from 
program to program.
While the projection should ideally be long enough 
to observe the significant impact of the program involved, 
it must be recognized that the ability to project into the 
future is curtailed as the period of projection is extended. 
This means that the data projected for extremely long-run 
futures would be so uncertain that the projection would be 
virtually useless,^
In making the specific determination of how long the 
multi-year projections should be, the following factors 
should be noted:
1, The length of the investment cycle (the time between the
^State-Local Finances Project, The Multi-Year 
Program and FinanciaT Plan. p. 14,
2por example, an expenditure for preschool education 
could have a direct impact for a period that extends over 
twelve years. (Hartley, Educational PIanning-Programrning- 
BUdgeting, p. 3.) The cost and performance projections for 
that long a period would be too uncertain to be of much 
practical use.
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decision to proceed on a program and the operational state 
of the program) plus a reasonable period of operation that 
allows the program to stabilize should be a minimum re­
quirement for the number of years projected.
2. The expected life of the program (if it is not to be 
conducted indefinitely) should be considered in the deter­
mination of future years to project.
3. The degree of accuracy of estimates of costs and outputs 
sets a maximum number of years’ projection that is possible. 
Projections should not be any further than reasonable 
accuracy will permit.^
4. It is convenient to project both costs and outputs for 
all programs the same number of years. However, if the degree 
of accuracy possible is different for costs and outputs,
the lack of accuracy of one should not prevent a longer pro­
jection of the other. If longer projections are useful for 
some programs and not for others, the length of time should 
be varied.
Regardless of the decision about the length of pro­
jections in the Multi-Year Financial and Program Plan, the 
period of consideration for analytic efforts should not be 
restricted. Systems analysis should consider the full period 
of effects —  both benefits and costs —  even if the
^Except for the data for the current budget year, 
none of the projections in the multi-year plan should be 
expected to have "budget" accuracy. This degree of accuracy 
is neither possible nor necessary for the multi-year plan 
or for analysis.
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projection in the Multi-Year Financial Plan is shorter. The 
uncertainty in cost and output projections can be reduced 
by analysis in the specific case. Where uncertainty cannot 
be reduced by analysis, it can be explicitly treated during 
the analysis.
The second key decision which must be made on the 
Multi-Year Financial and Program Plan is which costs will 
be included. The appropriations requested from Congress in 
any specific year do not necessarily correspond to the 
expenditures during that year because of multi-year authori­
zations. This discrepancy can be very significant. Table 8 
shows the magnitude of this problem for Fiscal Year 1968.
The ideal projection would project both costs and new- 
obligation authority for the entire period. Because this 
ideal would be costly to implement, it is satisfactory to 
project expenses over the full range and the new obligational 
authority only for the budget year. The projection of ex­
penses is more meaningful because expenditures more closely 
correspond to inputs consumed by the program.
Another aspect of the decision concerning the cost 
that should be projected is whether dollar values are ade­
quate measures of resources consumed. It is often necessary 
to include other measures of input in addition to dollars 
when some specific resource is very limited.^ Some of the
lone specific resource should never be used as the 
sole measure of cost since this implies that all other re­
sources are "free." The information in the multi-year plan 
is then distorted.
TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP OF AUTHORIZATIONS TO EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1968
New Obligational Authority 






To be used To be used in












Source; William J. Brown, The Federal Budgeting and Appropriations Process, p. IB.
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resources that could be appropriate for this purpose are 
personnel required and land used. It is not necessary that 
every program in a given agency, or even every program in a 
given program category, use the same projections of specific 
inputs. The most appropriate specific resource to be pro­
jected should be individually selected for each program.
Another decision that must be made on Multi-Year 
Financial and Program Plans concerns the determination of 
what level of programs will be projected. There are two 
basic approaches that can be followed —  an arithmetical 
extension of currently approved programs and a plan that 
reflects the changes in program mix.
The use of projections of currently approved programs 
is the approach currently followed by the Bureau of the 
Budget, This approach has definite limitations. While it 
illuminates costs in subsequent years caused by current 
decisions, it does not assist in planning for multi-year 
projections.1
For planning purposes it is preferable to have multi­
year projections unconstrained by current approvals (or 
requested a p p r o v a l s , S o m e  sort of over-all financial 
constraint should be imposed on the future-year plan projec­
tions to ensure that the plans are not overly optimistic.
^Schultze, Public Spending. pp. 97-98.
^Cleland and King, Systems Analysis and Project 
Mahagement. pp. 127-29.
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When the multi-year projections of costs are oriented 
toward planning and not just projections of currently author­
ized programs, distinguishing between firm projections of 
programs already approved and those of planned programs 
seems to be desirable.^ Also, the projection of planned 
programs should explicitly identify critical decision points. 
It is also undesirable to project a single program when 
alternative programs are possible, since this projection has 
a tendency to prematurely foreclose alternatives and reduce
Pthe flexibility of future actions. A method of portraying 
the multi-year projection that will allow for the maximum 
degree of flexibility as well as retain a high level of 
visibility of future years’ actions is difficult to attain 
and will require several compromises between these two par­
tially conflicting objectives.
Output Indicators 
Decisions concerning the selection of output indica­
tors for use in the multi-year plan are similar to the pro­
cess of selecting measures of effectiveness in the performance 
of systems analysis.3 The purposes of the output indicators 
in the program structure are to serve as a quick reminder of
^The breakout of projections into different classifi­
cations as required by the Bureau of the Budget (Appendix 
A-2) also assists in understanding by providing an indication 
of the "firmness” of the currently approved program projection.
Zjames R. Schlesinger, Defense Planning and Bud­
geting;' The Issue of Centralized Control. pp7 44-45.
^This is discussed in Appendix A-3.
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the basis for past decisions, to show the change expected 
from projected changes in the program, and to isolate issues 
requiring analysis.^ Many of the advantages of PPBS are 
foregone if the output indicators used are uninformative 
or misleading.2
There are two classes of output indicators that can 
be used —  program-size indicators and effectiveness mea­
sures. Program-size indicators indicate the quantity (or 
volume) of services given by the program, and effectiveness 
measures show the impact, or benefits, of the program.^
Program-size indicators are normally easier to devise 
than are the effectiveness measures. They can include a 
simple measure of the size of the program, such as number of 
students enrolled in educational programs. They can also 
include a measure of extensiveness of the service provided, 
such as the number of hours of education provided per child 
enrolled in an educational program. The extensiveness of the 
program can also be compared to the population to be served 
or to the total need for services, such as the percentage of 
eligible children enrolled in the educational program.^
^State-Local Finances Project, Output Measures for a 
Multi-Year' Prograiri and Financial Plan*, p. 7.
^McKean, Evaluating 'Alternative Expenditure Programs.
p. 18.
^New York, Division of Budget and Office of Planning 
Coordination, Guidelines for Planning-Programming-Budgeting, 
p. 25.
^State-Local Finances Project, Output Measures.
pp. 10-17.
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As useful as these program-size indicators are as 
output measures, their usefulness is severely limited in that 
they do not disclose the impact of the program on society. 
Effectiveness measures are required for this purpose. Exam­
ples of effectiveness measures include per cent reductions 
in number of traffic accidents, reduction in morbidity and 
mortality rates for different disease categories, and 
changes in illiteracy rates by age and ethnic groups.^
It is difficult to define output indicators for all 
of the governmental programs. In theory each program element,
subcategory, and category should have one or more output in-
2dicator. In practice this is not possible. Even where 
adequate proximate measures of effectiveness can be deter­
mined during analysis, it is not always possible to transfer 
these measures directly to the program structure. The prox­
imate measures of effectiveness used in a specific systems 
analysis may be misleading when removed from the context of 
that analysis.3 However, while PPBS cannot insist on precise
^U. S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Office of Assistant Secretary (Planning and Evaluation), 
Planning -Programimin'g-'Budgetin'g: Guidance for Program and 
Financial Plan. (April 17T 19bo). P. i3^« HEW also uses 
broad program category output indicators. It is difficult 
to assess the effect of a specific program on these indica­
tors because of the large number of factors that effect them. 
(U. S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Toward 
a Social Report, 'January 11, 1969.)
^State-Local Finances Project, Output Measures, p. 5.
3lbid.. pp. 16-17.
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output indicators for all parts of the program structure,
". . .it can insist on the value of a search for them."^
In the search for output indicators the following 
guidelines are appropriate:
1. The indicator chosen should be output oriented and 
directly related to the program objectives.
2. As far as possible, the measure chosen should be quan­
tifiable .
3. The output indicator should be thoroughly defined.
4. The output measure should be simple enough to be easily 
understood.
5. The data required to measure the indicator should be 
avaiiable on a continuing basis.2
6. Work' efficiency indicators, such as cost per individual 
trained, should not be used as output indicators.3
Relationship of PPBS to Traditional 
and Performance Budgeting
The final set of key decisions that must be made in
the design of an agency's Planning-Programming-Budgeting
iRovey, Government Decision-Making. p. 81.
pBrown, "An Operational Model for a Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System," pp. 43-44. This last guideline 
demonstrates one basic difference between output indicators 
in the multi-year program and measures of effectiveness in 
individual systems analyses. In the latter there is not a 
requirement for continuing measurement. However, it should 
be noted that the continuing measurement requirement for out­
put indicators in the multi-year program does not preclude 
the use of sampling to obtain the measurement.
^State-Local Finances Project, Output Measures, p. 17.
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System concerns PPBS*s relationship to traditional and 
performance budgeting. It is improper to allow the tradi­
tional budget accounts, which are usually structured for 
operational control, to overly influence the design of the 
program structure.^
It is equally true that the design of the program 
structure should not unduly effect the traditional appro­
priation categories. To have an effective PPBS it is not 
necessary to realign the appropriation structure to conform 
to the program structure. Such a realignment has two adverse 
effects. First, the budgeting staffs and the Congressional 
committees have developed a high level of expertise in the 
review of object-of-expenditure classifications. This re­
view, in addition to a broad program review, is necessary to 
ensure efficiency of operation. The change of appropriation 
categories would not allow this expertise to function as 
effectively as it has in the past.2 Second, the changing of 
appropriation categories to correspond to the program struc­
ture would impose a degree of rigidity that could be harmful 
in the early stages of PPBS. As noted in Appendix C-1, the 
first attempts of structuring programs must remain "fluid" 
and adaptable to changing circumstances. The changing of the 
legislative appropriation categories requires much more time
^State-Local Finances Project, Developing an Objec­
tive' Oriented•GovernmentaT Program Structure. p. 1.
^Hltch, Decision Making for Defense, p. 29.
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than the administrative change of a program structure.^
A decision must also be made on the relationship 
between PPBS and the performance budgeting system. While 
PPBS must use some of the data generated by a good perfor­
mance budgeting system, there is a danger in making the re­
lationship between these too close. Because management con­
trol and performance budgeting are more concrete and struc­
tured than are strategic planning and PPBS, the former system 
could dominate the latter.
Adoption of Components of PPBS 
It is unrealistic to expect PPBS to have the same
degree of usefulness in all of the areas of the Federal
Government.2 Therefore, the design of a PPB System for every 
agency must proceed in the following three steps ;
1. The best way to use PPBS concepts should be determined;
2. The costs required to implement and sustain that system
should be determined; and
3. The benefits that the system offers should be determined.3 
The design and implementation of PPBS itself must meet the 
test that the system stresses for all government decisions —
^State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB. 
pp. 63-70.
^Melvin Anshen, "The Program Budget in Operation," 
Program Budgefing. ed. by Novick, p. 356.
3state-Local Finances Project, Answering the Question; 
Ts an Integrated Planning. Programming. Budgeting System 
Useful for Our Jurisdiction.
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the benefits accruing must be worth the costs expended.1 
The problem of the cost-effectiveness of PPBS itself is a 
difficult one. No one has seriously collected data on either 
its costs or its benefits.  ̂ However, in making a decision 
to implement PPBS and in the determination of the exact 
components of PPBS to implement in an agency, the decision­
maker should explicitly consider both expected costs and 
benefits of the system.
This section will explore the cost involved in PPBS 
and then some of the benefits accruing from the use of 
certain components of the system. In the discussion of 
benefits from PPBS, emphasis will be placed on the charac­
teristics of a specific agency that will increase the benefits.
Costs
There are a number of costs involved in the imple­
mentation and use of PPBS by an agency of the Federal Govern­
ment. These costs have generally been ignored by those re­
commending a government-wide implementation of the system.
Cost involved in the implementation and use of PPBS can be 
divided into four categories: resource opportunity costs,
time opportunity costs, psychological (or nonmonetary) costs, 
and data costs.
^Steiner, "Problems in Implementing Program Bud­
geting," Program Budgeting, ed. by Novick, p. 350,
2u. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Progress 
and Potentials-, Hearings, 1967, p, 214.
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The resource opportunity costs are relatively straight­
forward. There are definite costs Involved in the hiring and 
training of personnel to work full-time on the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System. The General Accounting Office 
survey of seventeen agencies identified 2,474 "full-time- 
equivalent" PPB employees.! The significant resource cost 
is not the total number working on the system but the number 
who would not be required if the system were never imple­
mented in the agency. Obviously some of the functions per­
formed under the mantle of PPBS would be required even if 
the system did not formally exist in the agency.2
The time opportunity costs of implementing a Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System may be more significant than 
the resource opportunity costs, but they are not as easily 
estimated. The implementation phase of PPBS requires a con­
siderable amount of time of all executives and line managers, 
who will be participating in the design decisions, furnishing 
data, and even becoming acquainted with the new roles and 
skills expected of them.
U. S., General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the United States. •Report' to the Congress. July 29, 1969, 
p. 48.
^The Agency for International Development estimated 
that it spent 179 equivalent man-years on PPBS functions in 
1968. However, it required 147 equivalent man-years in 1962 
to perform some functions that are now a part of PPBS. The 
net manpower cost of PPBS as performed in AID is then 32 
equivalent man-years. (U. S., Congress, Senate, Planning, 
Programming. Budgeting. Inquiry, 1969, p. 4l4.)
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The psychological costs associated with PPBS can also 
be very high. Any alteration of the roles and functions of 
the existing structure can be costly in terms of psychologi­
cal, nonmonetary costs. These costs are difficult to esti­
mate.^
The data costs of PPBS are substantial. By its very 
nature, PPBS is a gigantic consumer of data.^ PPBS requires 
a substantial investment in cost data in order to be able 
to develop meaningful relationships to use in cost-estimating.3 
This cost data is often in a form that is not routinely gen­
erated by the traditional accounting procedures, and new 
accounting tasks must be imposed. In addition, an operational 
PPBS requires a considerable amount of data concerning the 
parameters of public programs and the effects that the pro­
duce.^
Because of the high cost of data, it is unreasonable 
to design a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System to furnish 
the absolute maximum amount of data possible. Decision-makers
ISince the method of implementation is one of the 
main determinants of the magnitude of "psychological costs" 
of PPBS, these will be discussed to a greater extent in 
Chapter VI.
^S, A, Haggart, Developing a Program Budgeting System 
as' an Aid in Planning Higher Education, p. 4.
^Robert N. Grosse and Arnold Proschan, Military Cost 
AhaTys'is, p. 5.
^Selma J. Mushkin and John Cotton, "Systematic 
Analysis and Grants-in-Aid in a Federal System," Analysis and 
Evaluât ion. U. S., Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Vol. I, 
1969, p. 352.
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are accustomed to working with fragmentary information when
it is feasible, but not economical, to develop more complete
information,! PPBS should strive for the same goal: to
develop all of the usable information that is economical —
not all that is feasible.
There is no completely satisfactory way to estimate
pthe data cost to support PPBS in the Federal Government.
Not only is it difficult to estimate the total cost of all 
of the data contained in the PPB System, but it is more 
difficult to determine what part of this data would be gen­
erated even if PPBS did not exist.
In spite of the difficulties concerned with the esti­
mation of the costs associated with PPBS, it is important 
that the general magnitude of these costs be considered.
The decision to implement the system must be based on the 
level of these costs compared to the benefits that are ex­
pected from the system.
Benefits of Program Structure 
The use of a program structure is helpful in increasing
^Harry G. Johnson, "The Economic Approach to Social 
Questions,"' The' Public' Interest. Summer, 1968, p. 76.
2The general magnitude of this cost can be seen from 
the experience of one of the states. The estimated annual 
operating cost of the automatic data-processing equipment to 
support California's version of PPBS is $217,000. (Califor­
nia, Department of Finance, The B'ud'ge't Data System, p. vii.) 
This cost does not include the initial cost of gathering the 
data. Also, the system used in California is much smaller 
and less complex than that used in the Federal Government.
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the perception and understanding of decision-makers in an 
agency which has a number of complex activities, which is 
not organized with a strong separation of missions between 
the separate subordinate organizational activities, and 
which has a heavily input-oriented traditional budget. Some 
agencies in the Federal Government have organizational struc­
tures that are more process-oriented than others and have 
traditional budgets that are less end-product oriented than 
others. The Department of Defense appears to be the extreme 
example of a highly complex, process-oriented organization 
with an input-oriented budget.^ Other agencies of the 
Federal Government demonstrate these characteristics to 
varying degrees, and the program structure will be less 
beneficial in these agencies.
The size of the organization also seems to effect the 
amount of benefit that can be derived from the structuring 
of the budget on a program basis. A program budget makes the 
objectives and goals of the organization explicit. Since the 
physical tasks of the agency are carried out at the lowest 
level, the larger the organization and the greater distance 
from the top to this lowest "action-level," the more necessary 
it is to have explicit objectives to guide the actions of 
subordinate levels.^
^David Novick, The Federal Budget as an Indicator of 
Government Tn'tentTons and the implications of Intentions. 
pTIïï:---------------------
^P. A. Don Vito, The Essentials of a Planning- 
Frogrammirig-Budgeting System, pp. 4-5.
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Another advantage of the program structure’s explicit 
statement of objectives is its effect on changes necessary 
in programs. It is never possible to be completely certain 
of what will occur in the future. If the objectives are 
explicitly defined, the probability is increased that proper 
adjustments will be made in the case of unpredictable cir­
cumstances, ̂  It would appear that the program structure 
would be a greater benefit when the environment of an agency 
is characterized by a rapid degree of change.
The program structure also has a desirable benefit 
in that its explicit statement of objectives can cause a 
re-examination of existing programs.^ The use of a program 
structure is more desirable when there is some doubt about 
the worth of some of the agency’s programs.
The use of a program structure also has a beneficial 
effect on the quality of communications outside of the agency 
by establishing a base for better dialogue between the public 
and professionals of the agency.3 The use of a program 
structure is then particularly desirable when the ability to 
communicate outside of the agency seems limited.
The need for a program-structured budget also increases 
when systems analysis is necessary in the agency. The
Ipaul M, Stokes, A Total Systems Approach to Manage­
ment' Control. p, 15,
^Christenson, ’’Program Budgeting," p, 11,
3James S, Dyer, The ITs'e of PPBS in a Public System 
of Higher E-duc'afioh;■ Ts it ’̂Cost Effective?/’ p, 17.
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relationship between the program structure and systems 
analysis is very strong. The program structure aids analy­
tic efforts by;
1. Providing a framework for analysis. A program structure 
makes the need for systems analysis more obvious then it 
might otherwise be,^ but by itself it does not ensure that
analysis will be performed or that it will be used in the
2decision process.
2. Suggesting possible trade-offs. The program structure 
highlights programs that are possible substitutes for each 
other, and those that complement each other.
3. Developing relevant information. The program structure 
develops information in a form that is more useful for 
analytical tools than is the traditional budget information.
4. Providing a means of recording the decisions that are 
based on analysis.3
It should be noted that the formalization of a program 
structure can hinder analysis in two ways. First, the effort 
devoted to developing the program structure often directly 
substitutes for analytic effort. Second, in some cases the 
program structure has been developed with no regard for the 
areas which require decisions or for the agency's decision
^California, Department of Finance, Program Budgeting 
in CaTi'fornia, by Silvey, p. 1.
^Committee for National Objectives, Budgeting for 
E-conomic Development. p. 34.
^Bradley, Some' Views on Program Budgeting, pp. 6-7.
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process. In this case it simply diverts attention from 
areas where analysis is necessary.^ These weaknesses do not 
result from an intrinsic weakness of program structures but 
from a misapplication of the program-structuring process.
In the discussion of the benefits of a program 
structure it should be noted that the program structure by 
itself has a limited amount of utility in direct decision­
making unless it is supplemented by a viable analytic capa­
bility.2 There are three reasons for this:
1. The program structure portrays only the primary trade­
offs and interdependencies. Analysis is necessary to consi­
der other interdependencies and trade-offs which may be 
critical in specific decision situations.3
2, The costs contained in the program structure give only 
the roughest indication of costs relevant for decision­
making since they are total or average costs and not incre­
mental costs.^ The costs in the program structure also 
usually include only the direct costs to the specific agency
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
Analysis. Hearings. 1969, p. 779.
2some writers such as S. A. Haggart, et al.. Program 
Budgeting for School District Planning: Concepts anS"
Applications. p. 17. incorrectly state that the program 
structure can be used directly in making decisions.
^Roland N. McKean and Melvin Anshen, "Limitations, 
Risks, and Problems," Program Budgeting, ed. by Novick,
pp. 292-93.
^Schlesinger, Centralized Control, p. 4.
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involved and exclude nonmonetary costs and costs to other 
government agencies and private groups,
3. The measures of effectiveness associated with the program 
structure are only partially informative. Systems analysis 
can usually devise better measures of effectiveness for the 
specific problem at hand,l
In addition to the benefits noted earlier that accrue 
with the use of the program structure, the process of de­
signing the program structure itself can be the source of 
some definite benefits. Some of these are:
1, The process of trying to explicitly define objectives 
can lead to some improvement in these objectives,2
2, The program structure design can give some useful in­
sights into the coverage of existing programs by revealing 
duplicating, overlapping, and wasteful programs as well as 
gaps in the program coverage that should be filled,3
3, The design of the program structure can provide analysts 
with the opportunity to learn more about the agency’s pro­
grams, This knowledge will increase the capability of the 
analyst to furnish useful studies,^
iRoland N, McKean, "Remaining Difficulties in Program 
Budgeting," A Commentary on Defense Management. ed. by 
Smale, p, 55.
^Dimock and Dimock, Public Administration, p, 498,
3carlson, "Status and Next Steps," Analysis and 
Evaluât ion. U, S,. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Vol. 
n7'T96TT'P. 617.
^U, s . .  Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
Analysis. Hearings, 1969, p. 780,
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4, The design of the program structure is the beginning of 
the dialogue between the analysts and line management. This 
provides an opportunity for these two groups to become 
accustomed to working and communicating with each other.^
5. The design of the program structure plays a large role 
In the "Institutionalization" of PPBS since It Is concrete 
proof of the Intention to Implement and use PPBS In the de­
cision process.2
It can be seen that the use of a program structure In 
connection with PPBS cannot be expected to have equal bene­
fits In all of the agencies of the Federal Government. An 
agency which has complex programs and activities, an organ­
izational structure based on something other than purpose, 
a highly Input-orlented budget, a large size, an environment 
characterized by change, a group of programs with question­
able outputs, and difficulty In external communications will 
benefit most from the use of a program structure. The use 
of a program structure In an agency which meets none of these 
conditions would appear questionable.
Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan 
There are two separate portions of the Multi-Year 
Financial and Program Plan that have benefits to the user —
^C. W, Churchman and A. H. Schalnblatt, "PPB: How
Can It Be Implemented?," Public Administration Review. XXIX 
(March/April, 1969), 180.
^State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB. p. 55.
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the multi-year feature of the plan and the output indicators. 
The multi-year feature forces the decision-maker to consider 
the future-year implications of current decisions.^ This 
feature is most important when an agency has; programs that 
extend for a period of time into the future; programs whose 
size and effects are not just arithmetical extensions of 
past history; and a "lag" between the expenditure of funds 
and the achievement of results, such as the long investment 
cycle for advanced military weapons.
The multi-year feature of the program plan has one 
other advantage. By establishing a framework and definite 
format for intermediate plans, it encourages planning on the 
part of the agency involved.  ̂ Planning is essential in 
agencies where change is likely in the future time period. 
With a well-established planning effort, an agency is able 
to anticipate areas that require future decisions and to 
make these decisions in a timely fashion.3
^Don Vito, Essentials of Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System, p. Ü.
^Edwin W, Beach, "California’s Programming and Bud­
geting System," Innovations. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, 1969, p. '5'1.
3a discussion of the benefits of the multi-year pro­
visions of the program plan would not be complete without a 
discussion of. one possible negative benefit. The multi-year 
projection of costs and benefits may inject an element of 
conservatism into the plans of the agency. The tendency to 
simply extend programs from the past into the future will 
exist. Once these programs are extended, ", , , unimagina­
tive minds will accept program plans as firm commitments," 
(Hartley, Educational Planning-Programming-Budgeting. p, 40,) 
This means that it could be difficult to process changes to
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The second part of the multi-year program plan that 
provides benefits to an agency is output indicators. These 
output indicators provide a reminder of the basis of past 
decisions and reflect the changes in output expected from 
changes in the program. As such, they are a major part of 
the presentation of the "base" from which analysis proceeds. 
The degree of benefits provided by the use of output indi­
cators is then related to the need for analysis in the 
agency.
Output indicators are also useful to help isolate the 
need for analysis. This means that the benefit of these 
indicators increases when the agency has an environment where 
future change is going to be necessary.
The output indicators also provide a rough measure of 
program accomplishment. This is useful in the comparison of 
planned accomplishments versus the accomplishments actually 
achieved. This aspect of output indicators means that they 
are more useful when there is a lag between the spending and 
the accomplishment, and when the outputs of the spending are 
not immediately obvious.^
the approved "base" since these changes would have to bear 
the burden of proof in establishing their superiority over 
those programs already projected.
^It would be incorrect to consider the multi-year 
program plan with its output indicators as a management- 
control device. The indicators in the program plan are too 
highly aggregated to provide more than a glimpse of the in­
formation needed for program control. More detailed organ­
izationally oriented information from a system such as 
"performance" budgeting is needed to effect adequate manage­
ment control within an agency.
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Probably the greatest benefit which can be received 
from output indicators in the program plan is the ability to 
devise meaningful quantitative indicators. Where the indi­
cators used are only program-size indicators, the benefits 
accruing from their use are less than when both program-size 
and effectiveness indicators are possible.
The level of benefits that are received from the use 
of a Multi-Year Program and Financial Plan will obviously 
vary between different agencies of the Federal Government.
An agency which has multi-year programs, faces a volatile 
climate, has a number of programs with a long lead-time, and 
has programs where meaningful quantitative indicators can 
be devised will derive more benefit from the use of a Multi- 
Year Program and Financial Plan than one which does not 
meet these criteria.
Systems Analysis
The "heart" of PPBS is the use of systems analysis.
One tends to agree with the thought expressed by Otto Eckstein
before a Congressional committee:
. . .  I do not believe that there is any field of public 
expenditure which could not be improved by having high- 
quality . . . analysis applied to it.l
Even so, the power of systems analysis is not uniform in all
contexts, and the benefits from the use of this analysis are
^U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Guide­
lines-. Hearings. 1969, p. 221.
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not equal in all areas.1 Some aspects that determine the 
amount of benefits possible from the use of systems analysis 
will now be explored.
The first, and most obvious, condition that must 
exist before the use of systems analysis will be beneficial 
in a particular agency is that alternative ways to achieve 
objectives must exist.^ If there is no alternative way of 
achieving the objective, the most that analysis can indicate 
is whether the achievements of the single alternative are 
worth the cost of that alternative.3
Analysis is most required when the use of unaided in­
tuition is the weakest. This occurs when the problems are 
extremely complex and historical precedence is lacking. The 
Department of Defense had these types of problems. The 
complexities of DOD systems and their operating environment 
are well known. In addition, no one had conducted a war of 
nuclear proportions, or even a limited war under the threat 
of escalation to nuclear levels. The historical lessons of 
warfare and weapons acquisition and use could well have been
lu. S., Congress, Senate, Planning, Programming,
Pudge ting,- Tnquiry, 1969, p. 135.
^Yehezkel Dror, "Systems Analysis and National Modern­
ization D e c i s i o n s Academy of Management Journal, XIII 
CJune, 1970), l43.
30ne must guard against the tendency to preclude 
analysis because of the lack of alternatives when the use of 
analysis is required primarily to uncover new alternatives.
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misleading.^ The complexities of nondefense programs normally 
arise from the existence of multiple objectives, undefined 
objectives, and multiple levels of government. These com­
plexities create a need for systems analysis, and the more 
complex the problem and situation, the greater the potential 
of systems analysis to provide meaningful input.
Systems analysis is more beneficial when a high rate 
of change is encountered. Incremental change is almost in­
evitable in the absence of a viable analytic capability.
The absolute rate of change is not as important as the amount 
of change that is expected during the effective time span 
between the decision on a program and its implementation.2 
Benefits of the use of analysis are more limited when the 
rate of technological, social, and/or political change is 
slow and incrementally changed programs are adequate.^
The amount of benefits possible from the use of 
systems analysis also seems to depend on the degree to which
1Malcolm W. Hoag, Some Complexities in Military 
Planning, p. i.
^Clay Thomas Whitehead, Uses and Limitations of 
Systems' Analysis, p. 13.
3one possible nonmonetary cost of the use of systems 
analysis should be noted in relation to the ability to change 
programs. The improper use of systems analysis can possibly 
stifle creativity and change. The process of getting a new 
idea approved can be made so burdensome that individuals may 
avoid trying to experiment with new ideas to avoid the work 
associated with approval. (Ibid.. p. 61.) The application 
of rigid systems analysis requirements during early stages 
of research, development, and experimentation would appear 
to be the major way to stifle this creativity.
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the agency Is attuned to responsiveness to the needs of 
consumers and users of the services It provides. By In­
sisting on adequate systems analysis, the objectives of an 
agency’s decisions can be changed from Internal orientation 
to the end Item, and responsiveness to the needs of the con­
sumer or user can be Increased.1 Governmental organizations 
which are made responsive to the consumer by some other 
mechanism, such as the profit motive, probably derive less 
benefit from the use of systems analysis than those which 
do not have this mechanism.
Another factor which determines the benefits possible 
from the use of systems analysis Is the resource Impact of 
the decisions. Obviously the greater the expenditures asso­
ciated with a particular decision and the greater the ad­
verse consequences of an Incorrect decision, the greater the 
need for systematic analysis.
Another benefit that accrues to the agency which makes 
effective use of systems analysis is that the use of analysis 
Itself becomes a means for justifying the agency’s budget 
proposal.2 The effective use of analysis Increases the 
rationality explicit In a program and helps to ’’sell” the 
program. In the words of one author, analyses become ”. . .  
powerful-weapons In the arsenal of persuasion.”3
......  ̂ California, State Personnel Board, Program Budgeting
lh‘ California. by Silvey, p. 2.
^Escarraz, ”PPBS and the National Governmient«” p. 135•
SHeld, ”PPBS Comes to Washington,”' Planning. Program­
ming Budgeting. ed, by Lyden and Miller, p. 25.
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Another factor which partially determines the benefits 
that systems analysis will offer to a specific agency is the 
availability of data and personnel. One author notes the 
following four characteristics as prerequisites to the effec­
tive use of systems analysis :
1) Availability of professionals able and willing to 
undertake high quality systems analysis,
2) Availability of data on which analysis can be based,
3) Availability of valid theories, which permit at 
least some reliable predictions on probable results of 
different alternatives,
4) Existence of sufficient power support to get access 
to required information,!
As noted before, the availability of data and person­
nel affects the speed at which adequate analysis is available 
more than the absolute possibility of ever achieving a posi­
tion where analysis is effective. Since data and personnel 
are developed only after experience with the use of systems 
analysis, an effectiveness-time curve for systems analysis 
in most agencies would look like Figure 3. The availability 
of data and personnel at the time that systems analysis is 
implemented establishes the initial degree of adequacy of 
analyses (Eq ), The method of implementation will establish 
the shape of the curve,^ However, there is an upper limit 
to the adequacy of analyses even over a long period of time 
(Em).
Probably the factor which most effects the degree of
lYehezkel Dror. Systems Analysis for Development 
Admiinistrafion": : Some Problems and Prerequisites, p, 9.
^This will be discussed in Chapter VI,
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benefits that can be received from the use of systems analy­
sis is the willingness of the decision-makers in the agency 
to use the products of this analysis. The purpose of systems 
analysis is not to make decisions but to present informa­
tion^ to the decision-maker so that he can make more informed 
decisions. The other characteristics that make the use of 
systems analysis beneficial are meaningless if the decision­
maker ignores the product of analysis in his decisions.^
General Comments 
The use of PPBS has two benefits which are extremely 
difficult to evaluate but which could very well be the most 
important products of the system. These are:
1. The attitudes of personnel associated with the programs 
of the Federal Government are changed from input-orientation 
to that of questioning the outputs of the program. This 
change could be very significant in the improvement of
^It is necessary to distinguish between data, of which 
decision-makers generally have too much, and information, of 
which decision-makers generally have too little. Only after 
data has been converted into a form which is meaningful for 
the decision-maker to use on the decision at hand can it be 
called "information." (Tom Alexander, "Computers Can't Solve 
Everything." Fortune. LXXX [October, 1969], 129.)
^This situation appears to occur often in govern­
mental agencies. For example, the systems analysis approach 
would appear to be particularly beneficial in the area of 
foreign affairs. Yet it has not been utilized to any signi­
ficant degree because of the predisposition of the pro­
fessional decision-makers in this area. (Norford, "Foreign 
Policy Planning," pp. 8I-IOO, and U. S., Congress, Senate, 
Planning. Frogramming. Budgeting. Inquiry. 1969, PP. I8l-b2.)
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governmental programs,̂
2, The approach of governmental decision-makers to their 
decisions can be changed to one of disciplined Judgment in­
stead of a form of ad hoc intuition. The quality of all 
decisions could well be improved.
There are two other aspects of the costs and benefits 
of PPBS that deserve discussion. First, if the four major 
components of PPBS that were discussed under design of the 
system are considered in a possible sequence of the potential 
system. Figure 4 shows how the costs and effectiveness vary.
It costs considerably more to implement.a PPB System with all 
four components than to implement only the program structure, 
but benefits that accrue are also much higher. Whether the 
additional benefits that would accrue from the full system 
are worth the additional cost should be a matter of analysis 
in the specific agency involved.
The second aspect of the costs and benefits of PPBS 
concerns the time of their incurrence. Because of the time 
lag which exists between the beginning of the process of 
implementing PPBS and its final achievement of full operation, 
its early use will involve considerable costs (both monetary 
and nonmonetary) and will provide little benefits. After the 
system has become fully operational, the costs involved will 
be reduced and the benefits will be increased.
ISelma J. Mushkin, "PPBS in City, State, and County; 
An Overview." Innovations. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, 1969, p. 10.
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This chapter has Indicated that the Planning- 
Programming-Budgetlng System that is adopted in each agency 
should be specially designed to meet the needs of that 
agency. The design of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System is itself a substantial analytic task. It should be 
approached with the same analytic discipline that PPBS en­
courages. In this case the variable parameters of the model 
are the five major decisions which must be made:
1. What are the key leverage decision points in an agency's 
operation?
2. What general approach should be taken to the program 
structure design —  deductive or inductive?
3. What general design should the Multi-Year Program and 
Financial Plan have, including length of projections, level 
of projections, and selection of cost measures?
4. What general design should the output indicators have?
5. What relationship should PPBS have to existing traditional 
and performance budgets?
The answers to each of these questions largely de­
termine the cost and benefits of PPBS. The second part of 
the design of a PPB System is to determine if the benefits 
achieved are worth the cost to be expended. It appears that 
a PPB System will have the greatest amount of benefits in an 
agency which: has a number of alternative ways to achieve
its objectives; is characterized by complex programs with a
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lack of historical precedence; exists in an environment 
where the rate of technological, social and/or political 
change is rapid; is organizationally structured along lines 
other than purpose; has a traditional budget that is heavily 
input-oriented; is a large organization with a long scalar 
chain-of-command; has programs that represent multi-year 
commitments; has a need to better communicate outside of 
the organization —  including a need to better "sell" pro­
grams; appears to have programs which have not been adequate 
to achieve objectives; is not naturally oriented toward 
responsiveness of consumer's and user's needs by a mechanism 
such, as the profit motive; has decisions characterized by 
large resource commitments or extremely adverse impacts when 
incorrect decisions are made; has personnel capable of per­
forming analysis and data capable of supporting analysis; 
and has decision-makers willing to use the products of PPBS, 
Agencies which do not have all of these character­
istics will derive less benefit from the use of PPBS than 
agencies which meet all of the characteristics. Whether the 
benefits that accrue in a specific agency that has only some 
of the characteristics are worth the costs of the system 
must be the subject of individual in-depth analysis.
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLEMENTATION OP PPBS
One of the most important tasks associated with the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in the Federal Govern­
ment is its implementation. The design of PPBS is wasted 
effort unless the system is put into practice by effective 
implementation. There is some indication that the problems 
of implementing PPBS have been ignored in the Federal 
Government, and this has been partially responsible for the 
lack of achievements of the system.
The task of implementing PPBS is one that is not very 
well understood. No single concrete plan for implementing 
PPBS can be formulated to work in all agencies. If all PPBS 
required was the institution of new forms into an agency, 
the implementation would be relatively easy. The concept of 
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, however, requires 
an organizational change of some magnitude. The attitudes, 
operations, and interrelationships of components of the 
organization must be changed if PPBS is to be effective.
The problem of changing an organization is one that 
has occupied a large body of theory. However, the theory of 
organizational change has been dominated by a narrowly defined
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segment of the soclal-science fraternity. The major topic 
which has occupied its attention has been where the organi­
zation attempts to move from an autocratic managerial en­
vironment to one where it strives to maximize the "human 
values" of its employees.^ For this reason there is little 
in the change literature that is directly applicable to the 
institution of a new management system like PPBS. However, 
the literature of organizational change abounds in guidelines 
and suggestions for facilitating any type.of change to an 
organization. These guidelines will be adapted to the con­
cepts of PPBS. First the philosophy of organizational change 
will be described. Then some key decisions and actions 
during the process of change will be discussed. Finally 
some guidelines on the implementation of the various components 
of PPBS will be covered.
Philosophy of Change 
States of Changing Organizations 
The process of change in an individual or an organiza­
tion can be divided into three stages :
1. "Unfreezing"; Stimulating the organization to feel that 
some sort of change is necessary.
2, "Changing": Introduction and application of new methods
and guidelines.
^Jeremiah J. O’Connell, Managing Organizational 
TnnovatTon. pp. 5-7.
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3. "Refreezing": Reinforcing the changed behavior patterns.^ 
This process of change is represented In Figure 5.
The length of the arrows representing forces that are facili­
tating or retarding change are representative of the strength 
of these forces. Notice that during the "unfreezing" stage 
the requirement is to reduce the strength, of the forces 
which retard the change process and increase the forces which 
facilitate change.
Also notice from Figure 5 that the change does not 
begin immediately after the forces retarding and facilitating 
change are imbalanced. In order to overcome the tendency 
of the organization to maintain the status quo, it is neces­
sary for change efforts to reach some "critical mass" before
pthey become effective.
Problems Encountered in the Change Effort 
The process of change Is not as simple as the schema­
tic representation in Figure 5 would have one believe. This 
is because it is not a simple matter to estimate the magni­
tude of the forces facilitating and retarding the change 
effort. Also, these forces are not independent. A change 
in a force that facilitates change can easily modify one of
^Larry E, Greiner and Louis B, Barnes, "Organization 
Change and Development," Organizational Change and Develop­
ment . ed. by Gene W, Dalton, Paul ft, Lawrence and Larry E. 
Greiner, pp. 6-7.
^Yehezkel Dror, "From Managemient Sciences to Policy 
Sciences. pp. 32-33.
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the forces that retards change. For example, a directive 
that decisions must be supported by systems analysis (the 
directive itself is a force facilitating change) may well 
arouse such resentment in the personnel receiving the di­
rective that they will actively work to circumvent it 
(their mental attitude is a force that retards change).
Normally the instigators of change are more realistic 
in accepting the limitations imposed by physical laws in 
change efforts than they are in accepting the limitations 
imposed by human psychology. For this reason the development 
of procedural aspects of PPBS and the development of analytic 
staffs have proceeded much more rapidly than the change in 
behavior and decision processes in the civilian agencies of 
the Federal Government. Unless some definite attention is 
paid to the need to change the behavior of the organization 
to adapt to PPBS, the adoption of that system is likely to 
remain at a superficial and mechanistic level.^ One of the 
first steps in implementation is to identify the sources of 
irritation and resistance that are inherent in the implemen­
tation of PPBS.2
^This was noted by a writer on the use of PPBS and 
systems analysis in the Atomic Energy Commission when he said 
that " . . .  until the AEG becomes convinced that economic 
analysis can be helpful to it in its decisionmaking and 
funding problems, no form of staff organization is likely to 
make it work." (Milton F. Searl, "Prospects for PPB at AEG," 
Analysis and Evaluation. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, Vol. Ill, I969, p. IOI6.)
^These are discussed in Appendix D-1.
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Decisions and Actions during 
Implementation of PPBS
Manner of Implementing PPBS 
The way In which PPBS Is Introduced can Influence the 
degree of resistance toward the Implementation and use of 
the system. While there Is an almost unlimited spectrum of 
types of action that can be employed In the Introduction of 
change In an organization,^ the principal characteristics 
of each of these allow their division Into three categories —  
directive, participatory, and group-sharing.
Directive Implement at1on
The Implementation of PPBS by directive change Is 
characterized by some form of compulsion. By Its very nature 
this type of change effort arouses a great deal of resent­
ment and opposition. The Initial result of Implementing 
PPBS by directive could be the adoption of the form but not 
the spirit of the system.^
It Is difficult to achieve the acceptance of a new 
form of management If It Is Instituted by force. It Is, 
however, not Impossible. The Department of Defense largely 
Instituted PPBS by directive. In this department the system 
was met with massive resistance, but because of the authority
Ipor example Garth N, Jones, Planned Organizatlonal 
Change. used nine "strategies" and twenty-nine "tactics" to 
Identify and classify organizational change efforts.
^Benton and Tenzer, Program Budgeting and Executive 
Coimltment. p. 15.
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and power of Secretary McNamara, the Individual services 
embraced the concepts of PPBS, Including systems analysis, 
largely as a matter of self-defense.1
The following conditions appear necessary before the 
directive method of Implementing PPBS can be successful;
1. The agency head must have the authority and the ability 
to direct the change and enforce It.
2. The enforcement must continue for a long enough period 
that attitude and behavior change Is forced (even If It Is 
In self-defense).
3. A high degree of creativity and Ingenuity Is not needed 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy In the design and Ini­
tial use of the system. (Secretary McNamara was able to use 
trained "consultants" from outside the DOD In the Initial 
transition to PPBS.)^
There are some definite advantages to the use of the 
directive means of Implementing PPBS. When the conditions 
noted above are met, PPBS can be Implemented more rapidly 
(at least at the highest level) than If a broader base of 
participation Is Involved, The agency head can also ensure 
that the design and operation of PPBS In the agency meets his
^Ibld., pp. 12-13. Another aspect of this acceptance 
could be the military's traditional Indoctrination of respect 
for authority and hierarchy, (Frederick C. Mosher, "Program 
Budgeting In Foreign Affairs; Some Reflections," Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, Inquiry. U. S., Congress, Senate,
^These conditions were adapted from Arnold S. Judson,




At the other end of the spectrum of methods of intro­
ducing PPBS Into a governmental agency Is participative 
change. Under the participative concept all of the affected 
Individuals In the agency are allowed a voice In the deci­
sion process on the design and Implementation of the planned 
system. There are many advantages to the use of participa­
tion In the Implementation of PPBS. Some of these Include;
1. Each Individual affected by the change has an enhanced 
sense of Importance due to his being given the opportunity 
to express his Ideas.
2. All concerned with the system will gain a better under­
standing of It.
3. All concerned with the system will feel a sense of re­
sponsibility toward the success of the system, and resistance 
to Its Implementation will be effectively reduced.1
While most managers will acknowledge the beneficial 
effects of participation In the Implementation of PPBS, a 
major problem Is the way In which that participation Is 
secured. "Participation" Is a psychological attitude on the 
part of the Individuals Involved that their work, opinions, 
and Ideas on the system will actually be respected.2 Whether
Ipioyd C. Mann and Franklin W. Neff, Managing Major 
Change' in OrganTzatlons. p. 79.
2paul R. Lawrence, "How to Deal with Resistance to 
Change," Or'ganlzatTo'naT Change and' Development. ed. by Dalton,
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this attitude can be established in any given agency depends 
largely on the past relationships that have existed in the 
agency.
There are three other problems in the use of partici­
pative implementation of PPBS in the agencies of the Federal 
Government. These are;
1. The size of the governmental agency and the number of 
people involved in PPBS make formal participation by every­
one almost a practical impossibility.^
2. To have successful participation in the design and 
implementation of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, 
the head of the agency must be willing to accept the ideas 
of the subordinates and have very little predisposition on 
how the system will be designed or operated.^
3. If the concepts of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System are dangerous to the job security of an individual.
Lawrence and Greiner, pp. 182-84. If the individual involved 
feels that the participation allowed is actually a psycholog­
ical gimmick, this method of implementing PPBS can generate 
more resistance than the directive implementation.
^Most of the success of totally participative change 
has been when it is applied to smaller groups. (Judson,
Guide' to Changes, p. 101.)
2since the system must be designed to serve the agency 
head, it is difficult to conceive of a case where he does 
not have at least some strong predispositions in regard to 
its design and operation. It is also likely that the agency 
head will have to make some decisions that he cannot Justify 
from the perspective of an individual who advocates a differ­
ent decision. Participation in this case can be effectively 
negated since it depends so highly on the subordinate’s 
perception.
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or to a program with which he is closely identified, it is 
doubtful if any meaningful level of participation can be 
attained.
Gr oup-Shar ing Imp lemen tat ion
On the broad spectrum of possible methods to implement 
PPBS, between directive and participative, are group-sharing 
approaches. These cover methods that can be somewhat 
directive —  or somewhat participative —  oriented. At the 
first extreme, the agency head defines the general outlines 
of the PPB System desired and its general operating tech­
niques. He also retains veto authority over the work of the 
group which fills in the details of the outlines. At the 
opposite extreme, only the broadest of needs is stated and 
the most general veto exercised.
This approach combines many of the advantages of the 
directive and participative methods of implementation of PPBS, 
In most organizational change efforts it has proven to be 
the most successful method of change.^
The method of implementation of PPBS and the level of 
participation in the operation of the system will be largely 
reflected in the organizational structures devised for the 
implementation and operational phase. This is discussed in 
Appendix D-2.
^Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of Organization Change," 
OrganizationaT Change and Development. ed. by Dalton, 
Lawrence and Greiner, pp. 2^0, 227-29.
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Speed of Implementation 
Not only is it necessary to decide on the general 
method of introducing PPBS into an agency, but the amount of 
time to be used for the introduction of the system should be 
determined. There are two critical aspects to the question 
of time in implementing PPBS —  the time after the decision 
to implement a PPB System and the start of the actual imple­
mentation, and the time of the implementation phase itself.
Tiirie Before Implementation
The time before the implementation of PPBS should be 
spent in determining the proper design of the system and how 
it should be implemented into the agency. This time is 
critical to the success of the system. It appears that the 
system has been implemented in the civilian sector of the 
Federal Government with little thought as to its best design 
or how it should be implemented.! There are definite risks 
in moving too quickly in the application of PPBS to govern­
mental agencies. Its misapplication can discredit the system 
itself and do irreparable damage to its potential in the
^Charles J. Hitch, "Decision Making in Large Organ­
izations," U. S.,
Congress, Senate, 1969, p. 580. The civilian agencies have 
taken their lead from Secretary McNamara in this regard.
Mr. Hitch recommended that a study group work for one year 
to define PPBS for the DOD. Secretary McNamara said, "Fine, 
but I want the system implemented this year, not next.”
(H. L. Petruschell, Some Remarks on Planning. Programming 
and Budgeting, pp. 1-2.) This haste of the civilian agencies 
disregards the fact that the DOD built their system on some 
twenty years of historical and theoretical background which 
did not exist in the nondefense areas.
286
government.
This period between the announcement of the intention 
to implement PPBS and its actual implementation is also 
valuable in reducing the amount of organizational resistance 
to the system. As a general rule, the shorter the period 
between the announcement of a change and its inception, the 
higher the resistance it encounters.^ This period can be 
usefully spent in educating the organization on the change 
involved so that the novelty and strangeness of the system 
disappears and personal accommodation and rationalization 
is possible.
There is no definite rule for the amount of time that 
should be devoted to the initial design effort. Most of the 
local and state governments found that one year was too 
short to perform this initial effort (including the initial 
staffing).2 A complex agency of the Federal Government 
could require a longer period of time, depending on the re­
sources committed to the effort.
There is also a practical limit to the amount of time 
that should be consumed in this preparatory stage. The major 
cost of deferring the implementation of the system is that 
the benefits uhat will accrue from its use are also deferred. 
The design of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System can 
also be overemphasized since there are many aspects of the
ljudson. Guide to Changes. p. 80.
^State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB.
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design that simply cannot be resolved until experience with 
the system is accumulated.
Time of Iiriplemenfation
The length of time that the implementation itself 
will require forces a significant decision. Generally per­
sonal resistance to a slow change is less because the indi­
viduals involved have a greater opportunity to assimilate 
the change.1 A slower pace of implementation of PPBS will 
allow the individuals responsible for the system to transmit 
and receive information about the system, adjust the system 
based on that feedback, and educate the individuals who are 
resisting the system.^
There are practical limitations to the time that 
should be allowed for the implementation of PPBS. The slower 
the implementation, the longer the benefits that will accrue 
from the system are deferred. An extremely slow organiza­
tional change can create resistance of its own, due to the 
long period of social and personal disruption.3
There is no hard and fast rule on the length of time 
required to implement PPBS. Even in the Department of Defense 
the system is still changing after ten years, but these 
changes appear to be the result of the flexibility of the
ljudsor. Guide to Changes, p. 00,
^Benton and Tenzer, Program Budgeting and Executive 
Comimitment. p. 17.
3Judson, Guide to Changes, p. 02.
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system in accommodating itself to different environmental 
circumstances and different management styles of different 
Secretaries of Defense. Almost without exception the local 
and state governments that have begun to implement PPBS have 
estimated that the total implementation effort will require 
three to five years.^ The actual length of time required 
before an effective, operative Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System is achieved seems to depend on the degree of commit­
ment of the agency head to the system as well as on the 
amount of resources that have been committed to its imple­
mentation.^
Communication During Implementation 
The nature and extent of the communications about the 
implementation of PPBS is another area which should be con­
sidered by managers. Generally the more open and accessible 
the lines of communication are kept during the implementation 
process, the more resistance will be reduced. If individuals
^State-Local Finances Project, PPB Pilot Project 
Reports' from the' Participating 5 States, 5 bounties and 5 
Ci't'ies.
p One author facetiously formulated a Law of Bureau­
cratic Assimilation which shows the amount of time (T), in 
days, required for a new system to become effective. This 
"law" states that T = 2 + 2 (n - 3)^, where n is the number 
of people who must accept the system. If this "law" were 
universally valid, an almost infinite period of implementation 
would be required for PPBS. The "law" does demonstrate that 
the total acceptance of PPBS in the Federal Government will 
require an extended period of time. (Ronald B. Lee, "The 
Law of Bureaucratic Assimilation," Public Administration 
Review. XXIX [March/April, 1969], pp. 203-4.)
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affected by PPBS are unable to base their perception of its 
impact on valid, open communications, they are likely to 
imagine negative effects.
There are a number of communication channels which 
deserve special attention during the implementation process:
1. Tne channel of communication that will inform individuals 
of exactly what the system involves, their role in the 
system, and the demands that the system will make on them.^
2. The channel of communication concerning the implementa­
tion process itself that includes a specific designation of 
the distribution of responsibilities for the implementation 
of specific aspects of the system.^
3. An ad hoc communication channel which allows discussion 
of the implementation and use of PPBS with any member of the 
organization who is dissatisfied with the proposed system.
Not only will this channel of communication help to reduce 
some of the resistance to the system,3 but it can serve as
a source of identifying possible inadequacies.
4. A channel of communication that indicates to higher 
management how well the system implementation is progressing.
^Haggart, Developing a Program Budgeting System,
p. 6.
^Ibid., p. 7.
^Researchers in the social aspects of change have 
found that even the process of "beefing" to management often 
helps employees release pent-up resistance and adjust to a 
changed environment. (William J. McLarney and William M. 
Berliner, 'Management' Training: ' Cases and Principles, 
p. 597.)
290
Informal as well as formal means of obtaining feedback should 
be used to ascertain the effectiveness of PPBS.^
The amount of attention devoted to these channels of 
communication throughout the Implementation process and the 
quality of the communications transmitted by these channels 
could be two of the more Important factors determining the 
ultimate success of PPBS In an agency. Only when Information 
passes comprehensively and smoothly through well-designed 
channels can the Implementation effort begin to be effective.
Training
Another key decision In the Implementation of the 
Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System In the Federal Govern­
ment Is the part that training will play In the Implementa­
tion process. Without some form of training a high degree 
of reliance Is placed on Informal Information, direct ex­
hortation, and supervised learning.  ̂ Training can be useful 
In reducing resistance of personnel to PPBS by directly 
attacking their preconceived attitudes about the system, by 
providing a means of communication on how the system Is to
^Formal methods of feedback will probably emphasize 
the mechanistic aspects of PPBS, such as whether or not a 
program structure has been established, whether there Is an 
analytical staff In existence, etc. Informal feedback should 
concentrate on such questions as: 1) What Is the degree of
Improvement of analytic studies? and 2) Is analysis being 
used as "window dressing" for preconceived decisions?
p. 129.
^O'Connell, Managing Organizational Innovation.
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be implemented and operated, and by upgrading the skills of 
the personnel who must use the system.
The expectations of the results of a training effort 
should not be set too high. Attendance at training, and 
even enthusiasm during the training session, does not ensure 
a change in the organization.^ Training must be reinforced 
by an organizational and procedural climate that allows 
successful implementation.
Organizational Climate 
The greatest determinant of successful efforts to 
implement PPBS has been the organizational environment that 
prevails. A high degree of correlation has been demonstrated 
between the ability of an organization to successfully 
assimilate any specific change and the existing receptiveness 
of the organization to change.2 Top management of an agency 
preparing to implement PPBS should evaluate the factors that 
determine the receptiveness of the organization to change. 
Some of these factors can be altered by the behavior and 
actions of top management, and others must only be accepted 
as indicators of the magnitude of the task of implementation. 
Factors which favorably influence the climate of an organiza­
tion toward the implementation of PPBS include ;
1. A top leader who supports the need for the implementation
^Richard Beckhard, Organizational Development ; 
Strategies and Models, pp. 21-22.
2 Jones,' Planned Organizational Change » pp. 92-93.
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of PPBS is necessary. The greater the prestige and power of 
this top leader, the more effective is his support in es­
tablishing a favorable climate for implementation.^
2. An individual with high prestige who is known as the 
direct initiator of the implementation of PPBS and who devotes 
the majority of his efforts toward its implementation will 
facilitate the process.^
3. The organization which is accustomed to operating in a 
changing environment and modifying its managerial systems to 
adapt to that environment will more easily implement PPBS,3
4. A capability for the organization to be directly re­
warded for its use of PPBS facilitates implementation.^
5. A high degree of mutual trust between the principal parts 
of an organization (upper and lower management, and line and 
staff) will increase the ease of PPBS implementation.5
6. Either a great deal of pressure from the external
^Gene W. Dalton, "Influence and Organizational 
Change," Organizational Change and Development. ed. by 
Dalton, Lawrence, and Greiner, pp. 237-39. This top manage­
ment support is primarily manifested in the agency head's 
demand for analysis and the use of analysis in his decisions.
^Gordon L. Lippitt, Organization Renewal, p. 151.
3ibid. Organizations which have been growing rapidly 
are likely to be more accustomed to changing managerial 
systems.
^Beckhard, Organization Development; Strategies and 
Models. p. 97. This means that PPBS will be more easily im- 
pl'emehted in those agencies that anticipate rising future 
appropriations.
^Lippitt, Organiz at ion Renewa1. p. 148.
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environment (Congress and clientele) for some sort of change 
or insularity from this environment will facilitate the im­
plementation of PPB8.1
Sequence of Implementation 
Another of the major decisions that must be made in 
the implementation of PPBS is the sequence of the imple­
mentation. Two questions are involved in this decision.
First, in what sequence should the components of PPBS be im­
plemented; second, in what sequence should the system be 
implemented throughout the organization.
Sequence of Component s
There are essentially three possible sequences that 
can be followed in the implementation of components of PPBS:
1. The program structure can be designed and implemented 
first. After this step is essentially complete, the multi­
year plan can be formulated and then systems analysis ser­
iously undertaken.
2. A start of systems analysis is made. After experience 
with analysis, the program structure process can be undertaken 
and the multi-year plan formulated.
3. Both systems analysis and program structuring are under­
taken simultaneously. After the program structure is com­
plete, the multi-year plan would be formulated.
^Beckhard, Organization Development: Strategies and 
Models. p. 97.
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The first method of implementation was largely followed 
in the Department of Defense. This department had the ad­
vantage of a number of years of analytical experience, even 
if the results of those early analyses had not been incor­
porated directly into the decision process. The major ad­
vantage in the design and implementation of the program struc­
ture first is that it lends substance to the entire effort 
of implementing PPBS since the results of the program- 
structuring effort are much more evident and concrete than 
the initial results of the analytical effort. The program 
structure also gives guidance to, and provides data for, the 
analytical effort. Finally, the process of developing a 
program structure is a source of less conflict than the use 
of systems analysis and can likely be implemented with less 
abrasiveness than can analysis. This early amicable task 
may facilitate the implementation of the total PPB System.
There are some definite handicaps to the attempt to 
implement PPBS by first designing and implementing the program 
structure. The program structure’s major contribution to 
PPBS is its ability to illuminate decision alternatives for 
analysis. By constructing the program structure without a 
historical analytic background, decisions are forced into an 
almost arbitrarily determined program structure; otherwise, 
the program structure would be built around the necessary de­
cisions. The second major product of the program structure 
is to provide data suitable for use in analysis. Unless some
295
experience in the use of analysis exists, the determination 
of what data is required must be rather arbitrary. Excessive 
attention to the design of the program structure without 
knowledge of the requirements of data for analysis may turn 
it into another accounting system whose product is of little 
more use for analytic purposes than the accounting system 
based on traditional input items,^
The second method of implementing PPBS has advantages 
and disadvantages that are almost opposite to those listed 
for the first method. Probably the major problem is that the 
products of analysis during the early stage of implementation 
are normally so marginal, and the natural opposition to the 
use of analysis is so large, that the entire system could be 
discredited and discarded before it has an opportunity to 
contribute significantly to the decision process.
The attempt to implement both systems analysis and 
the program structure simultaneously is most difficult. 
Normally the same group of individuals is directly concerned 
with the implementation of both. Because time is limited it 
is almost inevitable that one of the efforts is compromised. 
Since the task of implementing the program structure is more 
concrete, this phase seems to dominate that of securing
^Haggart, et al.. School District Planning, p. 185.
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systems analysis.^ If it can be properly enforced, this 
compromise of simultaneous implementation offers a reasonable 
alternative to the other two methods.
S'equence of Organizational Activities
The extensiveness of the implementation of PPBS is 
another decision that must be made before beginning its 
implementation. One method of overcoming resistance to the 
implementation of PPBS is to introduce it on a pilot-study 
basis and let the results be seen and spread elsewhere.^
One study found that most successful change patterns begin 
on a small scale and e x p ^ a ^ M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^




different organiz»^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ke of the interaction
^This observat^^^^^^^^^^^PIrin the experience of 
New York City’s use of of the dominance of the
program structure over the development of an analytic capa­
bility in the early stages of New York City's PPBS, the 
attempt to develop a program structure was subsequently de­
ferred until a viable analytic capability was achieved. 
(State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB, p. l4l.)
^Beckhard, Organization Development; Strategies and 
Models, p. 85. The Bureau of the Budget recommended that PPBS 
be tried in five or six of the more advanced nondefense 
agencies before a government-wide implementation was attemp­
ted. President Johnson vetoed this recommendation. (Cross, 
"The New Systems Budgeting," p. 113.)
^Greiner, "Patterns of Organization Change," Organi­
zational Change and Development, ed. by Dalton, Lawrence and 
Greiner, p. 219.
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systems analysis.^ If it can be properly enforced, this 
compromise of simultaneous implementation offers a reasonable 
alternative to the other two methods,
'Sequence of Organizational Activities
The extensiveness of the implementation of PPBS is 
another decision that must be made before beginning its 
implementation. One method of overcoming resistance to the 
implementation of PPBS is to introduce it on a pilot-study 
basis and let the results be seen and spread elsewhere.^
One study found that most successful change patterns begin 
on a small scale and expand.3
There are definite disadvantages to the attempt to 
"piece-meal" the implementation of the system:
1. When the program structure is being implemented first, 
it is difficult to divide the application of PPBS into 
different organizational activities because of the interaction
This observation was confirmed in the experience of 
New York City’s use of PPBS. Because of the dominance of the 
program structure over the development of an analytic capa­
bility in the early stages of New York City’s PPBS, the 
attempt to develop a program structure was subsequently de­
ferred until a viable analytic capability was achieved. 
(State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB, p. l4l.)
^Beckhard, Organization Development: Strategies and
Models, p. 85. The Bureau of the Budget recommended that PPBS 
be tried in five or six of the more advanced nondefense 
agencies before a government-wide implementation was attemp­
ted. President Johnson vetoed this recommendation. (Cross, 
"The New Systems Budgeting," p. 113.)
^Greiner, "Patterns of Organization Change," Organi­
zational Change and Development, ed. by Dalton, Lawrence and 
Greiner, p.' 219,
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of programs. If the analytic capability is to be implemented 
first, this "piece-meal" approach can be pursued,
2. It is possible that the introduction of PPBS on a 
"piece-meal" basis would create the impression that it is an 
experiment and that management is not serious about its 
eventual total adoption.
3. It is possible for organizational elements awaiting 
implementation of the system to build up resistance to the 
system.1
Guidelines for the Implementation 
Specific Components
There are some specific aspects which should be con­
sidered during the implementation of each of the components 
of PPBS. Those that concern the implementation of systems 
analysis will be discussed; then some aspects concerning 
the other components will be noted.
Systems Analysis 
One of the most difficult problems in the implementa­
tion of PPBS in the agencies of the Federal Government has 
been to combat the misconception that the mere existence of 
analytic groups in the organization ensures good systems 
analysis.2 Before systems analysis can be effective, the
^O’Connell, Managing Organizational Innovation, 
pp. 128 and l44.
^Martin L. Ernst, "Operations Research and the Large 
Strategic Problems." Operations Research. IX (July-August, 
1961), 442.
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following tasks must be accomplished; determining where 
analysis will be applied, determining how analysis will be 
scheduled, achieving "good" analysis, determining who will 
perform analysis, gathering data necessary for use In 
analysis, and ensuring that the analysis Is Integrated Into 
the decision process. None of these tasks Is easily accom­
plished.
Even If PPBS Is Implemented across-the-board In all 
of the activities of the agency. It Is not likely that all 
of the possible areas can be analyzed In the Initial stages. 
It Is probably best to concentrate the analytic efforts 
Initially rather than try to perform a comprehensive analysis 
of all of the activities In the agency. Some guidelines to 
be used In selecting the areas where Initial analytic efforts 
should be directed Include:
1. One of the most obvious criteria Is to start where the 
resource commitment Is the greatest.
2. Analytic efforts should be started In the area where the 
greatest need for change Is Indicated.
3. Analytic efforts should generally begin with areas that 
are simple and that can be more easily defined (Including a 
relatively high degree of data availability). The analytic 
efforts can then move to the more complex areas.1
iHaggart. ef al.. School District Planning, p. 191. 
This allows the analytic efforts to have some degree of Imme­
diate pay-off which lends credibility to the use of the tool 
in other decision areas. One should be cautioned, however, 
against allowing the analytic efforts to be concentrated on
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4. Analytic capability can be more easily applied to new, 
expanding programs than it can to the older established 
programs that are protected by an entrenched bureaucracy.^
5. The analytic efforts that already exist in the agency 
should be used as a starting point for analytic efforts 
under PPBS. Analytic efforts are often found in consultant 
efforts and studies by planning staffs.
Because systems analysis is to be an aid to decisions 
that are normally reflected in the budget, it is usually 
necessary to tie, to some degree, the process of systems 
analysis to the budget cycle. The budget cycle is charac­
terized by a rigid set of dates and deadlines that must be 
met. This means that some sort of timetable must be con­
structed, expressing dates for formulating possible new 
courses of action and/or problems and selecting those for 
analysis; forwarding these to the analytic offices for analy­
sis; transmitting the analyses to decision-makers for deci­
sion; incorporating the results of these decisions into pro­
grams; and formulating the specific budgetary implications
areas that are narrow in scope for an extended period of time 
since the largest pay-off from analysis will come from the 
consideration of more complex areas.
ISchultze, Public Spending, pp. 90-92. This applica­
tion of analytic efforts to new programs means that the data 
for analysis is normally more difficult to develop than it 
would be for existing programs, but the interests of per­
sonnel and their resistence to the analytic efforts will be 
considerably reduced. One must be cautioned against the 
tendency to justify only new programs using the terminology 
of systems analysis. This is not effective. Analysis should 
be used to develop information for decisions on new programs 
and not simply as a method of justification.
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of the decision.1
In deciding on schedule and timetable procedures for 
analyses, the implementor of PPBS must balance two conflicting 
goals. First, analysis is by its very nature irregular and 
sporadic. Problems do not arise according to some predeter­
mined schedule, nor is it possible to schedule the completion 
of analytic efforts to any finite degree. If analytic efforts 
are firmly scheduled, they will tend to emphasize methods
2and procedures and will lose a great deal of their substance. 
At the same time the crucial aspect of PPBS is that it does 
bring analysis into the mainstream of decision-making by 
systematically introducing it into the budgetary process.3 
As long as analysis remains isolated from the program deci­
sion process, it is likely to remain a virtually sterile, 
academic exercise.^
A reasonable compromise can be reached if the proce­
dures established for scheduling analytic efforts recognize 
the following factors:
1. Some analytic studies may require much more time than the 
normal budget cycle allows for completion. These studies 
should not be truncated simply to conform to an arbitrary
^Don Vito, Essentials of Planning-Programming- 
Budge'fing, p. 8.
^Schlesinger,' Political Process, p. 4.
3schultze, Public Spending, p. 77.
4Smithies, "Conceptual Framework," Program Budgeting, 
ed. by Novick, p. 60.
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budget-process-imposed date.
2. If a decision is required for the current budget cycle 
and the analysis is incomplete, a partial analysis can be 
used for the decision and the analysis continued. The de­
cision can be changed as the result of subsequent analytic 
efforts.
3. Not all problems can be identified on a specific date.
A method should be available to identify and incorporate 
problems into the analysis process at any time. The estab­
lishment of a specific date to identify problems can stimu­
late the specific identification of problems, but it should 
not foreclose their identification at any other time.
The implementor of systems analysis in a PPB System 
should not expect the initial analytic efforts to meet high 
standards of sophistication. The attainment of a viable 
systems analysis capability is a slow and costly process.^
Much of the initial analytic efforts will of necessity be 
less rigorous and use a great deal of crude estimates instead 
of firm data.2
As an admission of the difficulties of early analytical 
efforts, it may be desirable to concentrate on issue papers 
for many early analyses. The issue paper concentrates solely 
on the initial step of analysis —  formulating the problem.
^Benton and Tenzer, Program Budgeting and Executive 
Commitment,
^Hirsch, Integrating View, p. 25.
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It does not carry the analytic effort forward Into compari­
sons of costs and effectiveness. The use of issue papers 
has the following advantages:
1. They do not make heavy demands for technical analytical 
talent or for a vast amount of data.
2. They can be completed in a relatively short period of 
time.
3. They can provide an improved perspective for the use of 
government decision-makers.
4. They are not perceived by operating personnel as totally 
radical departures from the current way of making decisions.^
The use of issue papers to the complete exclusion of 
total analysis can be detrimental to the effective use of 
PPBS. By not completing the analysis of costs and effective­
ness of alternatives, the utility of systems analysis is 
considerably diluted.
Another problem that must be faced in the implementa­
tion of systems analysis is the determination of where the 
analysis is to be performed. Generally the most effective 
use of the limited resource of qualified systems analysts is 
to have all of the analyses performed by a central staff.
State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB, 
pp. 76-77. The content of issue papers normally Includes a 
complete definition of the problem; suggested objective, 
criteria, and effectiveness measures; a description of the 
current activities in the area; a discussion of significant 
factors that constrain the problem; and a list of the major 
alternatives to solve the problem. (State-Local Finances 
Project, A First Step to Analysis: The Issue Paper, pp. 3-4.)
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This could, however, lead to a dilution of over-all capa­
bility because of the resistance of line management to the 
authority of that staff and the almost inevitable biases that 
will exist when all analyses are performed in one office.^ 
Over an extended period of time it seems inevitable that a 
substantial analytic capability will have to develop in 
subordinate levels of the organization.^
One of the major tasks that faces a manager in the 
introduction of systems analysis in the Federal Government 
is the development of data needed for analysis. Because the 
acquisition of data is expensive it is probably desirable to 
defer the definition of specific data needs until after some 
experience with analysis is gained.3 Otherwise, data which 
is not required will be routinely gathered, and data which 
is required for analysis could be neglected.
Even after experience with analysis it is unreasonable 
to expect that the data required for analysis can be
^This is discussed in greater detail in Appendix D-2.
One compromise that is possible in the early stages of PPBS 
is to have the line management identify problems by issue 
papers and have the analysis of these problems performed by 
a central staff. (Nicholas M. Meiszer, "Developing a Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System in the City of Dayton, Ohio," 
Innovations. U. Si, Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1969* 
pp. 213-14.) However, it is doubtful if line management will 
continue lo identify significant issues for analysis if they 
know that both the analysis and the decision itself are going 
to be completely removed from their authority.
^Edward E. Winchester, "Ordering Spending Priorities," 
Defense Industry Bulletin, VI (May, 1970), 5.
^State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB, 
pp. 85-86.
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determined to a finite degree and a routine data collection 
system which completely solves future data problems imposed. 
The data required by large, complex problems is so haphazard 
that any data system which attempted to totally meet this 
need would not only be prohibitively expensive, it would be 
almost impossible to design.^ The best that can be achieved 
is the routine collection of the most significant elements 
of data that will have the greatest demand during future 
analyses. Specific analytic studies will continue to re­
quire a considerable data-collection effort themselves 
through sampling and/or experimentation to satisfy their 
individual data needs.
One of the first efforts in developing a data base for 
use in systems analysis should be the establishment of a 
program to systematically gather data about the effectiveness 
of major ongoing programs.^ This step will provide much of 
the data needed in subsequent analytic efforts. Also data 
should be developed on the production function of different 
programs. As a result, a meaningful research program may 
need to be established.^
Finally, a comprehensive attempt to develop data to 
be used in estimating the resource impact of various
lAnthony, Planning and Control Systems, p. 45. 
^State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB,
pp. 87-88.
3selma J. Mushkin, "PPB in Cities," Public Administra­
tion Review. XXIX (March/April, 1969), I68.
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alternatives should be developed. The data developed on 
costs must be related In some manner to the performance and 
physical characteristics of the activity under considera­
tion.^ This development will require the work of an in- 
house group of specialists who develop significant cost- 
estimating relationships.2 However, it should not be sur­
prising that the initial systems analyses performed under 
PPBS have cost models built almost entirely on sample data 
that is drawn during the analyses themselves. After a 
period of operation under the PPB System, the need for an 
extensive sampling step to gather cost data may be reduced 
with the development of a meaningful, comprehensive cost 
data bank.
The final major consideration in the implementation 
of systems analysis in the agencies of the Federal Government 
is that the results of the analysis must be integrated into 
the decision process. This means that the results of 
analysis must be communicated to the responsible decision­
maker; he must accept the analysis as relevant and valid; 
and he must base his decision on the information in the 
analysis.3 The most effective way to ensure that analysis
...... ^Gene H, Fisher, Cost Functions and Budgets (Cost
Considérations' in Sysfem's' 'Analysis), pp. 25-277
^F. S. Pardee, The' Financial Portion of a Management 
information System, pp. 17-22.
^Hovey, Government De ci s ion-Making, p. 5. This does 
not necessarily mean that he has to accept the results of 
the analysis uncritically or even make the decision conform
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becomes a part of the decision process is for the top execu­
tive to ask the right types of questions and insist on the 
answers to these questions.^ There is little to be gained 
from making an activity ritualistlcally adhere to the 
mechanistic requirements of reporting and communicating in 
a systems analysis format if it is incapable of or unwilling 
to undertake analysis.  ̂ However, when the top executive of 
an agency continues to insist on the answers that can be 
provided only by the application of systems analysis —  and 
not just the format or terminology of systems analysis —  
the required analytic capability will soon evolve.3
Other PPBS Components 
The implementation of PPBS requires the accomplishment
to the recommendations of the analysis. However, the infor­
mation presented by the analysis should have a significant 
impact on the decision that is made.
^California, Department of Finance, Programming and 
Budgetirig System. (March 1, 1969), p. 29.
^Allen Schick, "Systems for Analysis; PPB and Its 
Alternatives," .to'aTysis and Evaluation, U. S., Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Vol. Ill, 1969, p. o25.
3A case example of this attitude of the top executive 
in an agency is found in Secretary of Defense McNamara’s 
continuous insistence on a cost-effectiveness study to support 
the Navy’s proposed CVA program. Finally the Navy complied 
with the Secretary’s demands for a cost-effectiveness study, 
but only to the extent that they disguised their same justi­
fication under a large quantity of numbers —  most of which 
were arbitrarily derived. (Whitehead, Uses and Limitations, 
pp. 115-34 and 150.) While this insistence did not produce 
an adequate analysis in this specific case, the same insis­
tence over a long period of time produced a substantial im­
provement in the analytic efforts produced by the individual 
services.
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of some specific tasks In regard to components of the system 
other than systems analysis. The development of cost data 
for the program structure, the initial preparation of the 
multi-year program plan, and the institution of a procedure 
for changing the program plan are all required.
In the implementation of the program structure it is 
often necessary to develop some form of allocation formulas 
to translate input-oriented costs into program allocation 
formats. One way of making this initial translation is to 
develop a number of cost-estimating relationships (CER's) 
that relate parameters of the program to resource require­
ments. These CER’s are then applied to the historical ex­
perience of each of the programs, a historical program budget 
is constructed, and the totals contained in this budget are 
compared to the actual historical expenditures. If these 
historical figures are relatively accurate, the CER's de­
veloped can be used as a basis for allocation of costs.^
The initial preparation of the multi-year projections 
of programs is another problem in the implementation of PPBS. 
Theoretically the programs should be projected with a stable 
level of services and no changed mix of programs. The 
changes to this basis of projection should be made as a result
iQne case where this procedure was followed was in 
the Police Department of New York City. (A. J. Tenzer,
J. B. Benton, and C. Teng, Applying the Concepts of Program 
Budgeting to' the' "New York City Police Department .1 This is 
discussed in greater detail in' Appendix C-1.
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of systems analysis.1 Because of the minimum capability of 
systems analysis In the early stages of PPBS, the Insistence 
on firm. In-depth studies to support all changes appears 
unreasonable. At the very best, the majority of changes In 
program projections will have to be based on a less rigorous 
preliminary analysis (perhaps only an Issue paper formula­
tion of problems). Many other changes will probably be 
required without being based on any form of analysis at all.
An Insistence on analytic support of all changes to an 
arithmetical extension of programs will result In all 
analyses’ being superficial because of the dilution of 
analytic effort, and/or an undesirable degree of rigidity In 
the projection of programs.
It Is also necessary to devise a system for the revi­
sion of plans on a periodic basis. Generally the plan should 
be changed at least annually.^ The completion of a budget 
year means that the current year Is dropped from the projec­
tion and a new year must be added. This almost forces an 
annual review of the projected programs. It would be un­
desirable to attempt to force all changes to the projected 
program Into a very short time frame for the same reasons that 
analysis cannot be rigidly scheduled. The same Is true of 
attempting to preclude changes from being made to the plan




at any time during the year when the need for, and extent 
of, these changes become known. This means that a routine, 
year-round system of translating decisions made on the basis 
of analysis into the multi-year plan must be established.
Implementation Plan 
Based on the decisions reached regarding the process 
of implementation, a plan for implementing PPBS should be 
constructed that will guide the implementation efforts.
This plan should contain: a list of the major tasks involved
in the implementation of the system, including the training 
efforts; a designation of who is responsible for each of 
these tasks; a specific deadline for the completion of each 
task (and interim deadlines of the task will require an ex­
tended period of time); and a method of monitoring the com­
pletion of the tasks in the plan.
It would be unrealistic to expect this plan to be 
totally complete or even rigid during the implementation 
process. It must be realized that replanning of the imple­
mentation effort will be necessary as implementation itself 
progresses.1 The fact that this implementation plan will 
change does not diminish its importance in achieving a 
systematic, meaningful implementation program for PPBS.
^Mann and Neff, Managing Major Change in Organiza­
tions . p. 65.
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Summary
The task of Implementing PPBS In an agency of the 
Federal Government is extremely important. There are six 
major items which must be considered before undertaking the 
process of implementing PPBS. Decisions made on these items 
must balance the advantages and disadvantages discussed in 
this chapter. The six items are;
1. What general method of implementing PPBS is appropriate—  
directive with a central staff, participative with an ad hoc 
committee, or group-sharing with a combination of these two?
2. What should be the speed of implementation, including 
the amount of time between announcing that the system will 
be implemented and the actual start of implementation, as 
well as the time of the implementation effort itself?
3. What communication channels should be utilized during 
implementation?
4. What training should be used during implementation?
5. What organization climate for implementation of PPBS exists 
and how can it be improved?
6. What sequence of implementation of organizations and 
components should be followed?
In addition to these major considerations, the following 
nine decisions will improve the implementation of PPBS: how
to select areas for analysis; how to schedule analytic efforts; 
how to ensure that moderate demands are made of early analytic 
efforts; how to organize for analysis; how to begin gathering
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data for use in analysis; how to ensure that analysis is 
used for decisions; how to integrate costs into the program 
structure; how to handle early multi-year projections in 
PPBS; and how to ensure that the multi-year program does 
not become dysfunctionally rigid.
The process of implementing PPBS is too important 
to be left to random efforts. No matter what the ultimate 
potential of the system may be in a particular governmental 
agency, the system will never be beneficial until it has 
been adequately implemented. This task of implementation 




The most critical area of training of managers in 
PPBS is the utilization of the system. The Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System is a tool for managers, and 
like all tools, it can be helpful only if it is properly 
employed. If it is improperly employed its use can be 
harmful. Training in the utilization of the system will 
also facilitate its implementation by reducing the uneasiness 
that managers feel when they know that they are going to 
have to use a new managerial system requiring new skills.
Some of the aspects of use of components of the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System other than systems 
analysis will be discussed first. The major part of the 
chapter will concern the use of systems analysis under PPBS. 
This latter area of PPBS creates the greatest need for ac­
quisition of new skills by governmental managers. This 
corresponds to the finding of the head of the Administrative 
Staff College in Great Britain, who noted that the major 
problem of executives who attended his school was their 
inability to handle experts.^ In the case of PPBS the
^Sir Noel Frederick Hall, The Making of Higher Execu­
tive's:' • The' M o d e m  ChaTlenge. p. 39.
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"experts" that must be handled are the systems analysts.
Sir Noel Frederick Hall stated;
They [the executives] could not sufficiently clarify 
the issue upon which they wanted expert advice and they 
got confused in discussions with experts between issues 
of policy which were for others to decide and the 
analysis of facts and their rearrangement, which was 
the proper role of the expert advisor.^
This represents one of the major challenges in behavior
change required by managerial training in PPBS.
Use of Components of PPBS 
Other than Systems AnalyïïTs
The proper use of the program structure, multi-year 
program and financial plan, and integrative system of PPBS 
is not automatic once these systems have been well designed 
and implemented in an agency. They require the constant 
attention of the managerial corps of the agency.
The program structure should be under constant review 
to ensure that it is serving its purpose. There are two 
aspects of the program structure that deserve special atten­
tion. First, just as the analyst in performing his analysis 
cannot allow himself to be constrained by the manner that 
programs are packaged in the program structure,2 neither can 
the managers in the agency become so mesmerized by the program 
structure that they do not view the agency in other ways.
I'lbid.
^Schick, "Systems for Analysis," Analysis and Evalua- 
tion, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. Ill, 
pp. 826-27.
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The program structure chosen is just one of many possible 
ways to view the objectives and activities of the agency, 
and overconcentration of attention on this one view of the 
organization can lead to serious disorientation.^
Managers should not be surprised to find that there 
will be questions that must be investigated that are not 
illuminated to any degree by the program structure. This 
occurrence (if it is not too frequent) is not an indication 
that the program structure should be revised to routinely 
answer these questions.
The second aspect of the program structure that needs 
constant review is the need for it to furnish usable infor­
mation, If the data furnished by the program structure does 
not remain useful on a routine basis for analysis or for 
the illumination of the agency's activities, the structure 
should be redesigned to eliminate the data which is not used. 
The compilation of data based on the chance that it may be 
useful sometime in the future is very wasteful.  ̂ All of the
well-designed program structure can facilitate a 
multiple view of an organization by allowing program elements 
that deal with a specific area to be withdrawn from the total 
program structure for separate investigation. For example, 
it might be necessary to pull out all of the activities that 
are associated with Research and Development in an agency, 
even if these are located in several different program cate­
gories. This total view of R&D might be used to determine 
the best allocation of R&D funds in view of the over-all 
long-range goals of the agency.
2stuart J. Yuill, "Quantitative Information for 
Strategic Planning," Naval War College Review. XXIII, 
(November, 1970), 26.
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data breakouts provided by the program structure of PPBS 
must pass the test of PPBS Itself: the benefits provided by
having that piece of data must exceed the cost of accumu­
lating the data.
The major consideration in the use of the multi-year 
program and financial plan must be that it does not decrease 
the flexibility of the agency. Innovative changes to the 
plan must be allowed to occur. If the multi-year plan begins 
to assume an aura of invincibility that implicitly dis­
courages any changes to the plan and effectively straight- 
jackets the future options of the agency, this plan should 
be modified to extend less information into the future and 
thereby retain flexibility. The conflicting needs of 
flexibility of future actions and visibility of the future 
programs must be continuously balanced to ensure that one 
does not dominate the other.
Similarly, the use of the system to integrate analytic 
efforts into the multi-year plan should be subjected to con­
tinuous evaluation. The need for analyses to be integrated 
into the decision and budgetary process should not be allowed 
to dominate the requirement for analytic efforts to be epi­
sodic and free from the fixed routines, procedures, and dead­
lines of the budgetary process. The appearance of either 
budgetary domination of the analytic studies that makes analy­
tic studies procedure-and-format-orlented with little real 
substance, or the situation where the results of analysis are
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sterilized by never entering the actual decision process, 
should be detected early and corrected.
There Is another problem of the Integrative system 
that requires constant attention. There Is a tendency by 
some writers to recommend that all major programs should be 
subjected to complete analysis at least annually,^ There 
Is no reason for an annual review of each major program.
Over an extended period of time It might be desirable to 
review each program of an agency (as long as It is felt that 
the benefits of the analysis required outweigh the costs of 
the analysis). However, on programs that operate In an en­
vironment which does not change rapidly, an annual review 
would be wasteful and nonproductive. These programs should 
be analyzed only periodically (maybe every five or six years, 
depending on the conditions of the program and the availa­
bility of analytic talent). The attempt to extend analysis 
to a routine annual review of each major program In an agency 
will almost Inevitably lead to a degradation of the analytic 
capability. Analyses will become superficial In all areas —  
Including those areas where analytic efforts can and should 
have substantive Impacts.
The major area of concern In using the components of 
PPBS other than systems analysis must be to continuously re­
view the design of the system to ensure that proper balance
Ipor example, see Harry P. Hatry and John P. Cotton, 
Program' Planning for Snat'e. County, City, p. 29.
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Is retained between the many conflicting needs and purposes 
of this managerial system. The Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System, like all management systems, can become a 
burden to effective management, instead of an aid, if it 
begins to take on aspects of the "end" result of efforts 
rather than the "means" to more effective management.
Use of Systems Analysis 
The most critical skill acquisition that is necessary 
in the effective use of PPBS in the Federal Government is 
that of training managers in the use of systems analysis.
This need is more critical than the need for competent analysts 
to perform studies.^
When confronted with the need to train managers to be 
competent users of systems analysis, the common reaction is 
to train them as analysts. This is unnecessary. In fact, 
the concentration of managerial training on the techniques 
of manipulating hard quantitative data is probably harmful 
to the results required.^ Managers will tend to be overawed 
by the sophistication of the model manipulation as the result 
of this type of training and could overlook some of the more 
meaningful and critical aspects of the analysis.
The need for managerial knowledge of systems analysis
^Laurence P. Lynn, Jr., "Systems Analysis— Challenge 
to Military Management," Readings. ed. by Cleland and King, 
p. 224.
^Geoffrey E. Nunn and Lloyd L, Byers, "Quantitative 
Decision Tools and Management Development Programs," Training 
and DeveTopmertf Journal. XXI (November, I967)» 22.
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can be better defined if the manager’s role in the use of 
systems analysis is noted. The decision-maker must play a 
large role in the formulation of the problem for solution, 
a somewhat smaller role in the data-gathering process, an 
almost negligible role in the mechanical manipulation of 
the data, and the most important role in the interpretation 
of the results.1 Prom this specification of roles, the 
following needs of managers in connection with systems 
analysis can be identified;
1. They must have the capacity to recognize problem areas 
where systems analysis should be u s e d . 2
2. They must have a degree of familiarity with the types of 
models and tools to be used so that their limitations and 
potentials are known.
3. They must be familiar with the ’’language" of systems 
analysts so that they can communicate with them.
4. They must have an appreciation of the task involved in 
building the model, collecting the data, and using it.3
5. They must be able to take the results of analysis and 
apply them with due caution and reservations.
If governmental managers do not gain this required 
level of appreciation of systems analysis, its use could be 
very harmful in governmental agencies. In the hands of a
•̂ I b i d . . pp. 16-18. 
•^I b l d . . p. 13.
3-lbld., pp. 20-21.
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naive decision-maker, the systems analyst either has policy 
implications far beyond his role or the meaningful input 
that he could provide is ignored.
The discussion in this chapter on the use of systems 
analysis will concentrate on the required managerial consi­
derations during: 1) the process of selecting specific
problems for analysis; 2) the process of analysis itself;
3) the process of using the results of analysis for decisions; 
and 4) the requirements for actions concerning analysis 
after the decision.
Problem Selection 
The first action in the effective use of systems 
analysis in a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System is the 
selection of specific problems to be analyzed. A capable 
analytic staff can be totally wasted if the management corps 
of the agency selects the wrong problems for analysis.
The selection of problems to be subjected to analysis 
should be guided by the following factors:
1. ■ Th'e" problem should require a decision. Systems analysis 
under PPBS is designed to be an aid to decision-making. The 
application of substantial analytic resources to problems 
where no decision is necessary, or even wanted, will trans­
form the analytic capability to a theoretical, academic study
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group.̂
2, The problem should be one where the Information gained 
by analysis will make a difference In the decision. If the 
decision-maker is not able (or is not willing) to do anything 
but make one decision and any information disclosed by 
analysis would not change the preconceived decision, the use 
of analytic capability on that problem, simply to satisfy 
some administrative requirement, is wasteful.^
3. The problem should be of a nature so that the time avail­
able before a decision is essential does not preclude analysis, 
A sophisticated analysis requires a substantial amount of 
time. While a limited analysis, such as the formulation of 
the problem, can be useful for decision-making, the attempt
to perform a complete comparison of cost and effectiveness 
of alternatives in a limited time almost invariably leads to 
the imposition of such arbitrary assumptions that the results
iThis does not imply that some analytic resources 
should not be committed to the development of theoretic data 
for use in later decision-oriented analysis. The development 
of cost-estimating relationships is an example of the type 
of theoretic analysis that ^  required. However, the majority 
of analytic effort should be concentrated on immediate 
decision requirements, and any theoretical studies should be 
guided by the need for the results of this analysis for 
decision-oriented studies to be performed in the near future. 
As a practical matter, it might be preferable to have much 
of the theoretical analysis performed by consultant and 
academic activities and use the in-house capability for 
analyses that are oriented more toward immediate decisions.
^Gloria Grizzle, "PPBS in Dade County: Status of
Development and Implementation," Innovations. U. S., Congress, 
Joint Economic Committee, 1969, p. 6b.
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of the analysis are virtually useless, or even misleading,^
4, The problem should te" of the proper scope. It Is waste­
ful to apply analytic resources to simple problems that are 
amenable to adequate solution by the exercising of Intui­
tion.^ Similarly, the application of analysis to the most 
broad problem Is not as useful as the use of analysis on more 
restricted problems. Analysis Is most powerful In comparing 
somewhat limited alternatives that have the same general 
objectives and employ the same general means.3
Another relevant question In the selection of prob­
lems to be subjected to systems analysis Is whether the 
analysis should be concentrated on new programs or on existing 
programs. While It may be desirable to begin analytic efforts 
by concentrating on new programs, any mature analytic capa­
bility must operate on both new and existing programs.^
^Klaus Knorr, On "the" Cost-Effectiveness Approach’ to 
miTfary R&D. p. 4.
^Cleland and King, Systems Analysis and Project 
Management. pp. 32-33.
3schlck, "Systems for Analysis," Analysis and Evalua­
tion. U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. Ill,
1§69, pp. 825-26.
^Some authors attempt to draw a sharp distinction be­
tween analysis and evaluation. One states that "Evaluation 
Is retrospective; Its concern Is with what has been accom­
plished under existing or terminated programs. Accordingly, 
analysis tends to be associated with new public actions 
while evaluation concentrates on past decisions." (Schick, 
"Prom Analysis to Evaluation," p. 60.) This distinction Is 
overdrawn. The application of systems analysis for decision 
purposes follows the same general procedures whether It Is 
applied to existing or to old programs.
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Performance of Analysis 
Once the manager has decided that a problem should be 
subjected to analysis, it is necessary for him to pass it on 
to the analytic staff. He must endeavor to state the prob­
lem clearly enough that the analyst is guided to attack the 
right problem,. At the same time, the decision-maker should 
try to ensure that the form of the problem being passed to 
the analyst is not so constricted that the analysis is 
straight-jacketed.^ The most dangerous form of problem 
definition for systems analysis is the one which effectively 
closes out all of the alternatives except for the "pet" 
solution of the decision-maker and asks systems analysis to 
justify the already existing solution. This practice must 
be avoided.2
There is a tendency in the use of systems analysis 
for decision-makers to feel that the designation of a problem 
to be analyzed ends their responsibility for the analysis 
until they receive a completed product to implement. This 
is not possible because of the nature of problems involved.3 
One of the greatest advantages of PPBS, if it is properly 
employed, is that it compels a continuing dialogue between
^Yuill, "Quantitative Information for Strategic 
Planning," p. 22.
2john G. Honig, "Let's Talk About Systems Analysis 
and Operations Research," Army Management Views, XIII 
(May, 1968), 29. --------- ------------
^Churchman and Schainblatt, "PPB: How Can It Be
Implemented," p. 107.
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the decision-maker and the analyst.^ The need for the par­
ticipation of the decision-maker in the analysis itself can 
be easily seen when it is noted that:
1. The decision-maker is the most valuable source of the 
analyst's search for ideas and insights to the problem at 
hand.
2. The decision-maker is the individual who is best equipped 
to ensure that the analysis is consistent with the realities 
at hand.
3. Because the decision-maker is the person .̂Jho must act on 
the results of the analysis, he must have an intelligent 
understanding of the analysis itself. The depth of under­
standing required cannot usually be achieved by the simple 
review of a completed report of analysis.^
Not only is it necessary for there to be a high degree 
of interaction between the analyst and the decision-maker, 
but there should also be a high degree of participation by 
various types of experts in analysis. Often the crucial de­
tails and variables of a problem are obscured by statistical 
data. The analyst who works only with the hard data and 
neglects information from experts —  particularly about the 
practical realities of the areas being investigated —  is
iHatry and Cotton, Frogrami Planning for State, 
County.' City. pp. 7-9.
^William P. Snyder, Case Studies in Military Systems
"Analysis. pp. 116-17.
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likely to develop an analysis that is impractical and mis­
leading,^ This means that individuals in expert advisory 
positions —  particularly line-management positions —  must 
become immersed in the details of the analysis to ensure 
that the necessary technical input is provided. The 
decision-maker plays a key role in facilitating this inter­
action between systems analysts and line managers,
A climate of acceptable interaction between analysts 
and the experts in operative positions is difficult to 
achieve and maintain. There is almost an inevitable con­
flict between these two groups. Part of this conflict is 
generated because of the different interests of the two 
groups —  the analyst is primarily concerned with the future, 
and the operational personnel are primarily oriented toward 
the solution of current operating problems. The conflict is 
intensified because of the frequent communications breakdowns 
between the two groups. The vocabulary that the analyst 
uses is considerably different from the language of opera­
tional personnel. Also, the analyst, in his communications, 
is prone to become concerned with a wealth of statistical and 
mathematical trivia that is of little concern to, and even 
less understood by, operational personnel.^ At the same time.
^The need for expert advice that conveys knowledge of 
"people institutions" is well established in Olaf Helmer and 
Nicholas Rescher, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact 
Sciences," •Management Science. VI (October, 1959)» 38.
2Yu111, "Quantitative Information for Strategic 
Planning," pp. 20-21.
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operational personnel, in their communications, tend to be­
come overly concerned with minute details of operations 
that are of little interest to the analyst.
The maintenance of a climate that will facilitate 
meaningful interaction between the systems analysts and line 
personnel is a task that requires the continuous attention 
of the manager who hopes to achieve an adequate systems 
analysis capability. Ohé of the ways of achieving this 
improved relationship between the systems analysis staff and 
operational personnel is to ensure that the staff is pro­
perly oriented. Recommended staff procedures that will help 
accomplish this follow:
1. Do not let individual staff members become so overly 
identified with one type of program that they encounter undue 
opposition when attempting to deal with another type of 
program.
2. Convince the systems analysis staff that the act of 
winning acceptance of a new idea is as creative as the process 
of giving birth to a new idea.
3. Have the staff use understandable terms in all of its 
communications with operational personnel. It is not neces­
sary that operational personnel have an understanding of the 
analysis in the same reference as the systems analyst, but 
they should be able to visualize the analysis in terms of 
their own job experiences.
4. Have the staff develop a healthier respect for operational
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personnel, particularly regarding their possible resistence 
to new ideas generated by the staff. Opposition to an idea 
should not be automatically conceived of as something that 
must be overcome but as an indication that the idea may need 
some further refinement.^
Even with this orientation of the central analytical 
staff, it is probable that the relationships between the 
central staff and line management will become strained. If 
these relationships become so hostile that the adequacy of 
analysis is severely constricted, the decision-maker should 
take steps to alleviate the hostilities between the two 
groups. This might be done by a "confrontation meeting" 
between the two. The gist of this technique is that the two 
groups are brought together and asked to concur that the 
tension between them must be reduced. Then in separate lo­
cations each group is asked to write what it thinks the 
other group’s attitude is in the relationship. These two 
listings then serve as the basis of another meeting between 
the two groups.2 Whether confrontation meetings or some 
other procedure are used to smooth the relationship between 
the systems analysis staff and members of line management, 
the deterioration of these relationships cannot be ignored 
because of its direct effect on the adequacy, of analytic
^Adapted from Lawrence, "Resistence to Change," 
Organï'zat'iohaT Change" and Deyeropment. ed. by Dalton,
Lawrence and Greiner, pp. 191-95.
2a detailed procedure is described in Richard Beckhard, 
"The Confrontation Meeting," Ibid., pp. 270-80.
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efforts.
A major décision of the decision-maker in the per­
formance of specific analytic tasks is the one that deter­
mines the amount of resources that will be committed to any 
particular analytic effort. Generally the amount of re­
sources committed to perform a specific analysis should be 
related to the importance of the decision under question.
To make a valid decision about the form of analysis that is 
necessary in any particular case it might be desirable to 
perform a preliminary analysis that highlights the complexity 
of the problem, the degree of uncertainty involved, and the 
resources represented by the problem.^ The selection of the 
depth of analysis deserves no less retionality than the 
decision itself.
After the analysis has begun some decision must be 
made about the point at which the analysis effort will be 
terminated. There are two tendencies that exist that can 
cause analysis to continue after it should be terminated. 
First, decision-makers have an almost insatiable appetite for 
information. Second, the analyst involved with the problem 
tends to become enamoured with the specific application of 
technique to the problem at hand,^ As noted in Appendix A-4, 
any analysis of a complex problem is almost inevitably
^Weimann, "Decision-Making and Resource Allocation,”
p. 47.
^Snyder, Case Studies. p. l48.
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Incomplete. The temptation to continue the analysis after 
the point where the additional effort costs more than bene­
fits of the additional information received must be con­
tinuously resisted.
Another aspect in the use of systems analysis in an 
agency of the Federal Government is particularly applicable 
when a number of subordinate analytic activities are per­
forming analyses. In this case it is probably desirable that 
the central analytic staff furnish some common information 
to be used for analyses. Examples of the type of information 
that should be centrally developed include future trends of 
population, employment, wages, and prices. Unless this in­
formation is developed by a central office, each subordinate 
analytic activity will have to develop its own estimates.
This results in duplication of efforts as well as inconsis­
tencies of analyses.!
It mignt also be desirable to have some form of central 
guidance on such analytic matters as the number of sensitivity 
studies required and the discount rate to be applied to future 
costs and benefits.^ This type of guidance must be used with 
a great deal of discretion, though. If central staff guidance 
becomes too explicit, the subordinate analytic staffs will 
tend to perform analysis on a mechanistic basis and substitute
^State-Local Finances Project, Demographic and Economic 
Data Guidelines for a Planning-Programmlng^Ëuageting System! 
pp. d-b.
^U. S., General Accounting Office, Comptroller General 
of the United States. Report to the Congress. (July 29, 1969), 
p. 34.
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adherence to a check list of analysis for substantive analytic 
effort.
Decisions Based on Analysis 
While the decision-maker cannot divorce himself from 
the process of making the analysis, he becomes completely 
responsible for the use of the results of analysis after it 
is complete. No matter how good the analysis is, unless the 
decision-maker uses the information in making the decision 
required, the effort is totally wasted. In the use of analy­
sis the decision-maker does not have to accept the recommen­
dations totally or uncritically.1
One thing that the decision-maker should insist upon 
with the presentation of every analysis is that the results 
should be presented in a language that he can understand.^ 
Despite the immense amount of data that is normally contained 
in a systems analysis the basic structure of the analysis is 
always simple and should be simply and logically explained.
If the analytic product is voluminous, contains a large quanity 
of technical jargon and elegant mathematics and charts, but 
does not simply and concisely explain its basic structure, 
the analyst is probably trying to conceal inadequacies behind 
a technical facade.3
^Specific guidelines for the review of the products
of systems analysis are contained in Appendix E-1,
^Hanes, "Operations Research and Systems Analysis," p. 
3Malcolm W. Hoag,' An' Introduction to Systems' Analysis.
p. 21.
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When the results of the analysis are received, the 
recommendations of the systems analyst should not be auto­
matically accepted. In fact, one of the major potential 
problems in the use of systems analysis is that the user be­
comes awed by the massive array of quantitative data gathered 
and presented, and accepts the recommendations accompanying 
that quantitative data without any further consideration.
Just as it is an error of decision-making to accept 
the recommendations of the analysis without question, it is 
an equally large error to reject all of the information pro­
vided by the analysis simply because the analytic effort 
cannot give a clear, unequivocable recommendation for deci­
sion,^
There are many reasons why the decision-maker will 
make a decision that is different from the one recommended 
by the analyst. Some of these include:
1, The decision-maker is influenced by factors that are not 
considered directly in the analytic effort. Political factors 
operate more strongly on the decision-maker than they do on 
the analyst, and the decision reached considering these poli­
tical factors may be significantly different from the one
Historically, many areas of governmental activity 
have been dominated by qualitative considerations to such an 
extent that it is doubtful if any form of overreaction to 
quantitative data is probable for an extended period of time. 
For this reason the major problem of the decision-makers is 
not their "rubber-stamping" the results of analysis but their 
ignoring of them. (Markham and McConkey, "PPBS as an Aid to 
Decision Makers," p. 69.)
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which analysis indicates.^
2. The decision-maker may disagree with the analyst’s 
handling of objectives, assumptions, alternatives, and 
measures of effectiveness.
3. The decision-maker may disagree with the explicit weighting 
of multiple measures of effectiveness by the analyst.
4. The decision-maker may disagree with the identification 
of relevant factors and the strength of these relevant fac­
tors .
It is important to emphasize that simply because the 
decision-maker does not completely concur with the recommen­
dations of the analysis, this does not mean that he has repu­
diated the effort. The purpose of systems analysis is not
to make decisions but to provide additional illumination and 
insight into a problem so that the decision-maker can make 
a more knowledgeable decision. When a decision is made based 
on an analysis, the decision-maker should make his reasons 
for the decision explicit and inform the analyst of these 
reasons. In this manner the quality of analysis can be im­
proved and the analysts will not feel that their work is being
ignored in the decision process.
One other aspect of the decision process using analy­
sis should be mentioned. Some of the reasons for making a 
decision contrary to the one recommended by the analyst may 
be sufficient to return the analysis for additional work.
Ipetruschell, Some Remarks, p. 15.
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The desirability of doing this should be decided by weighing 
the cost of the additional work against the value of the 
additional Information possible with additional analysis.
One of the dangers of the use of systems analysis Is the 
tendency to continue to return the analysis for further re­
finement and more Information and thereby postpone the de­
cision Indefinitely, In some cases the cost of delaying 
the decision may be as high as, or higher than, the cost of 
an Incorrect decision.
Another tendency In the use of systems analysis that 
must be resisted Is to return the study for further analysis 
because the difference between the alternatives Is slight 
and a rational basis for the choice of one over others does 
not exist. In this case the cost of additional Information 
Invariably outweighs Its benefit. The "rational" action Is 
to make a decision by some "Irrational" means such as 
"flipping a coln,"l
Actions After Decision 
After a decision has been made based on analysis. It 
Is often necessary to have a continuing analytical follow-up 
of the program that Is Instituted (or continued). Generally, 
a form of analytic follow-up Is almost essential when the 
program represents a substantial recurring commitment of 
resources and/or there Is a high degree of uncertainty Involved
^Kenneth E, Bouldlng, "The Ethics of Rational Deci­
sion," Manaigeme^^^ XII (February, 1966), B-162,
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In the decision and analysis.
There are normally two ways that the follow-up to an 
existing program can be conducted:
1. A continuous reporting/control system can be instituted 
to monitor the cost and effectiveness parameters of the pro­
gram, and threshhold values can be established which, if 
exceeded, call for a re-evaluation of the program.^ One 
danger in the use of a reporting/control system of this 
nature is that it tends to build an undesirable degree of 
rigidity into the programs by implicitly regarding changes 
as bad.2
2. A periodic complete analysis of the existing program can 
be conducted. This analysis can be facilitated by the routine 
collection of cost and effectiveness data during the per­
formance of the program.
These two approaches to post-decision evaluation of 
major programs are not mutually exclusive. The reporting/ 
control system can be used to routinely collect data for the 
subsequent evaluations and can be used as a "triggering" 
device to identify the need for a complete analysis of the
^The Development Concept Paper (DCF) in the Depart­
ment of Defense accomplishes this for major weapon systems. 
(N. Waks, Top Management Decision-Making in Large Organiza­
tions . p. JT)
2por this reason there have been some recommendations 
that these reports on major weapon systems be eliminated. 
(Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the 
Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel,
1 July 1970. PP. 125-2b.j
334
existing program.
This complete analysis is not only useful for deter­
mining if changes are necessary in the existing program, but 
the comparison of the analysis of the existing program to the 
analysis performed before the program will have a disci­
plining effect on the entire analytic process. By viewing 
the divergence of actual and projected program performance, 
the participants in the analytic process can learn to per­
form increasingly better analyses.
This ability to learn from past analyses means that 
it could be desirable to perform total ex post evaluations 
of some completed programs. The aim of these ex post evalua­
tions must be to improve future analyses and not just to 
criticize earlier analyses and decisions. The process of 
ex post evaluation is one of comparing the effects of the 
program to what the effects would have been if the program 
had not been conducted. This represents a significant analy­
tical task in itself.^
^Effects with the program versus those without the 
program are not necessarily the same as the conditions before 
the program versus those after the program. If the program 
were never instituted, the conditions that existed before 
the decision would have probably changed during the period 
that the program operated. For this reason the analytical 
task involved in an adequate ex post evaluation is much more 
complex than a simple before/after study. There are some who 
contend that the analytical task is so large that it is 
impossible. However, it is difficult to justify the position 
that pre-analysis is helpful but post-analysis is impossible. 
(U. S., Department of Defense, Department of the Army, The 
Expost Evaluation of Federal Wafer Resource Projects in the 
United States, by Jim J. Tozzl [October. 1970J» P» 3^1.J
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Regardless of whether the follow-up to analysis Is 
conducted while a program is in progress or after it is 
complete, the fact remains that some sort of rigorous and 
persistent review of the results of major analytic studies 
after they have been translated into an operational envir­
onment is almost essential. This is the only way that con­
tinued improvement in analytic studies can be ensured.
Summary
Training in the proper utilization of the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System is essential in any PPBS 
managerial training program. As a tool, PPBS must be properly 
used or it can be dysfunctional to the performance of the 
agency. It is not necessary that managers become skilled 
systems analysts or even skillful in the use of techniques 
of systems analysis. However, they should become skillful 
in diagnosing the problems which should be subjected to 
systems analysis; participating in the proper manner in the 
analysis task itself; using the results of the analysis in 




The discussion in the last three chapters completes 
the basis of the proposed training model. The complete model 
will now be presented. First, specific learning objectives 
in each of the five major areas of required training iden­
tified in Chapter IV will be presented. This model is 
specifically designed for the most extensive training need. 
This need is found in the upper management levels of the 
civilian agencies of the Federal Government which have not 
successfully adopted a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. 
The need for adjusting this model to accommodate other groups 
of individuals will be discussed after the model has been 
outlined. Finally, some of the mechanics of training will 
be presented.
Specific Learning Objectives 
The description of an adequate training model must 
include an identification of specific learning objectives in 
each of the areas where training is to be conducted. These 
objectives state the knowledge, attitude, or skill that the 
trainee is to gain during a specific area of training. These
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objectives will be stated In three forms that imply different 
degrees of intensity:
1. Knowledge^: This is accomplished by a simple intellec­
tual acquaintance with the subject.
2. ■ Understanding : This requires an intellectual ability to 
comprehend the subject matter and the basic underlying con­
cepts, as well as an acquaintance with the subject.
3. ■ 'Skill ; This requires both understanding and the ability 
to translate this understanding into a practical applica­
tion.^
The' specific learning objectives are:
A. History of PPBS
1. ■ Knowledge of the early historical budgetary emphasis 
on minute control of the executive branch by the Congress.
2. ■ TCnbwTe'dge of the Taft Commission's recommendations 
in 1912, how these are the early forerunners of PPBS, and 
how the control function dominated the resulting Budgeting 
and Accounting Act of 1921.
3. ■ "Knowledge of the recommendations of the Hoover Com­
missions in 1949 and 1955, and the resulting movement toward 
performance budgets.
4. ■ Knowledge of the early antecedents of program
^The term "knowledge" is used in this model in the 
limited sense of "cognition," or becoming acquainted with.
^In the presentation of specific learning objectives 
some of the objectives that could have been included in other 
broader objectives are separately identified because they 
should be specifically stressed during the training.
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structures in budgeting, including Industrial use, broad 
national categories of the federal budget, the War Materials 
Board, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and state and local 
governments.
5. Knowledge of the early academic writings that advo­
cated program orientation In budgeting —  particularly in the 
Department of Defense,
6. Knowledge of the considerations of multi-year Impli­
cations of aspects of the Federal Government’s budget since 
1943.
7. Knowledge of the use of analysis In the area of water 
resources since 1902.
8. Knowledge of the evolution of the use of analytical 
techniques In the Department of Defense since World War II.
9. Understanding of the Inadequacies of the traditional 
budget system. Including;
a. The degree to which the changed governmental
functions required a change of budgeting emphasis.
b. The danger of obscuring objectives and accom­
plishments .
c. The problems of separating planning and budgeting.
d. The difficulty of rational fund allocations.
e. The absense of adequate planning data.
f. The neglect of future-year costs,
g. The bias against changing programs.
h. The problems of obscured alternatives.
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10. ■ KnoWlecL'ge of the Implementation of PPBS in the 
Department of Defense, including:
a. The historical development of the DOD that led 
to PPBS.
b. The specific problems with the traditional 
budget in the DOD,
c. The PPB System as it operates in the DOD.
11. Understanding of some of the systems that have been 
established in the Federal Government and their accomplish­
ments to date.
12. Understanding of the Presidential directive to 
implement PPBS on a government-wide basis,
B. Concepts and Techniques of PPBS
1. Understanding of the basic concepts that underlie PPBS 
and the characteristics of a PPB System, including an under­
standing of:
a. What the program structure is and why it is part 
of the system.
b. What the multi-year program is and why it is part 
of the system.
c. What systems analysis is and why it is part of 
the system.
d. What the integrative system of PPBS is and why 
it is part of the system.
2. ■ Understanding of systems analysis, including:
a. The evolution of systems analysis from operations
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research and its distinct differences from that discipline.
b. The components of systems analysis,
c. The process of systems analysis.
d. The relationship of systems analysis to the 
scientific method.
e. The relationship of "marginal analysis" to systems 
analysis.
f. The "systemic" nature of systems analysis.
g. The treatment of uncertainty in systems analysis.
3. Understanding of the common misconceptions of systems 
analysis, including:
a. Its bias toward the cheapest.
b. Its computerization of decisions.
c. Its total quantification of decisions.
d. Its replacement of judgment and of decision­
makers .
4. Understanding of the relationship of cost-benefit 
analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis and when and how 
these are to be applied.
5. Understanding of the relationship of systems analysis 
to specific analytic techniques.
6. Unders'tandlAg of the contributions of systems 
analysis, including its advantages over alternative methods 
of decision-making,
7. ' Under'st'a'n'dinf̂  the differences between PPBS and tradi­
tional budget
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8. ■ Un'dersfa'n'dl'ng of the differences between PPBS and 
performance budgets.
9. ■ Understanding of the relationship of PPBS to the 
Federal Government’s budgetary process, including incremental 
budgeting and zero-based budgeting.
10. Understanding of the conditions which are commonly 
misconceived as obstacles to the use of PPBS but actually 
give emphasis to the need for the system. These conditions 
include ;
a. Lack 6f planning.
b. Multi-levels of government.
c. Interdepartmental fragmentation of programs.
d. High, levels of "fixed" cost,
e. Undefined objectives.
f. Multiple objectives.
11. ■ Unde'r's'fadding of the effect on PPBS of;
a. Problems of quantifying programs.
b. Lack of data.
c. Lack of personnel,
d. Lack of historical experience with analysis.
e. High political content of programs.
12. ■ irnde'rstanding of the centrality of the top execu­
tive’s commitment to PPBS as a condition of its effective use.
C. • Design of PPBS
1. Understanding that PPBS is not a collection of tech­
niques that can be arbitrarily applied to a given agency, but
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a flexible management tool that is to be specifically de­
signed for the activity involved.
2. Skill in isolating the key decisions that determine 
the effectiveness of the agency.
3. ■ Skill in structuring a program-oriented budget that 
is applicable to the agency involved.
4. ■ Skill in deciding on the most effective type of 
multi-year program for the given agency.
5. ■ Skill in designing output indicators to be used in 
the program structure.
6. ' Skill in integrating PPBS into existing traditional 
and performance budget systems.
7. Skill in determining the costs and benefits of the 
various components of PPBS. This should include a complete 
understanding of the aspects of an agency that increase the 
benefits of program structures, multi-year programs, and 
systems analyses.
D. ■ Implementation of PPBS
1. ■ TTnderstanding of the relationship between the process 
of organizational change and the implementation of PPBS.
2. ' Skill in assessing the sources of personal resistance 
to the implementation of PPBS.
3. Skill in using the variables in the implementation 
process so that PPBS can be implemented as effectively and 
rapidly as possible. This skill must include knowledge of 
how the following affect the implementation of PPBS:
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a. Directive, participative, or group-sharing imple­
mentation patterns.
b. Speed of implementation,
c. Communication during implementation,
d. Training,
e. Proper organizational environment for implemen­
tation,
f. Modifying the sequence of implementation,
4. Skill in determining the best organizational and 
staffing patterns for an agency’s PPBS,
5. Skill in implementing analytic capability,
6, Skill in implementing other components of PPBS, such
as :
a. Initial allocation of costs to program structures,
b. Initial preparation of multi-year plans,
7, Skill in preparing and using implementation plans,
E, ■ Utilization of PPBS
1, ' Skill in monitoring the operations of PPBS to ensure 
that :
a. The program structure remains useful and does 
not restrict managerial vision.
b. The multi-year plan does not significantly re­
duce flexibility,
c. The mechanics of scheduling analysis do not cause 
analysis to become superficial,
2, Understanding of the techniques and language used by
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systems analysts,
3, Skill in selecting problems for analytical treatment,
4, Skill in defining problems for analysis,
5, ' Skill in interacting with systems analysts in the
process of analysis,
6, ' Skill in maintaining an organizational climate that 
allows the proper degree of interaction between analysts and 
"experts."
7, Skill in determining the depth of analysis required 
and when analysis will be terminated,
8, Skill in using a central analytic staff in its 
relationship with subordinate analytic staffs,
9, Skill in using systems analysis for decisions, 
including:
a. Reviewing analyses,
b. Making a decision based on analysis,
10, ■ Skill in making post-evaluations of analyses,
MQdlT’i cat ions to the Model 
As noted before, the model of training presented above 
is specifically designed to meet the training needs of the 
top executives in the civilian agencies of the Federal 
Government who do not have a satisfactorily operating 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, These individuals are 
characterized by their authority to influence the design and 
implementation of the system.
In training lower managerial levels of the organization.
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It Is doubtful if the individuals involved would have a 
great deal of influence over the design, implementation, 
and modification of the PPB System of the agency. The same 
specific learning objectives are appropriate, but the need 
to develop "skill" levels in some of the objectives could be 
decreased to the need to develop "understanding" levels.
The only "skill" levels necessary at the lowest level that 
PPBS training should penetrate would involve the use of 
systems analysis (specific learning objectives E-3 through 
E-10),
When an agency has a viable Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System the need for emphasis on the design and 
implementation phases of training can also be reduced. How­
ever, the requirement for a "skill" level in monitoring the 
operations of PPBS (specific learning objective C-1) must, 
of necessity, build on some of the "skill" levels developed 
in the design and implementation area of training. It 
appears that a "skill" level of training is necessary in the 
following areas when an agency has an adequate PPB System:
1, Structuring the program-oriented budget (C-3);
2, Designing the multi-year program (C-4);
3, Designing output indicators (C-5);
4, Assessing sources of personnel resistance to PPBS (D-2);
and
5, Implementing the analytic capability (D-5).
The remainder of "skill" levels noted in the training model
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above for design and implementation of PPBS could be reduced 
to "understanding" levels.
Mechanics of Training 
Lesson Plan Design 
The model presented above, with its specific learning 
objectives, does not constitute a complete lesson plan for 
PPBS training. The sequence of training from history to 
concepts and techniques, to design, to implementation, and 
finally to use is a logical general sequence. However, this 
general sequence can be modified in the design and timing of 
specific blocks of instruction. For example, some aspects 
of concepts and techniques may be taught before some aspects 
of history.
Since the specific design of blocks of instruction 
depends heavily on the methods of instruction employed, 
some general principles of instruction design will be pre­
sented. The first principle of training instruction is that 
the need for "unfreezing" should be first on the training 
agenda. Before the training presented can effectively change 
behavior, the trainee must feel a need for accepting the 
training and for changing his behavior. This means that the 
old habits and practices need to be questioned by focusing 
the training on needs that cannot be satisfied by existing 
behavior patterns.^ The following learning objectives should
iRolf P. Lynton and Udai Pareek, Training for 
DeveTopmenf. pp. 37-38.
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then be incorporated into the training effort as soon as 
possible :
1. Understanding of the inadequacies of the traditional 
budgeting system (A-9); and
2. Understanding of the contributions of systems analysis 
to decision-making (B-6),
This principle does not mean that these two learning 
objectives must be satisfied at the very inception of the 
training effort. However, they should be incorporated into 
the training as soon as it is possible when the other prin­
ciples of learning are considered. These principles are:
1. The principle of progression: Instruction should always
progress from simpler concepts to the more advanced ones. 
Before presenting any aspect of training, the conceptual 
basis for that aspect must be presented.^
2. The principle of repetition: The more complex the sub­
ject matter and the higher the level of training desired, the
2more the instruction must be presented over and over.
3. The principle of spacing: Lessons and concepts should
be spaced far enough apart that the trainee is able to
Ijn the case of PPBS training this means that some of 
the concepts of PPBS and traditional budgeting will probably 
have to be presented before the inadequacies of traditional 
budgeting can be understood. Also, some of the concepts and 
misconceptions of systems analysis must be presented before 
the benefits that will accrue from its use can be understood.
^This does not mean that exactly the same instruction 
should be repeated. Different methods, such as readings, 
lecture, discussion, etc., should be used to comply with 
this principle.
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assimilate them, but they must be presented rapidly enough
that the trainee does not lose interest.
4. The principle of duration: Because of the fatigue
factor, thé duration of any continuous block of instruc­
tion —  particularly when one method of instruction is
used —  should not be extended beyond the endurance of the
trainee,
5. The principle of action: When the subject matter is
complex, and higher levels of learning are required, the 
trainee learns better when he is able to put the lessons 
into practice in a training situation.^
Methods of Training
Ass igned -Readihgs
There are many educational methods that are applicable 
to training In PPBS. One of these methods that probably 
should be used in PPBS training for managers is assigned 
readings, but it should not be the only method. Assigned 
readings, without Interaction with instructors, will not be 
effective in achieving the necessary behavior changes because 
of the complexity of the material to be presented. Another 
problem with the use of assigned.readings as the major method 
of presentation Is the lack of a single, authoritative, and
These principles of learning were adapted from 
Howard S. McCord, Jr., "The Universality of Learning Prin­
ciples," Training and Development Journal. XXII (September, 
1966), 4g:?F:----------- ------------
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comprehensive work on all areas of PPBS.^
Lecture
Another method of training that will probably be re­
quired in the PPBS training effort is the lecture. The use 
of a lecture for disseminating a large amount of information 
to a large group in a short period of time is very effective. 
The initial exposure to new ideas and methods can often be 
most effectively presented in a lecture format. Particularly 
lectures can be used to pass on general knowledge and to
2allow the trainee to acquire basic concepts and terminology.
However, the utility of lecture in a PPBS training 
situation is limited. Because of the nature of lectures, the 
trainee plays an inactive role. For more advanced levels of 
training, any method that does not allow some activity by the 
student is suspect.3 Also the sole use of the lecture as a
^One should be cautioned against the assignment of 
extensive readings prior to the beginning of training. Exper­
ience with this practice has indicated that the reading is 
not normally done before the training, and if this omission 
is not questioned, it leaves a great deal of doubt in the 
minds of the trainees about whether the subsequent work must 
be done, (Lynton and Pareek, Training for Development, 
pp. 99-100.) If readings are assigned before the inception 
of the formal training effort, the quantity should be greatly 
restricted.
^Frederick C. Brent and Joseph E. McLean, "Teaching 
Methods —  Course Instruction," Education for Administrative 
Careers' in GoVernmen^^ Service. ed. by Stephen B. Sweeney, 
Thomas J. Davy and Lloyd M. Short, pp. 84-85.
^William McGehee, "Are We Using What We Know About 
Training,"' 'Readings' in Industrial and Business Psychology. 
ed. by Harry W. karn and B. Von Heller Gilmer, p.l64.
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training device minimizes the amount of feedback that the 
instructor receives,^ This feedback is essential in order 
to space the training effort effectively.
As a result of these advantages and disadvantages, 
the method of lecture appears adequate for the "knowledge" 
learning objectives stated in the model. However, the 
"understanding" objectives appear to require some form of 
action training for reinforcement of the knowledge gained by 
lecture and readings. Action training would appear indis- 
pensible for the "skill" level of training.
Action' Training Methods
There are four forms of action training that appear 
applicable to the PPBS training effort —  discussion, cases, 
problems, and role-playing. One caution is necessary on the 
use of these methods. The trainee cannot be expected to 
make a proper response during action training unless the re­
sponse is in his repertoire. This means that some method of 
training —  such as assigned readings or lecture —  is neces­
sary before the action training to set the intellectual basis 
and establish the initial skill level that the action training 
will sharpen,2
The discussion method of action training is particularly
^Wallace Wohlking, "Teaching Effectiveness and Feed­
back Mechanism,"' Training and Development Journal. XXÎ 
(June, 1967), 4-5.
^McGehee, "Are We Using What We Know About Training," 
Headings. ed, by Karn and Gilmer, p, l64.
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appropriate for PPBS, The use of discussion allows a con­
siderable degree of feedback to the Instructor so that he can 
assess the required spacing of training and the effective­
ness of the training provided.^ As a matter of practice, 
the use of structured instead of unstructured discussion 
appears more appropriate for PPBS training. In the former 
case the instructor guides or leads the discussion, and in 
the latter case the discussion is controlled almost totally 
by the participants. The major handicap to the use of un­
structured discussion in PPBS training is the high degree of 
inter-personnel conflicts and group-problems that arise.
The time required to resolve these problems could detract 
from the learning about PPBS.^
Structured discussion periods by themselves are most 
effective when the subject matter is somewhat controversial 
and a high degree of participation results.3 For this reason 
the use of this method appears particularly applicable in the 
learning objectives:
1. Understanding of the inadequacies of the traditional bud­
geting system (A-9);
2. Understanding of the common misconceptions of systems 
analysis (B-3);
^Wohlking, "Teaching Effectiveness and Feedback 
Mechanism," pp. 6-8.
^Warren, 'Training for Results. pp. 7%-77.
^Wohlking, "Teaching Effectiveness and Feedback 
Mechanism," p. 8.
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3. Understanding of the contributions of systems analysis, 
including its advantages over alternative methods of decision­
making (B-6); and
4. Understanding of the conditions which are commonly mis­
conceived as obstacles to the use of PPBS but actually give 
emphasis to its need (B-10).
The method of structured discussion can also be used 
in combination with one of the other forms of action 
training —  case studies, problems, and role-playing. This 
combination is normally an effective means of allowing the 
trainee to participate actively, while retaining the ability 
to furnish immediate feedback to the trainee on his per­
formance.
The use of case studies and problems^ as a training 
method in PPBS appears particularly appropriate. Cases and 
problems are especially useful to reinforce the theoretical 
concepts introduced to the student by some other method.^
They are also useful in teaching, and giving practice in 
applying, the skills of decision-making and problem-solving 
in an environment that retains some of its operational, real-
These two are combined because many of the "cases'* 
used in training actually require the trainee to work a 
specific problem. Both are handled in training situations 
in the same manner. The major difference between the two is 
that cases are based on "real-life" situations and problems 
can be totally hypothetical.
^Brent and McLean, "Teaching Methods —  Course In­
struction,"' 'Administrative' Careers. ed. by Sweeney, Davy and 
Short, pp. 9f-$W.
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life aspects.1 Because of the high degree of attention that 
must be paid to these two areas in PPBS training, the case- 
study and problem methods should play a major role in this 
training. Specifically, problems and case studies should be 
used as necessary in the most complex "understanding" learning 
objectives and extensively in the "skill" learning objectives.
The greatest limiting factor in the use of case 
studies and problems in PPBS training is the availability of 
case and problem material. Appendix F-1 lists a total of 
fifty-one cases that were identified as applicable to PPBS 
training. These cases are not appropriate for all of the 
learning objectives noted in the training model.^ The ma­
jority of cases (twenty-nine) are most applicable to the 
learning objective: Understanding of the techniques and
language used by systems analysts (E-2). Because of the dis­
orientation that could result from excessive concentration 
on techniques of analysis in managerial PPBS training, only 
those cases which could be used to meet some other learning 
objective would appear to have a wide application in the 
training model that has been formulated. Therefore, it appears 
that a well-developed training program for managers in PPBS 
will require the development of additional case studies and 
problems to meet some of the learning objectives. This task
lOdiorne, Training by Objectives, pp. 282-83.
 ̂Review of Appendix F-1 indicates that there are no 
cases that are directly applicable to the following "skill" 
learning objectives: C-4, C-6, C-7, D-2, D-6, D-7, E-5,
E—è , E—7, and E—8 «
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may not be as formidable as it appears since existing analyses 
and PPB Systems in the Federal Government can be used as case 
studies in some areas without the need for total hypothetical 
development.
The role-playing method also appears to have some 
application in PPBS managerial training. Under role-playing 
it is possible to attain a high degree of face-to-face 
interaction in a carefully controlled environment.^ This 
method appears to be particularly applicable when trying to 
develop a "skill" level in areas where the personal reaction 
of individuals in the organization plays a major part. Role- 
playing might be effectively used for the following specific 
learning objectives:
1. Skill in assessing the sources of personal resistance to 
the implementation of PPBS (D-2);
2. Skill in manipulating the variables of implementation of 
PPBS CD-3); and
3. Skill in maintaining an organization climate that allows 
the proper degree of interaction between analysts and 
"experts" (E-6),
Syh'di'cafe' 'System
One other method of training that might be effective 
in this training model is a derivation of the "syndicate" 
system used by the Administrative Staff College in Great
^Warren,' Training for Results. pp. 82-83.
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Britain.1 Under this system a "syndicate" (or group of 
trainees, usually numbering ten or less) is assigned a general 
task. This group makes a comprehensive study of documents 
and meets with various experts. Finally the group gives a 
full report on the area and has this report criticized by all 
of the trainees. In the case of PPBS training the task 
assigned could be the generation of an issue paper in one 
broad area. This task would be especially appropriate for 
the two learning objectives:
1, Skill in selecting problems for analytical treatment 
(E-3); and
2, Skill in defining problems for analysis (E-4),
Üth'e r 'Consideration s
There are a number of other aspects that influence 
the exact methods used in the PPBS managerial training. Some 
of these include: the physical facilities and budget avail­
able for the training effort, the geographic location of the 
training effort, the reaction of the trainee to the methods 
used, and the interests and skills of the instructors in-
pvolved. It seems obvious that an effective program of train­
ing will use a combination of methods —  assigned readings, 
lecture, discussion, case studies, problems, and role-playing •
^This system is completely described in Hall, Making 
of Eigher Executives, pp, 42-48,
^Brent and McLean, "Teaching Methods —  Course In­
struction," 'A'dminisfrative' Careers. ed. by Sweeney, Davy and 
Short, pp. 7&-WÜ.
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for reinforcement and repetition when necessary.
Trainee Selection and Time 
Two other aspects of the mechanics of training deserve 
mention. First, there appears to be an advantage to having 
trainees from as homogeneous an environment as possible in 
each separate training session. This is because the more 
closely the training effort is tied to the work environment, 
the more the behavior change carries over into the work 
situation,1 The existence of a relatively homogeneous group 
for training means that the cases, problems, and role- 
playing can be selectively drawn from an environment that 
more nearly approximates the work situation of the trainee.
This could aid in both the speed at which he assimilates the 
material and the degree to which he recognizes its appli­
cability in his personal work situation,^
Second, the amount of time that this training would 
require should be questioned. The methods chosen to conduct 
the training will have a major effect on the amount of time 
required. Based on the magnitude of the behavior change re­
quired, the complexity of the system, number of learning 
objectives, and the amount of action training methods necessary.
^Mason Haire, "Encapsulated Training," Readings. ed, 
by Karn and Gilmer, pp, 157-58,
p This recommendation corresponds to the finding that 
the most effective training in PPBS in state and local 
governments has been when the training was conducted inter­
nally, (State-Local Finances Project, Implemehting PPB.
pp. 17—18.)
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it would appear that approximately 108 hours of classroom 
time would be the minimum amount that would be acceptable 
for the total model,^ With the modifications noted earlier, 
where less extensive training is necessary, this time could 
be reduced.
Summary
The training model presented is a summary of the 
entire research effort to this point. All of the learning 
objectives presented under the heading of History of PPBS 
were expanded in the discussion contained in Chapter II.
The learning objectives under Concepts and Techniques of 
PPBS were expanded in the discussion contained in Chapters 
I and III. All of this material is readily available in 
the multitude of books, papers, and articles which have been 
written about PPBS. This material has been collected in 
these three chapters to provide a single, unified source 
which did not exist in the current literature. The learning 
objectives under Design, Implementation, and Utilization of 
PPBS were expanded in Chapters V, VI, and VII, respectively. 
For the implementation portions of the model this separate 
treatment of the subjects in Chapter VI was especially 
necessary, since a synthesis of PPBS and organizational change
iThis estimate was based on approximately one hour 
each for "knowledge" objectives, two hours each for "under­
standing" objectives, and three hours each for "skill" 
objectives. Adequate time for case preparation, problems, 
and readings would be required in addition to these class­
room hours.
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concepts was required. The consolidation of design and 
utilization of PPBS concepts in the other two chapters of 
this part consolidated all of the information from diverse 
sources in one location.
In effect. Chapters I through III and V through VII 
show the model of training. The explicit treatment of the 
training model in this chapter has simply stated the model 
in training terms. Modifications to the model to make it 
more applicable to lower-level managers and to agencies that 
have existing and adequate PPB Systems were also presented. 
Finally, some of the mechanics of the training required, 
including the use of different training methods, were dis­
cussed. Based on this model, an evaluation of the existing 
PPBS training efforts can be presented in Chapter IX.
PART III
CURRENT TRAINING AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CHAPTER IX 
EXISTING PPBS TRAINING EFFORTS
Based on the complete training model outlined in 
Chapter VIII, it is possible to evaluate the training con­
cerning the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System that is 
currently utilized in the Federal Government. The data 
required to evaluate these training efforts was gathered by 
means of a survey of different government activities and 
educational institutions.  ̂ This chapter will discuss first 
the training efforts in the civilian sector of the Federal 
Government, then those in the Department of Defense, and 
finally the efforts at educational institutions.2
PPBS' Training in the Civilian Sector of 
the Federal Government
The first task in assessing the effectiveness of 
training in PPBS for the nondefense sector of the Federal 
Government was to isolate the training efforts that were
^The survey instruments used are shown in Appendix
G-1.
pIn order to achieve a greater understanding of the 
training effort which is possible, a survey was also made of 
the PPBS training efforts of state and local governments.
The results of that survey are contained in Appendix G-2.
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currently available. The Office of Management and Budget^
Is the organizational entity In the Federal Government that 
Is responsible for the over-all Implementation of the 
Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System. This office was 
contacted and asked to Identify those courses that were 
being taught In this area. Mr. Ray W. Nlemela of the 
Evaluation Division of that office replied that all of the 
courses on PPBS were conducted by the Civil Service Commis­
sion.  ̂ Separate correspondence from the United States Civil 
Service Commission Identified the specific courses Involved.3 
A total of seventeen separate programs of training 
conducted by the Civil Service Commission were Identified as 
applicable to the Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System. The 
Management Sciences Training Center was requested to complete 
the survey of these training programs but declined to do so 
because of the time required. The Information necessary to 
compare these programs to the model was gathered from 
existing documents and from surveys of other organizations.
Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting Seminar
The major course offering by the Civil Service Com­
mission In the area of PPBS Is a two-week Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting Seminar. Because of the refusal of the Civil
^Formerly the Bureau of the Budget.
^Thls letter Is shown In Attachment 1 to Appendix G-3. %
^Thls letter Is shown In Attachment 2 to Appendix G-3.
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Service Commission to complete the survey form for this 
course, a 1968 study of the Seminar^ was used to determine 
the specific material presented and to compare it to the 
training model. The major difficulty in the use of this 
study as a basis for evaluation was that the course length 
was shortened from three weeks to two weeks subsequent to 
the study. However, most of the items deleted from the 
course offering were identified in the study, and the eval­
uation which follows considers these modifications.
The description of the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting Seminar is;
A two-week course designed to provide a grasp of the 
economic base of PPB, a working knowledge of the struc­
ture and operation, and an exposure through case work to 
economic analysis. The program provides an in-depth 
study of essential elements of PPB and extensive parti­
cipant involvement in small group work sessions.2
The purpose of this course is:
. . .  to retrain experienced analysts [financial 
analysts, budget analysts, and management analysts] and 
PPB output user managers for immediate assignment in and 
near newly created PPBS units.3
This course was created in 1966 to meet the major 
training requirement of PPBS implementation in the nondefense
^U, S., Civil Service Commission, Bureau of Training, 
A ?oTlow-u'p' Study 'of 'the' Three' Week Residential Seminar In 
"PPBS. C 1 9 6 ^
^U. S., Civil Service Commission, The Management 
Sciences Training Center, The Schedule for January-June. 
1971. Washington, D. C., n.d.
3u. S., Civil Service Commission, Bureau of Training, 
'Follow-up Study, (1968), p. 3.
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sector of the government. From the first session in 
February, 1966, until the session in May, 1968, a total of 
1,095 persons in twenty-eight separate departments and agen­
cies of the Federal Government had attended the course.
The course is currently offered approximately four times a 
year, with twenty to twenty-five participants each time.
Using the rough guide of one classroom hour for each 
"knowledge" objective, two for each "understanding" objec­
tive, and three for each "skill" objective to determine the 
approximate amount of time required in each area of training, 
the amount of emphasis required by the model of Chapter VIII 
is compared to this existing course in Table 9. From this 
table it is obvious that the existing seminar devotes a much 
higher percentage of time to the area of utilization of PPBS 
than does the model in Chapter VIII. The model, on the other 
hand, demands more emphasis on the history, design, and 
implementation of PPBS than this existing course provides.
Each of these areas will be discussed separately.
In the area of history of PPBS, only two segments of 
training are devoted to the specific learning objectives 
formulated in the training model. One of these concerns 
allocation decisions in the public sector (two lecture hours), 
and the other segment concerns new developments of PPBS (one 
lecture hour). The content of these blocks of instruction 
includes information on the following specific learning 
objectives: Understanding of the inadequacies of the
TABLE 9
MAJOR AREAS OF EMPHASIS IN PROPOSED TRAINING MODEL AND 




Area Hours of Time Hours of Til
A. History of PPBS 15 IH 3 3%
B. Concepts and Techniques of PPBS 24 22% 18 21%
C. Design of PPBS 20 19% 8 9%
D. Implementation of PPBS 20 19% 2 1/2 3%
E. Utilization of PPBS 29 27% 55 3/4 64%




traditional budget system (A-9); and Understanding of some 
of the systems that have been established In the Federal 
Government and their accomplishments to date (A-11). The 
remainder of this major area of training, which shows the 
Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System as only one step In 
the continuous sweep of budgetary change and reform and as 
a consolidation and expansion of existing techniques. Is 
totally neglected.
From the gross number of hours spent In the seminar 
on the area of concepts and techniques of PPBS, It would 
appear that the offering of the seminar and the model that
was devised In Chapter VIII are similar. The seminar hours
devoted to this area are In seven blocks of Instruction.
These are:
1. PPB Concepts —  2 lecture hours
2. PPB as a National Planning Tool —  1 1/2 lecture hours
3. Program Memorandum and Financial Plans —  3 1/2 lecture 
hours
4. Systems Analysis —  3 lecture hours
5. Private and Social Costs —  1 1/2 lecture hours
6. Decision-making under Uncertainty —  3 1/2 lecture hours
7. PPB and Federal Budget Decision-making —  3 lecture hours. 
Table 10 shows the specific learning objectives that are 
covered by each block of Instruction. From this table It can 
be seen that all of the specific learning objectives In this 
area are covered except B-8, B-10, B-11, and B-12. There
TABLE 10
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES OF PPBS COVERED IN PPB SEMINAR
Specific Learning Objectives Seminar Blocks of Instruction
Number Description &  2 il ^ É Z.
B-1 Understanding of basic concepts of PPBS X X X
B-2 Understanding of systems analysis X X X
B-3 Understanding of misconceptions about
systems analysis X
B-4 Understanding of the relationship between
cost-beneflt and cost-effectlveness
analysis X
B-5 Understanding of the relationship of
systems analysis to specific
analytic techniques X
B-6 Understanding of the contributions of m
systems analysis X
B-7 Understanding of the differences between
PPBS and traditional budgets X
B-8 Understanding of the differences between
PPBS and performance budgets 
B-9 Understanding of the relationship
of PPBS to the budgetary process X
B-10 Understanding of the conditions which are
commonly misconceived as obstacles 
to PPBS but actually give emphasis to 
Its need
B-11 Understanding of the effect on PPBS of
lack of data, etc,
B-12 Understanding of the centrality of the
top executive’s commitment to PPBS
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is, therefore, a correlation between the concepts and 
techniques portion of the model and the concepts and tech­
niques portion of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Seminar.
The seminar does not cover the required training on 
design of PPBS as well as it covers the concepts and techniques 
area. Only three of the seven specific learning objectives 
are covered. These are:
C-3, Skill in structuring a program-oriented budget that 
is applicable to the agency. This is directly addressed by 
three blocks of instruction —  The Distributed Output Concept,
1 1/2 lecture hours; Establishing and Applying Agency Cri­
teria, 2 1/4 lecture hours; and Budgeting by Objectives 
and/or Constructing a Crosswalk, 1/2 lecture hour.
C-5, Skill in designing output indicators. This is 
directly addressed in one block of instruction —  Clarifying 
Agency and Office Goals and Outputs, 1 lecture hour,
C-6, Skill in integrating PPBS into existing traditional 
and performance budget systems. This is addressed in one 
block of instruction —  PPB as a Decision-making System,
2 3/4 lecture hours.
The major gap in this training effort concerning 
design of PPBS is that it implicitly assumes that one rela­
tively rigid set of techniques, tools, and components of the 
system is universally applicable to all governmental agencies. 
This assumption that all of the components of the "classical"
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Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System are universally 
applicable in the same manner to all governmental agencies 
leads to the ignoring of some necessary aspects of PPBS de­
sign such as the identification of key decisions in an agency 
and the determination of the proper length and type of 
multi-year projections necessary for the agency.
The seminar coverage of the implementation of PPBS 
is even more sketchy. Only parts of two specific learning 
objectives are covered:
1. D-4, Skill in determining the best organizational and 
staffing patterns, is partially covered by a half-hour 
lecture on Hiring and Training PPB Analysts,
2. The data problems inherent in D-5, Skill in implementing 
the analytic capability, are covered by a two-hour lecture 
on Management Information Systems.
All training needs that concern the achievement of 
an organizational change effort of the magnitude of imple­
mentation of an adequate PPB System are completely ignored.
It is apparently assumed that an operative PPBS can be placed 
in existence by simply issuing a directive and instituting 
new reporting and budgetary forms. The multitude of possible 
organizational configurations of PPBS and their various ad­
vantages and disadvantages are also neglected by the seminar.
The seminar devotes the largest percentage of time in 
its program to the area of training that covers utilization 
of PPBS. However, most of this training is devoted to one
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specific learning objective —  E-2, Understanding of the 
techniques and language used by systems analysts, A total 
of 48 hours of training (or almost 54 per cent of the total 
the course) is devoted to this area.
This seminar training in the techniques and language 
of systems analysts can be divided into three blocks;
1. 10 1/2 hours of economic theory, including:
a. 3 hours of lecture on macroeconomics;
b. 4 hours of lecture on microeconomics;
c. 2 1/2 hours of lecture on supply-and-demand analysis;
and
d. 1 hour of lecture on price theory,
2. 14 3/4 hours on specific techniques of analysis, including:
a. 3 1/2 hours of lecture and problems on linear pro­
gramming;
b. 2 1/4 hours of lecture on statistics for managers^;
c. 2 1/2 hours of lecture on regression analysis;
d. 3 hours of lecture and problems on discounting and 
present value techniques;
e. 1 1/2 hours of lecture on decision trees; and
f. 2 hours of lecture on model-building,
3. 22 3/4 hours in cases and games using these analytic 
techniques, including:
a. Post Office (B) —  2 hours
b. Land and Facilities Development Administration —
^Most of the instruction in this area was eliminated 
in the shortened course taught after 1968,
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1 3/4 hours
c. Bureau of National Capital Airports —  2 1/2 hours
d. Bureau of Mines —  2 hours
e. Office of Economic Opportunity —  2 1/2 hours
f. Disease Control Programs —  2 hours^
g. Development of the Supersonic Transport —  2 1/2 hours
h. Smart Corp. Game —  4 1/2 hours
i. Budget Game —  3 hours (illustrating game theory)^
This heavy orientation toward the techniques of PPBS
is understandable when it is recalled that both analysts and 
managers are being trained. In fact, approximately one-half 
of the participants in the training have been from analytical 
positions. This large amount of training in techniques is 
not necessary for managerial training in PPBS. As was noted 
before, an excessive concentration with the techniques of 
data manipulation could prove dysfunctional in managerial 
training since it could lead to managerial neglect of the more 
difficult and meaningful aspects of PPBS and systems analysis.
The remaining 7 3/4 hours of the seminar that are
devoted to utilization of PPBS cover the following specific 
learning objectives:
1. E-1, Skill in monitoring the operations of PPBS, is
covered by a 2 1/4-hour lecture on operation of a PPB System.
^This case and the preceding five cases are discussed 
in Appendix F-1.
^This game was eliminated when the course was short­
ened to two weeks.
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2. E-3, Skill In selecting problems for analytical treat­
ment, is covered in a one-hour lecture on deciding what to 
analyze in program memorandas,
3. A part of E-5, Skill in interacting with systems analysts 
in the process of analysis, is covered in a half-hour lec­
ture on generating alternative programs to reach goals.
4. E-9, Skill in using systems analysis for decisions, is
covered in a four-hour case involving a discussion of a 
Corps of Engineers' Program Memorandum.
Five of the specific learning objectives of the 
utilization of PPBS area of the model are not treated in 
this seminar. These include; E-4, Skill in defining prob­
lems for analysis; E-6, Skill in maintaining an organizational 
climate that allows the proper degree of interaction between 
analysts and "experts"; E-7, Skill in determining the depth 
of analysis required and when analysis will be terminated;
E-8, Skill in using a central analytic staff in its relation­
ship with subordinate analytic staffs; and E-10, Skill in 
making post-evaluations of analyses.
It would be unreasonable to expect that this training 
course would correspond exactly to the model formulated since 
there is more than one approach possible to the teaching of 
PPBS to managers. However, one would not expect the wide 
divergence between the model and this seminar that is shown 
in Table 11,
The major problem of the training that is conducted
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TABLE 11
TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
BY THE PPB SEMINAR
Adequately Marginally Not
Covered Covered Covered





B-1 B-3 B-4 B-8 B-10
B-2 B-5 B-6 B-11 B-12
B-9 B-7





E-1 E-3 E-4 E-6
E-2 E-5 E-7 E-8
E—9 E—10
373
In this seminar is that an excessive amount of time is de­
voted to the teaching of the techniques of analysis and too 
little time is spent on the managerial functions of the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. Because of this, the 
net result of this training effort will probably be that 
little change in behavior of the managerial participants is 
achieved.^ To be successful in affecting managerial be­
havior changes, the course should be reoriented away from 
techniques and toward substantive managerial knowledge.
This would require having separate courses for analytical and 
managerial personnel.
Educational Program in Systems Analysis 
The second major training effort on the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System in the Federal Government is the 
Educational Program in Systems Analysis (EPSA). This is a 
one-year academic program which is conducted at civilian 
universities. Its primary purpose is to train analysts to 
perform PPB analyses. This program was started in 1966, and 
some 225 middle-level personnel completed the program in its
Pfirst three years.
^A representative of one of the states which used 
this seminar extensively for their training effort noted that 
the participants viewed the analytic exercises as a "textbook 
chore" and outside of their area of responsibility. Even 
after taking the course, any attempt to apply analysis to 
their own problems was "resisted." (Reply to the author’s 
survey by the Arkansas Planning Commission, April 26, 1971.)
2u. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
AhaTysis. Hearings. 1969, p. 782.
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A total of six universities participate in this pro­
gram —  University of California at Irvine, Harvard Univer­
sity, University of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, University of Michigan, and Stanford University, 
Each of these six universities was asked to complete a survey 
form on the training provided. All except the University of 
Michigan replied to this request. The programs offered at 
the other five universities will be described in summary 
fashion:
1. University of California at Irvine;
This university offers a program based on co-operation 
with the Rand Corporation. Generally a background in micro­
economics, operations research, and public finance and ad­
ministration is set. The Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System is not directly addressed in the program of study.
All of the emphasis is placed on how analysis is to be per­
formed .
2. Harvard University:
This university does not have a specific academic program 
established for EPSA, Individual programs are tailored from 
the normal curricula of Harvard University, Most of the 
participants take courses in economics relevant to systems 
analysis and work in fields that correspond to their area of 
governmental interest,
3. University of Maryland;
This university has a special program designed for EPSA
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students. The tools for systems analysis are developed in 
economic analysis and economic statistics courses. The stu­
dents then proceed to courses which demonstrate the use of 
systems analysis in governmental decision-making by the use 
of case studies. Only the systems-analysis portion of PPBS 
is covered in the program.
4. Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
This university has a special program for EPSA students. 
This program concentrates totally on the mechanics of applying 
systems analysis techniques to governmental-type problems.
The total concept of PPBS is never stressed.
5. Stanford University:
This university also has a special program for EPSA 
students. The cornerstone of this program is a 90-classroom- 
hour seminar. Industrial Engineering 237, Seminar in 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. This seminar is pri­
marily oriented toward the role of analytic techniques in the 
PPB System, but some of the broader concepts of PPBS are also 
presented.
These individual academic programs for the training 
of systems analysts have been successful. At the end of the 
program the participants have been able to perform analyses 
in a closely supervised environment. It is not surprising, 
though, that the program is not adequate for the training 
of managers in PPBS. The subject matter presented is too 
concentrated on one narrow aspect of PPBS —  systems analysis.
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The Instruction is, almost without exception, technique-, 
instead of managerially, oriented. While the program is 
successful in presenting how to perform analyses for analysts, 
it would be less successful in presenting information that 
the managers in the Federal Government require —  such as 
how to select problems for analysis, how to manage the 
analysis effort itself, and how to use the results of analysis 
in decision-making.
Other PPBS Courses
In addition to the two major programs that have been 
discussed there are another fifteen short courses, taught by 
the Civil Sei'vice Commission, that deal with one or more 
aspects of PPBS. These are discussed in Appendix G-3.
Generally there are two orientation courses for managerial 
personnel in PPBS (a three-day program for top executives 
and a two-day program for middle-level executives). These 
two programs are so short that only a rudimentary acquaintance 
with the concepts and techniques of PPBS is possible. These 
orientations are too short and superficial to cause the sig­
nificant change of behavior required by the institution of 
a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System.
There is one short course on the total Federal budge­
tary process that covers some of the history of budgeting as 
it applies to PPBS. There are also three courses which can 
be used to give managers an appreciation of systems-analysis 
techniques. These two groups of courses are directly applicable
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to the managerial training needs in PPBS. However, they are 
too superficial and fragmentary to meet the total training 
needs of governmental managerial personnel.
The other PPBS courses taught by the Civil Service 
Commission are directly oriented toward the teaching of 
specific techniques of analysis. They would be particularly 
applicable for the training of analysts to work in a given 
agency, but they are not adequate to meet the specialized 
training needs of managers.
PPBS Training in the Department of Defense 
The Department of Defense maintains a substantial 
training capability apart from the courses conducted by the 
Civil Service Commission. The catalog of Department of 
Defense courses of instruction was reviewed, and a total of 
twenty-four programs of training that could teach managerial 
PPBS were identified. Directors of these twenty-four pro­
grams were each requested to complete the survey, and replies 
were received from twenty of them.^ These programs can be 
divided into two general classes —  professional military 
schools and technical training courses.
Professional Military Schools 
The professional military schools are designed to 
give broad career training to officers and to selected
list of those that were contacted and those that 
replied to the survey is contained in Appendix G-4.
378
civilian employees in the Department of Defense, These pro­
grams are directly applicable to this study because their 
mission is educating line managers of the Department of 
Defense. A total of eleven professional military schools 
were requested to participate in the survey* and nine of 
these returned completed survey forms. Table 12 gives a 
summary review of the responses to this survey.
Prom Table 12 it is possible to divide the types of 
instruction into three general classes —  those that offer 
a very short orientation to PPBS, those that provide an 
orientation of three days’ length or less, and those that 
have a relatively extensive treatment of PPBS, The short- 
orientation approach to PPBS is taken by the National War 
College and the Armed Forces Staff College. In the three 
hours of instruction in the National War College, a degree 
of familiarity with PPBS is assumed and a short lecture with 
a seminar is used to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of 
the PPB System as practiced in the DOD, The five hours of 
study in the Armed Forces Staff College are devoted primarily 
to a lecture presentation designed to make the student 
familiar with the PPB System —  its forms, documents, and 
procedures —  as practiced in the DOD, Both of these pre­
sentations are too superficial to achieve the significant 
behavior change required.
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System is given 
more extensive treatment by the Squadron Officers School, the 
Command and General Staff College, and the Marine Corps
TABLE 12
PPBS TRAINING IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
Annual Classroom
School
Air Command and Staff College
Air War College
Armed Forces Staff College
Command and General Staff College
Industrial College of the Armed Forces*
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
National War College









Lt. Col./Col. 213 52
Maj./Lt. Col. 500 5
MaJ./Lt. Col. 1,250 21
Lt. Col./Col. 135 (45) 30 (60)
Maj./Lt. Col. 125 23
Col. 140 3




*The numbers in parentheses represent the individuals taking the PPBS elective in 
this school. Their PPBS training is more extensive than that of the entire 180 
participating officers.
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Command and Staff College. All of these courses extensively 
treat the historical development of PPBS in the Department 
of Defense. The final product of the DOD’s PPBS is also 
covered in each course in some detail. At this point the 
three presentations differ.
The Squadron Officers School treatment of PPBS goes 
beyond the structural aspects and discusses the concepts and 
procedures of systems analysis in a summary manner. These 
are illustrated by a seven-hour analytical problem.
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College’s pre­
sentation builds on the basis of knowledge of DGD's PPBS to 
explain the budgeting process at the unit level. The analy­
tical portion of PPBS is covered by two major analytic 
problems that require some twelve hours to complete.
The most extensive treatment of PPBS with this short 
orientation is by the Command and General Staff College.
About six hours of lecture and discussion are spent on the 
history and description of the DOD’s existing PPB System.
The remainder of the instructional time is spent on the 
analytic aspects of PPBS. This instruction is primarily 
oriented toward giving the student the basic vocabulary of 
systems analysis and some insights into its applicability 
in the operations of the Department of Defense.
These short three-day, or less, orientations on PPBS 
do not meet the training requirements as specified in the 
training model. The required depth of treatment of complex 
PPBS material is not possible in this short time period. The
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best that can be expected as a result of this form of training 
Is a slight reduction In the degree of unfamlllarlty that the 
PPB System arouses In the managerial personnel.
A special case of the professional military schools 
Is the School of Systems and Logistics. This Is a graduate 
degree granting Institution that educates military personnel 
and civilian employees of the Department of Defense. As 
such, It should be expected that the treatment of PPBS by 
this Institution would be significantly different than the 
broader oriented professional schools. Two courses at that 
school directly address PPBS. The structure of the DOD’s 
Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System Is discussed In about 
six hours In the Defense Financial Management Course. This 
basically describes the program structure and Integrative 
system used In the DOD. Approximately twenty hours of In­
struction are also devoted to the systems analysis portion 
of PPBS In the Cost and Economic Analysis Course. About four 
hours of this course are spent In lectures and the remaining 
sixteen hours are devoted to case studies and problems de­
signed to give the student an understanding of the concepts, 
methodologies, and techniques of systems analysis In the 
Department of Defense. This training Is too superficial to 
achieve the basic behavior change required by a PPB System, 
but It Is adequate to give the student a high degree of 
familiarity with the PPB System.
Three of the professional military schools of the
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Department of Defense —  the Air Command and Staff College, 
the Air War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces^ —  devote a substantial amount of their training 
effort to PPBS. Table 13 relates these course offerings to 
the specific learning objectives noted In Chapter VIII,
From Table 13 can be drawn some general conclusions 
about the extensiveness of Instruction of PPBS In these 
schools. The first noticeable difference between the model 
of training and the Instruction presented at these schools 
Is In the area of history of PPBS. Generally the evolution 
of PPBS Is Ignored In all but the ICAF presentation. How­
ever, all of the programs cover the evolution of analytical 
techniques In the DOD (A-8); the Inadequacies of the tradi­
tional budget (A-9); the process of Implementing PPBS In the 
DOD (A-10); and study of some existing systems, usually the 
DOD's (A-11).2
The second major difference between the model pre­
sented and the courses of Instruction offered at these schools 
Is the lack of emphasis by ACSC and AWC on the aspects of 
concepts and techniques that cover; the difference between
The Information presented for the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces Is for the approximately 45 out of 180 
students In each class who take the elective In their program 
that deals directly with PPBS. In the basic program taken by 
all of the students about one-half of the hours noted are 
spent on PPBS.
^The ICAF course covers some systems In the civilian 
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A-8 C C C
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B-5 P C P
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ACSC - Air Command and Staff College 
AWC - Air War College
ICAF - Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
C - Completely covered 
P - Partially covered
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PPBS and performance budgets (B-8); the conditions which 
tend to be misconceived as obstacles to the use of PPBS but 
actually give emphasis to the use of the system (B-10); the 
effect on PPBS of lack of data, personnel, etc, (B-11); and 
the absolute essentiality of support of the top executive 
(B-12).l
A third major difference between the instruction at 
these schools and that proposed by the training model of 
Chapter VIII is the lack of emphasis on design and imple­
mentation of PPBS. Except for a cursory treatment of the 
isolation of key decisions and design of program structures 
in the AWC program and a slightly more extensive treatment 
of questions of design of a PPB System by ICAF, these two 
major areas of training are completely ignored.
Finally, there are some aspects of the utilization of 
PPBS presented in the model that are ignored in the training. 
The ICAF program is the most extensive of the three in its 
coverage of the utilization of PPBS, and even it ignores the 
following learning objectives: skill in ensuring that the
PPB System does not become imbalanced (E-11); skill in main­
taining an organizational climate that allows the proper 
interaction between analysts and line "experts" (E-6); skill 
in determining the necessary depth of analysis (E-7); skill 
in the use of a central analytic staff (E-8); and skill in 
making post-evaluations of analyses (E-10),
^The ICAF course also neglects this last learning
objective.
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The reasons for all of these omissions In the training 
provided are not totally Illogical. Recall that the model 
was established for top management positions In an agency 
which does not have a viable Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng 
System. The typical students at professional military 
schools would be considered upper-level, but not top-level, 
managers, and the Department of Defense has an operable PPB 
System that has been In existence for almost ten years. As 
a result. It would appear reasonable that less attention 
would be paid to the historical development of PPBS, Its 
Initial design, and Its Implementation since these hurdles 
have already been passed. For this reason the coverage of 
these programs appears adequate to meet the needs of Its 
managerial students, with the following exceptions;
1. The areas of design and Implementation that establish 
the conceptual framework for learning objectives under utili­
zation of PPBS should be stressed to a greater degree,^
2. The specific learning objectives of the area of utiliza­
tion of PPBS that are not covered should be Incorporated Into 
the training effort.
The general orientation of these three programs Is 
closely geared to the model. Table l4 shows the distribution 
of hours by different training methods for the three programs. 
The cases and problems used In all of these programs are
^These would Include the following specific learning 
objectives: B-1, B-3, B-4, B-6, and C-5.
TABLE lit
PPBS INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS AT THREE PROFESSIONAL
MILITARY SCHOOLS
Cases and
School Lecture Discussion Problems Total
Air Command and Staff College 17 3 10 30
Air War College 8 30 111 • 52




designed to acquaint the manager with PPB concepts and with 
the concepts of systems analysis, and not to have the student 
learn how to perform the analyses themselves. This Is In 
contrast.to the predominate use of cases and problems In the 
Civil Service Commission’s Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting Seminar to teach the student specific analytic 
techniques. In this regard, the training at these pro­
fessional military schools Is more acceptable for managers 
than the seminar discussed earlier.
Notice also from Table 14 the different proportions 
of time spent In the use of lectures as an Instructional . 
technique at the different schools. The high percentage of 
time spent In lecture by ICAF compared to that of AWC 
allows ICAF to cover a larger number of the objectives 
stated In the model of Chapter VIII.
These three programs of training In PPBS should be 
adequate In achieving the managerial behavior change re­
quired by PPBS In the Department of Defense. However, they 
could be Improved by broadening their coverage as noted 
above.
Technical and Managerial Short Courses 
In addition to the professional military schools, 
thirteen technical and managerial courses In the Department 
of Defense were Identified as applicable to PPBS. Eleven of 
the thirteen activities conducting these courses replied to 
the survey. Of these eleven replies, four of the courses
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have material directly applicable to the managerial training 
of PPBS. Six of the courses are more applicable to the 
training of technicians directly Involved in the PPBS pro­
cess than of managers responsible for the use of the products 
of the system.^ One of the course offerings was not appli­
cable to this study.
Table 15 presents summary information on the four 
courses that are directly applicable to PPBS. Two of these 
courses have short orientation programs on PPBS. The Finan­
cial Management for Managers Course gives a brief overview 
of all of the financial management tools, including PPBS, 
that have historically been used in the Federal Government. 
However, the majority of this forty-hour course is devoted 
to the use of financial management for control purposes. The 
major part of the instruction on PPBS is a two-hour lecture 
on the PPBS cycle, and a four-hour orientation lecture and 
brief exercise on economic analysis. The other six hours of 
training that are PPBS-oriented include lectures on the his­
tory of budgeting, the resource allocation properties of 
budgets, and the use of financial data for decisions. This 
course treats PPBS too superficially to make a significant 
behavior change in participants.
The second orientation-type course is the Top Manage­
ment Seminar. This course devotes two hours of lecture to 
the structural aspects of PPBS. An eight-hour review of the
^These six courses are described in Appendix G-5.
TABLE 15
MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING EFFORTS IN DOD'S PPBS
Course*
Hours 







12 25 Both structural and analytical aspects 
of PPBS covered









40 24 Analytical aspects of 
PPBS only
*A11 courses taught by United States Army Management Engineering Training Agency
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techniques and concepts of systems analysis and a four-hour 
lecture on the types of qualitative considerations that must 
supplement quantitative data are also presented. Again the 
coverage of PPBS in this orientation is not sufficient to 
cause a significant change of managerial behavior.
The other two courses shown in Table 15 are parti­
cularly appropriate to the training needed by managers in 
PPBS. Table l6 shows the coverage of these courses of the 
learning objectives in the model that deal with the analy­
tical aspects of PPBS. The twenty-hour course. Quantitative 
Decisionmaking, is particularly impressive in its coming to 
grasp with some of the more difficult questions of managerial 
utilization of systems analysis, including the following 
specific learning objectives: skill in implementing analytic
capability (D-5)j skill in selecting problems for analytical 
treatment CE-3); skill in interacting with systems analysts 
in the process of analysis (E-5); and skill in maintaining 
an organizational climate that allows the proper degree of 
interaction between analysts and "experts" (E-6).
The second course shown in Table 16, Operations Re­
search Appreciation, is twice as long as the Quantitative 
Decisionmaking Course but it does not cover as much of the 
managerial learning objectives as the first course. This is 
because the majority of the course (some twenty-four hours 
of instruction) is spent in acquainting the manager with a 
broad spectrum of operations research techniques. The coverage 
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managerial PPBS training effort.
While extensive training in the Plannlng-Programmlng- 
Budgetlng System must of necessity include a considerable 
amount of training in the concepts and use of analytical 
techniques, it is incorrect to suppose that training in the 
structural aspects of the system is not also essential. The 
courses noted in Table 16 do not afford training in these 
structural aspects of PPBS and as a result, cannot be consi­
dered totally satisfactory as a PPBS training vehicle.
Comparison of Civilian and DOD Training Efforts 
The training efforts discussed to this point in this 
chapter constitute the majority of the formal training in 
PPBS in the Federal Government. The magnitude of all of 
these training efforts, including those in Appendix G-3 and 
Appendix G-5, is reflected in Table 17,
There are almost 250,000 man-hours devoted to PPBS 
training in the Federal Government each year. Over 130,000 
of these man-hours are devoted to acquainting management 
personnel with the PPB System, and the remainder is spent in 
the training of technical specialists to operate the system.
Some of the differences between the magnitude of 
civilian and military training in the PPB System are signi­
ficant. First, through the use of the professional military 
education program, the military services are able to train 
a significantly higher number of personnel in the managerial 
use of PPBS than are the civilian agencies. The quality of
TABLE 17









Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Military
1. Substantive PPBS Training 1 4(2) 100 1068 8,725 37,776
2. Training In Analytic Portion 
of PPBS 3
2 400 192 11,700 2,720
3. PPBS Orientations of Less Than 3 Days In Length 2 y(3) 400 4540 5,760 64,945
Subtotal 6 13 900 5800 26,185 105,441
4. Technical PPBS Training 10(4) 6 1470 470 27,900 39,440
5. Educational Program In Systems Analysis 1 75(5) 50,625
Total 17 19 2445 6270 104,710 144,881
U)VO
(1) Civilian programs means those conducted by the Civil Service Commission for all agencies 
of the government. Including the DOD.
(2) All of these courses are In the professional military schools.
C3) Five of these programs are In professional military schools.
C4) This Includes the one course In the Federal Budgeting Process.
(.5) This Is the average annual number of participants In this program from I966 to 1969.
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the training in these professional military schools appears 
at least comparable to that given in the Planning, Program­
ming, and Budgeting Seminar of the Civil Service Commission, 
which is heavily oriented toward the training of analysts.
The civilian agencies appear to devote a substantially 
higher amount of training effort to use of systems analysis 
than does the Department of Defense. Perhaps one reason for 
this relative lack of emphasis by the DOD is the extensive 
treatment of analytic techniques in the professional mili­
tary schools.
It is obvious that the DOD has a much higher incidence 
of exposure to the PPB System than do civilian agencies 
through short indoctrination programs. While these indoc­
trinations are not capable of causing a significant change 
of behavior of managers, they at least are valuable in re­
moving some of the unfamiliarity with the system.
The total amount of managerial training in PPBS is 
unevenly divided between civilian and military agencies, 
with the military training over six times as many people and 
devoting over four times as many man-hours to this training.
It appears that only the Department of Defense has been 
willing to perform the substantial training effort necessary 
to ensure that there exists adequate managerial knowledge and 
support to achieve an operative Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System.
The training of technical personnel to operate the
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PPB System appears evenly divided between the military and 
civilian sectors of the government. While the civilian 
sector trains over three times as many people as does the 
military sector, the amount of training in man-hours that 
is provided shows that the military sector has about 50 
per cent more training. This results largely from the 
broader scope and greater length of most military courses in 
this area.
The inclusion of the Educational Program in Systems 
Analysis as a totally civilian training effort makes the 
total amount of PPBS training appear more evenly balanced 
than is probably the case. The Department of Defense also 
utilizes this program to train analysts. In fact, one of the 
universities that participates in the Educational Program in 
Systems Analysis, the University of California at Irvine, 
has its program oriented heavily toward the requirements 
of military systems analysis. If EPSA is deleted from the 
total training shown in Table 17, the military sector of the 
Federal Government trains 6,270 people annually in PPBS, 
compared to 2,370 in the civilian sector. The military 
agencies devote 144,88l man-hours to this training, compared 
to 54,085 man-hours by civilian agencies. This strongly 
accents the different degree of emphasis given to this system 
in the two governmental sectors.
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University Education' In' PPBS 
University education In the Plannlng-Prograimnlng- 
Budgetlng System Is applicable to this study In two manners. 
First, the college courses In PPBS can be used to satisfy 
part of the training of managers In the Federal Government 
by utilizing these courses through a part-time study pro­
gram. For this purpose the evaluation of the courses must 
proceed on the same basis as the evaluation of governmental 
training efforts.
However, colleges and universities do not function 
primarily as training facilities to meet the Immediate 
training needs of the Federal Government or any other govern­
mental or private body. Instead, the primary purpose of 
these Institutions Is to prepare students for a broad spectrum 
of jobs after the end of college. One class of these jobs 
is public service. An adequate educational course In PPBS 
will probably not Include all of the details of PPBS necessary 
for managerial training.
The exposure of college students to the concepts of 
the Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgetlng System In their early 
college years Is Important to the achievement of an adequate 
government-wide PPB System. If the Individuals who will 
eventually become the managerial elite of the Federal Govern­
ment are educated In the concepts of PPBS while they are 
young and are not as skeptical of their ability to deal with 
analysis which contains even a minimum amount of quantitative 
manipulation, the task of reducing the "fear" of systems
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analysis Is greatly reduced,^
Identification of Areas for Survey 
As noted earlier, the basic method used to determine 
the educational institutions that should be surveyed was by 
screening the school catalogs of universities and colleges 
for courses that appear to contain a significant amount of 
PPBS instruction. The courses that were identified included 
those from the following four general academic areas:
1. PoTi'ti'cal' Science. including Government and Public Affairs 
Schools and Departments. ■ Most political science departments 
have a basic course in Public Administration. Because of the 
broad nature of these courses, it is assumed that the PPBS 
concept does not occupy a significant role in the offering 
and they were not included in the survey. The political 
science courses that were more specifically directed toward 
the use of budgets as decision tools (normally identified as 
Public Financial Management) were included. Any other courses 
which specifically identified the use of systems analysis or 
PPBS in the course description were included in the survey,
2, ■ PubTi'C 'Admin'isfratl'on, including Administration, and 
Government and Public Administration Schools and Departments, 
The courses in Public Administration are normally similar to 
those in Political Science. Any courses that appeared to be
^Statement of William W. Kaufman, U. 8,, Congress, 
Joint ̂ Economic Committee,' Ec'o'ndmi'c' Analysis. Hearings, 1969»
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specifically directed toward the use of financial data for 
governmental decisions were included.
3. Economics. Economic courses which stressed the macro- 
economic significance of government budgets were not included. 
Courses which stressed economic analysis in general and did 
not restrict themselves to the use of this analysis in the 
government sector were not included because of the appar­
ently insignificant part of the PPBS concept in these offer­
ings. Particularly appropriate to this study were the 
courses concerning the use of economic analysis in govern­
mental decision-making.
4, Business. including Business and Public Administration, 
Government and Business Administration, and Economics and 
Management Schools and Departments, Two subsections of this 
area were particularly appropriate;
a. Management: Management courses which were directed 
toward the use of systems analysis (or quantitative methods) 
in general were not included. Most of these courses were 
directed toward the use of these techniques in private enter­
prise, and the PPBS concept in the public sector is assumed 
to be an insignificant part of the course offerings. Manage­
ment courses which were specifically directed toward manager­
ial aspects of the public sector and indicated that decision­
making was the major focus of the course were included in 
the survey,
b. Accounting: Accounting courses which stressed the
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difference between accounting methods in the government and 
private enterprise were not considered. Only where budget 
development and the use of budgets for governmental decision­
making was apparently a significant portion of the course 
offering was the course surveyed.
In the University of Oklahoma library, the catalogs 
of approximately 1,100 universities and colleges were re­
viewed. Prom this review were identified a total of 149 
courses in 93 different departments^ that could potentially 
contain a significant amount of PPBS instruction. These 
departments were located in 82 universities and colleges.
In each of these cases a letter was sent to the head 
of the department, by name if that information was available.' 
He was asked to complete one copy of the survey form for 
each of the courses under his jurisdiction that contained a 
significant amount of PPBS instruction. Table 18 shows the 
number of replies received to the survey, by general academic 
area. Thirty-six of the ninty-three departments (or approx­
imately 39 per cent) replied to the survey.3 These replies 
represented 55 of the 149 courses (or about 37 per cent) that
The term "department" is loosely used in this case.
In some instances the lowest subdivision of a university that 
could be identified as responsible for a particular course 
was the School or College.
sample copy of the letter and form is contained in 
Appendix G-1.
3a list of the fifty-seven departments that did not 
reply to the survey request is contained in Appendix G-6.
TABLE 18










































Total 93 149 36 55 31
* Includes one course taught jointly by Economics and Political Science Departments
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were identified as potentially containing a significant 
amount of instruction in the area of PPBS. The completed 
surveys showed that only 31 of these 55 initially identified 
courses had a significant amount of PPBS instruction.^
One reason for the relatively low percentage of re­
plies to this Survey could be that negative replies were not 
2requested. Many of the departments might not have replied 
to the survey because none of the courses identified in the 
request, nor any other courses under their jurisdiction, had 
significant amounts of PPBS instruction.
Some comment should be made about the distribution 
of PPBS courses between the various academic areas. It is 
not surprising that the majority of academic courses that 
deal with PPBS are found in the Political Science Departments. 
The Department of Political Science has historically been the 
academic area that is primarily concerned with the operation 
of governmental activities, and the PPB System is a tool of 
these governmental activities. The small number of Public 
Administration courses identified is more a reflection of 
the relatively few separate Public Administration Departments. 
Most public administration is taught as an area of political
% o  additional courses were identified by the 35 
departments.
^A total of eight departments with nine "potential" 
courses furnished negative replies which stated that PPBS 
was not a significant part of the course identified or of any 
other course under their jurisdiction. These eight depart­
ments are identified in Appendix G-7,
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science.1 However, the relatively small number of Economics 
and Business area departments that could be identified as 
having significant PPBS courses is surprising. Since both 
of these academic areas exist in many different universities 
and colleges, it appears that their instruction in economic 
analysis, quantitative techniques, and management systems 
is largely limited to applications in the private, instead 
of public, sector. Prom the limited numbers of replies to 
the survey received from these academic areas, it appears 
that even the small number of courses in these two areas 
that were identified as potentially containing a significant 
amount of PPBS might be overly optimistic.
Another factor in this survey that is significant is 
the apparent lack of extensiveness of PPBS education in the 
colleges and universities. Of the approximately 1,100 
universities and colleges whose course offerings were reviewed, 
it was possible to identify courses with PPBS in only 82 of 
these schools. The replies to the survey indicate that maybe 
even this small percentage (less than one per cent) of schools 
with significant PPBS offerings is optimistic.
The adequacy of educational efforts in PPBS can be 
further evaluated by investigating the thirty-one courses 
that were definitely identified by the survey as containing 
significant PPBS material. Table 19 contains summary data
^Lloyd M. Short, "Introduction: Educational Organi­
zation for Instruction in Public Administration," Administra­
tive' careers, ed. by Sweeney, Davy and Short, p. 231
TABLE 19
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allocation of resources
General orientation as emerging 
tool of governments
Detailed examination of analyti­
cal portion of PPBS
History of budgeting including 
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Use of analytical techniques 
in DOD's PPBS
Emphasis on analytical portions 
of PPBS
Description of the budgets 
(including program budgets) of 
governmental agencies
Both structural and analytical 
aspects of PPBS covered
General overview of PPBS
Both structural and analytical 
aspects of PPBS covered
- t
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8 30 1/2* Both structural and analytical
aspects of PPBS covered
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Economics 
(2 Courses)
University of Miami Politics and
Public Affairs
University of Political Science
Nebraska at Omaha
University of Nevada Political Science
University of North Political Science 
Carolina
University of South Political Science 
Carolina
COI0)
aspects of PPBS covered
40 10 1 Emphasis on analytical portion
of PPBS
40 10 1 Emphasis on analytical portion
of PPBS
5 40 1 Overview of political consequence
of PPBS
20 20 1/2* Historical, structural, and
political study of PPBS
10 15 1 Historical development and
description of PPBS
24 10 1 Both structural and analytical
aspects covered with emphasis 
on analytical
8 20 1 Overview of both structural and
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Analytical aspects of PPBS
Both structural and analytical 
aspects of PPBS covered
Overview of both structural 
and analytical aspects of PPBS
Historical and political- 
process view of PPBS
Historical view of changing 
budgets
Overview of systems analysis 
in government
Both structural and analytical 
aspects of PPBS covered
*Course taught once every two years
**This is a two-semester course sequence
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for each of these courses.
The thirty-one courses identified in the survey have 
varying degrees of depth in their coverage of PPBS. A prox­
imate measure of the depth of presentation in these courses 
is the number of hours of the course that are devoted to 
the area of PPBS. Table 20 summarizes the number of courses 
in six classifications based on the number of classroom 
hours. There are five courses with three hours or less de­
voted to PPBS.^ Three of these courses are totally concerned 
with, the place of PPBS in the historical evolution of bud­
geting. They are primarily concerned with the effect of 
PPBS on the political process of decision-making. One of 
the other courses gives a brief orientation of systems 
analysis in the Federal Government, and the other discusses 
PPBS only as it effects the program structure of the Depart­
ment of Defense. None of the presentations in these five 
courses is capable of giving the student a level of knowledge 
that exceeds an elementary ability to recognize the key 
words associated with PPBS.
The two courses that devote four to six hours of
classroom time to PPBS offer only slightly more depth to the
2treatment of the subject. One of these courses is concerned
^These courses are taught by San Diego State College; 
University of California, Berkley; University of Iowa; and 
Wayne State University.
^These two courses are taught by Southern Illinois 
University, Edwardsville, and the University of Miami.
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Total 14 16 31
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totally with the political ramifications of the use of PPBS. 
The other course attempts to cover the history, structural 
components, analytical base, and political consequences of 
PPBS in six hours of structured discussion. The major em­
phasis appears to be the investigation of the effect of 
PPBS on the political process of budgeting in the Federal 
Government.
There are twelve courses that devote seven to twelve 
hours to PPBS.l These twelve courses represent four different 
approaches to the teaching of PPBS. Three of the courses 
present PPBS as a part of the historical evolution of bud­
geting in the government. One of these three courses is 
almost totally concerned with the impact of PPBS on the organ­
izational structure of the Federal Government. The other 
two courses provide a relatively comprehensive overview of 
the nature and purpose of PPBS in a historical setting.
Seven of the courses in this broad classification 
provide relatively complete descriptions of both structural 
and analytical aspects of PPBS. Three of these courses pro­
vide this information to establish a basis for investigating 
the effect of PPBS on the political process. The other four
^These courses are taught at Kent State University, 
Purdue University, San Diego State College, University of 
Colorado, University of Idaho, University of Iowa, University 
of Nevada, University of South Carolina, University of 
Southern California, University of Washington, and Washington 
State University.
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courses^ describe PPBS and its components to make the student 
aware of its capabilities and use in a managerial setting.
Of the courses discussed to this point, these four course 
offerings are the first that appear to make a significant 
contribution to management education in PPBS. Because of the 
relatively short amount of time devoted to the teaching of 
PPBS in these courses the offerings still can be character­
ized as only short orientations. Their managerial orienta­
tion does, however, make them applicable to the task of 
educating future public managers in the area of PPBS,
There are two other approaches to the instruction in 
PPBS found in the courses that devote seven to twelve hours 
of instruction to that system. One of these courses dis­
cusses PPBS from the point of view of a broad fund allocation 
device. This approach accents the conceptual basis of PPBS 
but the specific system requirements are not covered. Because 
of its lack of specific details, this educational effort is 
not too appropriate for managerial education. The other 
course is devoted solely to the analytical properties of the 
PPB System. In this limited field this latter course is 
applicable to the management training requirements of PPBS, 
There was only one course identified that devotes 
thirteen to eighteen hours to PPBS.^ This particular course
^These courses are taught by Kent State University, 
University of Colorado, University of Idaho, and University 
of Washington,
^This course is taught by the University of Arizona,
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is primarily oriented toward the analytic phases of PPBS and 
is applicable to the managerial educational needs in this 
limited part of the system.
There are four courses that devote nineteen to 
twenty-four hours to PPBS Instruction, Two of these courses^ 
are primarily concerned with the political process of bud­
geting and the way in which PPBS affects this process.
While the methods and concepts of PPBS are covered in these 
courses, their primary orientation toward political effects 
makes the courses less useful than others for managerial 
education.
The other two courses^ in this broad classification 
are more applicable to the required managerial educational 
efforts in PPBS, Both of these courses survey all of the 
components oi' PPBS by lecture and structured discussion.
The emphasis is to acquaint the student with the concepts and 
techniques so that they can be used as decision tools. One 
of the courses3 uses a number of problems and cases to illus­
trate the concepts and techniques of PPBS. Because of the 
amount of time that is spent on PPBS, these courses satis­
factorily perform the necessary managerial educational tasks
^These courses are taught by California State College, 
Long Beach, and University of Nebraska at Omaha.
^Thise courses are taught by Northeastern University 
and the University of North Carolina.
^This is the course taught by Northeastern University.
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for PPBS. Howeverj while the treatment of PPBS is adequate 
from the point of view of broad, general education, it is 
too superficial to be of much use as a direct training de­
vice for Federal Government activities.
The most extensive treatment of PPBS is provided by 
the seven courses which devote over twenty-four hours to 
that subject. Six of these courses deal solely with the 
analytical portion of PPBS.^ Four of the courses are di­
rectly concerned with the broad role of systems analysis in 
governmental decisions. One of these^ gives a broad, 
general survey of the use of analysis in the government. The 
other t-hree courses^ develop the concepts behind the use of 
systems analysis in the governmental sector and are particu­
larly useful in the managerial education required on the 
analytical portion of PPBS,
The other two courses that have over twenty-four 
hours of PPBS instruction and are oriented toward the use of 
systems analysis in connection with PPBS are more limited in 
scope. One of the courses deals exclusively with the use of 
analysis in connection with defense-oriented problems.^
^These courses are taught by the State University of 
New York at Albany, USAP Academy, University of Virginia, 
University of Maryland, and Wichita State University.
^This is the course taught by Wichita State University,
^These are the courses taught by the University of 
Virginia and University of Maryland.
^This is the course taught by the USAP Academy.
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Because of its special orelntatlon, the course Is particu­
larly appropriate for that limited field, but it should not 
be considered relevant to the problems of agencies outside 
of the Department of Defense. The other course, in the 
analytical portions of PPBS, is concerned almost solely with 
the economic aspects of systems analysis.^ Because of its 
heavy emphasis on the specific techniques of economic 
analysis and the way in which they should be applied, the 
course is more applicable to the education of analysis 
technicians than it is to the education of managers.
The most comprehensive course in PPBS that was iden­
tified in this survey is conducted at the University of 
California at Los Angeles. This course covers all aspects 
of PPBS in a relatively comprehensive manner. If the material 
in this course is related to the training model, the specific 
learning objectives shown in Table 21 are covered. Notice 
that this course is particularly strong in the coverage of 
the areas of History of PPBS and the Concepts and Techniques 
of PPBS. As one would expect in a course that is primarily 
designed for educational purposes, there is not a high degree 
of emphasis placed on the more practical areas of training 
such as design, implementation, and utilization of the system. 
However, the course is at least comparable to most of the 
training offered in the Federal Government.
^This is the course taught by the State University 
of New York at Albany.
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TABLE 21
SPECIFIC LEARNING OBJECTIVES COVERED IN UCLA'S 





Covered In Course 
but not as Intensively 
as in Model
A-1 B-IQ
A-2 C-3A-3 C-5A-8 D-2










It is obvious that the original Identification of 
thirty-one courses that are applicable to managerial educa­
tion in PPBS is overly optimistic. Most of the courses that 
were identified in the survey are oriented so heavily 
toward the effect of PPBS on the political process that they 
have a minimum amount of applicability to the task of 
managerial education. Only fifteen of the thirty-one 
courses initially identified in the survey appear to have a 
significant amount of managerial content in the instruction. 
These fifteen courses are summarized in Table 22.in the 
approximate order of the intensiveness of their treatment 
of PPBS-related subjects. Only one of these fifteen courses 
contains enough depth to be directly usable for managerial 
training efforts by off-duty education. The other fourteen 
courses appear adequate to provide some general education in 
PPBS to prospective public service managers. Even in this 
regard, the treatment of PPBS in most of these courses is 
sketchy because of the relatively small amount of time de- 
voted to the instruction.
Due to the small number of adequate managerial PPBS 
training courses that could be identified in the survey it 
is reasonable to conclude that the instruction in this area 
in colleges and universities is not extensive enough to 
provide a reservoir of entry-level managerial talent that has
Four of the seven total PPBS efforts and two of the 
six analytically oriented efforts devote twelve, or less, 
hours to PPBS instruction.
417
TABLE 22
COURSES WITH SIGNIFICANT MANAGERIAL 
PPBS OFFERINGS
A. Courses with total PPBS coverage:
University of Idaho 
University of Washington 
Kent State University 
University of Colorado
University of North 
Carolina 
Northeastern University
University of California 
at Los Angeles
Public Management Techniques 
Public Management 
Public Budgeting Policy 
Business and Governmental 
Budgeting and Control 
Statistical Analysis and 
Program Evaluation 
Systematic Analysis and 
Public Finance 
Public Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting
B. Courses with emphasis on analytical portion of PPBS:
*USAF Academy 
*State University of New 
York at Albany 
University of Maryland
University of Southern 
California 
University of Arizona
Wichita State University 
University of Virginia
Defense Economics 
Economics of the Public 
Sector 
Public Sector Workshop 




Fiscal and Budgetary 
Administration 
The Budgetary Process 
Systems Analysis
*These two courses have an extensive treatment of sharply 
limited aspects of systems analysis.
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adequate knowledge of PPBS. There are approximately 137 
individuals educated each year in one of the seven courses 
in Table 22 that give total PPBS coverage and approximately 
375 individuals educated in the eight analytically oriented 
courses.̂
One of the problems in the teaching of PPBS in the 
colleges and universities is the lack of a suitable college- 
level textbook. In the fifteen courses identified with 
significant managerially oriented PPBS offerings, the major 
text in use is Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
edited by Harley H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, Six of 
these fifteen courses use this book as a basic text,^ How­
ever, seven of the fifteen courses have not been able to find 
a specific text adequate for their purposes and rely on 
collections of articles, unpublished papers, and readings 
from Congressional sources. The other two courses use a 
variety of textual material for instruction, including 
Program Budgeting, edited by David Novickj The Economics of 
Defense in the Nuclear Age, by Charles J, Hitch and Roland 
N, McKean; and Planning, Programming, Budgeting; A Systems 
Approach to Management, edited by Fremont J, Lyden and Ernest
total of 888 individuals attend the thirty-one 
courses each year. The sixteen of these courses that were 
identified as not directly applicable to managerial educa­
tional needs account for 376 of these attendees.




The same general conclusion about the scarcity of 
acceptable textbooks in this field is supported when the 
sixteen courses not directly usable for managerial education 
are investigated. The most popular textbook in this group 
of courses is the Lyden and Miller book, which is used by 
five courses. Again six of these courses do not use a 
specific textbook but rely on collections of articles. 
Congressional testimonies, etc. for outside readings.
One other aspect of this managerial educational 
effort should be noted. Prom Table 20 it can be seen that 
only seventeen of the thirty-one courses that contain a 
significant amount of PPBS material can be taken by under­
graduate students. All but two of these seventeen are in 
the group that have twelve or less hours of instruction de­
voted to PPBS. The outlook for undergraduate managerially 
'oriented education in PPBS is even less encouraging. Of the 
eight courses identified that cover the analytical phase of 
PPBS from a managerial orientation, only two will permit 
undergraduate enrollment (one of these is at a service academy 
with no graduate students and the other devotes only twelve 
hours to systems analysis under PPBS). Of the seven courses 
identified that cover all aspects of PPBS from a managerial 
point of view, only two will permit undergraduate enrollment, 
and these two courses devote only eight and twelve hours re­
spectively to this instruction. It then appears that there
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is only a slight possibility of the Federal Government's 
recruiting managerially oriented personnel, trained in PPBS, 




A summary of the earlier chapters will be presented 
and then some general conclusions will be drawn. Finally, 
some recommendations for action and further study will be 
formulated.
Summary o.f Study 
This study developed a conceptual model of PPBS 
training. This model was structured by examining the "ideal" 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System and comparing it to 
the system that currently exists in the Federal Government. 
The overwhelming evidence about the existing system is that 
it has been largely adopted on a superficial, mechanistic 
basis in the nondefense agencies. In the Federal Government, 
only the Department of Defense has a PPB System that can be 
characterized as operating with any degree of significance 
and depth. The system has not resulted in the necessary 
changes to the decision processes of the government because 
governmental managers have not changed the way in which they 
view their problems and translate the solutions of these 
problems into action through the budget. This means that the 
primary requirement is for managers to make a significant
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change in their behavior. This change in behavior is the 
purpose of training.
The cornerstone of this study is the training model. 
Training should be provided extensively to managers in 
agencies of the Federal Government. A viable Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System depends on its enthusiastic 
acceptance by a large percentage of all managers in critical 
line and staff positions of a governmental agency. This 
training cannot be presented in a sterile manner that aims 
only at acquainting managers with the vocabulary of PPBS, 
Instead, the government should pursue a training program 
that causes significant changes in the actions of managers 
by modifying their attitudes, knowledge, and skills.
There are five major areas of training required in 
this managerial training program —  history of PPBS, con­
cepts and techniques of PPBS, implementation of PPBS, and 
utilization of PPBS. Specific learning objectives required 
in each of these areas are described in Chapter VIII. In 
addition, each of the areas is discussed in detail in other 
chapters.
The second major task of this study was an evaluation 
of the current training efforts in the Federal Government. 
This evaluation was performed by comparing the training pro­
vided against the conceptual model that had been formulated. 
Three specific classifications of training were investi­
gated —  that for nondefense agencies; that for the Depart­
ment of Defense; and that of universities and colleges.
423
'Concl’us'l'ons
This study supports a number of conclusions about
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in the Federal
Government. First, it can be concluded that PPBS can play
a major role in the management function of the Federal
Government. Its potential for increasing the rationality
of the governmental decision process is so high that the
goal of achieving a viable government-wide PPBS is one that
must be pursued. Senator Proxmire expressed the view that:
, . . PPB is the most basic and logical planning tool 
which exists.1
The second conclusion of this study is that, with the 
exception of the Department of Defense, the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System has not been implemented in the 
agencies of the Federal Government to any depth. The PPB 
System which now exists appears to be little more than the 
acceptance of a new vocabulary and format with the same 
decision and budgetary process being followed that PPBS was 
designed to change. Further, it can be concluded that one 
of the major reasons for this superficial acceptance of the 
system is the lack of change of behavior of managerial per­
sonnel in the Federal Government.
The survey conducted to compare current training efforts 
on the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in the Federal
^William Proxmire, "Foreword," Analysis and Evalua­
tion , U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Vol. I, 
1969, p. V i .
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Government to the model supports th.e following conclusions:
1. For civilian agencies:
a. The only major PPBS training effort for civilian 
agencies of the Federal Government —  the Planning, Program­
ming, and Budgeting Seminar —  is so dominated by its joint 
purpose of training technicians to operate the PPB System 
that the amount of managerial training provided is severely 
limited.
b. Most of the courses other than this seminar taught 
for the civilian agencies of the Federal Government are 
either too brief to achieve necessary behavioral changes of 
governmental managers or they are too heavily oriented toward 
the needs of technicians who operate the system to be of much 
use to managerial personnel. There are a few courses that 
are directed solely toward the analytical phase of PPBS that 
appear to provide adequate training in this limited area. 
These courses cannot substitute for a training effort that 
encompasses the entire PPB System,
c. The total investment in training in the civilian 
agencies is not adequate to achieve viable PPB Systems.
2. For military agencies:
a. The training in PPBS given in most military profes­
sional schools is too sketchy to achieve a dramatic change 
in behavior. However, some of these schools contain rela­
tively extensive PPBS training and only slight changes would 
be necessary to make this training conform to the model as 
modified for an agency which has an adequate PPB System in
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existence. The major difference between these DOD profes­
sional military schools and the PPB Seminar used by civilian 
agencies is the managerial orientation of the DOD programs 
as opposed to the technician orientation of the civilian 
program.
b. The short training courses used in the Department of 
Defense for PPBS training are adequate for the analytical 
portion of that system but do not cover the total system.
c. The Department of Defense has indicated its willing­
ness to make the necessary heavy investment in training to 
ensure an effective operation of its PPB System.
3. For educational efforts in colleges and universities:
a. There are apparently only a few colleges and univer­
sities that have courses containing a significant amount of 
PPBS education,
b. Most of the educational efforts In those courses 
responding to the survey are oriented so heavily toward the 
political process of budgeting that they are not highly 
applicable to the managerial educational needs of PPBS.
c. Only one PPBS course could be identified that would 
be directly applicable to the training needs in the Federal 
Government. The treatment of the total PPB System in another 
six courses and the analytical portion of PPBS in eight 
courses was adequate for educational purposes, but not de­
tailed enough for specific governmental training needs.
d. Unless PPBS education becomes more extensive in
426
colleges, and universities, the opposition to the PPB System 
will not be gradually reduced by the entry of new college 
graduates into the managerial ranks of the Federal Govern­
ment ,
Recommendations
The recommendations as a result of this study can be 
classified under two general headings —  recommendations for 
action and recommendations for further study. The first 
recommendation for action is that an effective Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System be adopted as far as possible 
by all of the agencies of the Federal Government. This 
adoption should not be a simple transplant of the existing 
forms and procedures from the Department of Defense but an 
attempt to adopt the concept of PPBS throughout the entire 
organization. This action will require a concentrated effort 
to design a system that is best for the particular agency 
involved and to implement this system into the agency.
As a part of the process of implementing PPBS into 
an agency of the Federal Government, a well-co-ordinated, 
complete managerial training effort will play an essential 
role. The alternatives to changing the behavior of managers 
of the agency by training are either (1) to replace all of 
the managers in the agency with individuals who have existing 
behavior patterns that coincide with the one desired, or (2) 
to forego the effective use of the system. Either of these 
alternatives represents a significant cost of not training.
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The training effort necessary in the implementation process 
can be guided by the model presented in Chapter VIII,
The major training effort in connection with PPBS 
that is taught by the U. S. Civil Service Commission, the 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Seminar, should be 
significantly upgraded. This upgrading will probably re­
quire the separation of this seminar into two programs —  
one for analysts and one for managers. In the managerial 
section of this seminar, less attention should be devoted to 
the specific techniques used by analysts and more attention 
paid to the managerial tasks associated with PPBS, Along 
with the changed emphasis of this training program, the 
course should be presented to a much broader population of 
managers of the Federal Government,
Similarly, the training efforts in PPBS should be 
upgraded in the Department of Defense, If it is desired to 
keep the basic managerial training in this department in the 
framework of professional military schools, this can be 
accomplished by a significant increase in the number of hours 
spent on the subject in some of the schools and a broadening 
of the PPBS curriculum in the three schools that already 
have considerable PPBS offerings.
In addition to these direct changes by the Federal 
Government, the instruction in colleges and universities on 
PPBS should also be significantly improved. Basically this 
requires two simultaneous movements. First, PPBS should be 
incorporated in the course offerings of more universities so
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that more students can be exposed to the system. Secondly, 
the courses should be altered to devote more attention to the 
necessary managerial knowledge associated with PPBS, instead 
of the current situation where there is such a high instruc­
tional dominance of political aspects of the system.
The development of adequate training efforts on PPBS 
in the Federal Government and the development of better 
managerially oriented PPBS courses in colleges and universi­
ties can have a synergetic impact on each other. As training 
causes the effectiveness of PPBS in practice in the govern­
ment to increase, more courses will be added in colleges and 
universities in recognition of the higher degree of importance 
of the system. These courses in the colleges will develop 
new managers for governmental activities who will be better 
able to use the system, and its effectiveness will again be 
increased.
In the course of this study were noted a number of 
areas where knowledge about the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System was still fragmentary and sketchy. Further study of 
these areas is desirable. Some of the most critical needs 
for further research include:
1, Much more needs to be known about what an operating PPB 
System costs and what effect it has on the quality of 
decisions.
2. More needs to be known about the training required and 
the adequacy of the current training efforts in the technical 
skills associated with PPBS.
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3. More needs to be known about how a PPB System should be 
Implemented In governmental agencies.
4. A need exists for better action training techniques in 
areas such as the design, implementation, and utilization 
of PPBS.
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System represents 
such a potentially significant tool for the improvement of 
the operations of the Federal Government that training in 
this area should be afforded a high degree of emphasis. This 
study has shown that the most neglected area in PPBS has been 
the training of the managers who are so central to the effec­
tive operations of the system. Training by itself cannot be 
expected to transform the behavior patterns of managers.
These new behavior patterns have to be reinforced by the total 
environment of the organization, including the actions of the 
individual’s superiors, subordinates, and peers as well as 
the general organizational climate and culture. However, an 
extensive and effective managerial training effort is the 
necessary first step in transforming the behavior of managers 















Fleet Marine forces 








Airlift and Sealift 
Airlift 
Sealift
Traffic management and water terminals 
Guard and Reserve Forces
Strategic forces (defensive)
General purpose forces 
Specialized forces 




Research and Development 
Research —  Army 
Research —  Navy 
Research —  Air Force 
Research —  ARPA 
Research —  DASA 
Exploratory development —  Army 
Exploratory development —  Navy 
Exploratory development —  Air Force 
Exploratory development —  ARPA 
Advanced development —  Army 
Advanced development —  Navy 
Advanced development —  Air Force 
Engineering development —  Army
432
Engineering development —  Navy 
Engineering development —  Air Force 
Management and support —  Army 
Management and support —  Navy 
Management and support —  Air Force 
Management and support —  Other 
Logistics 
Supply
Maintenance and service activities 
Other 
Personnel support
Training, medical, and other actitities 
Administration
Command undistributed adjustments 
Net unfinanced
Health, Education and Welfare
Education
Development of basic skills and attitudes 
Development of vocational and occupational skills 
Development of advanced academic and professional skills 




Development of health resources 
Prevention and control of health problems 
Providing health care 
General support 
Vocational Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation for disabling conditions 
General rehabilitation 
Social Services
Improving the social functioning of adults 
Improving the social functioning of the child and family






Other individual and family support 
General support 
International







Manpower Development Assistance 
Education 
Training





Employment market Information 
Placement services 
Special manpower programs 






Pension and retirement 
Research 
Administration 
Wage and Labor Standards
Wages and working conditions 
Occupational safety 
Utilization of women workers 
Research 
Labor-Management Relations
Administration of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act and the Welfare Pension Plans 
Reporting and Disclosure Act 
Veterans reemployment rights 
Labor-management relations assistance 
Research and policy development 
Administration 
Data Collections, Analysis and Dissemination 
Manpower and employment statistics 
Prices and living conditions 
Wages and Industrial relations 
Productivity and technological developments 
Industrial hazards 




Executive direction and management 
Legal services
International labor activities
Source: Listing Furnished by Bureau of the Budget, March 15,
1967, (U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern­
ment Operations, Planning, Programming. Budgeting. 




PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS IN THE MULTI-YEAR 
PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL PLAN (PFP)
The projection of governmental programs over an 
extended period of time requires two decisions:
1, Which programs are to be considered in the projection?
2. At what level of activity are these programs to be 
projected?
In the Federal Government, both of these questions are 
addressed in the guidance to the agencies from the Office of 
Management and Budgeting (formerly the Bureau of the Budget).
Only those programs which are authorized by current 
legislation and those programs which will be proposed for 
enactment during the budgetary year in question are contained 
in the PFP. When activities require annual authorization it 
may be assumed that this authorization will be secured in 
the form last approved by the President. When programs or 
activities have been authorized for several past years but 
the authorizations expire in the current year, it may be 
assumed that the authorization will be renewed, but the 
requirement for renewal must be separately noted. This means 
that an agency which plans to begin a new program, sub­
stantially modify an existing program, or expand an existing 
program in a period subsequent to the budgetary year in 
question would not show this change in the PFP. The PFP 
then becomes a record of the consequences of current program
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decisions, but it is not a plan of an agency for its future 
activities.
The level of programs that are projected is based on 
the extent to which current and past decisions legally, 
contractually, logically, or morally commit expenditures of 
the government. This commitment is difficult to define.
In order to increase the precision of definition, projections 
are divided into the following six classes:
Class T —  Programs controlled by statutory formulas: To
be in Class 1 the recipients and the amounts they are to 
receive must be specified by law. Social Security Payments 
and Veteran’s Compensation are examples of this type of 
program. Future projections are made by specifying the 
number of recipients for the future years.
Class 2 -- Programs controlled by work-load level: This
class includes programs where a specified need is to be met 
with a given quality of service for all qualified recipients. 
The Postal Service is an example of this type of program. 
Class 3 -- Ma'rket-oriented programs ; These programs are 
characterized by government commitment to respond to market 
conditions and are usually met by permanent budget authority. 
Agricultural price supports and interest on the public debt 
are examples of these programs. Usually the PFP includes 
supplementary material that shows the probable range of es­
timates with different environmental assumptions for future 
years.
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Class 4 —  New programs re'qul'rln'g le'gl.sl'af l'on ; All new 
programs are included in this classification. Puture-year 
projections are based on the classification the program 
would otherwise be in.
Class 5 —  Administration commitments ; This classification 
includes the programs that the President has publically and 
specifically committed the administration to change, and the 
changes are to occur after the proposed budget year.
Class 6 —  Programs controlled by the level of appropriations: 
This classification includes most grants, foreign assis­
tance, construction, research, service, and lending programs. 
Projections are made on a flat or declining trend, regardless 
of the projection of program needs (such as population 
served). There are two subdivisions of this classification;
Class 6a —  Construction and acquisition of major 
capitaT" items : Equipment should have a five-year cost of
$5 million or more to be included in this classification.
Major modernization or mechanization of equipment in programs 
that are normally in other classes is included here. The 
projection includes the full cost even if budget authority 
is not to be requested until subsequent budget years.
Class 6b — : Ongoing costs : All ongoing costs and minor
capital items are in this class. No increases can be shown 
beyond the budget year. Decreases are shown when appropriate,
e.g., when pilot or demonstration projects are completed.
Normally price levels and federal pay rates are
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assumed to be constant. However, where the program is 
highly sensitive to price-level changes (e.g., debt interest, 
agricultural price supports, and payments to retired per­
sonnel), future-year trends are based on the assumption 
that the price levels will change the same as they have in 
the past five years.
These projections of expenses are expressed for each 
agency in a summary table by each classification of commit­
ment. The totals in this summary table correspond to the 
totals for all of the agency’s programs.
Source: U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau
of the Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) 




COMPONENTS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS







All of these are present in each analysis even if not 
explicitly stated. The relationship between the components 
is shown in Figure 6.
Objectives
The primary purpose of undertaking systems analysis 
is to assist in decision-making. The first, and probably the 
major, task of the systems analyst is to determine what the 
objectives of the decision-maker are —  or, more importantly, 
what they should be. The determination of the objective is 
central to all components of analysis. Alternatives, models, 
costs, and effectiveness are all derived from the statement 
of objectives. Until one knows exactly what is to be accom­
plished, any information about what is currently being accom­
plished or what can be accomplished is largely irrelevant.
If the objective chosen is incorrect the wrong problem 
is solved. This means that the analyst cannot simply accept
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the objective as originally stated but must subject it to 
extensive analysis. This is done by broadening the objective 
and seeing what effect this process has on the problem at 
hand. For example, in the area of transportation an analyst 
might be given an objective of building highways. If this 
is broadened to transporting people and goods effectively, 
efficiently, and safely, there are more alternatives —  e.g., 
rail, air, and water modes of transportation —  and the 
analysis is substantially changed.
During analysis of objectives the analyst is required 
to balance two extremes. At one extreme almost all govern­
mental objectives could be called "contribution to national 
welfare," but this objective is too broad for any practical 
use. At the opposite extreme, objectives can be defined so 
narrowly that significant alternatives are foreclosed Cas 
was the case in the objective of building highways). Be­
tween these two extremes the analyst must define in opera­
tional terms the objective of the analysis, keeping the 
objective low enough to be tractable and high enough not to 
eliminate significant alternatives.
In establishing the objective of an analysis it is 
important not to lose sight of the common need for multiple 
objectives. While analysis is simpler when a single objective 
can be defined, it should be remembered that the purpose of 
analysis is to provide information to the decision-maker and 
not to make life simple for the analyst. Many governmental
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problems have multiple, incommensurate, and often conflicting 
objectives.! Any analysis which ignores these or tries to 
force them artificially into a single objective can seriously 
distort the decision.
Criteria
The component of criteria in systems analysis is the 
rule or standard used to weigh the cost and effectiveness of 
alternatives to determine a preferred alternative and to 
decide if the effectiveness achieved by that alternative is 
worth the cost to be expended. Obviously if the objectives 
of a problem are multidimensional, the criteria must also be 
mult idimens ional.
Criteria are seldom simple. Only if there is a 
single objective which can be measured on a single scale can 
the criteria be simply stated as maximizing effectiveness for 
a specified cost or minimizing cost for a specified level of 
effectiveness. Often only a part of the problem can be 
handled by a direct application of quantifiable criteria, and 
the decision-maker must be presented with data on effective­
ness and cost without a firm recommendation.
In devising criteria to be used in systems analysis 
the following rules are appropriate;
1. The criteria should be specifically related to the
^An example of this occurs in the area of law en­
forcement. The objective of reducing crime is constrained 
by the objective for ensuring that the basic rights of indi­
viduals are protected.
442
objectives of the problem at hand.
2. Suboptimization criteria (criteria for a part of the 
problem) should be used with great care. It should be en­
sured that the achievement of the suboptimization criteria 
will assist in the achievement of the larger objectives of 
the problem.
3. The attempt to define a single criterion for an analysis 
should be handled with great caution. All aspects of the 
objective must be considered, and any arbitrary weighting of 
objectives that obscures, rather than highlights, meaningful 
information should be rejected.
Effectiveness 
All of the problems in defining criteria also exist 
in defining effectiveness. Effectiveness is the measure of 
the extent to which the objectives of the problem are achieved 
within an established time frame and under specified environ­
mental conditions.
A separate measure of effectiveness is obviously re­
quired for each objective of the problem. Ideally each 
measure of effectiveness should be quantifiable but this is 
not always possible, and narrative analyses of qualitative 
considerations are often necessary.
One of the major contributions of analysis is devising 
proximate measures of effectiveness.^ These are practical
^The term "proximate measure of effectiveness" is bor­
rowed from Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. MeKean, The Econo­
mics' of Defense in the Nuclear Age.
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substitutes for direct measurements of the effectiveness of 
programs. For example, the assured destruction capability 
of offensive strategic military forces is often used as a 
proximate measure of effectiveness for the deference of 
nuclear war. In the use of proximate measures of effective­
ness it is necessary to remember that the scales are also 
only proximate, A specified per cent increase of the prox­
imate measure does not necessarily mean the same per cent 
increase in effectiveness. Sometimes the best that can be 
hoped for in proximate measures of effectiveness is some 
measurable unit that points in the right direction, with 
the scale becoming almost meaningless.
In devising measures of effectiveness in systems 
analysis the analyst again has to balance his efforts between 
two extremes. Generally the broader the measure of effec­
tiveness the better it relates to the objectives of the 
problem, but the more difficult it is to quantify and use in 
the analytic portion of the analysis. The more narrow the 
measure of effectiveness, the easier the analytic effort be­
comes, but the less it relates to the problem at hand.
Some rules on devising measures of effectiveness are:
1. Measures of effectiveness must be related to the objec­
tives of the problem, and generally there must be at least 
one measure of effectiveness for each objective,
2. Measures of effectiveness must be thoroughly defined,
3. The limitations of comprehensiveness and scale must be
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recognized on all measures of effectiveness.
4. Measurements of program size are necessary, but they are 
not sufficient as measures of effectiveness (e.g., the 
number of aircraft that can be purchased by using an alter­
native is important, but complete measures of effectiveness 
must consider what these aircraft will do in relation to the 
objectives of the problem),
5. Ideal measures of effectiveness are quantifiable, but 
it should be recognized that complete, comprehensive, quan­
titative measures of effectiveness are normally impossible. 
Qualitative measures of effectiveness should not be ignored.
Costs
Measurement of costs associated with alternatives is 
easier than measurement of effectiveness largely because 
quantitative data supporting cost measurement is available 
and data supporting measures of effectiveness is sketchy or 
nonexistent. It should, however, be recognized that the use 
of dollars in the measurement of costs is itself a proximate 
measure. Actually the concern in evaluating alternatives is 
the amount of resources consumed. Market value of these re­
sources is a convenient measure of the amount of resources 
used, but it is not a perfect one. On occasion it might be 
preferable to use a more specific measure of costs (especially 
when the resource in question is critical or in limited
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supply) in addition to the dollar measurement.^
There are several principles of costs that are rele­
vant to systems analysis ;
1. Future costs are used. The first and most complicating 
feature of cost is that the analyst is concerned with future 
cost, not with present cost. This fact introduces many 
forms of uncertainty into the analysis: uncertainty that 
the system will change before completion of the relevant 
time frame; uncertainty that the environment will change 
before completion; uncertainty about the cost-estimating 
relationships themselves —  basic data, extrapolation errors, 
etc.
2. Time of cost incurrence must be considered. A second 
principle of systems analysis is that cost must be time- 
phased. To be comparable to other alternatives, costs must
pbe discounted.
3. Incremental costs must be used. In the comparison of 
alternatives it is incremental, and not total costs, which 
are important. The concept of incremental costs will vary 
depending on the exact analysis involved. While total cost 
is important for many purposes, "sunk costs" do not have a 
place in cost-effectiveness analysis.
lEven if it were cost-effective, it would be non­
sensical to have a program that required a semiannual medical 
examination for every person in the United States if the 
medical personnel and facilities did not exist that could 
handle this work-load.
^Discounting of costs is discussed in Appendix A-6.
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4. Opportunity costs must be used. Th.e problem of costs is 
further complicated by the necessity to use opportunity 
costs. "Opportunity costs" means the cost of benefits that 
are foregone because of the choice of a particular alterna­
tive. The use of opportunity cost modifies the rule of 
"sunk, cost" to some degree. To say unequivocally that there 
is no cost in a piece of equipment on hand implies a lack of 
understanding of opportunity cost. If this equipment can
be used for another purpose, or sold, it has opportunity 
value and this value is the cost of retaining the equipment 
in its present use.
5. Full cost must be used. The principle of the use of 
full cost does not conflict with the principle of the use of 
incremental cost. "Full cost" means that all costs of an 
alternative must be considered regardless of where they are 
incurred. It is common practice for public agencies to 
operate to minimize their costs and, in so doing, shift 
costs to other agencies or to the general public. Included 
also in the principle of full costs is the need to consider 
costs which are nonfinancial. These are difficult to esti­
mate, and qualitative estimates may be necessary.
6. Meaningful cost categories are necessary. In systems 
analysis a meaningful division of cost categories should be 
devised. In the Department of Defense, costs are broken into 
three categories —  Research and Development, Investment, and 
Operating. The timing of the typical incurrence of these 









Research and Development - Development of a new capability to 
the point of introduction into production 
Investment - Costs required beyond the development phase to 
equip forces with new capability 
Operation - Recurring costs to operate and maintain the 
capability
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The use of these three breakouts of cost Is advan­
tageous from two points of view. Visibility of the effect 
of the expenditure is increased since each of these cost 
categories has a different impact on capability. Operation 
funds have a definite impact on current capability but a 
negligible impact on future capability (other than keeping 
existing systems in "good" condition). Investment funds do 
not affect current capability, but they have a significant 
effect on the short-term future capability. Research and 
Development funds do not affect current or short-term 
future capabilities, but they have a significant impact on 
the long-term future capability.
In addition to this advantage, the broad division of 
funds into these categories ties into the "branch point" 
where a critical decision on a program is necessary. The 
decision to proceed from R&D to Investment represents a major 
decision on the allocation of significant amounts of funds 
in future years for investment and operation.
In nondefense agencies some other breakout (such as 
distinguishing between operating and "grant" costs) may be 
appropriate. A meaningful classification scheme for costs 
greatly increases the illumination properties of systems 
analysis,
7. Relative rather than absolute accuracy is necessary.
Since costs in systems analysis are future costs, absolute 
accuracy of prediction is impossible. In analyzing costs for 
cost-effectiveness analysis, it is more important that
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relative accuracy be attained rather than absolute accuracy. 
With relative accuracy as a goal, only costs which change 
from one alternative to the next need to be considered.
For the purposes of cost-benefit analysis all of the 
costs that the alternative creates are the proper subject for 
analysis. The question of whether the benefits accruing are 
worth the costs being expended is one that can be answered 
only if all costs are identified with some degree of preci­
sion, This is a major reason why cost-effectiveness analysis 
is normally more helpful in decision-making than cost-benefit 
analysis,
8, Uncertainty must be considered. The final principle of 
costs in systems analysis is that uncertainty existing in 
the estimates must be explicitly recognized. This means 
that ranges of costs must be presented for possible statis­
tical errors and for various contingencies.
Model
The model is the component of systems analysis that 
abstracts important relationships between alternatives, 
effectiveness, costs, and the environment. In order to cope 
with the host of variables in any problem, the model identi­
fies the interrelationships and variables which are crucial 
and suppresses the others. For these crucial variables, 
cause-and-effect interrelationships are determined so that 
effectiveness and cost consequences of various alternatives 
can be explored.
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It Is not necessary that all of the relationships in 
a systems analysis model be stated in a mathematical format. 
Logically derived relationships often must be used, especially 
where qualitative aspects of the problem are important.
In the construction of the model it is essential that 
assumptions regarding which factors are relevant and their 
interdependencies be explicit. These assumptions are then 
open for study, criticism, evaluation, and improvement.
It is important to note that the model is not equiva­
lent to the real problem. By definition, all models are 
incomplete, idealized abstractions of the real world. The 
test of adequacy of a model is not complexity but ability 
to predict the consequences of alternatives.
It is also important to understand that there is no 
single form of model best for all problems. The model in a 
specific systems analysis depends both on what is being 
modeled and on the questions that are being asked.
The process of structuring the model has benefits 
beyond the ability of the finished model to predict costs and 
effectiveness. The breaking down of a complex system into 
its component parts and observing their interactions provides 
the analyst and decision-maker a clearer understanding of the 
problem. Also the model, with component parts and interactions 
explicitly exposed, serves as a precise structure for commun­
ication between the analyst, decision-maker, and appropriate 
experts.
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To this point in the discussion it has been assumed 
that there is a single model for each systems analysis. In 
reality, most systems analyses require a multiplicity of 
models. These can usually be classified into effectiveness 
models and cost models. The effectiveness model translates 
the output of alternatives described in operational terms 
into measures of effectiveness. For example, in a strategic 
warfare model the performance characteristics (speed, pay­
load capacity, etc.) of the aircraft and missiles under 
consideration would be the description of the alternatives. 
The model translates these performance capabilities into a 
meaningful measure of effectiveness such as assumed destruc­
tion capability for a selected group of targets. In the 
effectiveness model environmental characteristics play an 
important role. In the strategic warfare example the type 
of war, the political constraints, and the enemy’s capability 
are central factors for consideration.
In concept the cost model is much easier to construct 
and operate. The steps involved in cost-estimating include:
1. Defining the alternative in detail, including a complete 
description of the equipment or program, and its operating 
concepts and policies;
2. Collecting cost data;
3. Converting the alternative into a description of all of 
the resources needed;
4. Costing out the resource requirements.
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Cost model construction Is, however, seldom that simple. An 
attempt to individually cost out all of the items in a large 
complex system becomes expensive drudgery, and because of 
the lack of accuracy that is usually found in early system 
descriptions, the finite accuracy implied by such an approach 
is misleading.!
For this reason it is often necessary to find methods 
that allow quick estimates of costs in systems analysis.
This is usually accomplished by relating some broad perfor­
mance characteristic of the system to an element of cost in 
a statistically derived equation. For example,in the Depart­
ment of Defense one equation used for the nonrecurring en­
gineering cost of airframes is :
Dollars = 14 8%0'54w0.88 
where is the maximum speed in knots for the aircraft and 
W is the estimated weight of the aircraft in pounds.2 The 
Department of Defense has formulated many of these equations, 
called Cost-Estimating-Relationships CCER’s) for different 
equipment. Research and Development, and Investment costs.
^For example, the detailed "grass roots" approach to 
pricing the C-5A required the efforts of sixty persons for 
approximately four months each on a system that was relatively 
well defined at the time the estimate was made. The high 
degree of cost-error in that estimate is a testimony of the 
futility of attempting to precisely price each part of a 
complex system during the early stages of analysis. (Donald 
B. Rice, "Cost Analysis in the Department of Defense,"
Reading's in Co^and Management —  Analytical Methods. U . S., 
Department of Defense, Department of the Army, p. 31-23.)
^J. D. McCullough, Cost-Analysis for Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting Cost-Benefit Studies, p. .
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It is obvious that the final product of the cost 
model is dominated by uncertainties. CER’s themselves con­
tain statistical error. In addition, the performance para­
meters of the proposed alternative as well as the environ­
mental and operating conditions of the problem are all 
highly uncertain.
A final complication in cost models is the need to 
time—phase the cost. The model cannot be indifferent to the 
time of cost incurrence. Of course environmental aspects 
greatly effect the time when cost will be expended. The 
necessity for time-phasing then adds another element of un­
certainty to the model.
Alternatives
Systems analysis is predicated on the assumptions 
that alternative ways exist to achieve given governmental 
objectives and that these alternatives should be considered 
by the decision-maker. If there is, in fact, only one way 
to achieve a properly defined objective, it would be in­
appropriate to expend time and money conducting a systems 
analysis.
The process of conducting analysis is itself a source 
of alternatives. The investigation of the objective, es­
pecially when the objective can be broadened, suggests alter­
natives that might have been neglected. Also the determina­
tion of criteria and measures of effectiveness suggests new 
alternatives, to the analyst and the decision-maker. Finally
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the process of constructing the model to be used in analysis 
is a powerful source of alternatives. By exposing the 
major variables and interactions, the model can suggest 
better ways to accomplish a given objective.
Summary
Each of these components has been discussed separately. 
It is obvious that they interact greatly with one another.
For example, the capability of the model partially determines 
the measures of effectiveness that can be used since it would 
be nonsensical to devise a sophisticated effectiveness mea­
sure if th.e different alternatives could not be compared 
using that measure. The interaction of the components can 
be seen more easily by the discussion in Appendix A-4 of the 
process followed in the analysis of a problem. All of these 
components exist in almost every decision-making situation,
A virtue of systems analysis is that they are made open and 
explicit rather than remaining hidden.
Sources: The following sources supplied most of the back­
ground for the above discussion of components of 
systems analysis:
1. Analysis for Military Decisions, ed. by E. S. Quade.
2. Systems' Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in
Defense. ed. by E. S. (jjuade and W. i. feoucher.
3. Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear




PROCESS OP SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The process of systems analysis Is distinctive and 
can be divided into the five stages shown in Figure 8, In 
this figure the iterative nature of this cycle is emphasized, 
At any stage of the analysis the analyst can return to an 
earlier stage to refine it on the basis of additional infor­
mation received. This commonly occurs in the analysis of 
most complex problems.
Formulation
The formulation stage of the process of systems 
analysis is perhaps the most important. During this stage 
questions to be answered are determined and the context in 
which, these questions are to be answered is defined. This 
determination of the questions to be answered is central to 
the analysis. By determining the objectives to be sought, 
the scope of the problem is effectively set. The general 
rule in establishing the scope of the problem is to expand 
it until the most important interactions are included. This 
general rule must be tempered with the knowledge that the 
problems must be in a tractable form. If any important 
interactions are excluded from the scope of the problem in 
order to retain manageable proportions, they should be con­
sidered in the interpretation stage.
Tentative measures of effectiveness and assumptions
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FIGURE 8







to be used in the analysis are formulated, and the important 
variables that will be operating on the problem are deter­
mined during formulation. Important variables are deter­
mined by their effect on the problem. If the variable does 
not significantly effect the problem, it should be excluded. 
Insensitivity of the problem to the values of certain 
variables can occur because the variable is trivial or be­
cause the variable affects all of the alternatives under 
question in the same manner. Once the important variables 
have been identified, they are usually aggregated to make 
the problem more manageable.
When this tentative list of important variables has 
been established, tentative relationships between them are 
established. These relationships are often sketchy at this 
point because of the lack of empirical data.
It is important to note the general process that is 
followed in the formulation stage. First the problem is 
expanded as far as possible. Then it is decomposed .to note 
significant variables. Finally these variables are aggregated 
to make the problem size more manageable, and relationships 
are established between these variables.
The end result of the formulation stage is a set of 
hypotheses concerning:
1. the proper scope of the problem;
2. the proper objectives of the problem;
3. the major variables acting in the problem; and
4. the interactions between these variables.
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All of these hypotheses are tentative and are usually re­
vised in subsequent stages of the analysis. This is the 
primary reason that the cycle in iterative. However, it is 
important that these hypotheses be formulated at this stage 
of the analysis. This gives structure to the remaining 
steps in the analysis. It is equally important that these 
sketchy hypotheses not be accepted as absolute in subsequent 
stages. They must each be subjected to analysis to determine 
if they are in fact valid. The scope of the problem and 
objectives must be continually investigated to ensure that 
they are correct. Variables that were excluded from the 
analysis because of the insensitivity of the problem must 
be assessed continually to ensure that this exclusion is 
still correct.- Interrelationships between variables must 
be defined more explicitly in the subsequent stages and 
should be subjected to continuous testing for validity.
Search
This phase is concerned with the collection of data 
to be used throughout the analysis. The search phase is 
guided, but not totally restricted, by the hypotheses formu­
lated earlier. In addition to facts to support or reject 
the hypotheses already formulated, possible alternatives are 
a subject of search. Not only obvious alternatives but 
hidden alternatives and improvements of the obvious alterna­
tives should be the subject of this search. The active 
search for alternatives does not imply that all possible
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alternatives will be investigated. To make the analysis 
manageable it is normally necessary to exclude some alter­
natives from detailed consideration. This exclusion should 
not be performed arbitrarily, but should be a subject of 
analysis itself. The reasons for excluding some alternatives 
from consideration should be explicitly stated and period­
ically re-evaluated.
A major part of the search phase is devoted to filling 
out the relationships between major variables. Detailed 
cause-and-effect relationships should be formulated and 
verified. Cost-estimating relationships are also formulated.
The search phase could be extended indefinitely since 
there is no end to the amount of information possible in any 
major analysis. Most search phases are incomplete because 
of time and cost limitations of data-gathering. Even if 
cost and time were unlimited, it is doubtful if all data 
could be gathered. Some tests that would provide valuable 
information are practically impossible.^ As a result of 
this, one of the most difficult decisions during analysis is 
where to stop gathering data. There is no set rule for 
determining this. The time available for decision, the cost 
of additional data and the probable impact if the information 
is not received must be considered and a decision on when to
Ipor example, the reaction of a military enemy to the 
use of a tactical nuclear weapon in a limited conflict could 
be a valuable input to some analytic efforts. The political 
cost of using a nuclear weapon merely to gather information 
for analysis would be prohibitively high.
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proceed to other phases made.
Explanation
The first step In the explanation phase Is the con­
struction of the model to be used to Investigate effective­
ness and cost Implications of various alternatives. This 
model Integrates the variables and their Interactions which 
are Important to the problem.
Once the model has been formulated, computations and 
comparisons of the various alternatives take place. The end 
result should be a listing of all alternatives and their 
effectiveness. Because of the uncertainty existing In most 
systems analysis. It Is doubtful If any one presentation of 
effectiveness and cost measures Is possible.^
Interpretation
The Interpretation phase of systems analysis Is where 
the analyst and declslon-maker view the product of the model 
and subject It to critical questioning. These questions 
Investigate the effect of variables omitted from the model 
(particularly qualitative aspects of the problem); Investi­
gate the reasonableness of the assumptions made; and consider 
uncertainties. Finally a conclusion Is reached.
It Is possible that during Interpretation none of the 
alternatives are acceptable. In this case It might be
^The treatment of uncertainty Is discussed In more 
detail In Appendix A-5.
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necessary to redefine the problem, including the objectives 
and criteria, and search for new alternatives.
Verification
This phase normally involves the testing of the con­
clusions by experiment. It should be recognized that veri­
fication in a rigid sense is not always possible since ex­
perimentation in many real-world situations, particularly 
most military problems, is virtually impossible. The closest 
that one can come to scientific precision in this case is 
to open the analysis for criticism and debate.
Summary
Based on the discussion above, a more detailed process 
chart of the process of systems analysis can be constructed 
(Figure 9). This figure shows the major steps in each of the 
five stages. The normal flow of systems analysis is noted 
by solid lines. Broken lines show the major elements causing 
the process to cycle. For example, during Step 9» "Build 
Model," it is often necessary to return to Steps 6 and 7.^
In view of the potentially infinite cycling of the 
systems analysis process, a decision must be made when each 
step is adequate and no further cycling is necessary.
Analysis of a complex system is never perfectly complete.
All of the cycle movements of the process are not 
shown. For example, it might be necessary to go from Step 9 
to any of the previous steps in the cycle and not just to 
Steps 6 and 7.
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FIGURE 9

















































Test by Experiment/ 
Criticism
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The object is to have a partial analysis which is as mean­
ingful as possible. All systems analyses follow this general 
process. One of the aspects of systems analysis that dis­
tinguishes it from alternative forms of decision-making is 
the open and explicit nature of the various steps shown in 
this process. This is considerably different than decision­
making by purely intuitive means, which obscures the entire 
process between determining objectives and reaching a solu­
tion.
Source: This discussion was adapted from E. S. Quade,
"Methods and Procedures," Analysis for Military 
Decisions, ed. by E. S. Quade, pp. 15b-Yb.
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APPENDIX A-5
TREATMENT OP UNCERTAINTY IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
One of the characteristics of the problems upon 
which systems analysis operates is that a large amount of 
uncertainty exists. One of the major advantages of the use 
of systems analysis is its explicit treatment of this uncer­
tainty.
Actual Uncertainty and Risk 
Before discussing the treatment of uncertainty, it 
is necessary to draw a technical distinction between two 
forms of uncertainty:
Situations of risk where the uncontrollable random event 
comes from a population which has a known probability dis­
tribution;
Situations' of actual uncertainty where the uncontrollable 
random event comes from a population where the probability 
distribution is not even known.^
Two aspects of these definitions should be accented. 
Both risk and uncertainty are characterized by uncontrollable 
random events. If the event is controllable it becomes a 
variable in the analysis itself. The difference between risk 
and uncertainty is knowledge of the probability of a random
For purposes of convenience, actual uncertainty will 
be referred to as uncertainty without continual reference to 
the "actual" in the remainder of this Appendix.
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occurrence. Of course this knowledge of the probability of 
occurrence is often sketchy itself.
It is improper to consider these two as interchange­
able during analysis. Analysis which arbitrarily assigns 
probability values to uncertainty in order to make it more 
tractable to calculation has to make some rather arbitrary 
assumptions which could lead to incorrect conclusions.^ Of 
course some situations of uncertainty can be converted into 
situations of risk by further analysis, data-gathering, or 
experimentation. This may contribute to a more usable 
analytic product.
Use of uncertainty in analysis implies some knowledge 
about the possible events even if the probability of the 
occurrence of these events is unknown. If knowledge is so 
limited that possible states cannot even be predicted, it 
is doubtful if systems analysis will be able to provide 
much insight into the consequences of uncertainty.
Sources of Uncertainty and Risk 
The basic source of uncertainty comes because analysis 
is concerned with the future. The further into the future 
that analysis attempts to penetrate, the more pervasive be­
comes the element of uncertainty. The sources of uncertainty
The treatment of uncertainty by assigning probability 
values is improperly recommended by some writers. For 
example, see U. S., Department of Defense, Department of the 
Army, Decision Analysis Using Present Value Techniques, by 
George B. Williams, James È. Butterfield, and Mary S. 
Biagioli, and Prank J. Husic, Cost Uncertainty Analysis.
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and risk can be described by four broad classifications : 
planning factor uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, 
technological uncertainty, and personal reaction uncertainty.
There are both uncertainty and risk involved in 
planning factors in systems analysis. The way that a program 
is to operate in the future is always unknown. Some elements 
can be assigned specific probabilities and others cannot.
For example, the chance variation of dispersal in bombing 
errors can usually be assigned a probability distribution. 
However, in an advanced system there is an element of un­
certainty on even the average size of the bombing error to 
be achieved. Planning factor uncertainty is most often seen 
in the formulation of cause-and-effect relationships and 
operates on both the cost and effectiveness parts of the model. 
In developing cost-estimating relationships, statistical 
error is always present since a relationship that allows 
"perfect fitting" of data is seldom possible. The transla­
tion of alternatives into performance rates and then into 
measures of effectiveness is subject to a high degree of un­
certainty which, is usually greater than the possible sta­
tistical errors faced in cost analysis.
Probably the most pervasive form of uncertainty in 
systems analysis comes from the environment. These uncer­
tainties often dominate all others. In military situations 
the scope of future conflicts (local or general), their lo­
cation, and the political constraints are all critical to
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analysis. In nondefense programs the state of the economy, 
price-level changes, etc. often have a major bearing on the 
analysis and the proposed alternatives.
Technological uncertainty is also everpresent* Of 
course technological uncertainty increases the further one 
attempts to push the state of the art. Technological uncer­
tainty is then a major factor in programs with a high tech­
nological content.
Finally there is a source of uncertainty regarding 
the reactions of individuals who interact with the system.
In military systems analysis this is primarily manifested 
in the reaction of th.e enemy and is one of the most com­
plicating factors of analysis. It cannot be assumed that 
th.e enemy will not change as a result of program decisions; 
yet, it also cannot be assumed that he will be omniscient 
and make changes that perfectly negate any advancements 
that the program promises.
A form of personal reaction uncertainty also exists 
in many nondefense programs. For example, the reaction of 
the individuals in the work force to "guaranteed income" is 
highly uncertain. One advantage of the nondefense programs 
is that much of this uncertainty can be reduced to risk by
f ■
experimentation, while experimentation with enemy reactions 
can be expensive both in resources consumed and in political 
costs.
Environmental, technological, and personal reaction
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uncertainty affect both costs and effectiveness. This means 
that outputs of analysis cannot be considered as perfectly 
finite or absolute.
Handling Uncertainty and Risk 
The most sweeping generalization about uncertainty 
and risk in systems analysis is that they cannot be ignored. 
Some writers advocate an approach to uncertainty and risk 
of calculating an expected value and maximizing this. The 
use of such an approach is subject to the following criti­
cisms :
1. It is assumed that a valid probability distribution is 
known for all chance variables. While this is true for 
risk, it is incorrect for uncertainty. To calculate an ex­
pected value when uncertainty exists, one must either ignore 
the uncertainty or arbitrarily weight each possible state
of uncertainty with a probability. Either of these could 
lead to grossly misleading results.
2. Even where only risk exists, the use of an expected value 
as a sole criterion is questionable. This presumes that the 
decision-maker is indifferent to the range of values. This 
presumption is seldom true. Consider the case shown in 
Figure 10. Here the decision-maker may want to choose alter­
native B with a lower expected value because of its smaller 
variation.
Two other methods of handling uncertainty (used par­
ticularly in calculating benefit/cost ratios in the natural
FIGURE 10







EV - Expected Value of Effectiveness
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resource areas) are shortening the time horizon and/or 
raising the discount rate used in the evaluation. These 
methods are questionable. When one adjusts the discount rate 
and/or shortens the time horizon to compensate for uncer­
tainty, the uncertainty is treated implicitly and not ex­
plicitly. The effects of uncertainty are then hidden from 
the decision-maker.^
One of the major techniques used to treat uncertainty
2is sensitivity analysis. In sensitivity analysis planning 
parameters are allowed to vary over a relevant range, and 
the effect on costs and effectiveness is noted. The result 
of sensitivity analysis is a set of sensitivity curves. A 
group of typical sensitivity curves is shown in Figure 11.
The major considerations in the interpretation of sensitivity 
curves are the slope and the shape of the curve. In Figure 
11, curve A indicates that the cost or effectiveness is 
relatively insensitive to the characteristic being varied.
By contrast the characteristic shown by curve B is very sen­
sitive. Curve C illustrates the case where cost and effec­
tiveness is sensitive in the lower range but insensitive in 
the higher range. Curve D indicates a characteristic which
The use of an increased discount rate to handle risk 
or uncertainty can also have the opposite reaction to the 
one desired. This is discussed in Appendix A-6.
2In its common usage, "sensitivity analysis" is used 
to treat uncertainty associated with planning factors. The 
treatment of uncertainty from environmental and technological 








is sensitive in the lower range and acutely sensitive in the 
higher range.
For illustrative purposes the above curves have been 
constructed with a single line. In most practical situations 
the sensitivity curves would appear more like Figure 12. On 
this curve the effectiveness or cost for each system char­
acteristic is not calculated only at a finite point, but 
statistical uncertainties in cost and performance calculations 
are recognized and a range of possible values presented.
This range of values is most important when the range varies 
with the characteristic (as is the case in Figure 12).
There are cases where the program characteristic in­
volved does not lend itself to quantification on a numerical 
scale. Sensitivity analysis is still possible using quali­
tative descriptions of the characteristic. In the Department 
of Defense it is common to use three estimates —  optimistic, 
pessimistic, and most likely —  and to determine a statistical 
range of possible values for each of these.
Another technique used in systems analysis to treat 
uncertainty is contingency analysis. Here the analyst 
answers the important "what if" questions. Different envir­
onmental, technological, and personal reaction contingencies 
are postulated, and alternatives are evaluated for each of 
them.
Also uncertainty can be explicitly handled by sub­
jecting an alternative to a fortiori analysis. In this case.
FIGURE 12
SENSITIVITY CURVE WITH RISK ADDED
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the question is asked of every possible contingency and pro­
gram characteristic —  what Is the worst that can happen 
from the point of view of the preferred alternative? All 
uncertainties are resolved In favor of this worst possible 
case, and the alternative which appears to be preferred Is 
compared to other alternatives In this state. Obviously If 
the preferred alternative retains Its edge or even remains 
close In costs and effectiveness to other alternatives In 
these circumstances, this Is a powerful argument for Its 
adoption.
Effect of Uncertainty Analysis on Decisions
The purpose of uncertainty analysis Is the same as 
all other parts of systems analysis —  to provide Information 
to the declslon-maker for a better-informed decision. It 
has already been noted that a declslon-maker might choose an 
alternative with a smaller expected pay-off because of the 
greater certainty of a minimum level of results. The declslon- 
maker may also wish to compromise cost or effectiveness In 
one circumstance or contingency to ensure a minimum (maximum) 
level of effectiveness (cost) In another circumstance or 
contingency.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of uncertainty 
analysis Is Its effect on the design of alternatives. One 
of the primary purposes of systems analysis Is to try to find 
"better" ways of accomplishing objectives. One of the char­
acteristics of these "better" ways Is the Insensitivity of
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their costs and effectiveness to different contingencies and 
uncertainties. Often this Insensitivity Is attained by 
"hedging" (using a mix of alternatives) to ensure a higher 
degree of capability across the entire range of possible 
circumstances. Another form of "hedging" occurs when the 
knowledge of uncertainty keeps the declslon-maker from making 
a firm decision. In order to reduce uncertainty It Is de­
cided to gather more knowledge about the system. Its envir­
onment, future technology, and possible personal reactions. 
Another beneficial result of uncertainty analysis Is to 
highlight the specific areas where Increased knowledge would 
be beneficial. Areas where costs or effectiveness are un­
certain can be subjected to a higher level of experimentation 
and research to reduce the range of variability.
The fact that the explicit treatment of uncertainty 
by systems analysis allows a better-informed decision does 
not Imply that the decision-maker's task Is simplified. 
Actually, the requirement for decision may be complicated 
because the declslon-maker must explicitly face uncertainty 
that he was unaware of before systems analysis. The choice 
between alternatives A, B, and C In Figure 13a Is difficult 
enough. This difficulty Is compounded by noting the envelope 
of possible outcomes of alternatives as shown in Figure 13b.
One practical caution should be expressed In regard 
to the treatment of uncertainty In systems analysis. It Is 
no more possible to treat In analytic detail each possible 
contingency or each possible performance characteristic than
FIGURE 13
















it is. to investigate every alternative possible or to include 
all variables in the model. Some preliminary screening, of 
states and parameters to be subjected to sensitivity and 
contingency analysis must take place. It is important that 
this screening be performed openly and as empirically as 
possible to ensure that the most significant features are 
investigated. Even without total inclusiveness, the explicit 
treatment of uncertainty by systems analysis remains one of 
its primary strengths as a decision aid.
Sources: The following were the primary sources used in
developing this appendix:
1. Systems' Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in
Defense, ed.'by E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher. ' ^
2. ' Analysis' for' Miiifary Decisions, ed. by E. S. Quade.
3. P. 8. Pardee, The Financial Portion of a Management 
information System.
4. Charles J. Hitch, An Appreciation of Systems Analysis.
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APPENDIX A-6
DISCOUNT RATES IN SYSTEMS AN^YSIS
The area of systems analysis and cost-beneflt analysis 
that has received the greatest academic attention has been 
the handling of time in the calculation of net benefits and 
costs. The time element is critical since resources are not 
necessarily expended and benefits are not necessarily re­
ceived at one specific time. For example, if a dam is con­
structed there is a large initial investment cost; there are 
continuing operational costs; and benefits (flood control, 
recreation, hydroelectric power, etc.) continue to accrue for 
the life of the dam. Since money itself has a time value 
(i.e., one dollar consumed today is worth more than a dollar 
comsumed one year from today), the valuation method used in 
benefit-cost analysis must include some form of discounting 
of future benefits and costs. In this regard, cost-benefit 
analysis is similar to investment analysis in industry.^
Different Discount Rates Proposed 
Proposed discount rates can be classified into four 
general schools. These are:
1. Using the rate of return of capital in private industry.^
^Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting, pp. 626-32.
2jacob A. Stockfisch, "The Interest Rate Applicable 
to Government Investment Projects," Program Budgeting and 
Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley'H. HlnrlcHs' and Graeme 
M. Taylor,pp. 1H7-2Ô1.
479
2. Using a social cost rate which, uses a weighted average 
of source of funds by financing, i.e., one rate for funds 
accumulated by taxing, and another for funds accumulated by 
borrowing.1
3. Using a social cost rate which considers the ultimate 
source of the funds in determining a weighted average. Funds 
from consumers (even if collected by taxation) are weighted 
at the long-term government bond rate, and funds from in­
dustry are weighted by the pretax return on capital rate.
All funds which would be otherwise unemployed are weighted
2at 0 per cent.
4. Using the rate of interest on borrowed government funds. 
Senate Document 97 giving the Congressional guidance on the 
discount rate for water resource projects states that dis­
count rates
. . . shall be based on the average rate of interest 
payable by the Treasury on interest-bearing marketable 
securities of the United States outstanding at the end 
of the fiscal year preceding such computation, which upon 
original issue, had terms to maturity of 15 years or 
more.3
^Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Effi­
ciency; Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis and Program 
Budgeting," Public Administration Review, XXVI (December, 
1966), 292-BÏïï:
^William J. Baumol, "On the Appropriate Discount 
Rate for Public Projects," The Analysis and Evaluatioh of 
Public Expenditures: The PPB System, U. S., Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Vol. I, 1969, pp. 489-503.
^Elmer B. Staats, "Survey of Use by Federal Agencies 
of the Discounting Technique in Evaluating Public Programs," 
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Hlnrichs 
and Taylor, p. 2i7.
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It is not surprising that these diverse methods of 
calculating appropriate discount rates achieve diverse re­
sults, The range of rates runs from 3.2 per cent for long­
term bonds to 15 per cent for industrial return on capital.
The social costs methods indicate discount rates from^ 5 to 
10 per cent. The ambiguity of what discount rate to use is 
not limited to governmental projects. In business, various
figures are used, and the most common figure is determined
]by a subjective statement by management.
The use of discount rates in the government varies by 
as much as the theoretical arguments vary. Actual rates used 
range from 3 per cent by the Office of Economic Opportunity 
on Job Corps programs to 12 per cent by the Department of 
Interior on energy and mineral development programs, where 
exploitation is a private function. Most civilian agencies 
(Tennessee Valley Authority, General Services Administration, 
Department of Agriculture, and Department of Transportation) 
use a 4.2 to 5 per cent.^ The current guidelines for discount­
ing on a government-wide basis are contained in Bureau of the 
Budget Circular No. A-94, which requires that discounting be 
done at a rate no lower than the current rate of yield on
^Anthony, Management Accounting, p. 633.
^Staats, "Survey of Discounting Technique," Program 
Budgetijig and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Hinrichs and 
Taylor, pp. 2È2-È4.
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government bonds,^ Individual agencies also have specific 
guidance on the discount rate to be used. For example, the
pDepartment of Defense requires a 10 per cent rate.
While there is considerable conflict over the specific 
rate which, should be used for discounting costs and benefits 
of public projects, the economics profession generally 
agrees that the 3.2 per cent which is the coupon rate of 
interest on long-term bonds is too low. Prom this point of 
common agreement, theories to use rates from 5 to 15 per cent 
are advanced.
Effect of Different Discount Rates 
One of the ways of noting the effect of the use of 
different discount rates is to see how approved projects 
would be affected by rate changes. One study considered 
Corps of Engineers projects. By varying the discount rates, 
the percentage of projects which would have unfavorable 
benefit-cost ratios were:
U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic 
Analysis and the Efficiency of Government. Hearings, before 
the Subcommittee on Economy in the Government, 19o9, p, 705. 
There are two distinctions between this rate and the rate 
directed by Senate Document 97. BOB Bulletin A-94 includes 
all government bonds and not Just those with an original 
term of maturity of fifteen years or more. These latter bonds 
normally have a statutory limit to their rate of interest.
Also the BOB direction is for current yield —  not the coupon 
yield of the bonds. Generally the BOB direction will result 
in higher discount rates than will Senate Document 97.
^U. S., Department of Defense, Economic Analysis of 
Proposed Department of Defense Investments, DOb Instruction 
7041,3, CPebruary 2b, 19&9), p. 6.
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Discount Rate Percentage Unfavorable
2-5/8 0 per cent
4 9 per cent
6 64 per cent
8 80 per cent^
This study assumes that proper benefits and costs have been
considered and that the estimates of their magnitude are
correct.
One of the more Interesting approaches to the use of 
a discount rate Is taken by Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. 
McKean. They recommend that a "rough average" of the rate 
of return in the private economy be used (about 6 to 8 per 
cent). But the significant point that they make Is that the 
uncertainties of costs' and benefits' estimation are so large 
that It Is unnecessary to Insist on absolute precision for 
discount rates.2
One of the disturbing practices In the use of discount 
rates within the Federal Government has been the tendency of 
some activities to try to account for uncertainties and 
risks by raising the discount rate. As noted In Appendix A-5 
this practice obscures, rather than Illuminates, the effect 
of uncertainty on a proposed alternative. In the case where 
only costs are calculated In dollar terms and benefits are 
calculated In some other units, this procedure can also be 
totally misleading. Consider the example where two
^Wildavsky, "Political Economy of Efficiency," p, 297.
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics 
of Defense In the Nuclear Age, pp, 213-14,
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alternatives, each, with identical cost streams of $100,000 
per year for 20 years, are under consideration. If Alter­
native A is considered an average risk and the agency policy 
of discount rates is to use 8 per cent per year, the present 
value of the costs would be $981,815. If Alternative B has 
a relatively high element of risk and a 10 per cent discount 
rate were used to reflect this higher degree of risk, the 
present value of the costs would be $851,356. If all else 
were equal, the tendency would be to select Alternative B 
with its lower cost —  a decision which is contrary to 
"common sense."
Recommendation for Use of Discount Rate 
While it is improper to use the discount rate to 
account for uncertainties in the analysis, it is proper to 
consider the discount rate as one of the uncertain elements 
of analysis. A rate of 6 to 10 per cent should be used in 
initial calculations, and the effect of different discount 




BENEFIT/COST RATIOS AS OBJECTIVES 
IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
There is a tendency by some practitioners of systems 
analysis to use the maximum benefit/cost ratio as an objec­
tive in cost-effectiveness analysis. This practice does 
not conform to economic optimization. To illustrate the 
possible divergence between the economic optimization and 
maximum benefit/cost ratios as objective functions, con­
sider the highly simplified example where all benefits can 
be accurately measured on a dollar scale; the area which is 
in question is one that can be achieved by only one alter­
native which can vary in size (or rate of output); and the 
benefits vary linearly with the rate of output. This is 
shown in Figure 14.
If a vector, OY, is defined that extends from the 
origin to the cost for any given rate of output, R^, and 
is defined as the angle between OY and the horizontal 
axis of the graph, it can be proven that the benefit/cost
ratio equals' ' tan gC .
tan ̂
Proof: For R̂ _:
1. Benefit/Cost Ratio = OBi (Definition)
“TOi
2. OBĵ  = RiA (Construction)
OCj_ ~ R^B
FIGURE 14







Rn Rg Rate of Output
486R^A





RiA4. tan gC = _____  (Division)
tan ̂  R^B
5. Benefit/Cost Ratio = tan d. (Substitution)
tan ̂
Prom Figure 14, it is obvious that the benefit/cost 
ratio is maximized at Ri where OY is tangent to the cost 
curve. By contrast, net benefits (total benefits minus 
cost) are maximized by Rg (where the slope of the cost curve 
is equal to the slope of the benefit curve —  or where 
marginal cost equals marginal benefits).
It can then be seen that the benefit/cost ratio.», 
while a powerful tool, has definite limitations for use as 
a criterion in analysis. Generally it should be used as a 
criterion only when the cost of the project is strictly de­
fined and not allowed to vary. The benefit/cost ratio is 
not an adequate criterion for cost-effectiveness analysis or 
for any form of selection from various alternatives.
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APPENDIX A-8
TWO QUALITATIVE TECHNIQUES OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Because much of the apprehension toward the use of 
systems analysis is based on the premise that it deals strict­
ly with quantitative material, this discussion of two qual­
itatively oriented techniques of systems analysis is pre­
sented. These two techniques are called the Delphi tech­
nique and scenario writing.
Delphi Technique 
The Delphi technique was devised as a method to add 
structure to the elicitation of opinions from experts. Its 
goal is to make the use of expert opinion subject to some of 
the safeguards of objectivity found in science.
Delphi is based on the premise that while "two heads 
are better than one" in working on a problem because they 
have more information, they also have more "misinformation," 
The gathering of experts together in a committee is as likely 
to accent the misinformation as it is to accent the valid 
information. This is because the "ritual" followed in a 
committee meeting might influence decisions as much as the 
knowledge and preference of the individuals involved.
Specifically, there are four major drawbacks to the 
use of committees in eliciting expert opinions;
1. One individual is likely to dominate decisions because 
of his personal bearing, his ability to communicate verbally.
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or his professional reputation. This dominance may be dis­
proportionate to the individual's knowledge in the particular 
field of interest.
2. A considerable amount of "noise" exists in the communi­
cation within the committee. The use of emotional and 
ambiguous words means that the message spoken by one indivi­
dual is not always the same as the message received by 
others.
3. There is high group pressure for conformity. This is 
often counterbalanced by the reluctance of individuals to 
change their publically stated position.
4. The reasoning process used by the committee in reaching 
a decision or conclusion is often obscured.
The Delphi technique is relatively simple in concept. 
The "expert" participants remain anonymous. In "Round One" 
they are queried by written questionnaires about their 
opinion on a particular subject. "Round Two" gives the 
participant a summary of views held by others (without iden­
tification of the individuals involved)j asks the expert to 
reconsider his opinion; and asks him to note the factors and 
considerations that he believes are relevant to the opinion 
he reaches. This "cybernetic" process is continued until 
convergence of opinions is obtained or unreconcilable dif­
ferences are noted.
The process can be refined by using a number of more 
specific questions on a subject area designed to bring out
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the reasoning behind the over-all judgment. The participants 
can also be allowed to request additional factual data that 
they feel would allow a better judgment. (This data is given 
to all participants and not just the one who requested it.)
The experience to date in the use of the Delphi
technique indicates that convergence on a single answer, or 
two readily identifiable schools of thought, is relatively 
rapid (normally no more than three "Rounds"). It also indi­
cates that the process is more conducive to independent 
thought and considered opinion than is normal in a committee 
process. One experiment successfully contrasted the Delphi 
technique to committees by using questions whose answers 
could be checked for accuracy (e.g.. What was the suicide 
rate for females in the United States in 1950?). It was 
found that the Delphi technique gave more accurate answers 
than did the committees.
The Delphi technique has also been used to:
1. Determine the viewpoint of a Soviet planner on the number
of weapons necessary and the "targeting" of these weapons to 
reduce the munitions capability of the United States by a 
specified percentage;^
2. Predict the political conditions of the world in twenty- 
five to fifty years;
^The cross-section of experts which can be used is 
evident in the seven-man panel used in this case. There were 
four economists, one physical-vulnerability specialist, one 
systems analyst, and one electronics engineer.
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3. Allocate a hypothetical budget for a university;
4. Allocate a hypothetical budget for law enforcement; and
5. Predict the operating environment of a specific company 
in twenty years. (This was used as a basis for allocating 
the company’s research budget.)
All of these were "successful" to the degree that conver­
gence was achieved and the reasons for the positions held 
were crystallized.
The use of the Delphi technique is not without its 
disadvantages. First, the process is cumbersome and places 
a heavy burden on the individuals who are using the technique. 
Second, the process is relatively slow in that considerable 
time is required between "Rounds" for processing information, 
gathering additional data, etc. Finally, results of the 
process can be biased by the selection of the panel members, 
the design of the questions, and the methods of providing 
feedback. Even with these shortcomings, the use of the 
Delphi technique promises to have an ever-increasing appli­
cation in the analysis of major problems.
Scenarios
Scenario writing has long been a part of most military 
systems analyses. The purpose of writing a scenario is 
usually to describe the environmental conditions under which 
a weapon system must operate in a future time frame.
The scenario contains a proposed step-by-step sequence 
of actions, stated as explicitly as possible, that connects
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the present environmental state with the one that is pro­
jected for the future. The advantage of using this technique 
is that the reasoning behind the projection is open and 
explicit.
Scenarios have been modified in two basic manners.
One of these is to develop "alternative futures," where the 
assumptions that cause changes in the step-by-step projection 
of the future environment are altered so that the result is 
not one projection of future conditions but a set of different 
possible future conditions. This is particularly valuable 
in contingency analysis.
Scenarios have also been used to derive the worst 
possible case for future conditions. This worst possible case 
does not require a high degree of credibility but only a 
degree of possibility. This projection of the future has 
been used for a fortiori analysis.
Summary
Both scenario writing and the Delphi technique have 
been used in systems analysis to deal with problems which are 
highly qualitative. Logic, supplemented with these techniques, 
is the principal tool for the consideration of non-quantifiable 
aspects of systems analysis.
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Sources: The following sources were used to develop the
material In this appendix:
a) Delphi Technique:
Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer, "An Experimental Application 
of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts," Management 
Science. IX (April, 1963), 458-6?.
Bernice B. Brown, Delphi Process: A Methodology for the
Elicitation of Opinions of Experts,
Olaf Helmer, Systematic Use of Experts' Opinions.
Norman C. Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study
of Group Opinion.
b) Scenarios:
Seyom Brown, "Scenarios In Systems Analysis," Systems 
Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications In Defense,
ed. by E. S. Quade and W. l7 Boucher, pp. 29Ü-3ÏÛ.
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APPENDIX A-9
PPBS, PERFORMANCE, AND TRADITIONAL 
BUDGETS IN INDUSTRY
The use of budgets as managerial tools is highly 
developed in the industrial sector. For this reason it is 
illuminating to view the three types of budgets from in­
dustry’s point of view.
Traditional Budget 
Industry often has a budget that corresponds closely 
to the traditional budget of the government. Items of ex­
penditure are broken into the objects to be purchased such 
as material, supplies, investment items, salaries. These 
budgets are used for two basic purposes. First, the budget 
is used as a control device for objects that subordinate 
managers buy. Second, the budget is used to facilitate per­
sonnel recruitment planning and centralized purchasing 
planning.
A manager in industry who felt that this input-oriented 
budget was the only budget required would be considered 
totally irrational. It is difficult to conceive of the presi­
dent of a company receiving detailed information on the cost 
of salaries, materials, supplies, and equipment through his 
budgetary system and absolutely nothing about which products 
were profitable or even about whether the firm as a whole was 
operating at a profit.
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Performance Budget
One of the principal budgeting tools used in industry 
is that of the performance or responsibility budget. This 
budget sets forth the plans for operation in terms of the 
individual responsible organizations. In connection with 
responsibility budgeting, cost accounting is normally applied. 
Under this concept the organization is divided into a number 
of responsibility centers (or profit centers). For each of 
these centers the outputs and inputs are measured and the 
profit for that individual center is calculated.
This measurement of profit for each autonomous center 
in the company is analogous to the performance budgeting of 
the government. Many of the problems faced in the two are 
similar. One of these problems is determining the unit of 
output. In industry no problem exists when the profit center 
produces only one homogeneous product. However, when the 
products produced are not homogeneous, a method of weighting 
these into equivalent units, or the use of standard hours and 
costs, is normally followed. In industry the problem also 
exists where it is impossible to impute a direct monetary 
value to the output of a specific unit. Industry often solves 
this by using standard work-load units without trying to 
determine the specific profit of the responsibility center. 
Finally, some responsibility centers have outputs that cannot 
even be quantified, much less assigned a dollar value. In 
this case expenses are charged to the responsibility center.
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and no quantitative measurement of output is attempted.
In most of the "responsibility centers" in the govern­
mental sector the problem of measuring output is like that 
in industry where no direct "profit" can be calculated. The 
application of standard costs to the "responsibility center" 
to compare outputs and inputs is still possible where the 
outputs are quantifiable.
The purpose of this responsibility budgeting system 
is largely one of control. The various levels of management 
are interested in the efficiency with which the responsibility 
centers are operating. The control aspect is implemented by 
the use of periodic performance reports which compare the 
work actually being accomplished (outputs) to the resources 
consumed (inputs) and both of these to the budget (or plan) 
formulated. Armed with this knowledge, the manager is able 
to make corrections as necessary in the ongoing operation of 
the firm.
Managers in private industry find that the use of a 
cost-accounting system with responsibility centers does not 
in itself furnish sufficient information for budgeting pur­
poses. It is difficult to imagine a company’s president 
being concerned solely with the performance of subunits of 
his organization and not with the total profitability of the 
company and the profitability of different products and lines 
of products. It is conceivable that all of the various de­
partments of a firm Cfabrication, assembly, etc.) operate
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efficiently without the total firm making a profit.
PPBS
The concept of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System is one that is very common in industry. In fact the 
normal method of constructing a budget in private industry 
closely corresponds to the "idealized" PPB system. The first 
step in budgeting in industry is to determine the probable 
sales of different products and translate this into a budgeted 
income statement to determine the projected Profitability of 
the firm. After this requirements are placed on the various 
responsibility centers for their budgets, and finally the 
personnel, materials, supply, and investment budgets are 
generated.
The determination of which products to sell Cand in 
what numbers) during the next year can be directly compared 
to the program decisions required by the government under 
PPBS. The use of a budgeted income statement to determine 
profits is equivalent to the use of benefit-cost analysis in 
the government to determine if a program is worth while. The 
task facing governmental organizations is much more complex 
for three reasons :
1. The final output of most government programs cannot be 
measured in dollars, and the yardstick of profit does not 
furnish an easy measure of the worth of a program. The final 
determination of a program's worth is often a totally sub­
jective judgment which balances outputs and costs.
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2, The translation of inputs into program terms is difficult 
in governmental activities. Industry also has this same 
problem to some degree. It is difficult to gauge the effects 
of an expanded customer-service department on the income 
statement, just as it is difficult to gauge the effect of an 
expanded personnel office on the quality of outputs of a 
given governmental activity. The major difference between 
industry and the government in this case is that the complexity 
of the government makes such situations more common. In 
these cases budgeting for the responsibility center, in both 
industry and the government, cannot be accomplished by a 
direct translation of product (or program) requirements. 
Instead, budgeting is accomplished by negotiation between 
subordinates and supervisors in the chain of command within 
relatively well-defined financial limits.
3. The outputs of the government are not reduceable to a 
single unit which can be compared in the framework of a single 
income statement. The equivalent situation can be imagined
in industry if each line of product were purchased with a 
different, inconvertible monetary unit and the financial 
solvency of the company depended on its profitability in each 
monetary unit. It is inconceivable that the firm would then 
refuse to measure income to costs and expenses for each line 
of product. The industrial budgeting cycle would then be the 
same, except product decisions would be made on the basis of 
several income statements instead of one aggregate statement.
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Industrial firms have begun to adopt some specific 
aspects of PPBS from the Federal Government. Some firms 
have begun to view their outputs in general product classes 
defined by the service given to the customers and projecting 
the revenue and costs associated with these product classes 
over a period of years. Under this concept a program 
structure for a firm would look like Table 23. Firms have 
found that this longer range use of budgets gives advantages 
in planning for changes in product lines and mixes of products 
within a given product line.
Summary
Private industry uses all three types of budgets in 
their managerial efforts —  the traditional budget for opera­
tional control, the performance budget for managerial control, 
and the budgeted income statement for product/program deci­
sions at the first of the budget cycle. Industry does not 
feel that there is more than one "budget." Rather, three 
views of "the budget" are used to perform different tasks.
The government, through PPBS, has adopted the premise from 
industry that program decisions must be made before performance 
and object of expenditure budgets are formulated. Industry, 
in turn, has adopted the need to structure budgets by grouping 
their products in light of the customer’s view of the service 



















Source; L. A. Dougherty, Developing Corporate Strategy 
Through Planning. Programming. Budgeting.
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Source: The discussion about the use of budget in industry
was adapted from Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting.
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APPENDIX A-10
COMPARISON OP TRADITIONAL AND PROGRAM BUDGETS 
IN THE EDUCATION SEGMENT OP THE DEPARTMENT 
OP HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELPARE
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has 
developed a highly sophisticated program structure in the 
Education area. Essentially the structure is a four- 
dimensional matrix that is based on the following broad 
categories ;
1. The basic goal to be pursued;
2. The target group (by social conditions) to be reached;
3. The general method used by the program; and
4. The target group (by educational category) to be reached.
This breakout allows decision-makers to retrieve a 
variety of information in a number of aggregate forms. 
Examples of the information possible would include identi­
fication of all of the money being expended for;
1. Developing basic skills;
2. Improving the education of the economically and socially 
disadvantaged;
3. Expanding institutional facilities; or
4. Giving aid to secondary-level students.
By contrast, the traditional appropriations categories 
for the Office of Education in the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare contain 18 major appropriation cate­
gories, 86 minor appropriation categories, and 164
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appropriation subcategories. Most of these are object-oriented 
and are historically and legislatively titled. The amount 
of meaningful data which can be derived from this breakout 
is meager.
In addition to the format advantage, the Education 
portion of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
includes some of the funds spent in other agencies for educa­
tional activities. Some of these include;
1. From the Office of Economic Opportunity: Educational 
Research Activities and Follow-Thru Program;
2. From the Department of Housing and Urban Development:
College Housing Loan Program;
3. From the Department of Commerce: Educational portions 
of Appalachian Regional Development;
4. From the National Science Foundation: Educational Re­
search Activities;
5. From the Department of Defense: Civil Defense Adult 






Development of Basic Skills 
Development of Vocational and Occupational 
Skills
Development of Advanced Academic and 
Professional Skills 
Library and Community Development 
General Research (non-allocable research) 
General Support COE salaries and expenses) 







Improving the Education of the General 
Population 
Improving the Education of the Econom­
ically and Socially Disadvantaged 
Improving the Education of the Physi­
cally and Mentally Handicapped 
Improving International Education 
Other
Program Character;
Supplementing Institutional Resources 
(general operations, services, 
materials)
Expanding Institutional Facilities 
(equipment and major construction) 
Increasing Opportunity for Higher 
Education (student aid)
Improving the Supply of Educational 
Personnel (recruitment, training) 
Developing and Introducing Innova­
tion (research, development, 
demonstration)
Collecting and Disseminating Infor­
mation (statistics, information, 
dissemination, evaluation)
Other (general program support, 
unallocable salaries and expenses)
Fifth and 
Sixth Educational Level Objective
Preschool, Elementary. Secondary, and Local 
Agency Level 
Preschool
Preschool and Elementary 
Elementary
Elementary and Secondary 
Secondary
Elementary and Secondary Vocational 
Local Educational Agency Development 
and Training 
Other Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, 
and Local Educational Agencies




Fifth and Sixth 
(cent'd)
Post-Secondary and Higher Education Levels 
toSt-Secondary Vocational ^includes 
Technical Institutes)
Post-Secondary Vocational and Junior 
or Community College 




All Higher Education 
Other Advanced Training
Other Post-Secondary and Higher Education
State Agencies and Organizations for 
Higher Education
State Commissions for Higher Education 
Other Organizations for Higher Education





Other Adult and General Education
Lihrary Agencies 
Public Libraries 
State Library Agency 




Policy Research Centers 
Preschool Laboratories 
Other R&D Centers 
ERIC Central 
ERIC Clearinghouse 
Instructional Materials Centers 
Other Academic Research (not listed 
above)
Other Research Organizations
Other Public and Private Agencies (not 
listed above)
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Le ve 1 Categories-









Elementary and Secondary Educational Activities
Educationally Deprived Children
Local Educational Agencies 
Indiana
Handicapped Children
Juvenile Delinquents in Institutions




Guidance Counseling and Testing
Strengthening State Departments of Education
Grants to States 
Grants for Special Projects 
State Statistical Services 
State Supervisory Services
Equipment and Minor Remodeling
Grants to States




Bilingual Education Programs 
Dropout Prevention Programs 
Dissemination of Information
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Program Planning and Evaluation 
Planning






School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas
Maintenance and Operations
Payments to Local Educational Agencies 
Payments to Other Federal Agencies
Construction
Assistance to Local Educational Agencies
Assistance for School Construction of Federal Properties
Technical Services - Washington





Education Professions Development Activities
State Grants for Recruitment of Education Personnel
Development of Educational Personnel
Encouragement of Educational Careers
Experienced Teacher Fellowships
Prospective Teacher Fellowships
Strengthening Graduate Schools of Education






















Strengthening Developing Institutions 
Colleges of A&M Bankhead-Jones Act 
Undergraduate Television Equipment 
Other Undergraduate Instructional Equipment
Construction




State Administration and Planning
Technical Services - Washington
Technical Services - Field
Major Disaster Areas
Educational Opportunity Grants
Grants to Higher Education Institutes 
Encouragement of Educational Talent
Direct Loans CNDEA II)
Contributions to Loan Funds 
Loans to Institutions 
Teacher Cancellation
Insured Loans
Advances for Reserve Funds 




Higher Education Activities Supplemental 
Grants for Student Services 
Inter-Institution Sharing of Resources
Other Proposed Programs
Improvement of Graduate Schools 
Dissemination of Information 





Expansion and Improvement of Vocational Education
Vocational Training
Vocational Education Act of 1963 
George-Barden Act 
Supplementary Acts
Homemaking Education (Proposed New Program)
Insured Loans
Advances for Reserve Funds 
Interest Payments
Work-Study
Innovative Occupational Programs (Proposed New Program)
Dissemination of Information (Proposed New Program)






Lihraries and Community Services
Library Services and Construction Act PL 89-511
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Grants for Public Libraries 
Interlibrary Cooperation 
State Institutional Library Services 
Library Services to Physically Handicapped
Construction of Public Libraries
College Library Resources
Acquisition and Cataloging by Library of Congress
Library Training
Librarian Training Grants 
Library School Program Development
University Community Service Programs
Grants to States 
Special Projects
Adult Basic Education










Educational Improvement for the Handicapped 
Preschool and School Programs 
Teacher Education and Recruitment 
Teacher Education
Personnel Recruitment and Information
Physical Education and Recreation Therapist Training
Research and Innovative Programs




Physical Education and Recreation Research and 
Development








Education Labs and R&D Centers
Laboratories
Centers
General Education Research and Demonstrations
General Education Research 
Evaluation Studies 
National Achievement Study 
Demonstration and Development
Categorical Research, and Demonstrations
Vocational Education 










Rdr'eigpi Language Training and Area Programs 
Language and Area Programs
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Language and Area Centers 
Language and Area Fellowships





Educational Research and Training
Research in Foreign Education
Training Research and Study Grants
Higher Education
Elementary and Secondary Education
Office of Education Salaries and Expenses
Executive Direction and Administration
Washington
Field
National Center for Education Statistics
Washington
Field
Elementary and Secondary Education
Washington
Field
















Institute of International Studies
Washington
Field
Civil Rights Educational Activities
Institutes and Grants
University Institutes for School Personnel 
Desegregation Center Institutes for School Personnel 
Grants to School Boards
Technical Assistance - Desegregation Centers 
Technical Assistance - State Educational Agencies
Technical Services and Administration
Washington
Field
Colleges for Agriculture and Me'chahical Arts
Grants to States
Promotion of Vocational Education Act of February 23» 1917
Grants to States
Student Loan Insurance Fund
Higher Education and Vocational Student Loans
Vocational Education Loan Defaults
Higher Education Facilities Loan Fund
HEFA Loan Fund Operating Costs
Commission on Sales of Participations 
Interest Expenses on Participation Certificates 
Administrative Expenses
HEFA Loan Fund Capital Outlay
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Source: U. S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Office of Assistant Secretary (Planning and 
Evaluation), Planning-Prograiiuning-Budgeting; 
Guidance for Program and Financial Plan, (17 April 1 6̂8).
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APPENDIX B-1
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO MEMBERS OP THE CABINET AND 
HEADS OF AGENCIES ON THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW 
GOVERNMENT-WIDE PLANNING AND BUDGETING 
SYSTEM, AUGUST 25, 1965
I have asked you to meet with me this morning to dis­
cuss the Introduction of a new planning and budgeting system 
throughout the Government,
The objective of this program Is simple: to use the
most modern management tools so that the full promise of a 
finer life can be brought to every American at the least 
possible cost.
This program Is aimed at finding new ways to do new 
jobs faster, better, less expensively; to Insure sounder 
judgment through more accurate Information; to pinpoint those 
things we ought to do more, and to spotlight those things we 
ought to do less; to make our decision-making process as up 
to date as our space-exploring equipment; In short, we want 
to trade In our surreys for automobiles, our old cannon for 
new missiles.
Everything I have done In both legislation and the 
construction of a budget has been guided by my deep concern 
for the American people —  consistent with wise management 
of the tax-payer’s dollar.
In translating this principle In action, and with the
help of an outstanding Congress, we have passed more pro­
gressive legislation than In any comparable period In history.
We have been compassionate. We have also been prudent,
But we can and must do better If we are to bring the 
Great Society closer to all the people.
Good Government demands excellence.
It demands the fullest value for each dollar spent.
It demands that we take advantage of the most modern manage­
ment techniques.
This Is what I want to Introduce today —  a new 
plannlng-programmlng-budgetlng system developed by our top 
management experts led by Budget Director Charles Schultze. 
Once In operation. It will enable us to —
(1) Identify our national goals with precision and
on a continuing basis.
C2) Choose among those goals the ones that are most 
urgent.
C3) Search for alternative means of reaching those
goals most effectively at the least cost.
(4) Inform ourselves not merely on next year's
costs —  but on the second, and third, and sub­
sequent year’s costs —  of our programs.
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C5) Measure the performance of our programs to Insure 
a dollar’s worth of service for each dollar spent.
This system will improve our ability to control our 
programs and our budgets rather than having them control us.
It will operate year round. Studies, goals, program pro­
posals, and reviews will be scheduled throughout the year 
instead of being crowded into ’’budget time."
To establish this system and carry out the necessary 
studies, each of you will need a Central Staff for Program 
and Policy Planning accountable directly to you. To make this 
work will take good people, the best you now have and the 
best you can find.
I intend to have the 1968 budget and later-year 
programs presented in this new form by next spring.
With these programs will go the first studies produced 
by your planning and policy, staffs.
It is important to remember one thing; no system, no 
matter how refined, can make decisions for you. You and I 
have that responsibility in the executive branch. But our 
judgment is no better than our information. This system will 
present us with the alternatives and the information on the 
basis of which we can, together, make better decisions. The 
people will be the beneficiary.
The Budget Director has already talked to most of you 
about the need for this new approach. He is now preparing 
plans for setting it up. He is ready to help you in any way 
he can.
Within the next several weeks he will send our de­
tailed instructions for incorporating fiscal year I968 and 
later-year programs into this system. But to make this new 
plan a success, he will need your full support, I know that 
you will give him that support.
Source : Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
(Washington: Government Printing Office),
August 30, 1965, Vol. I.
516
APPENDIX B-2
LIST OP AGENCIES WHICH ARE REQUIRED 
TO IMPLEMENT PPBS
Table 2H shows the agencies which have been required 
to implement PPBS in accordance with BOB Bulletin 66-3, 
October 12, 1965; BOB Bulletin 68-2, July 18, 1967; and BOB 
Bulletin 68-9, April 12, 1968, The agencies which have a 
formal Planning-Programming-Budgeting System as of May,
1969, are also shown.
Sources :
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the 
Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting, BOB Bulletin 66-3. 
COctober~i2V"l955')': '--
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the 
Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting CPPB), BOB Bulletin 
68-2, CJÏÏTy'll}", 19”67J. --- ---------- ------
U. s.. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the 
Budget, Planning-Programming-Budgeting CPPB), BOB Bulletin 
68-9, CAprîT-TST'm g ) .  ^ ^ ^ ------
Jack W. Carlson, "The Status and Next Steps for Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting," The Analysis and Evaluation of 
Public Expenditures ; The PPB System. U. S., Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Vol. II, 1969, p. 637.
TABLE 24 
AGENCIES WITH PPBS
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense - Military Functions
Department of Defense - Corps of Engineers
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 





Department of State (excluding Agency for
International Development)
Treasury Department





National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Science Foundation
Office of Economic Opportunity
Peace Corps
United States Information Agency 
Veterans Administration 
Department of Transportation 
Civil Service Commission 










































































































Federal Trade Commission 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Small Business Administration 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Railroad Retirement Board







(a) Directed to adopt PPBS by January 1, I968
(b) Required to adopt only parts of PPBS





GUIDE TO THE RESOLUTION OF SOME PROBLEMS 
IN PROGRAM STRUCTURE DESIGN
The process of program structure design is one that 
is particularly difficult. No specific rules can be formu­
lated to simplify this task. There are probably as many 
different acceptable program structures as there are indi­
viduals who attempt to design the structure. Most of the 
problems of design may be resolved by looking at the over-all 
purpose of the program structure: to identify a cluster of
governmental activities that are in closer competition with 
each other than they are with activities outside of the 
program so that systems analysis of these activities is 
facilitated. A number of problems continually arise in the 
design of program structures, These will be discussed 
individually,
End-Product Definition 
It is generally conceded that intermediate products 
should normally not be included in a program structure. Some 
suthors have carried this concept to an extreme position and 
determined that none of the programs in the Federal Govern­
ment’s program structure should have products that are 
"consumed" within the Federal Government,^ This concept of
This is advocated in Samuel M. Greenhouse, "A 
‘Distributed Output’ Concept for the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System," Personnel Administration. XXX CJuly/August,
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end-products assumes that PPBS is a tool to be used only at 
the Presidential and Congressional level. In practice, PPBS 
is primarily designed to aid decision-makers in the agencies 
themselves. This means that the end-products around which 
the program is structured should be the end-products from 
the view of the head of the agency.̂
Even within this general guidance, it might be 
necessary to design a specific program category that does 
not represent an end-product because of the over-riding con­
sideration for the program structure to aid analytic efforts. 
For example, the Airlift and Sealift program category in the 
Department of Defense does not represent a direct end-product, 
Instead, it contributes primarily to General Purpose Forces, 
However, the analysis requirements of "airlift and sealift" 
make its isolation as a separate program category desirable,
Multi-Purpose Categories 
Another practical problem encountered in the design 
of program structures is that of the placement of categories 
that contribute to more than one purpose. These categories
1967)* 36-39. This "distributed output concept" means that 
agencies which perform predominantly supporting functions 
Csuch as the General Services Administration) "distribute" 
or allocate their costs to the agencies receiving the ser­
vices, The agencies receiving the allocations can then 
reflect "full costs" in final products that go outside of 
the Federal Government,
^End-products should then be those products or ser­
vices that are "consumed" outside of the agency —  regardless 
of whether they are "consumed" by another agency of the 
Federal Government or "consumed" outside of the government.
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are of two general types —  truly multi-purpose categories 
and support categories.
Many programs in the government naturally serve more 
than one purpose. It would be misleading to divide these 
programs and allocate their costs and outputs to various 
program categories. Generally the best that can be done is 
to place the program in a category corresponding to its 
primary purpose. If another purpose is critical it would be 
permissible to put the program in a second program category 
as a "non-add" entry. There is no way that a single program 
structure that shows all interactions between programs 
could be designed. Only the major interactive, substitutive, 
and complementary programs can be shown.^
The other part of the problem of handling programs 
that contribute to more than one purpose is support programs. 
The placement of support activities can be handled in one of 
three manners —  allocation of the costs to mission program 
categories ; a separate program category; or a combination of 
these two. ■
Generally the allocation of support costs to mission 
program categories is undesirable unless the support costs 
involved are variable and depend directly on the level of 
activity in the mission programs. Arbitrary allocations can
^It should be noted that regardless of the placement 
of individual programs in a program structure, all comple­
mentary, substitutive, and interactive programs must be 
considered during an analytical study.
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distort the costs shown in a particular program category and 
be misleading to decision-makers and analysts,^
The simplest way to handle support activities is to 
accumulate all of them in one separate program category.
This practice can be misleading since it could be assumed 
that the level of support costs is totally independent of 
the size and nature of the mission programs. This practice 
will also increase the tendency to have "tip-of-the-iceberg" 
estimates of costs in the analysis of direct "mission" 
programs.
Probably the most meaningful program structure is 
one that combines these two approaches. Support costs that 
can easily and meaningfully be allocated to mission program 
categories are allocated, and the residual costs are retained 
in a separate program category. This must be tempered with 
the need to maintain a minimum cost of data-gath.ering in a 
program structure. The allocation of costs requires the 
routine generation of data of both the costs in the support 
area and the size of the allocation parameter in mission
When support costs are included in a mission pro­
gram category, they can be allocated to existing program 
elements, or separate program elements can be designed to 
absorb the support costs. The decision of which of these to 
use should again be based on the degree of relationship 
between the level of the direct mission program elements 
and the support cost. If this relationship is strong, the 
costs should be allocated; if not, they should be accumulated 
in a separate program element.
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programs
One other caution is appropriate in the discussion 
of the allocation of support costs. The basis for allocation 
should be logically as well as statistically verifiable,^
This basis should be stated explicitly and be periodically 
reverified to ensure that it is still valid.
Multi-Classification 
Another practical problem that is involved in the 
design of a program structure is how to design the structure 
so that it is capable of providing data for a number of 
types of questions. Ideally the program structure format 
should be capable of reorganizing the data contained in it 
to provide answers to many psssible questions.^
The problem of multi-classifications is principally
^Regardless of the general procedure determined to 
handle support costs, analytic efforts should attempt to 
determine the total incremental cost involved in a given 
effort. This will frequently involve the gathering of costs 
from support program elements or categories for analyses of 
mission' activities.
^It is possible to have a high degree of statistical 
correlation on the size of an element ..of support cost with a 
parameter of operating programs that would allow a non­
sensical allocation of costs. For example, the total support 
cost of internal training could be statistically correlated 
to the total direct appropriations of activities which re­
quire this training. Allocation of these costs, on this 
basis, would be difficult to substantiate logically if these 
activities had significantly different proportions of their 
costs devoted to operating and investment purposes.
3An example of this type of program structure is in 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Appendix 
A-10). Here program data can be aggregated by major objec­
tives, activities, target groups by age, and target groups 
by social conditions.
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one of determining whether a particular grouping or classi­
fication is to be Included. It is possible to envision an 
almost infinite number of interesting classifications for 
data. If a program structure included all of these, the 
cost of maintaining the information would be unrealistically 
high. Each classification of data should meet one of two 
criteria : it should involve a substantial commitment of
resources, or it should be of a significant degree of im­
portance to the activities of the agency. If these criteria 
are not met, the classification should not be included in 
the program structure.
The expectations about the program structure providing 
data should be reasonable. No program structure is going to 
be capable of being a complete data source for all analysis 
and all decision-making. Instead, the program structure 
sh.ould be expected to provide information on the major ques­
tions that must be answered on a recurring basis.
Organizational Congruence 
The aspect of design of a program structure that 
allows the crossing of organizational lines is one that 
creates a major problem. The tendency is for an organization 
to want to structure its programs so that the program budget 
corresponds to the organization —  or conversely, to modify 
the organization so that it corresponds to the program struc­
ture. Neither of these tendencies is desirable.
If the program structure is simply a mirror image of
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the existing organizational structure, much of the illumina­
tive power of PPBS is lost. The traditional budget accumu­
lates costs by organizational units, A superimposed program 
budget that accumulates the same information as the organi­
zational budget is a duplication of effort.
The tendency to try to reorganize an agency to match 
the program structure should also be resisted. A well- 
designed program structure may point out organizational 
weakness that should be corrected, but the fact that the 
organization does not perfectly match the program structure 
is not sufficient to determine that a reorganization is 
necessary. Organizations can be structured by either process, 
purpose, or a combination of these.^ The program structure 
is built solely on the basis of purpose. To reorganize an 
agency to conform to the program structure would be to 
forego many of the advantages of a process-oriented organi- 
zational structure. By the use of a program structure the 
advantages of better program decisions and planning can be 
achieved without the loss of control that would result if 
the process-oriented organizational structure were abandoned.
Most organizations do reflect a combination of 
process-oriented and purpose-oriented organizational struc­
ture.
2Some of these advantages include: the more economi­
cal utilization of professional skills; Insurance of a higher 
quality of technical decisions; insurance of more "professional" 
development; the cancellation of work-load flucuations; and 
the attainment of a higher degree of consistency in technical 
decision. (Harvey Sherman, It All Depends, pp. 34-35.)
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Program Descriptions 
One way to preclude some defects in the design of a 
program structure is to use program descriptions. A complete 
description of each program category, subcategory, and 
element contained in the structure should be prepared. This 
description should include an explicit identification of the 
objectives that the program component is trying to achieve 
as well as an explicit delineation of the content of each 
component.
Program descriptions aid in communications about 
the program structure and its use in analytic efforts. In 
addition, complete description of the program components 
helps to ensure consistent treatment of aspects of design 
throughout the structuring process and during any subse­
quent modification of the program structure.
Stability of Program Structure 
Another problem in the design of a program structure 
concerns the stability that should be expected in the struc­
ture itself. Obviously the structure must remain relatively 
stable so that long-range planning is possible. However, 
situations, programs, and objectives change and a program 
structure that is completely rigid will soon be of limited 
use for decision purposes.
This conflict is usually resolved by establishing 
broad program categories that are relatively stable and allow 
for considerable replacement and realignment of the individual
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elements within these categories. This compromise gives a 
degree of over-all stability and also a degree of flexibility.
Even the over-all program structure must be ex­
pected to change over a period of time. Particularly in 
the early use of PPBS changes and modifications will be re­
quired. The desire to retain a stable planning instrument 
should not inhibit the major modifications necessary, and 
the first few years of PPBS will probably result in a 
relatively fluid program structure.
Summary
The design phase of the program structure is one 
which contains many problems, most of which must be resolved 
by some form of compromise. The overriding consideration 
in each, decision on the design of the program structure 
should be its effect on analysis and the decision process.
The design of the program structure of the budget is 
critical because it begins to give a definite meaning and 
sense of reality to the Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
System. There is a danger that this step will be accepted 
by some as the total substance of PPBS. This tendency should 
be avoided, and the constant reference to the ultimate pur­
pose of the program structure —  to better structure budgetary 
information for analytic purposes —  should help counteract 
this.
Because of the many compromises necessary in the 
design of the program structure, it is not advisable to devote
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an inordinate amount of time during the initial design to 
the complete refinement of definitions of all aspects of the 
program structure. It should be recognized that the use of 
PPBS will suggest necessary revisions to the program struc­
ture, and a workable structure will be the product of 
evolution.
Sources: The material in this Appendix was predominantly
adapted from:
Cl) Sue A, Haggart, et al., Program Budgeting for School 
District Planning: Concepts and ApplicarlonsT '
C2) State-Local Finances Project, Developing an Objective- 
Oriented Governmental Program Structure.
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APPENDIX D-1
FACTORS CAUSING RESISTANCE TO PPBS
In the implementing of a Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System, one of the first and most important tasks 
that a manager must undertake is an assessment of sources 
of resistance to the proposed system. Only after this re­
sistance is identified can the manager take the necessary 
steps to overcome it and achieve an effective system.
Generally there are three ways that individuals are 
effected by any change in an organization. These are :
1. Behaviorial effects; Changes in the way the individual 
performs his work.
2. Psychological effects: Changes in the way the individual 
relates to his work.
3. Sociological effects; The way in which the established 
relationships with others are altered.^
The implementation of PPBS is so significant that all of 
these effects are substantial. Generally if an individual 
perceives these effects as contributing to his sense of 
importance and personal worth, his reaction to the change is 
favorable. If the change is perceived as detracting from 
his sense of importance and personal worth, his reaction to 
the change is unfavorable and he will resist the implementa-




The purpose of this Appendix is to highlight those 
aspects of PPBS where the perception of individuals will 
possibly indicate to them that the change is unfavorable.
For purposes of discussion these will be divided into aspects 
that change organizational relationships, those that change 
the immediate job, those that effect the governmental pro­
grams, and miscellaneous effects.
Organizational Relationships
A managerial system change such as the implementation 
of PPBS always results in a massive change of organizational 
relationships. As one author, who is an expert in organi­
zational change, commented;
Change typically involves risk and fear. Any signifi­
cant change in human organizations involves rearrangement 
of patterns of power, association, status, skills andvalues,2
Part of the resistance that results from the shifts 
in organizational relationships obviously occurs because the 
individuals involved do not know exactly what will change. 
This fear of the unknown makes these individuals cling to the 
familiar routines and Institutional arrangements that already
^Ibid,. p, 34,
^Warren G. Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying 
Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," The 




However, It is not Just the fear of the unknown that 
causes resistance to PPBS. The implementation of PPBS causes 
a significant shift in the organizational "power" arrange­
ments within a given agency. The fact that an office of 
systems analysis will begin to make a direct input into the 
major decision process constitutes a major shift of power. 
Resistance to the implementation of PPBS because of this 
loss of power and authority should be divided into two 
classes. First, there are the individuals who are in es­
tablished seats of power of the agency, and the introduction 
of PPBS will result in an actual decrease in their organi­
zational authority and power. Their resistance to the system 
is almost inevitable. Second, there are individuals within 
an agency who perceive the loss of organizational power and 
authority as the result of the implementation of PPBS when 
no actual loss will occur. Information which changes their 
perception can reduce this source of resistance.
Another source of resistance to PPBS is the change 
in the personal relationships in the agency as a result of 
operating under the new system. Any change which requires 
individuals to begin working with a new group of people is 
likely to be resisted if these new relationships are not
^Robert E. Millward, "PPBS; Problems of Implemen­
tation*" JTournal of the American Institute of Planners, 
XXXIV (March, 196Ü), 92.
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smooth..^ The new relationship between line managers and the 
systems analysts is one that is susceptible to a high degree 
of conflict. Managers tend to view systems analysts as in­
dividuals who are "bogged down" in their special techniques 
and are not familiar with the operational problems that 
exist in the agency. The systems analysts, on the other 
hand, tend to view line management with less than enthusiasm.
They see these managers as imprecise and careless in their
2decision-making techniques. Analysts, when their recom­
mendations are not accepted without modification, intensify 
this conflict by viewing managers as ineptj of lower intelli­
gence; unduly influenced by narrow, parochial interests; and 
victims of bureaucratic inertia.^ The potential conflict 
relationship between line management and the systems analysts 
can be a source of massive resistance to PPBS.^
^Frank J. Jasinski, "Adapting Organizations to New 
Technology," Harvard Business Review, XXXVII CJanuary- 
February, 1959J, 79-bO,
^Robert H, Hayes, "Qualitative Insights from Quanti­
tative Methods," Harvard Business Review, XLVII CJuly- 
AugUst, 1969), 111.
^K. A. Archibald, Three Views of the Expert’s Role 
in Policy-Making; Systems Analysis, Incrementalism and'the 
Clinical Approach.
^This conflict is further intensified when the per­
sonal characteristics of these two groups are considerably 
different. An example of this was the "whiz kids" under 
Secretary McNamara in the Department of Defense. This group 
was generally young, had little military experience, and was 
somewhat skeptical of authority. By contrast, the senior 
military officers were very rank- and experience-oriented. 
(William P. Snyder, Case Studies in Military Systems Analysis, 
p. 2.) However, this vast difference between the "whiz kids**
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Work Requirements 
An organizational change such as the implementation 
of PPBS in a governmental agency will change many of the 
requirements of the work itself of line management. When­
ever the Job task is changed significantly, a number of 
questions about the change occur to individuals. The per­
ceived answers to these questions will determine the response 
of the individual to this change. The questions include:
1. "How effective will I be in the new situation?"
2. "What new things will I have to learn? Can I learn 
them? How difficult will it be for me? How much time will 
I have to learn these things?"
3. "What will the change mean in terms of how others will 
regard me? What will be my new status in the eyes of 
others?"^
The aspects of PPBS that would cause unfavorable answers to 
these questions can be identified.
Maybe the greatest obstacle to acceptance of PPBS by 
line management is the unfamiliarity of these individuals
and the military may have contributed to some reduction of 
resistance due to the lack of perceived threat to job secur­
ity. Because of the military/civilian split, the senior 
military personnel did not feel that their immediate job was 
in danger of being assumed by these "whiz kids," This reduced 
job threat does not exist in the nonmilitary agencies where 
both.line managers and systems analysts are civilians,
CJ. B. Benton and A. L. Tenzer, Program Budgeting and Execu­
tive Commitment. p. 17.)
^Judson, A Manager's Guide to Making Changes, 
pp. 29—30.
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with the techniques and tools of systematic, quantitative 
analysis. Many managers find themselves threatened when 
mathematical techniques of any kind are used,^ These indi­
viduals realize that there will be some changes in the types 
of managers that the Federal Government hires and promotes. 
They will naturally resent these changes,^
A second change in the job of line management that 
will create resistance to the implementation of PPBS is the 
need for managers to make their decision criteria explicit 
and allow systems analysts to use that criteria in their 
efforts.. Managers are normally reluctant to spell out their 
decision criteria in detail because they feel that this 
infringes on their authority and causes them to lose their 
advantages of experience and expertise,^
The decision-makers in the Federal Government also 
resist the application of systems analysis to decisions
Geoffrey E, Nunn and Lloyd L, Byers, "Quantitative 
Decision Tools and Management Development Programs," Training 
and Development Journal, XXI (.November, 1967), 9. This 
appears to be the case in the attitude of Foreign Service 
Officers, Most of these individuals have a background which 
is well founded in liberal arts. The use of quantitative 
concepts and techniques is totally alien to the background, 
(Henry S, Howen and Albert P, Williams, Jr,, "Policy Analysis 
in International Affairs," The Analysis and Evaluation of 
PuhTic Expenditures: The PPB System, Ü, È,, Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Vol, III, 1969» p. 995.)
^Robert F, Vandell, "Management Evolution in the 
Quantitative World," Harvard Business Review. XLVIII 
(January-February, 1970), S7.
^Stuart J, Yuill, "Quantitative Information for 
Strategic Planning," Naval War College Review. XXIII 
(November, 1970), 21,
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because the aspects stressed during analysis are often dif­
ferent from those that they have historically considered 
important. Analysis is likely to overlook intangible and 
unquantifiable factors. Even when these factors, such as 
organizational continuity, discipline, morale, and esprit 
de corps. are a part of the analysis it is doubtful that 
they will be given the same high degree of emphasis that 
they received in decisions prior to analysis.^
Another major difference between the decision­
maker's task under PPBS and his "traditional" decision task 
is the general approach to problems. Managers are comfor­
table dealing with problems using natural analogs on a 
highly aggregated basis. They have a fundamental disposition
to limit the amount of information received and considered
2in the decision process. The use of systems analysis demands 
that more factors and information be considered than would 
be considered in decisions based on analogs. Systems 
analysis also demands that the decision at hand be broken
^James. R, Schlesinger, "Quantitative Analysis and 
National Security," World Politics. XV CJanuary, 1963), 312.
^Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Ethics of Rational Deci­
sion," ^^ana^gemen]^^ XII (February, 1966), B-I67.
This limitation of information can be easily seen in the 
methods of "trimming" a budget under the traditional budget 
versus those necessary under PPBS. It is much easier to 
"cut" budgets by imposing arbitrary financial limits than 
to familiarize oneself with the details necessary to reduce 
budgets based on functional needs, (U. S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Planning, Pro­
gramming . Budgeting, Inquiry, of the Subcommittee on National 
Security and International Operations, 1969, P. 224.)
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into its component parts and that judgment be applied 
piecemeal to each of these component questions. The decision­
makers feel that they have less control over the eventual 
outcome of a decision when applying these piecemeal Judg­
ments than they do when applying Judgment to the entire prob­
lem on the basis of a natural analog.^
The aspect of systems analysis that explicitly 
treats uncertainty also makes decision-makers uncomfortable 
and increases their resistance to its use. Systems analysis 
makes the decisions more difficult because the decision-maker 
becomes aware of uncertainties that he was unaware of, or 
chose to ignore, in the decisions made without analysis.
Another reason for the resistance of line management 
to the implementation of PPBS is its perceived effect on the 
"status" of the individual decision-maker. Decision-makers 
are often afraid to use the services of a systems analyst 
for the same reason that they are afraid to consult a com­
puter. There is an implicit feeling that the need to use 
these outside services is because of a "loss of intuition" 
by the decision-maker.^
Finally, managers will resist the Implementation of 
PPBS because the entire basis for Justification of their work
^Clay Thomas Whitehead, Uses and Limitations of 
Systems Analysis. p. 108.
^Gerhard Colm and Luther H. Gulick, Program Planning 
forJWatTonaT Goals. p. 171, and Yuill, "Quantitative Infor­
mation tor Strategic Planning," p. 126.
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is changed. Managers are skilled in performance and activity
measures and would rather communicate to higher levels on
this basis. They are not as skilled in the determination of
objectives and the measurement of benefits.  ̂ One author
overstated this condition by noting that:
In the past, social action agencies have measured 
operating "performance" In terms of honesty (no em­
bezzlement), prudence (no profligacy), cost control 
(not using too many paper clips), and occasionally 
relatively crude output standards (the number of job 
placements In a training program). However, under 
cost-beneflt standards, for example, the program manager 
can be honest, prudent, and thrifty (all no doubt 
great virtues) and still look like a clod with a 
shockingly low benefit-cost ratio.^
Governmental Programs 
The use of PPBS Is also perceived by governmental 
employees as a threat because of Its Implied réallocation of 
funds. Since PPBS Is a tool to provide for a basis of 
better allocation of funds. It Is reasonable for administra­
tors to question the effect of the use of this system on the 
programs with which they are concerned. In this regard, PPBS 
can be perceived In three different manners : It will help
achieve an expanded budget; It will have no effect on the
^C, W, Churchman and A, H, Schalnblatt, "PPB: How
Can It Be Implemented," Public Administration Review, XXIX 
(March/April, 1969), 185:
^Walter Williams, "Developing an Agency Evaluation 
Strategy for Social Action Programs," Office of Economic 
Opportunity, December 16, 1968, as cited by Robert A, Levine, 
"Policy Analysis and Economic Opportunity Programs,"
Analysis and Evaluation, U, S,, Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, Vol, III, 1969, pp. 1189-90,
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level of the budget; or the budget will be reduced under 
PPBS.l
If an individual perceives PPBS in the first method 
noted above, it is likely that he will support and actively 
work for its implementation. If PPBS is perceived in the 
third method noted above, it is likely that its implemen­
tation will be resisted by the employees of the activity.
This resistance to PPBS because of its perceived 
impact on current programs is not totally irrational. Often 
a government employee has devoted years of his life to the 
design and operation of a specific governmental program.
He tends to view national needs as completely synonymous 
with that specific program. Any analysis which fails to 
support this conception will create tension in the individual.' 
When confronted by a systems analysis that states that the 
particular program with which an individual decision-maker 
is closely involved is not the best alternative to achieve
^Some people, such as Lyle E. Crane, School of 
Natural Resources, University of Michigan, in Ruth P. Mack 
and Sumner Myers, "Outdoor Recreation," Measuring Benefits 
of Government Investments, ed. by Robert Dorfman, pp. 110-16, 
see PPBS and benefit-cost analysis as a way to substantiate 
demands for more funds. The effective use of PPBS does not 
guarantee a higher budget, though. In some cases PPBS, im­
plemented effectively, can result in a lower level of appro­
priations. For example, the Office of Economic Opportunity 
has one of the more sophisticated program-evaluation efforts 
in the Federal Government’s PPBS. This office still finds 
it very difficult to receive funds for its programs.
(Allen Schick, "From Analysis to Evaluation," The Annals of 
the American Academy of PolitIcaT and Social Science. CCCXÜIV 
[March, 1971], 70.)
^Whitehead, Uses and Limitations, p. 95.
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an objective, the individual has no choice but to believe 
either that something is wrong with the program or that 
something is wrong with the analysis. Generally he will 
question the analysis before the program.^ Because of the 
danger that analysis will disclose that their favorite pro­
gram is not effective, it is not surprising that many
managers will resist the application of PPBS and systems
2analysis to that program.
Miscellaneous Sources of Resistance 
In addition to these three major classifications of 
sources of resistance, there are a number of other factors 
that can create a significant level of opposition to PPBS. 
Many individuals feel that PPBS implies reorganization be­
cause the program structure cuts across the organizational 
lines.^ This fear of reorganization gives rise to uncer­
tainties about the new personal and organizational situa­
tions which may result.
The manner of implementation of PPBS in the Federal
^Harold A. Hovey, The Planning-Programming-Budgeting 
Approach to Government Decision-Making, p. 93»
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 
Operations, Planning, Programming, Budgeting. Inquiry, of the 
Subcommittee on National Security and International Opera­
tions, 1969, p. 127. This resistance of personnel to the 
inroads of PPBS will probably increase to the extent that 
their immediate job security and promotion potential is re­
lated to the success of the individual program in question.
3Millward, "PPBS: Problems of Implementation,"
pp. 92-93.
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Government can also increase resistance to the system. A 
directed, forceful manner of implementation can increase 
resistance because the individuals feel that their needs are 
not being considered and they resent the loss of control over 
their own actions.
Finally, the amount of work generated by the imple­
mentation of a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System can 
lead directly to resistance to the system. The amount of 
effort of the line management in generating data and pro­
viding technical expertise to the system is very large. This 
active support may be difficult to attain because the ongoing 
duties of line management are of such a magnitude that they 
often find it difficult to spend a significant amount of time 
directly involved with the system.^ Many managers, particu­
larly at a lower level, only see the costs of the system 
and do not see the benefits that are accruing at a higher 
organizational level.^ The existence of high costs in the 
absence of perceived benefits will almost inevitably generate 
resistance to the system.
Summary
The assessment of the sources of resistance noted 
above gives a number of Indications on how opposition to PPBS
^State-Local Finances Project, PPB Pilot Project 
Reports from the Participating 5 States. 5 Counties and 5 
Cities, p. lEEl---------  --------- ------------------
^Churchman and Schainblatt, "PPB; How Can It Be 
Implemented," p. 185.
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can be reduced. Some of these include:
1. Eliminating uncertainty in what organizational relation­
ships will prevail after PPBS.
2. "Lubricating" the new interpersonal relationships that 
are created as a result of PPBS —  particularly those between 
line management and the systems, analysts.
3. Training that eliminates unfamiliarity with PPBS concepts 
and techniques.
4. Training so that decision-makers view their programs in 
a larger perspective and treat analysis which is critical of 
their program as an aid to decision and design instead of an 
affront to their experience, intelligence, and status.
5. Ensuring that personnel understand that a program struc­
ture which, cuts across organizational lines does not mean 
that a reorganization is either necessary or desirable.
6. Modifying the means of implementation so that personnel 
perceive the system as something not necessarily "forced" on 
them.
7. Moderating the cost-benefit perception of individuals by 
Ca) lowering the costs of PPBS by recognizing and allowing 
for the time required of line management, and (b) ensuring 
that the lower levels see the benefit of the system.
It would be unrealistic to expect the implementation 
of PPBS to be accomplished without resistance. In addition 
to the fact that the use of PPBS has an effect on the power 
and authority relationships, the nature of the system itself
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is a source of conflict that generates opposition. If there 
were no opposition, it would be doubtful if PPBS was per­
forming the functions for which it was created.^ This 
conflict-generating feature of PPBS can be seen in most of 
the goals of PPBS, Some of these are:
1. PPBS is geared toward change of the organization in an 
environment that is now oriented toward the status quo.̂
2. PPBS has a definite function of reallocating funds.
3. One of the major goals of systems analysis ". . . is to 
question, to challenge and to provoke debate."3
4. Finally, the nature of the goals that distinguish PPBS 
from operating management creates conflict. The long-run 
goals that are the proper concern of PPBS will conflict on 
occasion with the short-run goals, of operating management,^
While the implementation of PPBS can, therefore, be 
facilitated by the reduction of resistance and conflict, any 
attempt to totally eliminate resistance to PPBS will defeat 
the purposes of the system. A viable, operative Planning-
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 
Operations, Planning. Programming. Budgeting. Inquiry, of the 
Subcommittee on National Security and International Opera- 
tions, 1969i p.' 134.
/ p  - ■Allen Schick,."Introducing PPBS at the State and 
Local Level," (unpublished paper. Tufts University, n. d.)
^Alain C. Enthoven, "Systems Analysis in the Pentagon," 
speech presented to the Association for Public Program 
Analysis, Washington, D. C., September 26, 1968.
■^Benton and Tenzer, Program Budgeting and Executive 
Cominifment. p. 22.
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Programming-Budgeting System is intrinsically a generator 
of conflict and resistance to its use.
544
APPENDIX D-2
ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING OF PPBS EFFORT
During the Implementation of a Plannlng-Programmlng- 
Budgetlng System one of the most crucial sets of required 
decisions concerns the organization and staffing of the 
PPBS effort. These decisions affect both the eventual 
operating capability of the system and the degree of resis­
tance that will be met during Implementation, Some of the 
key considerations In this area will be discussed. First, 
the possibilities of organizing for the Implementation 
effort of PPBS; then, the organization necessary to sustain 
the PPBS effort after It Is Implemented; and finally, the 
staffing requirements of a PPBS effort will be discussed,
iJtplêmentlng Organization 
In Implementing PPBS some form of organization Is 
required to perform the following tasks: Identifying the
agency’s major objectives and formulating the program struc­
ture; Identifying the key Issues that should be subjected 
to analysis In the Initial phases of PPBS; determining the 
processes and procedures to be followed In analytical efforts 
and data collection; and determining the continuing adminis­
trative framework for PPBS,
Generally there are three organizational arrangements 
that can be used to perform these tasks —  central staff unit; 
ad hoc. temporary advisory group (composed of members from
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the operating activities); or a combination of these. If a 
decision is made to implement PPBS using a central staff 
unit, the group that performs the work will normally be the 
same as the staff agency that will be responsible for the 
eventual operation of PPBS. The relationship of line manage­
ment to this staff unit is one of responding to requests 
for information and data.
This centralized form of implementation has some 
definite advantages. These are:
1. The agency head could maintain a high degree of control 
over the work.
2. The program structure would be less influenced by the 
existing organizational structure.
3. The selection of areas for analysis would not be unduly 
biased by predispositions of line management.
4. The time required for implementation would be reduced 
because less negotiation and compromise would be required.
5. The "institutionalization" of PPBS would result since a 
permanent group would be in existence.
Prom the point of view of the eventual effective 
operation of PPBS, this centralized implementing organization 
structure has some definite disadvantages. The lack of par­
ticipation of line management can create a high degree of 
hostility toward PPBS and a reluctance to furnish the infor­
mation necessary for the design or effective use of the system. 
The separation of PPBS design from the operating environment
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of line management can also reduce the amount of practical 
realities in the final system.
The use of an ad hoc, temporary advisory group to 
implement PPBS also has some advantages. Generally these 
are the reverse of the disadvantages noted for the central 
staff unit. Each subordinate activity that is represented 
on the advisory group will feel that it has played a sig­
nificant part in the design of PPBS and the implementation 
process will probably be facilitated. This approach has 
disadvantages in that the central, broad-based view of the 
organization and its objectives and functions would be 
lacking.
A compromise to these two approaches Includes the 
use of both a central staff and an ad hoc, temporary commit­
tee to implement PPBS. The combination of these two could
allow a significant amount of participation by subordinate 
organizational activities without their parochial interests 
dominating the system. Within this combination, there is a 
spectrum of possible organizational relationships. This 
spectrum can be described by three positions;
1. At one extreme, the temporary group would just be advisory 
to the central staff. The advisory group could debate ideas 
and provide a communication chain to the operating activi­
ties, but the authority for decision would belong to the
central staff.
2. In the middle of the spectrum, the temporary group and
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the central staff could be coequal, with disputes and dif­
ferences being resolved by the head of the agency.
3. At the other extreme, the central staff could be sub­
ordinate to the advisory committee and furnish technical 
advice when requested. Decisions concerning the implementa­
tion of PPBS would be made by the advisory group.
The choice of where on this spectrum the individual agency's 
implementation program will be located depends on the cir­
cumstances of the particular agency. If the cost of hostility 
encountered during implementation and the possibility of an 
"impractical" system is considered higher than the benefits 
of a more co-ordinated system, the implementation organiza­
tion should be constructed in line with the third possible 
compromise. If the reverse is true, the first compromise 
would be preferred.
When utilizing a compromise organizational arrange­
ment, it is important that the duties, responsibilities, and 
authority of each of the participants be defined as completely 
as possible. If they are not defined in this manner, it is 
possible for some significant aspect of the implementation 
of PPBS to be neglected, and the working relationship between 
the participants could degenerate into a meaningless, wasteful 
struggle for power.
Regardless of the organizational arrangement used to 
implement PPBS, it would be a mistake for the head of the 
agency simply to assign the task and withdraw from the process 
until the system is implemented. The agency head should be
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actively Involved in the implementation process since the 
system is primarily designed to serve him in his decision 
capacity.
Operating Organization 
The form of organization that is chosen for the 
operation of PPBS will also have an impact on how the system 
is received by the operational activities. There are some 
general rules which appear appropriate to the organization 
of the PPBS effort. These are;
1. The central staff component that is responsible for 
analysis should have relatively direct access to the decision­
maker
2. The staff should be located at a level high enough that
a broad organizational perspective is possible;
3. The staff should be allowed a high degree of freedom in
the analysis efforts performed;
4. The staff should have a relative degree of security so 
that their analyses are not constrained to the "party line";
5. The staff should be isolated from the day-to-day opera­
tional problems so that they are able to spend full time on 
the broader issues for analysis;
6. The staff should not be isolated from line management to
^This is because the staff's function is to provide 
information that will be used for his decisions. Only if the 
staff has a high degree of familiarity with the problems the 
decision-maker faces and the information that he considers 
important, can this function be effectively performed.
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the extent that knowledge of practical operations and systems 
is lost; and
7. The staff’s outputs should be located so that they are 
directly used in the decision-making process of the agency. 
These rules cannot be rigidly followed since they are inter­
nally inconsistent. For example, the need for the staff to 
be isolated from the daily operational problems must be 
compromised with the need for the staff to be familiar with 
the operating procedures and systems.
Generally there are three organizational placements 
that are appropriate for PPBS analytic staffs —  in the 
Budgeting Office, in the Planning Office, and in a separate 
activity. The placement of the central analytic staff for 
PPBS under either budgeting or planning should be done with 
caution. PPBS is to provide a bridge between planning and 
budgeting, and if the central staff is placed under either 
of these it must retain close ties to the other. Generally, 
the placement of a PPBS staff under the Planning Office will 
effectively Isolate it from the day-to-day operational prob­
lems, but this tends to sacrifice operating knowledge and 
isolate it from the decision process. In the Budgeting Office, 
the PPBS analytic staff is closely associated with the day- 
to-day operations of the agency and is a part of the normal 
decision process, but it could become too involved in the 
smaller operational problems of the agency to be of much use 
in planning. A separate office could be a reasonable
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compromise between the two If the magnitude of the PPBS effort 
is sufficient to justify a separate organizational entity.
The proper organizational placement of a central 
staff for analytic efforts does not resolve all of the organ­
izational questions associated with PPBS. There is a definite 
danger to having all of the analysis associated with PPBS 
concentrated in one central group. The operations of this 
group could control the types of decisions the executive 
makes, the alternatives he sees, the information he receives, 
and the criteria that he uses. If all studies initiated are 
closely controlled by one central staff, the "biases" of 
that staff could dominate the decision process. The incep­
tion of planning efforts also begins at the lower levels of 
the organization, and the technical data necessary for most 
analysis exists at that point. As a result, much of analysis 
can best be performed at these lower levels. For this 
reason it is almost essential that an analytic capability be 
established at several lower organizational levels as well 
as just at the central staff level.
The organizational relationship established between 
the central analytic staff and the analytic staffs of lower 
organizational units does a great deal to determine the degree 
of centralization of authority that results from PPBS. The 
operating relationship between the central analytic staff and 
subordinate analytic staffs is established by three criteria:
1. Who identifies the areas requiring analysis?
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2. Who performs the analysis Itself?
3. Who makes the final decision based on the analysis?
If the central analytic staff selects the areas for analysis, 
performs the analysis themselves, and refers the product to 
the agency head for decision, the centralizing impact of PPBS 
will be very significant. If, on the other hand, the areas 
for analysis are selected by subordinate activities, analyses 
are performed at subordinate levels, and subordinate decision­
makers are allowed to make decisions with a high threshold 
value of decision impact, then the use of PPBS will not have 
a significant impact on the centralization of authority in 
the agency. The role of the central analytic staff in this 
latter case is as a reviewing agency for the analyses referred 
to the agency head for decision. Between these two extremes 
there are various combinations of analyses initiation, per­
formance, and approval that will have a more, or a less, 
centralizing impact.̂
^Contrary to some belief, the use of PPBS in any 
agency is not neutral in its effect on centralization of 
authority. PPBS has a natural tendency to create centrali­
zation since it crosses organizational lines; forces deci­
sions to the attention of the chief executive; and makes as­
sumptions explicit in the decision process so that higher 
levels can meaningfully participate in these decisions. Some 
agency heads such as Secretary McNamara have welcomed PPBS 
because it afforded a much higher degree of control over their 
organization. It is also possible' for the use of PPBS to 
allow more decentralized decisions by having a more meaningful 
delegation of decentralized authority. The input orientation 
of the traditional budget has led to excessive attention to 
detail at the top echelons of agencies. PPBS can allow the 
delegation of objectives and criteria to lower levels and 
let these lower levels be concerned with implementation.
552
The amount of centralization that is implicit in the 
operating procedures established will partially determine 
the degree of resistance that the implementation of PPBS 
encounters. The more centralization that is involved, the 
greater loss of power and authority of subordinate officials 
and the greater their resistance.
The operating procedures between the central analytic 
staffs and subordinate activities should be based on an 
assessment of the benefits that can be derived from higher 
and lower degrees of centralization. Some of the benefits 
that must be considered include:
1. Benefits of "centralization":
a. More co-ordination can be achieved and alternatives
can be viewed across organizational lines when the analysis
is performed at the central level.
b. The agency head has more control over the products 
of analysis and the decisions of the agency.
c. The achievement of an adequate analytic capability 
is easier due to the decreased demand for analysts.
2. Advantages of "decentralization":
a. Implementation of PPBS will not be resisted as much.
b. Subordinate activities retain their incentive for 
inventiveness and adaptation of new alternatives.
c. Conflicting opinions are not suppressed by a mono­
lithic analytic unit.
d. Subordinate officials are trained in the use of
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analytic tools for decisions.
e. Operating data necessary for analyses Is more readily 
available.
The operating procedures between the central staff 
and analytic staffs at subordinate levels also determine the 
number of people required on the central staff. As stronger 
staffs are developed at operational levels and more analyses 
are performed at these levels, there Is a requirement for a 
smaller sized central analytic staff. Other determinants of 
the size of the staff required at the central level Include:
1. The size of the governmental agency Involved;
2. The variety and complexity of the agency's operating 
programs ; and
3. The sophistication of analyses desired.
Staffing
The method In which the staffing function Is performed 
Is also a determinant of the ease of Implementing PPBS, The 
major staffing requirement under PPBS Is to man the central 
and subordinate analytical staffs. Generally staffing can 
be performed In one, or a combination, of the following three 
manners :
1. Hire Individuals trained In systems analysis from outside 
the agency. When this Is done the staff Is well qualified 
to apply the techniques necessary, but a major upgrading of 
knowledge In the organization and Its programs Is required. 
Because it Is likely that these individuals from outside the
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agency will have significantly different personal character­
istics (particularly age and experience) than line management, 
the conflict between the staff specialists and line managers 
could become more intense.^
2. Upgrade the analytic skills of individuals from line 
activities. These individuals have the advantage of being 
familiar with the organization and the substance of the pro­
grams. Also line managers will not feel that the staff is 
"unreachable.” The major problem of trying to upgrade exis­
ting personnel is the amount of time required before an 
operational analytic capability is achieved.
3. Use consultants from outside the agency. This alternative 
has the advantage of being quickly implemented because the 
immediate product of analytic efforts from consultants will 
probably be more usable than the initial analytic products
of an in-house staff. Overreliance on consultant capability, 
however, can lead to the neglect of development of an ade­
quate internal staff. The results of studies from consul­
tants are difficult to assimilate consistently into the deci­
sion process of the agency since they usually encounter a 
high degree of resistance of line management. In determining 
the method of staffing of systems analysts, the decision-
^This apparently has been one of the problems in the 
Federal Government*s implementation of PPBS to date. One 
author noted that the individuals who pioneered PPBS in the 
Federal Government were technical specialists " . . .  with 
little understanding, less interest and no experience in 
general management." (Bertram M. Gross, "The New Systems 
Budgeting," Public Administration Review, XXIX [March/April, 
1969], 115.) :
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maker must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of 
these and try to find an optimum blend of staffing.
Once the decision is made on the general approach to 
be followed in staffing the analytic office, it is necessary 
to look for the specific individuals. The required academic 
background for a systems analyst staff is truly multi- 
disciplinarian since different disciplines view complex 
problems in different manners. Successful analysts have come 
from almost every academic discipline, including Law, History, 
Psychology, Political Science, Economics, Mathematics, Sta­
tistics, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Engineering, and 
Business Administration,
Probably more important than the academic background 
of the analysts selected are their personal characteristics. 
William B, Ross, Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Analysis 
and Program Evaluation in the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, stated that he felt that successful analysis 
involved 10 to 20 per cent technique application and 80 to 
90 per cent substantive knowledge.^ It would appear that the 
following qualification would be critical in the selection 
of analysts :
1. A background of public service that helps the analyst 
identify and formulate problems.
U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The 
PTanning-Programming-Budgeting System; Progress and Poten­
tials Hearings , before the Subcommittee on Economy in 
Government, 1967, p. 79.
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2. A high degree of maturity that allows the analyst to have 
his analysis subjected to criticism and to accept the limita­
tions of analysis.
3. A high degree of incisiveness and imagination that allows 
the analyst to get to the heart of problems and formulate 
better objectives.
4. Some degree of mathematical skill, so that the quanti­
tative techniques that are often used in analysis are not 
beyond the analyst's level of comprehension,
5. A high degree of resourcefulness and dynamism that will 
lead the analyst to search out problems for analysis.
6. An ability to express himself capably in both verbal and 
written communications.
7. A high degree of diplomacy that will facilitate the 
interpersonal relationships between the analysts and line 
managers.
Once the individuals have been selected to staff the 
analytic office, it will be necessary to provide training to 
upgrade their skills. If the individual has experience in 
the agency it will probably be necessary to train him in 
analytical techniques.^ The academic training that is given 
is only the start of the necessary indoctrination. The best 
education for a potential analyst is performing analyses 
under the supervision of experienced analysts.
^Some of the training programs available for this 
purpose are discussed in Chapter IX.
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Summary
This appendix has addressed some key considerations 
involved in the organizational and staffing decisions of 
PPBS, These decisions can be made in such a manner that the 
internal opposition to PPBS is reduced. For example, the 
implementation can be left largely to a temporary committee 
from the operating elements; a small central analytic staff 
can be established with subordinate responsibility for iden­
tifying areas for potential analysis, performing the analysis, 
and approving analyses with a high threshold value; and the 
majority of individuals selected for the analytic staffs can 
come from the operational activities. These decisions that 
facilitate the implementation of PPBS can be made only at a 
price —  a more limited, unco-ordinated program structure; 
loss of individual control of decisions by the agency head; 
inadequate utilization of limited analytic talent; and an 
increased amount of time before the analytic efforts are 
fruitful. These decisions should be made on the basis of the 
costs and benefits of each possible alternative.
Sources; The discussion in the appendix was largely adopted 
from the following sources:
1, J, B, Benton and A. L, Tenzer, Program Budgeting and 
Executive Commitment,
2, James R, Schlesinger, Defense Planning and Budgeting:
The Issue of Centralized Control,
3, Operations Research Office, Fields of Knowledge and 
Operations Research,
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4, State-Local Finances Project, Administrative Framework 
for Establishing Planning-ProgranimIh.'g-B'udgeting' Systems l~n 
States. Cities, and Counties; Some Considerations and" 
Suggested Possibilities.
5, State-Local Finances Project, Implementing PPB in State, 
City, and County.
6, State-Local Finances Project, Staffing and Training for 
a PPB Syatem in State and Local Governments.
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APPENDIX E-1
GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The receipt of the product of systems analysis re­
quires a decision on the part of the decision-maker. If a 
decision-maker takes the results of analyses based on "blind 
faith" and automatically concurs in their recommendations, 
this could be the source of large errors. For this reason 
any systems analysis must be subjected to an extensive re­
view before a decision is made.
The reason for this review of systems analyses should 
be to make the decision-maker better aware of how the recom­
mendations of the analysis should be treated. If the review 
of analyses degenerates into an attempt to try to achieve a 
perfect analysis, it could be dysfunctional. In all proba­
bility, no analysis of a major complex problem in the 
Federal Government will ever achieve "perfection." As noted 
in Appendix A-4, it is doubtful if any analysis will even be 
complete because of the time, cost, and data limitations.
The decision-maker's review of systems analyses should then 
concentrate on gaining more knowledge about the analysis it­
self so that he is aware of the caution with which its 
recommendations should be treated. Review should not become 
a contest to determine how many "errors" can be found. If 
the review of systems analysis is not kept in proper perspec­
tive, it is possible that the analysis will be continuously
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returned to the analytic group to correct "errors." The net 
result of this would be that the decision required on the 
problem would be postponed, at a significantly high cost of 
inactivity.
This appendix will furnish a glimpse at some of the 
aspects which should be considered during review of any sys­
tems analysis. Some broad general areas to be considered 
will be discussed, and a list of questions that should be 
asked of any analysis will be presented.
Decision-makers should be cautioned against the 
tendency to substitute intensive review of analyses for 
active participation in the analyses themselves. The review 
process is limited in the effect that it can have on the 
analytic effort, while participation in the analysis can 
greatly enhance the over-all quaTi.ty of the analysis.
General Areas of Review
There are two general areas which appear to be the 
major problems in most systems analyses —  biases and lack 
of substance. These are manifested in so many diverse 
manners that it is impossible to consider them properly in 
any given question or set of questions about the analysis.
In the review of a systems analysis these should be constantly 




It Is Incorrect to assume that a process such as 
systems analysis which Is open, explicit, and attempts to 
conform to the scientific method Is free from the biases that 
exist In all organizations and Individuals. In all en­
deavors where the elements of judgment and perception are 
highly active, biases can become a serious source of dis­
orientation.
The fact that there are strong biases toward a 
common viewpoint In any organization should not be surprising. 
There are a number of reasons why these biases exist. Some 
of these are:
1. Individuals tend to follow their Interests In the selec­
tion of occupations, and as a result the organization Is 
composed largely of people with common Interests and goals 
who reinforce each other's beliefs.
2. All communications received In the organization are a 
filtered ahd simplified view of reality that tends to rein­
force the biases that exist.
3. The Intensity of experience and attention In a given area 
over a period of time tends to form a block to the considera­
tion of other possible areas.
Because of the mutual reinforcement of these areas 
of early Intellectual commitment and symmetry of Information 
and experience. It Is little wonder that the biases that 
exist In a given organization are compounded and gain In 
strength over time. The preponderance and strength of these
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biases make it doubtful if a given organization has the 
ability even to ask the proper questions about its operations 
and goals.
These biases that exist in an organization have a 
definite effect on the performance of analyses. It is un­
reasonable to expect an analyst to be able to remain free 
from the social- and communication-generated biases that 
exist in a given organization. In addition to the sources 
of bias that exist throughout the organization, the analyst 
has biases imposed directly on his work. During the evalua­
tions of his analytic efforts and during the interaction 
with the reviewers of analytic efforts the analyst becomes 
directly aware of the alternatives, assumptions, ideas, 
etc. that are contrary to the views and biases of the or­
ganizational "party line" and often finds that it is useless, 
and often damaging to his career, to support these alterna­
tives, etc. As a result analyses tend to be biased to 
"please" the organization.
The process of analysis itself is a source of another 
form of bias that operates on the analyst. When the analyst 
designs a specific alternative himself, he creates a source 
of commitment to that alternative which can bias his consider­
ation of the other alternatives that are designed by someone 
else. The analyst also tends to work with the analysis to 
the extent that he begins to believe that his assumptions and 
models are more representative of the "real world" than they 
might possibly be, and as a result he attaches undue
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significance to his results and recommendations.
The detection of bias in systems analyses would be 
relatively simple if this bias was manifested by deliberate 
attempts to distort the recommendations. However, this is 
seldom the case. Most of biases reflected in analysis come 
with the conviction of the analyst and the organization that 
they are presenting an open, objective study that is free 
from bias. The identification of these "hidden" biases is 
extremely difficult.
There are many ways that biases are manifested in 
systems analyses. Some of these include:
1. The objective is limited so that it conforms closely to 
the current operation of the organization.
2. The alternatives considered are all consistent with a 
biased view of reality.
3. The contingencies considered in the analysis are all 
consistent with the organization's biases.
4. Costs and benefits are restricted to those accruing to 
only a selected population (e.g., only costs to the specific 
agency and benefits to their direct clientele are included, 
and costs to other agencies or the public in general and 
benefits to groups other than direct clientele are ignored ).
5. Optimistic estimates of costs and benefits are presented.
The most obvious way to combat organizational bias 
in systems analysis is to have the same problem analyzed again 
by an organization which will have biases operating in an
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opposite direction.^ The major disadvantage of this method 
is the cost of the duplicate analytic efforts.
A less extreme counter to the existence of bias in 
systems analysis is to have the completed analysis reviewed 
by an organization that has biases in the opposite direction. 
This review, in the role of a "devil's advocate," can isolate 
areas and alternatives not considered in the orginal analysis. 
Another way to reduce the degree of bias that exists 
in analytic studies is to have the studies performed outside 
of the activity which has any operational responsibility for 
the programs involved. There are two major difficulties 
involved in this practice. First, if the analytic staff 
communicates properly with the operational personnel they will 
still tend to be affected by the biases of these individuals. 
Second, it the analytic staff does not communicate with the 
operational personnel, the results of the study could be so 
impractical that they would be virtually useless.
While it is impossible to totally eliminate bias from 
any systems analysis, the process of analysis itself makes 
the existence of this bias easier to handle than it is in a
^One case where this was done was a study for a 
cross-Florida barge canal. The Corps of Engineers (who would 
perform the work if the project were approved) made a benefit- 
cost analysis. The result of this analysis was that benefits 
would be 120 per cent of costs. A consulting firm hired by 
the railroads in the area (who were understandably opposed 
to the canal) made a benefit-cost study which showed total 
benefits of 13 per cent of costs. ("Putting a Dollar Sign 
on Everything," Business Week, July 16, 1966, p. 128.)
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form of decision-malcing that relies totally on intuition.
The attempt to make all assumptions and Judgments open and 
explicit during the analysis aids in the identification of 
bias. If this bias is identified, the decision-maker can 
compensate for it in the caution that he applies to the use 
of the results of the analysis.
Lack of Analytic Substance
The second major problem in many systems analyses is 
that they often substitute the mechanics of analysis for its 
substance. Like any other individual, the systems analyst 
is a product of his background and environment. Because of 
the necessity of some quantitative knowledge, the field of 
systems analysis is dominated by the quantitatively oriented 
disciplines. This background means that many analysts are 
more comfortable when they are manipulating mathematical 
tools than when they are trying to come to grasp with the 
ill-defined, unstructured tasks of problem formulation and 
definition. Also, the literature on systems analysis is 
dominated by detailed descriptions of the tools and techniques 
used in analysis rather than the general approach and orien­
tation of analysis.
The end result of these background and environmental 
effects is that the analyst’s effort is often primarily con­
cerned with the manipulation of quantitative data rather than 
with actual analysis of the problem. The problem is over­
simplified and distorted to fit an existing and convenient
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mathematical formula or technique rather than adapting and 
developing formulas or techniques to fit the real-world 
problem.
This problem of overemphasizing techniques and ne­
glecting the substance of the problem is manifested in the 
results of the analysis in many ways. Some of these include:
1. The problem formulation and design of the analysis 
cannot be explained simply and logically.
2. The results of the analysis tend to be mathematically 
"clean” and do not reflect uncertainty.^
3. The details of computation are emphasized too heavily in 
the presentation of the results of the analysis,
p4. Data is painstakingly refined.
5. All intangible and unquantifiable factors are neglected 
or arbitrarily forced into a quantitative expression.
6. The criteria used in the problem is limited so that it 
fits the data and techniques available.
7. Firm, hard recommendations are given.
The easiest way to combat the tendency of systems 
analysis studies to become disoriented toward the mechanics 
of the problem and away from its substance is to have mean­
ingful participation by the decision-maker in the performance
Risk may be identified and extensively treated, but 
uncertainty that cannot be characterized by probability 
values is neglected.
pThe usual presence of uncertainty dominates the 
probable data error to such an extent that detailed refine­
ment is unnecessary in most analyses.
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of the analysis Itself, This participation can force the 
analyst to consider the complexities of the real problem.
Also, in the use of the completed product of systems analysis, 
the decision-maker should make a practice of asking diffi­
cult questions and demanding that the completed analysis 
answer these questions to the best of its ability.
Questions for Review of Analysis 
The following questions can be used as guides to 
the review of a systems analysis effort. Most of these ques­
tions are not answerable on an absolute basis but require a 
subjective evaluation. It is also doubtful if any analysis 
would be able to satisfy all of the questions. The asking 
of these questions will give the decision-maker a feeling for 
the reliance that he should place on the specific recommen­
dations made by the analysis. For purposes of convenience 
these questions are divided into seven categories —
(a) Objectives, Criteria, and Effectiveness; (b) Assumptions; 
Cc) Alternatives; Cd) Models; Ce) Cost; Cf) Sensitivity 
Analysis; and Cg) Recommendations and Documentation,
These questions are :
A, Objectives, Criteria, and Effectiveness
1, If the objective defined by the analysis is expanded, 
are more alternatives possible, and is a meaningful comparison 
of these alternatives possible?
2, Is the objective defined by the problem too broad to 
allow meaningful comparisons of alternatives?
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3. Is the objective defined by the analysis consistent 
with the problem that requires solution?
4. Are multiple objectives Ignored In order to simplify 
analysis?
5. Was the objective of the analysis redefined during 
the process of the analysis Itself?
6. Is the criteria Identified consistent with higher- 
level objectives?
7. Does the criteria used consider all of the dimensions 
of a multiple objective?
8. Is the criteria used reasonable (such as maximizing 
effectiveness for a specified cost or minimizing cost for a 
specified level of effectiveness) Instead of nonsensical 
(such as minimizing cost and maximizing effectiveness)?
9. Are ratios used as criteria?
a. If ratios are used, does this mean that the
analysis Is indifferent to the absolute size of effec­
tiveness or cost?
b. If ratios are used, are all resources considered
in the cost portion of the ratio?
10. Are program-size and performance rates used as the 
only measures of effectiveness?
11. Is there at least one separate measure of effective­
ness for each dimension of a multiple objective?
12. Is It recognized that proximate measures of effec­
tiveness are Imperfect Indicators of the attainment of 
objectives?
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a. Are the measures of effectiveness adequately 
defined?
b. Has there been an attempt to consider aspects of 
the objectives that are not covered by the proximate 
measures of effectiveness?
c . Is the fact that there are differences between 
the scales of proximate measures of effectiveness and 
attainment of objectives recognized?
13. Is time an explicit part of the measures of effec­
tiveness?
14. Are qualitative measures of effectiveness ignored?
15. Are all measures of effectiveness arbitrarily forced 
into a dollar measurement?
a. Would the results of the analysis be more infor­
mative if units of measurement other than dollars were 
used for some areas of effectiveness?
16. Does it appear that the first measure of effective­
ness that was suggested was uncritically accepted so that 
data manupulation could begin?
B. Assumptions
1. Have the assumptions reduced the problem to the extent 
that the results are no longer useful?
2. Are there alternative assumptions as reasonable as 
the assumptions used in the analysis?
a. Were these alternative assumptions checked by 
sensitivity analysis?
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3. Was any element of uncertainty removed by assumption 
and not checked subsequently by sensitivity analysis?
4. If the validity of an assumption became critical to 
the analysis, was this assumption re-examined and subjected 
to rigorous analytical treatment?
5. Are there any assumptions that appear to have been 
made to make the model easier to manipulate?
6. Is the future environment of the analysis implicitly 
assumed to be the same as today's environment?
7. Has there been an implicit assumption that what has 
happened in the past will continue into the future in an 
uninterrupted trend?
a. What happens to the recommendations if these
"historical trend" assumptions are relaxed?
8. Does the use of certain tools of analysis carry 
hidden assumptions (such as the linearity of specific rela­
tionships) ?
9. Are there implicit assumptions contained in the attempt 
to secure quantitative measures of qualitative factors?
C. Alternatives
1. Have all meaningful alternatives been considered?
a. If any alternatives have been excluded from de­
tailed analysis, was this done openly and explicitly, and
can this exclusion be verified by the analysis itself?
2. Are the alternatives compared really significant 
alternatives or just minor variations of each other?
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3. Are current programs and capabilities considered 
among the alternatives?
4. Were the alternatives restricted by adherence to 
the "party line"?
a. Were any alternatives considered that would have 
Involved administration and operation of the program by 
another organization?
5. Did the process of analysis Itself generate any 
meaningful alternatives?
6. Are any combinations of alternatives possible that 
could lead to a major Improvement In effectiveness?
7. Are the alternatives considered really feasible In 
light of the prevailing political, cultural, and policy 
considerations ?
8. Are the alternatives considered adequately described?
D. Models
1. Are all of the key factors of the real world contained 
In the model?
a. If some key factors are excluded from the model, 
can this be justified based on Insensitivity of results 
to changes In these factors, etc?
2. Were all major Interactions considered In the model?
3. Were spill-over benefits explicitly considered and 
defined?
4. Is the logic of the model stated clearly and concisely 
In nonmathematlcal terms?
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5. Is the logical structure of the model intuitively 
acceptable?
6. Are the cause-and-effect relationships contained in 
the model intuitively satisfying?
7. Were enough representative situations analyzed to 
define the parameters and their relationships in the model?
8. Does the model consider political, administrative, 
legal, and psychological constraints as well as physical 
limitations?
a. Was the influence of non-quantifiable factors 
explicitly considered in the model unless it is logically 
demonstrated that this influence is negligible?
b. Were the various possible personal reactions of 
major characters in the program (members of the organi­
zation, clients, enemies, etc.) considered?
9. H.OW does the model treat the problems associated with 
implementing the program?
10. Does the model cover the full time span of the oper­
ation of the program?
11. Did the incorporation of details take place in the 
later stages of the analysis (after formulation of the prob­
lem, determination of alternatives and key factors, etc.)?
12. In building the model, was the representativeness of 




1. Are all costs included, even if they will be incurred 
outside of the activity involved?
2. Are incremental costs used?
3. How were the opportunity costs of the resources on
hand at the start of the program calculated?
4. How is the time value of money considered?
5. Was the total cost (including support cost) over the
entire life of the program considered?
a. Are the costs of initial implementation of the 
program (training, construction, etc.) included?
6. Were nonmonetary costs considered?
7. If dollars are used as the only measure of cost, is
this because other measures are unimportant?
a. Would the analysis be more informative if some 
resources were measured in physical units in addition to 
dollars?
8. If support costs were allocated to the alternatives, 
was the basis for allocation valid?
a. If some other "reasonable" basis for allocating 
costs were used, would the recommendation of the analysis 
be substantially changed?
9. Are the cost estimates for all of the alternatives
made in a comparable manner?
10. Were the cost-estimating relationships extrapolated 
beyond the capability of the historical data?
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a. Was this extrapolation Justified by "logic”?
b. Was the additional uncertainty generated by this 
extrapolation considered?
11. How is the remaining value of assets that will be on 
hand at the end of a proposed program treated?
12. Have meaningful cost categories been devised?
F . Sensitivity Analyses
1. Does the model distinguish between risk and uncer­
tainty?
2. Was uncertainty neglected while a detailed analysis 
was made of the more easily defined risk?
a. Was uncertainty ignored by concentrating on the 
calculation of one "expected" value?
3. Was contingency analysis performed over the full 
range of possible contingencies?
a. If less than the full range of possible contin­
gencies was used, is there a reasonable explanation for 
excluding some?
4. Was sensitivity analysis used to investigate the 
possible technological and performance changes of the system?
5. Was sensitivity analysis used to explore the uncer­
tainties in the parameters of the model itself?
6. Was the sensitivity of the analysis to the key judg­
ments of the analyst explicitly noted?
7. Was the discount rate used to find a present value for 
cost and monetary benefits subjected to sensitivity analysis?
575
8. Have uncertainty and sensitivity of costs as well 
as effectiveness been explicitly considered?
9. Are both the range and rate of sensitivities con­
sidered in the analysis?
10. Was the sensitivity analysis used to design better 
(less sensitive) alternatives?
11. Has a fortiori analysis been used to verify the 
capability of the preferred alternative?
12. Has uncertainty been implicitly handled by raising 
the discount rates instead of being explicitly treated?
G. Recommendations and Documentation
1. Is the information presented by the analysis in a 
meaningful and usable form?
2. Does the study, as a whole, logically support the 
conclusions and recommendations presented?
3. Do the conclusions reached by the analysis actually 
answer the key questions of the decision-maker?
4. Are the recommendations made consistent with the 
uncertainty existing in the analysis?
5. Are the limitations of the analysis, as well as its 
strengths, stated clearly and explicitly?
6. Are the conclusions and recommendations based on 
significant differences between alternatives that are not 
dominated by the uncertainty inherent in the analysis?
7. Were all Judgments in the analysis made explicit 
and not disguised as fact?
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8. Are all calculations in the analysis explicitly 
performed so that they can be duplicated?
9. Is the data used in the analysis (and the sources of 
that data) explicitly exposed?
10. Does the quantitative data presentation imply a 
higher degree of precision than is possible due to statistical 
and real uncertainties?
11. Is there an indication that the analyst performed 
this analysis in isolation or is there evidence of signifi­
cant operational participation?
Summary
The information contained in a systems analysis study 
is of little use to a decision-maker unless he is able to 
establish the degree of credibility that he can assign to 
that information and the degree of caution with which the 
information should be used. This is the purpose of the review 
of systems analysis studies. It is important that the result 
of this review be conveyed to the individual (or group of 
individuals) who performed the analysis. This feedback will 
enable them to improve future analytic efforts.
Sources: The material in this appendix was largely suggested
by:
1. Irving Heymont, et al.. Guide for Reviewers of Studies 
Containing Gost-Effectiveness Analysis.
2. Herbert Kahn and Irwin Mann, Ten Common Pitfalls.
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3. E. S, Quade, "Récapitulation," Analysis for Military 
Decisions. ed. by E. S. Quade, pp. 318-30.
4. E, S. Quade, "Pitfalls and Limitations," Systems Analysis 
and Policy Planning; Applications in Defense, ed. by E. S. 
Quade and W. I. Boucher, pp. 34^-63.




A total of fifty-one cases that are appropriate for 
training in the area of PPBS in the governmental sector were 
identified. These cases are classified according to their 
major application to the specific learning objectives noted 
in Chapter VIII, Table 25 presents the number of cases 
applicable to each of the objectives.
The cases that were identified are listed below.
They are listed in accordance with the major areas of 
training and specific learning objectives identified in 
Chapter VIII, The location of each case and a short des­
cription of each case is presented. If the case appears 
applicable to more than one specific learning objective, the 
second objective is shown, by number, in the parentheses 
following the description of the case.
Concepts and Techniques of PPBS
B. 3.0, Understanding of Total Quantification Misconception 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PREELAND
William P, Snyder, Case Studies in Military Systems Analysis,
This is an illustrative systems analysis of a high- 
level, complex, and ill-defined problem. There is a high 
content of qualitative data in the case.
TABLE 25
APPLICABILITY OP TRAINING CASES TO LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Learning
Objective Specific Learning Objective
B. 3.0, Understanding of "Total Quantification" misconception
C. 3. Skill in developing a program structure
C, 5. Skill in designing output indicators
D. 3.f. Skill in modifying sequence of implementation
D. 4. Skill in determining organizational patterns
D, 5. Skill in implementing analytic capability
E. 1. Skill in monitoring operations of PPBS
E. 2. Knowledge of systems analysis techniques and language
E. 3. Skill in selecting problems for analysis
E. 4. Skill in defining problems for analysis



















C. 3. Skill in Developing a Program Structure 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 72-80.
This case consists of a hypothetical report by the
PCC on the proper program structure for the agency. The
student is asked to review the report and design a program
structure with output indicators. CC. 5.)
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OP TRANSPORTATION
The Intercollegiate Case Clearing House (Case 13C20)
This case describes in detail the functions of the
Department of Transportation in New York. Several bases for
developing a program structure are presented. The student
is asked to develop the program structure.
POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
'Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley
E. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. Uo-71.
This case contains a number of Post Office intra-
departmental memoranda and the minutes of a meeting on PPBS.
Departmental data is presented and the student is asked to
select the program structure that is most suitable from the
many that are recommended.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 11C46)
This case discusses the efforts to design a program
structure for the Forest Service of the Department of
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Agriculture. The student is asked to evaluate the evolution 
of the program structure and the reaction of managers in the 
Forest Service to this structure,
C. 5. Skill in Designing Output Indicators 
BUREAU OP CENSUS
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H, Hinrichs and Graeme M'. 'Taylor, pp. 140-150.
This case discusses the Bureau of Census output in­
dicators in the Foreign Trade Program. The difference between 
performance indicators for control and PPBS output indicators 
is stressed. CB. 8.)
PEACE CORPS
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley
E. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 119-39.
This case discusses the Peace Corps' PPBS, its
program structure, and the method that it used to develop
output indicators. The student is asked to evaluate these
output indicators.
Implementation of PPBS
D. 3.f. Skill in Modifying Sequence of Implementation 
PPB IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C22)
This case describes, in detail, the implementation 
of PPBS in New York City. The system was implemented by first 
trying to achieve an adequate analytic capability before 
structuring the budget in program terms. The student is asked 
to evaluate this approach to PPBS,
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PPB IN THE CITY OP PHILADELPHIA
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C21)
This case describes, in detail, the implementation 
of PPBS in Philadelphia. The system was implemented by 
first developing a program structure and then implementing 
the analytic tasks. The student is asked to evaluate this 
approach to PPBS.
D. 4. Skill in Determining Organizational Patterns 
MIDLANDIA
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C19)
This case concerns the plan of implementation of ppBS 
by the hypothetical State of Midlandia. One of the key 
questions addressed is the placement of the PPB staff in 
either Planning or Budgeting. The student is asked to make 
a decision on the organizational placement of the PPB staff 
and draw up a phased implementation plan. CD. 7.)
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (B)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse CCase 12C6)
This case discusses the merits of changing the organi­
zational location of budgeting from Office of Management, 
Budget and Finance Division to the Office of Research, Plans, 
Programs and Evaluation because of PPBS. The student is 
asked to decide if this change is advisable.
Ü. S. DEPARTMENT OP LABOR
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 11C45)
This case discusses the organizational evolution of
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the Department of Labor from 1948 to 1966. The Department's 
program structure for PPBS Is described. The student is 
asked to evaluate further proposed organizational changes to 
make the organization more compatible with the program 
structure.
D. 5. Skill in Implementing Analytical Capability 
THE POST OFFICE
R. Joseph Novogrod, Gladys 0. Dimock, and Marshall E. Dimock, 
Casebook in Public Administration, pp. 249-80.
This case is based on four interviews with staff 
members of the Post Office Department. The individuals in 
the interview discuss some of the actions taken during the 
implementation of PPBS and systems analysis in that depart­
ment .
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR CB)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C38)
This case describes the Department of Labor's efforts 
to integrate the review and analysis function into PPBS. In­
terviews and parts of actual reports are used. The student 
is asked to evaluate the Department's efforts. (E. I.e.)
Use of PPBS
E, 1. Skill in Monitoring Operations of PPBS 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C39)
This case discusses the procedures and forms adopted 
in the Department of the Interior for the development of 
long-range budgets and the preparation of Program Memoranda.
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The student Is asked to comment on the adequacy of these 
procedures.
E. 2. Knowledge of System Analysis Techniques and Language
AGRICULTURE STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 271-80.
This case concerns a program analysis of the peanut 
agriculture program, A considerable amount of program data 
is presented. The student is asked to evaluate four alter­
natives against the present procedure. This case requires 
the refinement of objectives and development of measures of 
effectiveness before beginning analysis. (B. 2.b.)
BOMB RACKS FOR THE F-lOB
William P. Snyder, Case Studies in Military Systems Analysis, 
pp. 47-59.
This is a case which requires th.e student to prepare 
cost-effectiveness analysis where the decision-maker is 
asked to choose between two competing weapon systems. The 
situation is relatively simple. A solution guide is pre­
sented. Sensitivity analysis and the danger of attaching 
undue significance to minute differences are illustrated.
CB. 2.g.)
BUREAU OF MINES
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 290-99.
This case presents data on the supply and demand of 
helium through the twenty-first century and proposes a con­
servation program. The student is asked to make a cost-
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benefit analysis of the proposed program.
BUREAU OP NATIONAL CAPITAL AIRPORTS
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H.. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 300-10.
This case presents the problem of airport congestion
in the Washington, D. C., area. The student is asked to
evaluate seven proposals.^presented in general terms, and
perform a systems analysis study of this problem.
BUREAU OF NATIONAL CAPITAL AIRPORTS (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C66)
This case presents cost and revenue data for Dulles
and Washington National Airports, The student is asked to
prepare an analysis revising, or retaining, the current fee
charges.
DOWNTOWN PARKING AUTHORITY
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed, by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 255-57.
This case describes a proposed municipal parking
facility. The student is asked to prepare an analysis of
the problem.
FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 234-39.
This case requires an analysis of a proposed replace­
ment of air traffic control receivers in the Federal Aviation 
Agency. The costs and savings associated with this action 
are presented, and the student must perform the analysis and 
make the recommendation.
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FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C48)
This case describes the mortgage insurance program 
of PEA. The student is required to make an analysis of the 
alternatives available for changing maturity and loan/value 
ratios.
FOREST SERVICE
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H, Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 258-70.
This case describes alternatives possible to increase
the supply of timber in the year 2000. The student is asked
to use these generally defined alternatives and projections
of timber growth and demand to prepare a Program Memorandum
on forest products.
FOREST SERVICE (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse CCase 11C59)
This case shows the projection of timber supply for 
the year 2000. The student is asked to prepare a sensitivity 
analysis on the effect of a changed GNP on the stock of 
timber. CB. 2.g.)
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CA)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C11)
This case presents the details of three housing assis­
tance programs —  Low-Rent Public Housing; Below-Market In­
terest Rate Program; and Rent Supplement Program. The student 
is asked to calculate the cost of subsidizing a family of 
four with low income under each of the programs.
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HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CB)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C12)
This case presents housing and demographic data for 
a hypothetical city of 200,000. The analysis also uses the 
data in the HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (A) Case. The 
student is asked to prepare a ten-year housing plan to 
eliminate substandard housing in that city.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case IICB)
This case provided data on the costs and additional 
revenues from auditing different classes of tax returns.
The Student is asked to perform an analysis of the audit
procedure using marginal cost and marginal revenues. CB, 2.e.) 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (B)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (.Case 12C9)
This case concerns the operation of a sample survey 
to estimate the extent of under-reporting of tax liability.
The student is asked to prepare a sampling plan based on
opportunity costs. (B. 2.b.)
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (C)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C10)
This case presents the alternative of computerizing 
the servicing of tax returns in one 1RS District. The student 
is asked to analyze the costs and effectiveness of the com­
puterized method versus the manual system.
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LAND AND FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C63)
This case discusses the point-rating system used In 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to assist In 
selecting water and sewer facilities programs for funding.
The student Is asked to apply the system to two specific 
projects and to evaluate the usefulness of the rating system. 
MacARTHURS IN EUROPE
William P. Snyder, Case Studies In Military Systems Analysis, 
pp. 61-84.
This Is a relatively complex case Involving the com­
parison of two weapon systems. The student Is requested to 
perform an analysis based on given facts. A solution guide 
Is provided. The need for explicit treatment of uncertainty 
(best-optlmlstlc-pesslmlstlc estimates are made) and the 
concept of marginal costs are Illustrated. (B. 2.b. and 
B. 2.g.)
MICHIGAN GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAD PROGRAM
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C29)
This case presents a large amount of data on the 
characteristics of colleges and college students and state 
and federal student guaranteed loan programs. The student 
Is asked to perform an analysis to answer the question of 
whether the guaranteed loan program should be continued and. 
If so. In what manner.
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NUTHATCH NATIONAL FOREST (A)
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis> ed. by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M, Taylor, pp. 2bl-b6.
This case presents a problem where the alternatives
are selling timber from a forest In one of two manners or
opening the area to recreation. The student Is asked to
analyze these alternatives and provide a recommendation.
NUTHATCH NATIONAL FOREST (B)
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H.' Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 2Ü7-Ü9.
This case Introduces another dimension to the case
above. The alternative of providing Intensified management
to Increase the yields of a deferred timber harvest Is
added. The student Is asked to use discounting techniques
to aid In the analysis.
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley 
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. taylor, pp. 3li-36.
This case compares three different approaches to
calculating benefits of anti-poverty programs. The student
Is asked to evaluate these approaches. (B. 2.b.)
POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT (B)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 11C50)
This case presents data on the money-order operations 
of the Post Office. Based on the data provided, the student 
Is asked to analyze proposals to Increase the fees for these 
money orders and otherwise modify the money-order fee 
structure.
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POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT (.0)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 11C51)
This case Isolates the problem of the effect of the 
Post Office closing on Washington’s Birthday and Veteran's 
Day and not closing on regional holidays. The student Is 
asked to prepare an analysis of the various possible 
holiday operating policies.
POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT (D)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 11C52R2)
This case concerns the alternative of offering dis­
counts for mailers who pre-sort first-class mall. Based on 
the cost data presented, the student Is asked to prepare an 
analysis of this problem.
REFUSE DISPOSAL (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C27)
This case presents quantitative data on the operating 
parameters of New York City's refuse-dlsposal activity. The 
student Is asked to calculate when the city will exhaust Its 
landfill.
REFUSE DISPOSAL (B)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C28)
This case describes four alternatives for future 
refuse disposal. The student Is asked to perform a cost- 
effectlveness study of these four alternatives which are In­




The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13024)
This case presents the data to be used to develop 
relationships between the adequacy of street lighting and 
traffic accidents and crime. The student is asked to develop 
the relationships based on the control data presented and 
to note the limitations of this data. (E. 9.)
SWIMMING POOLS
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13023)
This is a simple study to determine the best way to 
provide the opportunity for swimming for residents of a 
"model neighborhood." The alternatives of constructing three 
pools, six pools, or busing are presented. The student is 
to perform an analysis of these three alternatives.
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M. Taylor, pp. 229-33.
This case concerns the replacement of a hospital 
boiler plant. Investment and operational cost data is given 
for three alternatives. The student is to use a discount rate 
and perform a cost-effectiveness analysis to select the pre­
ferred alternative. Intangible factors also must be con­
sidered.
E. 3. Skill in Selecting Problems for Analysis 
BUREAU OP RECLAMATION (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 12C68)
This case involves the adoption of quantitative
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staffing guides developed by the Air Force to the personnel 
support function of the Bureau of Reclamation, The student 
is asked to comment on the applicability of these guides 
and how the PPB approach would work in the personnel area.
E. 4. Skill in Defining Problems for Analysis 
EMERGENCY AMBULANCE SERVICE (A)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C25)
This case presents a description of the emergency 
ambulance service of New. York City. The student is asked to 
define the system and to determine objectives and measures 
of effectiveness and specific alternatives.
E. 9. Skill in Using Systems Analysis for Decisions 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (B)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse CCase 12C44)
This case presents the problem of allocating limited 
funds to two incommensurate projects —  helium conservation 
and research in underground excavation. Information from the 
Program Memoranda for these projects is presented. The stu­
dent is asked to use this information in making a decision. 
DISEASE CONTROL PROGRAMS
Program Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, ed. by Harley
H. Hinrichs and Graeme M-. Taylor, pp. 240-54.
This case presents the results of a program analysis
on possible motorcycle accident prevention control programs.
The student is asked to review the benefit-cost study and
decide if the recommended amount of funding is adequate. The
issue of placing a value on human life is raised by the study.
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EMERGENCY AMBULANCE SERVICE (B)
The Intercollegiate Case Clearinghouse (Case 13C26)
This case is composed of a complete systems analysis 
of the emergency ambulance service of New York City. Three 
alternatives (all ambulances at hospital, a satellite system, 
and dispersed ambulances) are considered. The student is 
asked to review the analysis as an aid to decision-making.
NAVY SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTERS
William P. Snyder, Case Studies in Military Systems Analysis, 
pp. 121-45.    :-- ----
This is a complex case which presents a report of 
systems analysis on the number and types of helicopter systems 
for search and rescue missions and their operation procedures. 
The student is asked to make the decision. This case illus­
trates many of the problems of incommensurate variables.
THE PANTHERS (A)
U. S. Army Management School, Port Belvoir, Virginia
This case shows a short cost-effectiveness analysis 
to study the replacement of 750-pound bombs and 2.75-inch 
rockets with "Panther" guided missiles. There are some obvious 
errors (particularly omissions) in the analysis. Discussion 
questions are used to guide the students in the review of 
this analysis.
THE PIONEER-PREIGHTER
William P. Snyder, Case Studies in Military Systems Analysis,
pp. 85-120.
This case presents a completed cost-effectiveness
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study on two competing weapon systems, and the student is 
asked to make a decision based on this study. This analysis 





The basic data for evaluating existing PPBS training 
efforts was gathered by a survey. The normal survey package 
included:
(a). A letter that requested the organization or school to 
complete the survey. As far as possible, this letter was 
addressed to specific individuals in the organization or 
school.
(,b). An explanation sheet of the questions contained in 
the survey questionnaire. This sheet defined the scope of 
the survey and gave examples of the types of replies that 
were desired.
(c). The questionnaire itself. The majority of questions 
in the questionnaire were open-ended. This questionnaire 
technique was deliberately used so that the replies would not 
be constrained by the language of the questionnaire.
Two basic forms of questionnaires were used —  one 
for training efforts and one for educational efforts. The 
same general information was requested in both, but the 
phrasing of questions was changed to make them more appli­
cable to the specific institution in question. Copies of a 
typical letter, a questionnaire explanation, and a question­




The Management Department at this University is 
surveying the various training programs that are 
currently being offered in the area of the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System. It appears that a 
part of your professional military course concerns 
this system.
While the attached questionnaire is specifically 
designed for short training efforts instead of 
longer and broader educational efforts such as your 
school conducts, it can be adapted to use for’the 
portion of your course that concerns PPBS. I would 
greatly appreciate your organization completing the 
survey form and returning it in the stamped envelope 




PPBS Training Effort Questionnaire Explanation 
I. Scope of Study:
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) that 
is the subject of this survey is the one that was first im­
plemented in the Department of Defense in I96I and expanded 
to most of the agencies of the Federal Government in 1965.
The system has been adapted and implemented in many state 
and local governments since that time. As used in this 
survey, PPBS includes one or more of the following items:
1) A program structure which is established in terms of 
objectives or missions of the agency,
2) A multi-year projection of costs and benefits (or 
outputs) of the programs in the program structure.
3) A system of program decisions based on an analytical 
comparison of costs and benefits of alternatives through the 
use of systems analysis (including economic analysis, 
benefit-cost analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis).
The primary aim of this survey is to determine the types 
of training currently available to public managerial personnel 
in the general area of PPBS. While managerial training is 
the main emphasis, any specialized training that is provided 
for budgeting personnel, systems analysts, etc. is of interest 
to evaluate its possible applicability to managerial training. 
For the purpose of this survey, short (usually one day or 
less), general orientation programs are not considered as 
training.
II. Explanation of .Selected Questionnaire Entries:
I. H. 1. Level of Participants : Include the military or
■ civil service grades of participants or a more 
general description of organizational placement 
where specific grades are not applicable.
III. PPBS Coverage : Examples of information desired
include :
Area: History of PPBS
1. Knowledge by the trainee of the evolution 
of budget practices (including PPBS) in 
the Federal Government.
Area : Program Structure
1. Knowledge by the trainee of program 
structure concept.
2. Ability of the trainee to distinguish 
between input-oriented traditional budgets 
and output-oriented traditional budgets.
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Area: Analytical Analysis
1. Knowledge by the trainee of the concepts 
and procedures of systems analysis.
2. Knowledge by the trainee of the general 
applicability of economic concepts such
as marginal cost to governmental programs.
IV. Methods of Instruction;
A. Instructional Techniques: Examples include:
Lecture 3 hours
Structured Discussion 6 hours
Problem 6 hours
B. Training materials: Please list the textbook,
cases, etc. used for training purposes. If 
any of these materials were developed locally, 
please describe in enough detail that their 
content can be easily understood.
V. Remarks : Include any remarks which you feel would
assist the researcher in understanding 
the training program. Include as attach­
ments any schedules, lesson outlines, 
etc. which would provide more visibility.
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B. Organization Conducting Training
C. Course Number and Name
D. Number of Direct Training Hours in Training Effort
E. Number of Direct Training Hours Devoted to One or 
More Aspects of PPBS_______________________________
F. Usual Class Size
G. Frequency of Offering
H. Participant Information:
1. Level of Participants
2. Organizational Responsibility of Participants 
(Check One)
  Top Executives (Agency or Department Heads)
   Line Management





(Describe in general terms the major aim, or objective, 
of the training effort and a short course description.)
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III. PPBS Coverage:
(Describe the areas of PPBS covered in the course 
offering and the specific learning objectives in 
each area)
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IV. Methods of Instruction;
A, What specific instructional techniques are used in 
the PPBS area of the course and how many classroom 
hours are devoted to each?
B. What texts, cases, or other training materials are 
used for the PPBS portion of the course?
V. Remarks:
A. Name and telephone number of individual to contact 




The Management Department at this University is 
surveying the educational programs that are 
currently offered in the area of the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), Prom a 
review of your University bulletin the following 
courses appear to be applicable to the PPBS 
concept:
If PPBS is a significant part of these course 
offerings, I would appreciate it if one questionnaire 
were completed for each course. If there are other 
courses offered by your department in which PPBS 
is a significant part, please have the questionnaire 
reproduced locally and complete one form for each 
course.
Your cooperation in this study and the return of 
the forms in the attached envelope before May 15, 
1971, will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
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PPBS Educational Effort Questionnaire Explanation 
I, Scope of Study;
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) that 
is the subject of this survey is the one that was first im­
plemented in the Department of Defense in 196I and expanded 
to most of the agencies of the Federal Government in 1965.
The system has been adapted and implemented in may state 
and local governments since that time. As used in this 
survey, PPBS includes one or more of the following items:
1) A program Structure which is established in terms of 
objectives of missions of the agency.
2) A multi-year projection of costs and benefits (or 
outputs) of the programs in the program structure.
3) A system of program decisions based on an analytical 
comparison of costs and benefits of alternatives through the 
use of systems analysis (including economic analysis, benefit- 
cost analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis).
The primary aim of this survey is to determine the extent 
to which this new managerial innovation in the government has 
penetrated into the various universities. To be considered 
in the survey it is not necessary that a course be taught 
solely on PPBS or that all of the elements of PPBS be included 
in the course. For example a course which concerns the appli­
cation of systems analysis in the public sector would be appli­
cable to this survey. Also a course on governmental budgeting 
which contained a significant block (say 6 classroom hours 
or more) of instruction on PPBS would be applicable.
II. Explanation of Selected Questionnaire Entries:
I. D. Course Length; Number of semester or quarter hours 
credit given for the course. Please distinguish 
between quarter and semester.
III. PPBS Coverage : Examples of information desired
include :
Area: History of PPBS
1. Knowledge by the student of the evolution 
of budget practices (including PPBS) in 
the Federal Government.
Area: Program Structure
1. Knowledge by the student of program 
structure concept.
2. Ability of the student to distinguish 
between input-oriented traditional budgets 
and output-oriented traditional budgets.
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Area; Analytical Analysis
1. Knowledge by the student of the concepts 
and procedures of systems analysis,
2. Knowledge by the student of the general 
applicability of economic concepts such
as marginal cost to governmental programs.
IV. Methods of Instruction:
A. Instructional Techniques: Examples include;
Lecture 3 hours
Structured Discussion 6 hours
Problem 6 hours
B. Educational materials: Please list the text­
book, cases, etc. used for educational purposes. 
If any of these materials were developed 
locally, please describe in enough detail that 
their content can be easily understood.
V. Remarks : Include any remarks which you feel would 
assist the researcher in understanding 
the educational program. Include as 
attachments any schedules, lesson out­






A. Name of School
B, Department
C. Course Number and Name
D. Course Length
E. Number of Classroom Hours Devoted to PPBS
F, Usual Class Size




Both Graduate and Undergraduate
II. General Information:
(Describe in general terms the major aim or objective 
of the course and a short course description.)
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III. PPBS Coverage:
(Describe the areas of PPBS covered in the course 
offering and the specific learning objectives in 
each area.)
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IV. Methods of Instruction;
A. What specific instructional techniques are used in 
the PPBS area of the course and how many classroom 
hours are devoted to each?
B. What texts, cases, or other educational materials 
are used for the PPBS portion of the course?
V. Remarks :
A. Name and telephone number of individual to contact 




SURVEY OP PPBS TRAINING EFFORTS IN STATE,
COUNTY, AND CITY GOVERNMENTS
In order to better understand the managerial PPBS 
training effort, state, county, and city units that have 
conducted some formal PPBS training were surveyed. The 
purpose of this survey was not to compare the results to the 
conceptual training model designed for the Federal Govern­
ment, but to assist in constructing the model. Because of 
the objective nature of the questionnaire, the same survey 
form was used for these governmental activities as was used 
for Federal Government training.
The non-federal governmental bodies selected to 
participate in the survey were identified by the narrative 
report of a survey, conducted by the State-Local Finances 
Project^, of implementation of PPBS in state and local govern­
ments, Only those governmental and private associations 
that were reported to have conducted training or were planning 
training were included in the survey population.
Table 26 gives a list of the activities requested to 
participate in the survey and indicates those who replied to 
the survey request. Table 27 gives a summary of the number 
of replies to the survey request. Eighteen of the thirty- 
five organizations (or about 51 per cent) requested to
^Implementing PPB in State, City, and County, pp 
135-37 and Ï42-45. -------- ^ ^
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TABLE 26
LIST OP ACTIVITIES CONTACTED IN SURVEY OF 
NON-FEDERAL TRAINING
Associations :
*Budget Executives Institute, Oakland University 
**International City Managers’ Association 




















«Bucks County, Pennsylvania 
««Metropolitan Dade County, Florida 
««Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee 
«Monroe County, New York 
««Omstead County, Minnesota 
««Orange County, California 












*Replied that no training in PPBS was conducted 
**Did not reply to survey
TABLE 27

































participate in the survey replied to the request for infor­
mation. One-half of these eighteen indicated that no train­
ing had been conducted except for very short orientation 
programs.1
Survey Results 
In order to present a complete picture of the results 
of this survey, each of the nine positive replies will be 
discussed. These are discussed in the approximate order of 
the depth of the training offered, beginning with the least 
intensive training.
City of Detroit 
Detroit, Michigan, has conducted one training pro­
gram in the area of PPBS. This course involved fifteen hours 
of lecture instruction. The course could be classified as 
a reasonably comprehensive orientation of the PPBS concept, 
including an introduction to systems analysis.
City of Dayton 
Dayton, Ohio, attempted to develop a PPBS course for 
managers that was to be taught by the internal staff. This 
training was conducted from February to July, 1968. A total 
of twenty hours of instruction was presented. The majority 
of the course was spent in working on Issue Papers. The city
^Three of the nine had conducted short orientations 
(less than one day) or had an informal training program. The 
other six reported no training at all.
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itself was not extremely pleased with the results of this 
training because of the lack of professional trainers.
State of Rhode Island 
Rhode Island has conducted one major training pro­
gram for line management personnel in the state's Health, 
Welfare, and Education Departments. This course required a 
total of twenty-two hours (taught once a week for four 
weeks). The history of PPBS and its concepts and techniques 
were presented. Considerable attention was paid to the 
proper selection of problems for systems analysis and the use 
of analysis for decision purpose. About fifteen hours of 
this training was devoted to case discussion.^
State of Arkansas 
Arkansas utilized the U. S. Civil Service Commission's 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Seminar to train some 
thirty-five top-level executives in line management posi­
tions. Because of the high degree of emphasis on the use of 
analytic techniques, the reaction of the participants to this 
course was largely negative. The behavior of the managers 
attending the course was not affected by the instruction 
provided.
In addition to this course, a nineteen-hour training 
program in PPBS for middle-management personnel is planned 
for the summer of 1971 covering essentially the same mater­
ial.
6l4
State of Connecticut 
Connecticut utilized a consultant firm to develop 
and teach a twenty-eight-hour course In PPBS to members of 
line management. A one-day orientation was presented to 
agency heads, and the other four days of training were pre­
sented to the middle-management levels. The courses covered
the concepts of PPBS, the structuring of programs, the
!
application of systems analysis, and Implementation of PPBS. 
Generally the lecture method of presentation was used for 
all Instruction.
State of Vermont 
Vermont has utilized an extensive four-week course 
In PPBS for Its top executives and line managers. The first 
week of the course Is spent In lectures and discussion on 
the concepts and techniques of PPBS; the methods of devel­
oping program structures; the implementation of PPBS (In­
cluding training and staffing); and the monitoring of the 
PPB System. The remainder of the course Is devoted to the 
analysis of specific state governmental problems on a task- 
group basis. The instructors of the seminar meet with the 
task-group members to guide their analytic work. Pinal re­




Pennsylvania has developed a sophisticated program 
of training in the area of PPBS, This training program is 
based on six courses. The major course from the point of 
view of managerial personnel was a thirty-hour Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting Seminar conducted by a consultant firm 
during December, 1968, and February, 1969. This course 
covered the history of PPBS, including examples of its appli­
cation in other governmental activities. The major stress 
was on the conceptual basis of the Planning-Programming- 
Budgeting System. Another course in the Pennsylvania program 
was a one-time offering on Public Expenditure Analysis. A 
total of forty—eight hours was devoted to this training 
effort. Quantitative techniques of systems analysis were 
explained through lecture and an illustrated cost-effectiveness 
study. Since 1968 a total of 154 employees have been trained 
in these two managerially oriented courses.
The remaining four courses in PPBS in Pennsylvania 
are oriented more toward the technicians who operate the PPB 
System than they are toward the managerial personnel in the 
state. These courses include:
1. A twelve-hour PPBS Operations course which is given to 
all those employees who have duties directly involved in the 
PPB System. This course covers program structures, program 
plans, program revision requests, program policy guidance, 
analysis of programs, and budget procedures and instructions.
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2. A sixty-hour economic analysis course for analysts in
PPBS. This course gives an introduction into economic theory
and analytical procedures required by PPBS.
3. A sixty-hour quantitative techniques course for PPBS 
analysts. The course primarily deals with statistical 
methods that are required by PPBS.
4. A sixty-hour computer science course that presents basic
computer technology to PPBS technicians.
State of California
California has also developed a sophisticated pro­
gram of training in PPBS. The major element in this training 
is the development of training teams to perform internal 
training in each of the departments. Prom each department 
one training team, composed of seven members (three line 
managers, a fiscal officer, a finance budget analyst, a 
legislative analyst, and a training officer), is provided 
forty-eight hours of instruction in PPBS. This instruction 
includes the history of PPBS; the process of systems analy­
sis; and the specific details of the PPB System adopted in 
California. Since 1969 some 240 individuals have completed 
this instructor development training.
In addition to this program, an extensive forty-hour 
course in Program Management is provided to top executives 
and line managers from the state’s departments. This course 
relates concepts behind the PPB System and discusses 
managerial use of systems analysis. Scheduling and evaluation
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procedures for controlling major programs are also presented. 
Prom 1968 through 1970, some 700 executives in the state's 
agencies have been trained in this course.
The state also has a course that is used for budget 
personnel in PPBS. This course covers the history and 
concepts of PPBS, especially as practiced in California, in 
about thirty hours of intensive training. About 15O per­
sonnel have been trained through this course.
State of New Jersey 
New Jersey has developed a unique approach to train­
ing of managers in connection with the PPB System. The 
training program is directly related to the stage of parti­
cipation of the individual department involved in the PPB 
System of the state. A total of twenty-two-days' training 
is provided during the first year that an agency of the state
uses PPBS. Six more days of instruction are provided during
the second year that PPBS is used in the agency. The type
of training provided is very extensive. Not only are the
concepts and techniques of PPBS presented but a great deal 
of action training is provided on the implementation of PPBS 
including staffing, design of program structures, implementing 
analytic studies, organizing for PPBS, and organizational 
change in connection with PPBS. The managerial use of analy­
sis, including the identification and definition of issues 
for analysis and the determination of alternative methods to 
achieve objectives, is stressed.
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Summary
Even though the number of states that replied to the 
survey and are engaged in an active training program for PPBS 
is relatively small, one cannot help but be impressed with 
the magnitude of efforts of at least four of them. These 
four training programs all have a high degree of emphasis 
on the training of managerial personnel. Vermont's use of 
task-force analysis for training, Pennsylvania's use of 
short courses taught on an extensive basis, California's use 
of internal departmental instructor teams supplemented with 
an extensive course in program management, and New Jersey's 
intensive program of instruction on PPBS that corresponds to 
the depth of participation of the agency in the system, all 
represent unique approaches to the complex problem of 
achieving a massive change in the behavior of managerial 




PPBS-RELATED COURSES FOR CIVILIAN AGENCIES 
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT^
From the material received from the United States 
Civil Service Commission, the courses applicable to PPBS 
were identified. Two courses were of direct interest to the 
study. These were a two-week Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting Seminar and a nine-month effort called "Educational 
Program in Systems Analysis." These are discussed in detail 
in Chapter IX.
In addition to these two courses, there were a 
number of courses that were related to specific aspects of 
PPBS. These included:
1. Two short orientation programs. One is designed for
upper-level management and the other for middle management.
Because of their short duration, they could not treat any of
the learning objectives in the model formulated in Chapter VIII
in anything but a summary manner. These programs are:
EXECUTIVE ORIENTATION IN PPB
An introduction to major concepts of PPB including the founda­
tions, documentations, and processes. Principally an informa­
tional program with one case problem to demonstrate roles and 
application of analysis. Primarily for grades GS-14 and above.
^The course descriptions presented in this appendix 
are quoted from U. S., Civil Service Commission, The Manage­
ment Services Training Center, The Schedule for January-June. 
1971» Washington, D. C., n. d.
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Frequency of Offering: Approximately four times a year with
30-40 participants each time 
Number of Classroom Hours: 18
GENERAL ORIENTATION IN PROGRAM EVALUATION
A general introduction to objectives and methodology of PPB 
for middle level personnel. Lecture program aimed at in­
forming participants on the broad aspects involved in PPB.
Frequency of Offering: Approximately six times a year with
30-40 participants each time 
Number of Classroom Hours: 12
2. One short course on the history of budgeting. This 
course would primarily be concerned with specific learning 
objectives A-1, A-2, and A-3 which relate to the early his­
tory of budgeting, the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921, 
and the Hoover Commissions.
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS
This course is designed to provide an understanding of the 
budget process. It will be helpful particularly for those 
working in a professional capacity who are relatively new to 
the Government. Subject matter includes the function, history, 
and procedures of the Federal Budget Process.
Frequency of Offering: Approximately twelve times a year
with 30-40 participants each time 
Number of Classroom Hours: 12
3. Three courses that cover the use of analytical and mathe­
matical techniques in management. These courses would be use­
ful in developing a perceived need for analytic techniques in 
managers and giving them an acquaintance with the capabilities 
of systems analysis.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
A program designed for managers, staff professionals, adminis­
trators, and others who want to better understand and use 
systematic approaches to the problems of their agencies, or 
who work with those who are now using systems analysis. The 
course is intended for GS-13 and above or equivalent.
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Frequency of Offering: Approximately ten times a year with
30-40 participants 
Number of Classroom Hours : 18
ECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS
A program to provide public managers with an understanding 
of economic considerations and implications in the decision 
process. Topics in price theory, determination of demand, 
cost analysis, economic efficiency, and capital budgeting.
Frequency of offering: Approximately twice a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 30
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
A course designed to: acquaint management and others feeling
a need for the training with tools and techniques of analysis; 
provide an orientation in the application of analytic tools 
to management problem-solving; and develop an appreciation 
for analytic techniques. The program is structured to permit 
discussion along with an exchange of ideas and information.
Frequency of offering: Approximately four times a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours : 30
4. Nine courses that are specifically designed to acquaint
the trainee with specific techniques of systems analysis rather
than the broad appreciation presented in the previous courses.
EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUES
A program designed to examine applications of mathematical 
and statistical techniques in the solution of organizational 
problems. Participants are presumed to have general and recent 
knowledge of algebra, finite mathematics, and statistics.
Frequency of offering: Approximately twice a year with
30-40 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 10
OPERATIONS RESEARCH ORIENTATION
A program designed to provide a general introduction to the 
classes of analytic techniques known as Operations Research/ 
Systems Analysis. The underlying management concepts, basic 
methodology, and classification and description of techniques 
and their uses will be covered.
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Frequency of offering: Approximately twice a year with
30-40 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 18
EXECUTIVE WORKSHOP IN OPERATIONS-RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
A course designed as a techniques-oriented program for execu­
tives already familiar with the broad concepts of Operations 
Research/Systems Analysis, Major techniques covered are: 
mathematical programming, probability techniques, simulation 
models, and networking.
Frequency of offering: Approximately twice a year with
30-40 participants 
Number of classroom hours : 12
ECONOMIC INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
A course covering the major elements involved in economic in­
vestment analysis of Department of Defense projects. Lectures, 
case studies, and discussion groups cover such topics as: 
discounted cash flow, cost analysis, treatment of inflation 
and uncertainty, decision criteria, and preparation and pre­
sentation of economic investment analyses. Although cases and 
examples are drawn from Defense, the principles and techni­
ques are applicable to all government programs using economic 
analysis. Participation is open to civilian and military 
personnel in the middle or upper levels of management, admin­
istration, or budgeting in government.
Frequency of offering: Approximately eight times a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 24
TECHNIQUES AND METHODS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
This program is designed to increase the practical under­
standing of such basic operations-research techniques as: 
inventory theory, replacement theory, simulation, cost/benefit 
analysis, linear and dynamic programming, and game theory.
Frequency of offering: Approximately four times a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 24
COST/BENEFIT WORKSHOP
A course designed to provide instruction in the basics of 
cost/benefit analysis, with a maximum amount of participation 
in actual analysis and a minimum amount of philosophy consis­
tent with understanding. Several case exercises take up about 
half the course workshop. Topics covered include: the setting
623
for analysis; criteria problems and output measures; problem 
formulation and systems identification; the process of 
analysis; model building and use; present value, discounting, 
and other time problems in analysis; cost and benefit iden­
tification and calculation; standards for reviewing analysis; 
and the economics of public program analysis.
Frequency of offering: Approximately eight times a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 30
DETERMINING PROGRAM COSTS
A course to provide participants with an understanding of the 
techniques for estimating costs of future programs and the 
capability to apply these techniques to their own operations. 
Participants will learn methods for costing and analyzing 
current anÇ proposed programs through the use of demon­
stration cases and guided workshops. Subjects include: 
regression and correlation analysis, time series, improvement 
curves, and index numbers. Limitations and assumptions 
within the management context will be highlighted.
Frequency of offering: Approximately four times a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 30
LINEAR PROGRAMMING
A course designed to enable an analyst or program manager to: 
recognize problems that can be solved by linear programming; 
understand the ideas of linear programming; formulate problems 
in the correct form for solution; and obtain solutions to 
problems, usually through, the use of standard computer pro­
grams readily available for all government computers. A 
computer will be used for solving demonstration problems.
Frequency of offering: Approximately twice a year with.
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 30
DISCOUNT RATES AND PROCEDURES
A course to instruct managers and program analysts in the 
proper application of discount rates to projected cost and 
benefit streams of alternative programs. For purposes of com­
parison, the anticipated costs and benefits of all major 
government investments must be reduced to a level of present 
value through the application of appropriate discount rates. 
This course will discuss the question of the appropriate rates, 
explain the concept of present value, and equip participants 
to derive present value through the use of standard discount 
tables.
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Frequency of offering: Approximately four times a year with
20-25 participants 
Number of classroom hours: 6
Attachments:
1. Letter from Roy W. Nlemela, Evaluation Division, Office 
of Management and Budget, February 19, 1971.
2. Letter from Thomas D, Cablk, Management Services Training 
Center, Bureau of Training, United States Civil Service 




Major Richard D. Smith 
1005 Chautauqua Avenue 
Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Dear Major Smith:
Your letter of January 30 to the head of our Resources 
Systems Branch, Budget Review Division, has been referred 
to me for reply.
The Office of Management and Budget, previously the Bureau 
of the Budget, relies on the Civil Service Commission for 
establishing and operating Government training courses.
May I suggest, therefore, that your question about PPB and 
systems analysis courses can be answered best by the 
Management Sciences Training Center of the Civil Service 
Commission here in Washington. Please contact Mr. Chester 
Wright, Director of the Center, at the address shown on the 
enclosed card,
I wish you well on your research project.
Sincerely,
CSigned by)






Richard D. Smith 
Major, USAF
1005 Chautauqua Avenue 
Norman, Oklahoma 73069
Dear Major Smith:
Your letter of January 30, requesting information on certain 
training courses, has just arrived on my desk. I hope the 
delay has not caused you any hardship in your research.
The PPB and Systems Analysis training courses which we provide 
are shown in two enclosed brochures. In the blue booklet are 
short courses given here in Washington. Similar courses are 
given by our Regional Training Centers in various locations 
around the country. Some of the courses are given entirely 
by our staff, some are given by contractors, and some are 
combinations. If it is necessary to distinguish between 
them, I shall be happy to do so. I have marked the courses 
most closely connected with PPB and Systems Analysis with a 
red check mark. Others are related in varying degrees to 
those subjects.
In addition, we administer a nine-month training program 
called the "Educational Program in Systems Analysis," described 
in the brown brochure. It Is given by 6 universities.
Per your request, our booklet describing available teaching 
cases is also enclosed. As a small incidental matter, we 
changed our scope and name last year, and are now the Manage­
ment Sciences Training Center.
If you have additional questions, please write to me.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed by)
Thomas D. Cablk 
Assistant Director for 
Program Analysis 






LIST OP DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRAINING 
ACTIVITIES SURVEYED
I. Professional Military Schools
Air Command and Staff College 
Air War College 
Armed Forces Staff College 
*Army War College 
Command and General Staff College 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
Marine Corps Command and Staff College 
National War College 
*Naval Postgraduate School 
School of Systems and Logistics 
Squadron Officers' School
II. Technical and Managerial Short Courses
Advanced Cost and Economic Analysis, School of Systems 
and Logistics, USAF 
Advanced Quantitative Methods In Cost Analysis, School 
of Systems and Logistics, USAF 
Basic Quantitative Methods In Cost Analysis, School of 
Systems and Logistics, USAF 
**Budget Officer Course, Air Training Command, USAF 
*Defense Management Systems Course, Naval Postgraduate 
School, USN
Economic Analysis for Declslon-maklng, Army Management 
Engineering Training Agency, USA 
Financial Administration Course, Air Training Command, 
USAF
Financial Management for Managers, Army Management 
Engineering Training Agency, USA 
Operations Research Appreciation, Army Management 
Engineering Training Agency, USA 
*Operations Research/Systems Analysis Executive Course, 
Army Management School, USA 
Professional Military Controller Course, Air University 
Institute for Professional Development, USAF 
Quantitative Declslon-maklng, Army Management Engineering 
Training Agency, USA 
Top Management Seminar, Army Management Engineering 
Training Agency, USA
*These offices did not reply to the survey,
**A reply was received to the survey but the course offering 
was not applicable to this study.
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APPENDIX G-5
OTHER PPBS-RELATED COURSES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
In addition to the Department of Defense's programs 
of training in PPBS that are discussed in Chapter IX, six 
short courses that are directly related to the PPBS effort 
were identified. These courses are not included in Chapter IX 
because they are primarily designed for technicians for 
PPBS work. As such, they provide a highly intensive treat­
ment of narrow subjects and are not easily and economically 
adaptable to managerial PPBS training.
These six courses are:
Economic Analysis for Decision-making 
Army Management Engineering Training Agency 
This course is designed to give the trainee knowledge 
in the use of a variety of techniques to evaluate cost impacts 
of management decisions. Training in concepts of applied 
decision-making, classification and measurements of cost, time 
value of money, and basic methods of economic comparisons is 
provided.
Frequence of offering: 8 times a year with 20 participants
Number of classroom hours: 80
Basic Quantitative Methods in Cost Analysis 
School of Systems and Logistics 
This course is designed to develop a basic under­
standing in quantitative techniques used in cost-estimating
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and cost analysis. Topics include basic statistics, linear 
analysis, regression analysis, and variance analysis as 
applied to cost-estimating.
Frequency of offering; Approximately 3 times a year with
20 participants
Number of classroom hours: 82
Advanced Quantitative Methods in Cost Analysis 
School of Systems and Logistics 
This course is designed to develop more advanced 
skills of quantitative techniques in cost-estimating. Topics 
include multi-variate regression analysis, curilinear re­
gression analysis, and use of time-sharing computers in 
cost-estimating.
Frequency of offering: Approximately 2 times a year with
IB participants
Number of clsssroom hours: 108
Advanced Cost and Economic Analysis
School of Systems and Logistics
This course provides extensive application of the
techniques taught in the two previous courses. Topics include
review of the techniques taught in the two earlier courses,
sensitivity analysis, and evaluation of existing data base.
Frequency of offering: Approximately 2 times per year with
15 participants
Number of classroom hours: 120
Professional Military Controller Course
Air University Institute for Professional Development
This course is designed to develop the professional
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qualifications, of a comptroller at departmental and operating 
levels. A substantial part of this course includes a survey 
of some of the principles of PPBS as it affects the comp­
troller of the organization.
Frequency of offering: 3 times a year with 38-40 participants
each time
Number of classroom hours devoted to PPBS-related subjects: 77
Financial Administration Course 
Air Training Command 
This course is designed for mid-level personnel in 
the comptroller's organization. It presents financial tech­
niques, including a discussion of PPBS from the point of 
view of its effect on the operations of the comptroller. 
Frequency of offering: 4 times a year with 12-16 participants
Number of classroom hours devoted to PPBS-related topics: 78
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APPENDIX G-6
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES NOT REPLYING TO SURVEY
School
American University
Arizona State University 
Ball State University 
Boise State College 




California State Polytechio 
College, Kellogg-Voorhis 




Florida A&M University 
Florida State University 
George Washington University
Georgia State College 
Harvard University 
Indiana State University 
Indiana University 
Louisiana State University 
Michigan State University 
Moorhead State College 
North Carolina State 
University 
Northwestern University 
Ohio State University 
Pennsylvania State College 
Princeton University
Sonoma State College 
Southern Illinois Univer­
sity , Carbondale 
Stanford University 
Syracuse University 
United States Naval Academy 
University of California at 
Los Angeles 
University of California at 
Riverside
Department

































Graduate School of Business 
Political Science 
English, History, and Government 
Economics
Graduate School of Administra­
tion
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University of Denver College of Business Administra­
tion
University of Florida Political Science
University of Georgia Political Science
University of Hartford School of Business and Public
Admi nistration
University of Iowa Political Science
University of Maine Political Science
University of Massachusetts Economics
University of Michigan Economics
Political Science
University of Minnesota School of Public Affairs
University of Mississippi Economics and Business
Administration
University of Missouri, Political Science
Columbia
University of Missouri, School of Administration
Kansas City
University of Nebraska Economics
University of North Economics
Carolina
University of Pennsylvania School of Finance and Commerce
University of Rhode Island Political Science
University of Utah Political Science
University of Washington Economics
Utah State University Political Science
Washington University Economics
Wayne State University Economics
West Virginia University Political Science
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APPENDIX G-7
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES REPLYING WHERE PPBS IS NOT A 
SIGNIFICANT PART OP CURRENT COURSE OFFERINGS
School
*Brigham Young University 
Harvard University 
Memphis State University 
Ohio University 
Princeton University 
University of Chicago 
^University of Mississippi 








Graduate School of Business 
Political Science 
Economics
*A course with a substantial offering in PPBS is planned 
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